

revista do centro de pesquisas e

ESTUDOSKANTIANOS

Valerio Rohden

3 . 1 . 2015

UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL PAULISTA

Reitor

Julio Cezar Durigan

Vice-Reitora

Marilza Vieira Cunha Rudge

Pró-Reitora de Pesquisa

Maria José Soares Mendes Giannini

Conselho Editorial de Periódicos Científicos da UNESP

Coordenadora

Tânia Regina de Luca

FACULDADE DE FILOSOFIA E CIÊNCIAS

Diretor

José Carlos Miguel

Vice-Diretor

Marcelo Tavella Navega

Departamento de Filosofia

Chefe

Pedro Geraldo Aparecido Novelli

Vice-Chefe

Ricardo Pereira Tassinari

Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia

Coordenador

Reinaldo Sampaio Pereira

Vice-Coordenadora

Mariana Cláudia Broens

Conselho de Curso do Curso de Filosofia

Coordenador

Ricardo Monteagudo

Vice-Coordenador

Kleber Cecon

UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL PAULISTA
Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências

revista do centro de pesquisas e
ESTUDOS KANTIANOS
Valerio Rohden

ISSN 2318-0501

Estudos Kantianos	Marília	v. 3	n. 1	p. 1-184	Jan.-Jun.	2015
-------------------	---------	------	------	----------	-----------	------

Correspondência e material para publicação deverão ser encaminhados a:
Correspondence and materials for publication should be addressed to:

ESTUDOS KANTIANOS
<http://www2.marília.unesp.br/revistas/>
Departamento de Filosofia
Av. Hygino Muzzi Filho, 737
17525-900 – Marília – SP

Editoria

Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques [UNESP] – Editor
Paulo Renato Cardoso de Jesus [Universidade Portucalense Infante Dom Henrique – Editor Associado
Luigi Caranti [Università degli Studi di Catania] - Editor Associado

CONSELHO EDITORIAL

Adriana Conceição Guimarães Veríssimo Serrão [Universidade de Lisboa]
Agostinho de Freitas Meirelles [Universidade Federal do Pará]
Alessandro Pinzani [Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina]
Andréa Luisa Bucchile Faggion [Universidade Estadual de Maringá]
Aylton Barbieri Durão [Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina]
Bernd Dörflinger [Universität Trier]
Claudio La Rocca [Università di Genova]
Clélia Aparecida Martins [†] [Universidade Estadual Paulista]
Daniel Omar Perez [Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná]
Daniel Tourinho Peres [Universidade Federal da Bahia]
Fernando Costa Mattos [Universidade Federal do ABC]
Gabriele Tomasi [Università di Padova]
Gerson Louzado [Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul]
Giorgia Cecchinato [Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais]
Giuseppe Micheli [Università di Padova]
Guido Antônio de Almeida [Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro]
Günter Zöllner [Universität München]
Heiner Klemme [Universität Mainz]
Herman Parret [Université de Louvain]
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales Chacón [Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia]
Jean-Christophe Merle [Universität Vechta]
Jesús Gonzáles Fisac [Universidad de Cádiz]
João Carlos Brum Torres [Universidade de Caxias do Sul]
José Oscar de Almeida Marques [Universidade Estadual de Campinas]
Juan Adolfo Bonaccini [Universidade Federal de Pernambuco]
Julio Cesar Ramos Esteves [Universidade Estadual do Norte Fluminense]
Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos [Universidade de Lisboa]
Luca Illetterati [Università di Padova]
Marco Sgarbi [Università di Verona]
Mai Lequan [Université Jean Moulin – Lyon 3]
Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez [Universidad de Granada]
Margit Ruffing [Universität Mainz]
Mária de Lourdes Alves Borges [Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina]
Mária Lúcia Mello e Oliveira Cacciola [Universidade de São Paulo]
María Xesús Vázquez Lobeiras [Universidade de Santiago de Compostela]
Mario Caimi [Universidad de Buenos Aires]
Michèle Cohen-Halimi [Université de Paris X – Nanterre]
Nuria Sánchez Madrid [Universidad Complutense de Madrid]
Olavo Calábria Pimenta [Universidade Federal de Uberlândia]
Patrícia Maria Kauark Leite [Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais]
Paulo Renato C. de Jesus [Universidade Portucalense Infante Dom Henrique]
Pedro Costa Rego [Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro]
Pedro Paulo da Costa Corôa [Universidade Federal do Pará]
Renato Valois Cordeiro [Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro]
Ricardo Ribeiro Terra [Universidade de São Paulo]
Riccardo Pozzo [Università di Verona]
Robert Loudon [University of Southern Maine]
Robinson dos Santos [Universidade Federal de Pelotas]
Rogelio Rovira [Universidad Complutense de Madrid]
Sílvia Altmann [Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul]
Sorin Baiasu [Keele University]
Tristan Torriani [Universidade Estadual de Campinas]
Vera Cristina Gonçalves de Andrade Bueno [Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro]
Vinicius Berlendis de Figueiredo [Universidade Federal do Paraná]
Virginia de Araújo Figueiredo [Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais]
Walter Valdevino Oliveira Silva [Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro]
Zeljko Loparic [Universidade Estadual de Campinas]

Publicação semestral / Biannual Publication

SUMÁRIO / CONTENTS

Palavra do Editor.....	7
Editor's Note.....	9

ESTUDO EM DESTAQUE / SCHOLARSHIP HIGHLIGHT

The Platonic Republic.” The Beginnings of Kant’s Juridico-Political Philosophy in the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> Günter ZÖLLER.....	11
---	----

ARTIGOS / ARTICLES

Some Implications from the Primacy of the Good Will Julio ESTEVES.....	27
When the strictest right is the greatest wrong: Kant on Fairness Alice Pinheiro WALLA.....	39
Remarks on “the Only Original Right Belonging to Every Man by Virtue of His Humanity” Andrea FAGGION.....	57
Defending Kant after Darwin: a Reassessment of <i>Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose</i> Luigi CARANTI.....	67
Philosophy of History of Adam Ferguson and Immanuel Kant Sandra ZÁKUTNÁ.....	75

Freedom of the Press: a Kantian Approach <i>Joel Thiago KLEIN</i>	83
Antropología Crítica y Lenguaje Común o del Suelo Lingüístico de la Experiencia Antropológica en la Lectura Foucaultiana de Kant <i>Critical anthropology and Common language or about the linguistic Ground of the anthropological experience in Foucauldian Reading of Kant</i> <i>Marco DÍAZ MARSÁ</i>	93
La notion de ‘système’ chez Wolff, Lambert et Kant <i>Henny BLOMME</i>	105
Kant e il Fondamento Cercato del Sapere. A Partire Dalla Polemica con Eberhard <i>Giulio GORLA</i>	127
The Imagination in Kant’s Philosophy and Some Related Questions <i>Olavo CALÁBRIA</i>	139
Fortschritt zum Besseren oder Zukunft einer Illusion? Freud und Kant als Aufklärer <i>Margit RUFFING</i>	159
A Faculdade de Filosofia e a Prática do Uso Público da Razão <i>Vera Cristina de Andrade BUENO</i>	169
 RESENHA/REVIW	
“A Forma e o Sentimento do Mundo, <i>Jogo, humor e arte de viver na filosofia do século XVIII</i> , de Márcio Suzuki. Editora 34, 2014 <i>Márcio Benchimol BARROS</i>	177

PALAVRA DO EDITOR

O presente fascículo de **Estudos Kantianos** [EK] reúne treze artigos e uma resenha, cujos autores são acadêmicos da Alemanha, Bélgica, Brasil, Eslováquia, Espanha, Irlanda e Itália. A todos, os agradecimentos de **EK**.

Os temas em destaque nos artigos desse número abordam questões atinentes a: política, moral, direito, história, antropologia, conhecimento, Kant e Freud e uso público da razão. A resenha ora publicada atém-se à obra: *A Forma e o Sentimento do Mundo – Jogo, humor e arte de viver na filosofia do século XVIII*, de Márcio Suzuki, lançamento de 2014.

•

Dedicada ao comentário de um conceito, passagem, capítulo, relação exemplar do pensamento kantiano, sempre por meio de artigo de um proeminente *Kant scholar*, é aqui inserida uma nova seção em **EK**: “**Estudo em destaque**”. No fascículo a seguir, ela é inaugurada por Günter Zöllner, a quem muito agradecemos, através do texto: “*The Virtuous Republic. Rousseau and Kant on the Relation Between Civil and Moral Religion.*”

•

O segundo fascículo do atual volume 3 de **EK**, referente ao período entre julho e dezembro de 2015, cuja preparação está inteiramente a cargo de Paulo R. Jesus, Editor Associado da revista, será consagrado ao tópico: “A Psicologia em Kant: Sobre os fundamentos de uma ciência do sujeito”.

•

EK dá as boas-vindas a Luigi Caranti, da *Università degli Studi di Catania*, que, juntamente com Paulo R. Jesus, responderá pela Editoria Associada do periódico.

•

Desde há pouco, dois indexadores internacionais – *Web of Science* e *The Philosopher’s Index* – acompanham a evolução de **EK**, processo que poderá culminar na indexação da revista por ambos esses prestigiosos organismos.

Boa leitura!

Os Editores.

EDITOR'S NOTE

The new issue of *Estudos Kantianos* [EK] gathers thirteen articles and a book review, authored by scholars from Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Ireland, Slovakia, Spain and Italy. To them all, the team of the EK expresses her profound acknowledgment and gratitude.

Among the most relevant topics addressed by the articles published in this issue are those related to: politics, morals, law, history, anthropology, knowledge, Kant and Freud and the public use of reason. The book review now published presents the monograph entitled *A Forma e o Sentimento do Mundo – Jogo, humor e arte de viver na filosofia do século XVIII* [*The Form and the World Feeling: Play, humor and art of living in the philosophy of the eighteenth century*], by Márcio Suzuki, released in 2014.

•

Devoted to the critical study of a concept, passage, chapter, typical relationship of Kantian thought, always through an article written by a prominent Kant scholar, a new section is included on EK: “**Scholarship Highlight**”. In the next issue, it is inaugurated by Günter Zöller, whom we are very grateful, for his text: “*The Virtuous Republic. Rousseau and Kant on the Relation Between Civil and Moral Religion.*”

•

The second issue of the current volume 3 of EK, for the period between July and December 2015, under preparation by Paulo R. Jesus, the journal's Associate Editor, will be devoted to the following topic: “Kant's Psychology: On the Foundations of the science of self”.

•

EK welcomes Luigi Caranti, from the Università degli Studi di Catania, who together with Paulo R. Jesus, belongs to the team of the journal's Associate Editors.

•

Since recently, two international indices - Web of Science and The Philosopher's Index – have been monitoring the evolution of EK, a process that could culminate in the journal's indexing by both of these prestigious organizations.

Enjoy reading EK!

The Editors.

"THE PLATONIC REPUBLIC."

THE BEGINNINGS OF KANT'S JURIDICO-POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE *CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON*¹

Günter ZÖLLER²

Amicus Plato, sed magis amica veritas

In response to the editor's invitation to subject a favorite passage from Kant to closer scrutiny, this essay focuses on Kant's engagement with Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*,³ which presents a crucial but often overlooked feature of Kant's *magnum opus*. In particular, the essay examines Kant's positive pronouncements on the "Platonic republic" (*Platonische Republik*) in Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic by placing them in the twofold context of the first *Critique's* affirmative retake on Plato's Forms (*Ideen*) and its original views on juridico-political matters. More specifically, the essay aims to show that Kant's prime position in legal and political philosophy, as contained in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), involves a normative conception of civic life that places the societal exercise of individual freedom under universal laws.

Historically as well as systematically, Kant's presentation of his original position in juridico-political philosophy, which forms part of his reading of Plato's Forms in general and of Plato's *Republic* in particular, occurs in advance of the print publication of Kant's writings dedicated to the philosophy of political history and juridical law ("right," *Recht*) from the mid 1780s through the late 1790s and also ahead of his foundational writings in moral philosophy from the mid to late 1780s (*Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 1785; *Critique or Practical Reason*, 1788). In particular, the beginnings of Kant's juridico-political philosophy in the *Critique of Pure Reason* anticipate the eventual appearance of his pure philosophy of law in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) by no less than sixteen years. Moreover, a closer examination of the Platonic inspiration behind Kant's proto-philosophy of law and politics in the first *Critique* affords a fascinating glimpse into the original difference and systematic separation of (juridical) law and ethics in Kant's critical philosophy.⁴ Section 1 explores the extent of affinity between Plato and Kant as arch-representatives of ancient and modern idealism. Section 2 traces the transition from Platonic dogmatism to Kantian criticism in the theory of ideas. Section 3 presents Kant's appropriation of the idea of the "Platonic republic" for purposes of a specifically modern republican account of the rule of law under conditions of freedom.

1. PLATO AND KANT

Schopenhauer at one point recommends his readers to focus their study of the philosophers of the past on two outstanding thinkers, Plato and Kant. The pairing of Plato and Kant as main representatives of the Western search for wisdom also informs Schopenhauer's own philosophy, as set forth in *The World as Will and Representation* – with Kant's transcendental idealism underlying Schopenhauer's account of the world as representation as it is governed by the principle of sufficient reason and Plato's theory of Forms informing the account of aesthetic and artistic cognition of the world as representation as it is conceived independent of the principle of sufficient reason, detailed in Books One and Three of Schopenhauer's *magnum opus*, respectively.

But there is more to Schopenhauer's exclusive linkage of Plato and Kant as the masterminds of Western philosophy than their syncretistic recycling in his own neo-Kantian metaphysics of cognition and his neo-Platonic metaphysics of art. For Schopenhauer, Plato and Kant are joined in the pursuit of one of the two key concerns of philosophy in general, including non-Western thought, viz., the distinction and the connection between the real and the ideal (the other chief concern being the freedom of the will peculiar to Western thought, according to Schopenhauer). The first of the two main problems of philosophy, as seen by Schopenhauer, emerges epistemologically as the relation between sensing and thinking, ontologically as the relation between the world of sense and the world of the understanding, and axiologically as the relation between truth and semblance. For Schopenhauer, Plato and Kant share a dualist doctrine that differentiates the world in accordance with a twofold, realist and idealist stance on it and that orients human life from one (the real) to the other (the ideal) in a movement that is at once intellectual ascent and moral advance.

To be sure, Schopenhauer's persuasive portrayal of Plato and Kant as the twin heroes of the life of thought is motivated and oriented by his own post-Kantian retake on the idealist tradition in ancient and modern philosophy. Moreover, Schopenhauer can claim neither Plato nor Kant as an ancestor or antecedent for the entire other side of his philosophy, which joins a Platonic-Kantian idealism of the world as representation with a crypto-Fichtean and pseudo-Schellingian anti-rationalism of the world as will, detailed in the philosophy of the will in nature and the ethics of the will's psycho-cosmic itinerary from self-affirmation to self-denial in Books Two and Four of *The World as Will and Representation*, respectively.⁵

The exclusive pairing of Plato and Kant is not limited to Schopenhauer and his pursuit of historical credentials for an essentially ahistorical account of world and self. Other philosophers indebted to Kant also have sought to compare – and contrast – Kant with Plato and to seek out the affinities between two philosophers otherwise separated by the great gulf that divides ancient and modern philosophy. Particularly noteworthy is the case of Paul Natorp, a prominent late 19th century and early 20th century philosopher and, together with Hermann Cohen, the head of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism – and the author of a scholarly study of Plato, covering most of the dialogues, in an attempt to claim Plato as a proto-Kantian for the critical tradition in philosophy.⁶

Natorp's philosophical project of retrieving the Platonism of Kant by way of exhibiting the Kantianism of Plato has its *fundamentum in re* in Kant's own extensive engagement with Platonic philosophy, which is to be found in his published writings (*Druckschriften*) as well as in his literary remains (*Nachlaß*) and in the extant transcripts of his lectures (*Vorlesungsnachschriften*). To be sure, Kant is not a historian of philosophy. In fact his work on Plato, as manifested in the scattered texts mentioning or using Plato, precedes the philologically based philosophical discussion of Plato to be found in his successors, chiefly among them F. D. E. Schleiermacher, who produced a comprehensive German translation of Plato's works still in use today.

Kant himself treats Plato the same way he refers to other philosophers of the remote and recent past as well as the present – citing them without quoting them, reducing their complex views to elementary doctrinal and methodological positions and treating them as virtual contemporaries in an abstract, ahistorical dialogue with alternative approaches to philosophical problems deemed to be as perduring as their previous solutions are considered deficient.⁷

Still Plato stands out in Kant's treatment of the philosophical past for the breath and depth of attention that he devotes to Platonic and neo-Platonic concepts and doctrines throughout his philosophical career. In particular, Kant's core project of a critical assessment of past and possible metaphysics, carried out under an epistemological perspective and resulting in the development of "transcendental philosophy" (*Transzendentalphilosophie*) and its preliminary presentation in the "critique of pure speculative reason"⁸ in the *Critique of Pure Reason*,⁹ is shaped by a comprehensive critique of the Platonic and neo-Platonic recourse to intellectual intuition as a dogmatic device claiming pure rational knowledge of supersensory objects. But Kant's critical engagement with Plato and with Platonism is not limited to the destruction of the latter's dogmatic metaphysics and extravagant epistemology. In other regards Kant shows a critical appreciation for Platonic positions and offers a sympathetic assessment of concepts and doctrines attributed to Plato and reconstructed in the context of Kant's own emerging or developed views on the nature of knowledge in general and the possibility of synthetic cognitions a priori in particular.

The common ground on which the critical encounter of Kant with Plato takes place is the idealist stance they both take – albeit in quite different and even opposed ways – on the "critical distinction" (*kritische Unterscheidung*)¹⁰ between appearance and reality. For Kant as for Plato objects divide into those of sense (or sensibility) and those of thought (or the understanding). To be sure, in Kant the objects of mere thought are exactly that: noumena or *intelligibilia* (those being the Greek and Latin terms for such entities), with no warranted assertibility on their own, while the objects of sense (phenomena or *sensibilia*) constitute the possible objects of knowledge (*Wissen*) and of the latter's completist integration into science (*Wissenschaft*). By contrast, for Plato the beings of thought, composed of Forms or ideas, constitute the proper and exclusive objects of knowledge or science (*episteme*), while the objects of sense afford only uncertain and unreliable epistemic belief (*doxa*).

The different assessment of the ideal and the real in Plato and Kant makes them adopt structurally related but contentually opposed versions of idealism. Kant espouses an idealism of forms ("formal idealism"),¹¹ according to which a priori forms – specifically the pure forms

of sensibility – condition and shape the objects of sense.¹² Plato advances an idealism of Forms (“ideas”), according to which everything is what it is due to the Forms it instantiates (*metexis*) and everything so existing is known only in terms of those Forms. Moreover, while Kant ties form to subjectivity – more precisely, to pure, “transcendental” subjectivity and specifically to the latter’s pure forms of sensibility (space and time) – and has objectivity be grounded in such more-than-subjective subjectivity, Plato dissociates form from formation and has the Form-ideas consist in a fixed set of logical super-predicates and ontological super-universals.

Finally, in Kant’s version of idealism (“transcendental idealism”)¹³ the validity of the a priori sensory forms of space and time is limited to objects given sensorily (“appearances”), at the exclusion of their validity for objects insofar as they do not appear to the senses (“things in themselves”). For Kant, the objective validity of space and time involves at once their “empirical reality” (*empirische Realität*) – their reality with regard to appearances – and their non-empirical or “transcendental ideality” (*transzendente Idealität*) – their ideality *qua* non-reality with respect to the things (in) themselves.¹⁴ Accordingly, for Kant ideality comes to convey non-validity or “nullity” (*Nullität*),¹⁵ a conceptual move that amounts to a complete reversal of the Platonic limitation of true reality and actual validity to the ideas in their supra-subjective status as absolute forms.

2. FROM PLATO TO KANT

The major differences between Kantian criticism and Platonic dogmatism and between Platonic and Kantian idealism notwithstanding, Kant emerges not only as the methodological critic and doctrinal opponent of Platonic metaphysics and its associated epistemology. In particular, Kant turns to Plato for a conception of thinking, along with the latter’s vehicles and objects, that reaches, in principle, beyond the world of appearances and aims at a different, higher sphere reserved for a mode of thinking and conceiving of objects that operates with the pointed exclusion of sensing and perceiving.

Kant’s sympathetic portrayal of Plato, to be found in the very work – the *Critique of Pure Reason* – that also contains some of his most severe criticisms of metaphysical thinking in the Platonic tradition,¹⁶ is apt to surprise those readers of the first *Critique* who focus on the theory of experience to be found in the work’s “first half,” through the end of the Transcendental Analytic – a bipartite division of the work not to be found in the text itself but dating back to by H. J. Paton’s pioneering commentary on what he termed “Kant’s metaphysic of experience.”¹⁷ Yet for Kant and his attentive reader, the *Critique of Pure Reason* not only does not end with the Transcendental Analytic but first comes into its own in the following extensive section, the Transcendental Dialectic, which comprises almost two thirds of the work and contains a basic as well as detailed critique of pure reason’s pretense to knowledge of supersensory objects.

To be sure, the negative, destructive critique of dogmatic metaphysics effectuated in the Transcendental Dialectic presupposes the prior parts of the first *Critique*, in particular the Transcendental Aesthetic’s argumentative introduction of transcendental idealism, which limits the objects of possible knowledge to things as they are sensorily given under conditions of space

and time (appearances) and subject to further determination by the categorial concepts and principles set forth in the Transcendental Analytic. But the Transcendental Dialectic following these parts of the work is not a mere anti-dogmatic annex to the previously presented positive account of the non-empirical conditions of experience and of the objects of experience.

The Transcendental Dialectic supplements the account of the principles of sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the account of the principles of the understanding (*Verstand*) in the Transcendental Analytic with an account of the principles of reason (*Vernunft*).¹⁸ In particular, reason in the specific sense in which it is elucidated in the Transcendental Dialectic – as the very “faculty of principles” (*Vermögen der Prinzipien*)¹⁹ – is not reducible to the faculty of the understanding dealt with in the Transcendental Analytic. It is precisely because the Transcendental Dialectic introduces its own concepts and principles, specifically different from those germane to the Transcendental Analytic, that the previously established restriction of the understanding to possible experience is not sufficient to rule out the reach of reason, as opposed to the understanding, beyond possible experience to the supersensory objects target by traditional, dogmatic metaphysics, viz., God, soul and world.

The further type of concept introduced in the Transcendental Dialectic eludes the restriction of the understanding and its concepts to possible experience by making the very transcending of experience – in fact, of any possible experience – its defining characteristic. As concepts concerning the unconditional (*Unbedingtes*) or the totality of conditions, the pure concepts of reason represent objects that, in principle, are not given in experience but that are entertained in thought, by means of concatenated syllogistic inferences, as the unconditioned or the sum total of conditions to everything conditioned given by sensibility and thought by the understanding.²⁰

Kant lends further articulation to the methodological and procedural differences between the use of the understanding and the employment of reason by designating the kinds of concepts involved in each of the two cognitive faculties with historically laden and personally specific terms. For the “pure concepts of the understanding” (*reine Verstandesbegriffe*) he resorts to the designation “categories,” introduced by Aristotle for the general kinds of logico-ontological predicates.²¹ In particular, Kant notes the core function of the categories to “understand” (*verstehen*)²² experience and its objects on the basis of given appearances and their conceptual determination as representations of empirical objects, situated in space and time and governed by universal laws that constitute the systematic unity of nature.

By contrast, Kant draws on Plato and the latter’s introduction of metempirical logical and ontological grounds, viz., the Forms (*idea, eidos*; German *Idee*), to capture the supersensory intent of the concepts of reason.²³ On Kant’s construal, the claimed objective reference of the ideas as concepts originating in pure reason is not based on prior sensory input, as in the case of the pure concepts of the understanding, which – while originating in the pure understanding – require a priori sensory conditions (schemata) for their effective employment as modes of the valid cognition of objects.²⁴ In the case of ideas, by contrast, possible experience does not serve as the warrant grounding cognitive claims but as the starting point for a chain of inferences

that leads from a given conditioned to an unconditioned, or to a totality of conditions, which as such, in principle, cannot be given but can only be thought.²⁵

To be sure, on Kant's critical assessment, the concepts so employed do not yield the objectively valid cognition (knowledge, *Wissen*) claimed by traditional, dogmatic metaphysics on behalf of the existence and essence of the soul, the world and God. In particular, metaphysical reasoning of the dogmatic kind rests on the conceptual confusion of the ontological status of a given conditioned with that of its conceived totality of conditions or the unconditional supposed to be underlying it. Critically considered, the objects of the concepts of reason (ideas) are not "given" (*gegeben*) but only "imposed" as tasks or problems (*aufgegeben*).²⁶ They are entities to be supposed or presupposed with no cognitive warrant available for their actual existence. Far from being concepts that are constitutive of an object domain of its own, composed of supersensory beings, ideas in Kant – more precisely, purely speculative, "transcendental ideas"²⁷ – turn out to be nothing but regulative principles that are to orient the empirical employment of the understanding toward a complete system of nature forever approached and never achieved by reason's coordinating cognitive efforts.

Yet on Kant's account, the role of reason – of purely cognitive, speculative reason, to be precise²⁸ – is not exhausted by its systematic function of providing imaginary focal points for the ideal extension of the cumulative cognitions of the categorial understanding in the latter's essentially empirical employment. Due to its characteristic scope beyond any and all possible experience, the speculative ideas of reason introduce a dimension of thought that essentially exceeds the understanding's constitutive commitment to the domain of nature and its objects in space and time. According to Kant, it is the further function of the ideas of reason to assure that the world of sense is not taken to exhaust what there is – or might be or ought to be – and thus to open up a conceptual space, however ontically empty or epistemically inaccessible on purely cognitive grounds, that prepares the subsequent occupation and determination of that very space with entities and objects differently constituted and alternatively warranted than the natural objects of theoretical cognition. More specifically, the speculative ideas of theoretical reason in Kant prepare the deployment of practical, morally motivating reason, which requires a conceptual space – the world of the understanding (*Verstandeswelt*) – not confined by the strictly determinist laws of nature. Moreover, the space so delineated by the essential extension of the scope of reason beyond the "bounds of the understanding" (*Grenzen des Verstandes*)²⁹ is to be occupied by a special kind of idea and its peculiar principle, viz., the idea of freedom (from natural laws) and the moral principle (of unconditional obligation).³⁰

To be sure, the account of sensibility, understanding and reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason* does not actually address moral matters and practical principles, except by anticipation of their subsequent treatment in moral philosophy proper. Nor is the further perspective of reason's practical use allowed to exercise a manipulative influence on the design and doctrine of the first *Critique*. Rather Kant maintains a naturally purposive structure of reason that involves a complementary and completist relation of mutual support and enhancement in which the (theoretical) restriction (to nature) and the (practical) realization (through freedom) are in an equilibrium of perfect, as it were pre-established harmony.³¹

Moreover, in addition to procuring the conceptual space for the subsequent extension of the critique of reason into matters of moral philosophy, Kant critical theoretical philosophy, as presented in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, contains doctrinal details that direct the quasi-Platonically conceived transcendental ideas of reason toward a critically warranted metaphysics addressing the traditional topics of rationalist metaphysics (God, soul, world). For, according to Kant, the restriction of objectively valid theoretical cognition to experience and its object domain (appearances) not only restricts the a priori cognitive forms to an empirical employment. It equally involves the limitation of the domain so constituted (experience) to mere appearances, at the exclusion of the things as they are, or rather might be, "in themselves." While the latter domain stays open and remains empty from the standpoint of theoretical cognition, the restriction of knowledge to possible experience – on Kant's account – does not *eo ipso* amount to the restriction of objects in general to empirical objects. By establishing, on theoretical grounds alone, that the cognitive restriction to experience does not exclude, in fact even involves, a not-impossible, "problematic"³² extension of objects beyond the natural and the apparenial into the supernatural and substantial, Kant supplements the destructive, negative critique of metaphysics with a minimally sized, limitatively structured and indirectly oriented metaphysical canon consisting chiefly in the rejection of the empiricist or skeptical denial of the existence of God, of the immortality of the soul and of the reality of freedom.³³

In particular, the critical Kant argues against the crypto-metaphysical anti-metaphysics of the skeptic-turned-dogmatist, whom he historically identifies with Hume³⁴ and to whom he ascribes the doctrinal dogmatic triad of psychological materialism (no immortal soul), cosmological naturalism (no freedom of causation) and theological fatalism (no providential God).³⁵ By contrast, Kant's own critically delimited stance on metaphysics, as presented in the first *Critique* and in the *Prolegomena*, refrains from any positive metaphysical claims, consists entirely in the argumentative exclusion of the aforementioned positions and is exhausted by the limitative metaphysical positions of psychological anti-materialism, cosmological anti-naturalism and theological anti-fatalism. According to Kant, any further specification of the metaphysical objects of the pure ideas of reason has to rely on justificatory resources other than theoretical cognition, viz., morally natured and practically based cognition involving not the grounds and bounds of rational knowing but those of rational willing and the latter's ideal object, viz., the highest good.³⁶

3. KANT'S PLATO

The Platonic inspiration behind Kant's account of ideas and their distinct domain beyond possible experience but within reason is not exhausted by the preparation and propagation of a critically certified metaphysics of the limitative cognition of God, soul and the world, as envisioned in the Appendix of the Transcendental Dialectic.³⁷ Nor is reason's reach beyond nature to moral matters restricted to the novel version of the traditional doctrine of the highest good provided in the Canon of Pure Reason of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method.³⁸ In illustrating his account of the concepts specific to reason (ideas) in the opening book of

the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant focuses on Plato's philosophical predilection for ideas in moral matters, chiefly that of virtue (*Tugend*). The move from theoretical ideas, which also are entertained by Plato and so mentioned by Kant, to practical ideas allows Kant to distinguish a false, illegitimate use of ideas in Plato from their legitimate deployment to be found already in Plato and taken up, in a specifically modified form, by Kant.

At the opening of his critical engagement with Plato, Kant critiques Plato for turning ideas *qua* concepts of pure reason into "archetypes of the things themselves" (*Urbilder der Dinge selbst*).³⁹ He goes on to offer a deflationary reading of Platonic ideas based on the hermeneutic insight that it is possible, by carefully comparing an author's thoughts with each other, to understand an author better than he understood himself.⁴⁰ Kant illustrates the yield of such a critically shaped interpretation by turning to practical ideas, which involve the idea of "freedom"⁴¹ and are not based on concepts reflecting the order of nature but are expressive of reason. Taking virtue as an example, Kant cites approvingly Plato's insight into the non-empirical origin of the "idea of virtue" (*Idee der Tugend*) as the "rule" (*Regel*) and "prototype" (*Muster*) of ethical conduct.⁴²

But Kant takes issue with Plato's extension of ideas into theoretical cognition, especially into mathematics, given that the latter does not exceed experience but, according to Kant, lies entirely within the confines of possible experience.⁴³ On Kant's construal, the chief characteristic of practical ideas is the latter's causal power in actions and on objects, due to which reason possesses efficacy in the moral domain.⁴⁴ The yield of the previously stated hermeneutic maxim of improving on an author's self-understanding by way of comparative criticism thus consists in Kant's distinction between the use of ideas in mathematical and in moral matters. On Kant's account, ideas are essential and even foundational in the latter case, whereas the assimilation of mathematical concepts, which – according to Kant – involve the forms of sensibility and are hence restricted to the formal features of appearances, constitutes a misuse of ideas and amounts to the confusion of a priori concepts based on (sensory) intuition with a priori concepts based on reason.⁴⁵

The close linkage of Platonic ideas with practical freedom and moral matters detected by Kant foreshadows and even prepares the move from transcendental freedom to moral freedom and the associated transition from pure theoretical ("speculative") reason to pure practical reason effectuated in Kant's foundational moral philosophy. Still the critical reconstruction of practical ideas in Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic precedes the latter's introduction of transcendental freedom in the solution to the Third Antinomy.⁴⁶ The practical freedom adduced by Kant in his critical interpretation of Plato is not yet the absolute, "transcendental freedom"⁴⁷ of pure reason, envisioned in the solution to the Third Antinomy as transcendental freedom and substantiated in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, but the freedom of the elective will (*Willkür*) from empirical determination and the latter's alternative susceptibility to non-empirical concepts of reason (ideas) and pure principles of reason (moral laws).

In the systematic context of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which is essentially and exclusively a "critique of pure speculative reason,"⁴⁸ all that can be ascertained is reason's imposition of ideas-based laws ("moral laws;" *moralische Gesetze, sittliche Gesetze*)⁴⁹ and the freedom from

solely sensory determination thereby entailed.⁵⁰ The further issue of reason's rules possibly being subject to a yet higher determining influence that would turn what is freedom with regard to the senses into nature with reference to further factors remains pointedly unaddressed and purposively left open within the confines of the first *Critique*.⁵¹ In particular, the notion of reason not only standing under laws of its own but being the very author of such laws ("autonomy")⁵² is absent from Kant's rereading of practical Platonic ideas in the Transcendental Dialectic, and from the first *Critique* altogether. The "practical freedom"⁵³ adduced as actual in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not the practically realized transcendental or cosmological freedom of the Third Antinomy, but the freedom necessary and sufficient for acting through reason and from reasons entertained in the Canon of Pure Reason of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The characteristic conception of freedom in volition and action featured in the *Critique of Pure Reason* – a relative and comparative rather than an absolute freedom – also underlies the interpretation of the "Platonic republic"⁵⁴ offered at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic. On Kant's (re-)interpretation, Plato's ideal state constitution is not the excessive example of a dreamt-up political perfection issuing from the brain of an idle intellectual. Neither deserves Plato's stated requirement that princes be philosophers to be the object of ridicule. As understood by Kant, the Platonic republic is an indispensable a priori concept of reason ("necessary idea")⁵⁵ that is to guide the first design of a state constitution as much as all subsequent legislation and so to serve as a standard for political theory as well as practice. As an idea, the Platonic republic is neither based on experience nor subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation. Instead, it is to function as the criterion for judging any and all exercise of legislative as well as executive power.⁵⁶

But Kant does not leave it at the functional rehabilitation of the Platonic republic as the conveyance of the normative standard for juridico-political activity. In a move that redefines Plato's ideal state (*Politeia*) in decidedly republican terms, Kant links the formal requirement of idea-driven political theory and practice with the material demand of freedom at the core of the ideal political constitution. While this move to an ideal (republican) state of freedom is not based on the general outlook or the specifics of Plato's ideal state, it can be seen as a further result of Kant's exegetical strategy of hermeneutically surpassing an earlier author. Drawing on the republican tradition of civic equality, Kant defines the state *qua* republic in terms of the practically necessary idea of "a constitution of the *greatest human freedom* according to laws that ensure that *the freedom of everyone can coexist with that of the others*."⁵⁷ The dual focus on freedom and law places Kant's definition into the political tradition of republicanism with its equal emphasis on civic freedom from inner and outer domination or interference and on the rule of law to ensure every citizen's equal enjoyment of such freedom.⁵⁸ The republican intent of Kant's definition is rendered clearer yet by his explicit exclusion of the citizens' "greatest happiness" from the definitional prerequisites of political society so defined.⁵⁹ On Kant's account, happiness is not the aim or purpose and not even a definitional feature of the state *qua* republic, but the latter's quasi-natural automatic result.⁶⁰

Yet for all its republican repercussions Kant's definition of the republic that is the state adds an innovation to the features of the rule of law and of equal civic freedom to be found in ancient and early-modern republicanism. The traditional insistence on equitable laws leaves the specifics of the laws unaddressed and even pointedly open, instead focusing on their equitable application. By contrast, Kant's definition specifies, at least formally, the laws that are to rule human freedom in terms of their scope and purpose. The laws are to ensure that everyone's freedom can coexist with that of everyone else. By placing the requirement of universal compatibility on everyone's freedom, the laws envisioned in Kant's definition not only extend equally to everyone but outright intend everyone's *equal freedom*. No one may enjoy their freedom at the expense of anyone else, and everyone may enjoy their freedom to the extent that no one else's freedom is restricted.

The point of Kant's definition of freedom, which restricts everyone's freedom to conditions of its compatibility with the freedom of everyone else, is not restriction *per se*. In fact, rather than reducing freedom, the political constitution envisioned by Kant is designed to enhance it. Far from minimizing everyone's freedom, the Kantian republic maximizes the latter. On Kant's assessment, to achieve and ensure the "greatest human freedom" on a societal scale requires not only the rule of laws but the rule of such laws and of those laws only that in turn are informed by the principle of everyone's equal freedom. Moreover, the freedom involved in civic legislation in the republican vein, as defined by Kant, is the freedom of outer action that is regulated by laws prescribing and prohibiting some things in the interest of permitting and allowing other things. With the idea of the (Platonic) republic Kant has formulated the criterion for civically minded, just laws and has provided a specifically modern retake on the original, Platonic republic's philosophical focus on justice (*dikaiosyne*). The criterion advanced by Kant is the maximal extension and the minimal restriction of external freedom under conditions of everyone's equal freedom.

Kant was to revisit the modern republican conception of the state as a juridico-political society under "objective laws of freedom"⁶¹ within a few years after its initial introduction in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: briefly so in Fifth Proposition of his popular essay in the philosophy of history from 1784, the very title of which takes up the Platonic cast of the initial presentation ("Idea For a Universal History With a Cosmopolitan Purpose"),⁶² and more extensively in his lecture course on natural law from the summer semester 1784, preserved in the student transcript known as *Naturrecht Feyerabend*.⁶³ In both cases, the core concern of Kant's conception of civil society or the state of (juridical) law is with guaranteeing the "freedom of others" (*Freiheit anderer*) and hence with "universal freedom" (*allgemeine Freiheit*)⁶⁴ – freedom being understood as the freedom of choice with regard to outer actions. The treatment of external freedom in the *Naturrecht Feyerabend* adds to the previously presented conjunction of restriction and realization in the legislation of freedom's laws the further features of "bindingness" (*Verbindlichkeit*) and "constraint" (*Zwang*) that are to enable and assure the efficacy of juridical laws.⁶⁵ Moreover, the *Naturrecht Feyerabend* sharpens Kant's initial introduction of the juridico-political idea of the state *qua* republic in the first *Critique* by means of the critical distinction between (juridical) law and ethics, presented as the difference between legally enforceable "conformity to law" (*Gesetzmäßigkeit, Legalität*) and juridically

irrelevant but ethically essential "moral mindedness" (*Gesinnung, Moralität*).⁶⁶ The dissociation of the republican state of law and justice from moral motivation and ethical attitude, which was to receive its systematic articulation in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797),⁶⁷ conveys Kant's departure from the Greco-Roman and neo-Roman tradition of a civically minded republicanism of committed citizen-patriots in favor of a distinctly modern, liberal version of citizenship that joins obedience to the law with a political participation reduced to representation.⁶⁸

REFERENCES

- KANT, Immanuel. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Hrsg.: Bd. 1-22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff.
- NATORP, Paul. *Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus*. Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1903 / Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2004.
- PATON, Herbert James. *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience. A Commentary on the First Half of the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936.
- PETTIT, Philip. *Republicanism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- PIPPIN, Robert B. *Kant's Theory of Form. An Essay on the "Critique of Pure Reason"*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.
- REICH, Klaus. *Kant und die Ethik der Griechen*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1935.
- SANTOZKI, Ulrike. *Die Bedeutung antiker Theorien für die Genese und Systematik von Kants Philosophie. Eine Analyse der drei Kritiken*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2006.
- ZÖLLER, Günter. *Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung bei Kant. Zur systematischen Bedeutung der Termini "objektive Realität" und "objektive Gültigkeit" in der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"*. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1984.
- _____. "German Realism. The Self-Limitation of Idealist Thinking in Fichte, Schelling and Schopenhauer," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, ed. K. Ameriks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 200-218.
- _____. "In der Begrenzung zeigt sich der Meister. Der metaphysische Minimalismus der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*," in *Metaphysik und Kritik. Interpretationen zur "Transzendentalen Dialektik" der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. J. Chotas, J. Karásek and J. Stolzenberg. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2008, 19-33.
- _____. "Der negative und der positive Nutzen der Ideen. Kant über die Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft," in *Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Die regulativen Ideen in Kants theoretischer Philosophie*, ed. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck. Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 2011, 13-27.
- _____. "Schopenhauer's Fairy Tale About Fichte. The Origin of *The World As Will and Representation* in German Idealism," in *A Companion to Schopenhauer*, ed. Bart Vandenabeele. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 385-402.
- _____. "Hoffen-Dürfen. Kants kritische Begründung des moralischen Glaubens," in *Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit/Foi et raison dans la philosophie moderne*, ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann and Raoul Weicker. Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 2013, 245-257.

_____. *Res Publica. Plato's "Republic" in Classical German Philosophy*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2015.

_____. "Allgemeine Freiheit'. Kants *Naturrecht Feyerabend* über Wille, Recht und Gesetz," forthcoming in *Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Ethik in Kants praktischer Philosophie*, ed. Bernd Dörflinger, Dieter Hüning and Günter Kruck. Hildesheim: Olms.

_____. "L'intelligible en nous. Liberté transcendante et chose en elle-même dans l'Élucidation critique de l'analytique de la raison pratique pure de Kant," in Kant. *La raison pratique. Concepts et héritages*, ed. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing and Ricardo Terra. Paris: Vrin, 2015, 53-70.

_____. "The supersensible . . . in us, above us and after us.' The Critical Conception of the Highest Good in Kant's Practico-Dogmatic Metaphysics," forthcoming in *The Highest Good in Kant's Philosophy*, ed. Thomas Höwing, Florian Marwede and Marcus Willaschek. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.

_____. "Without Hope and Fear.' Kant's *Naturrecht Feyerabend* on Bindingness and Obligation," forthcoming in *Reading Kant's Lectures*, ed. Robert Clewis. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.

_____. "True Republic.' Kant's Legalist Republicanism in Its Historical and Philosophical Context." Forthcoming in *Kant's Doctrine of Right*, ed. Jean-Christophe Merle. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

ABSTRACT: The essay focuses Kant's engagement with Plato at the beginning of the Transcendental Dialectic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which presents a crucial but often overlooked feature of Kant's *magnum opus*. In particular, the essay examines Kant's positive pronouncements on the "Platonic republic" (*Platonische Republik*) in Book One of the Transcendental Dialectic by placing them in the twofold context of the first *Critique's* affirmative retake on Plato's Forms (*Ideen*) and its original views on juridico-political matters. More specifically, the essay aims to show that Kant's prime position in legal and political philosophy, as contained in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), involves a normative conception of civic life that places the societal exercise of individual freedom under universal laws. Section 1 explores the extent of affinity between Plato and Kant as arch-representatives of ancient and modern idealism. Section 2 traces the transition from Platonic dogmatism to Kantian criticism in the theory of ideas. Section 3 presents Kant's appropriation of the idea of the "Platonic republic" for purposes of a specifically modern republican account of the rule of law under conditions of freedom.

KEYWORDS: Kant, Plato, republic, idea, freedom, equality.

NOTES

1 The article was written during my tenure as Visiting Professor at Venice International University and Università Ca' Foscari Venezia during the spring of 2015.

2 Günter Zöllner is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Munich (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München). He has held visiting professorships at Princeton University, Emory University, Seoul National University, McGill University, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Venice International University, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia and Fudan University. He is the author, editor and coeditor of 35 books as well as the author of more than 300 articles, mostly on Kant and German idealism, that have appeared in sixteen languages worldwide. His most recent book publications include: *Fichte lesen* (2013, Japanese translation 2014, Italian translation 2015) and *Res Publica. Plato's "Republic" in Classical German Philosophy* (2015).

3 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 312-320/B 368-377.

4 On the original difference and systematic affinity between the juridical and the ethical in Kant's mature moral philosophy, see Günter Zöllner, "Allgemeine Freiheit'. Kants *Naturrecht Feyerabend* über Wille, Recht und Gesetz," forthcoming in *Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Ethik in Kants praktischer Philosophie*, ed. Bernd Dörflinger, Dieter Hüning and Günter Kruck. Hildesheim: Olms.

- 5 On Schopenhauer's clandestine relation to Fichte and Schelling, see Günter Zöller, "German Realism. The Self-Limitation of Idealist Thinking in Fichte, Schelling and Schopenhauer," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, ed. K. Ameriks. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 200-218 and id., "Schopenhauer's Fairy Tale About Fichte. The Origin of *The World As Will and Representation* in German Idealism," in *A Companion to Schopenhauer*, ed. Bart Vandenabeele. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, 385-402.
- 6 Paul Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus*. Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1903. Hamburg: F. Meiner, 2004.
- 7 On Kant's relation and reference to ancient philosophy in general and ancient ethical thought in particular, see Ulrike Santozki, *Die Bedeutung antiker Theorien für die Genese und Systematik von Kants Philosophie. Eine Analyse der drei Kritiken*. Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2006 and Klaus Reich, *Kant und die Ethik der Griechen*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1935.
- 8 *Critique of Pure Reason*, B XII.
- 9 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 10-13 and B 24-28.
- 10 *Critique of Pure Reason*, B XXVIII.
- 11 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 491 note/B 519 note and AA 04: 337 (*Prolegomena*). See also Robert B. Pippin, *Kant's Theory of Form. An Essay on the "Critique of Pure Reason"*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982.
- 12 On the systematic status of transcendental idealism in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, see Günter Zöller, *Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung bei Kant. Zur systematischen Bedeutung der Termini "objektive Realität" und "objektive Gültigkeit" in der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"*. Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1984.
- 13 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 491/B 519.
- 14 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 28/B 44 and A 35f./B 52.
- 15 See Refl, AA 18: 646 (*Reflexion* 6324).
- 16 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 5/B 9.
- 17 Herbert James Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience. A Commentary on the First Half of the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1936.
- 18 On the nature and function of (theoretical) reason in Kant, see Günter Zöller, "Der negative und der positive Nutzen der Ideen. Kant über die Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft," in *Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Die regulativen Ideen in Kants theoretischer Philosophie*, ed. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck. Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 2011, p. 13-27.
- 19 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 299/B 356.
- 20 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 321-332/B 377-389.
- 21 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 81/B 107.
- 22 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 311/B 367.
- 23 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 313/B 370.
- 24 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 137-147/B 176-187.
- 25 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 308f./B 365f.
- 26 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 497f./B 526 and A 508/B 536.
- 27 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 321/B 378.
- 28 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 305-309/B 362-366.
- 29 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 280/B 336.
- 30 See, e.g., *Critique of Pure Reason*, B XXVII f.
- 31 On the architectonic unity of theoretical and practical reason in Kant's critical philosophy, see AA 5:89-106, esp. 106 (*Critique of Practical Reason*). On the core concern of the second *Critique* with the non-reductive unity of theoretical and practical reason, see Günter Zöller, "L'intelligible en nous. Liberté transcendantale et chose en elle-même dans l'Élucidation critique de l'analytique de la raison pratique pure de Kant," in Kant. *La raison pratique. Concepts et héritages*, ed. Sophie Grapotte, Margit Ruffing and Ricardo Terra. Paris: Vrin, 2015, 53-70.
- 32 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 646/B 674.

33 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, B XXXIV. On the Kantian conception of a limitatively revised metaphysics, see Günter Zöller, "In der Begrenzung zeigt sich der Meister. Der metaphysische Minimalismus der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*," in *Metaphysik und Kritik. Interpretationen zur "Transzendentalen Dialektik" der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, ed. J. Chotas, J. Karásek and J. Stolzenberg. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2008, 19-33.

34 See AA 4:360 (*Prolegomena*).

35 See AA 4:363 (*Prolegomena*). See also *Critique of Pure Reason*, B XXXIV.

36 On the systematic function and the architectonic status of the highest good within the confines of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, see Günter Zöller. "Hoffen-Dürfen. Kants kritische Begründung des moralischen Glaubens," in *Glaube und Vernunft in der Philosophie der Neuzeit/Foi et raison dans la philosophie moderne*, ed. Dietmar H. Heidemann and Raoul Weicker. Hildesheim/ New York: Olms, 2013, 245-257.

37 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 642-704/B 670-732.

38 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 795-831/B 823-859. On the systematic status of the highest good in Kant, see Günter Zöller, "The supersensible . . . in us, above us and after us.' The Critical Conception of the Highest Good in Kant's Practico-Dogmatic Metaphysics," forthcoming in *The Highest Good in Kant's Philosophy*, ed. Thomas Höwing, Florian Marwede and Marcus Willaschek. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.

39 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 313/B 370.

40 See A 314/B 370. For an account of Kant's relation to Plato in the context of classical German political philosophy and its republican dimension, see Günter Zöller, *Res Publica. Plato's "Republic" in Classical German Philosophy*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2015.

41 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 314/B 371.

42 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 315/B 372.

43 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 314f./B 371f.

44 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 317/B 374.

45 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 314/B 371 note.

46 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 532-558/B 560-586.

47 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 803/B 831.

48 *Critique of Pure Reason*, B XXII.

49 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 807f./B 835f.

50 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 801f./B 829f.

51 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 803/B 831.

52 See AA 4:433 (*Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals*) and 5:33 (*Critique of Practical Reason*)

53 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 802/B 830.

54 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 316/B 372.

55 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 316/B 373.

56 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 316f./B 372-374 (*Gesetzgebung und Regierung*).

57 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 316/B 373 (*Eine Verfassung von der größten menschlichen Freiheit nach Gesetzen, welche machen, daß jedes Freiheit mit der andern ihrer zusammen bestehen kann ...*) (emphasis in the original).

58 For a recent reconceptualization of republicanism as requiring freedom from structural domination rather than from factual interference, see Philip Pettit, *Republicanism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

59 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 316/B 373.

60 See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 316/B 374 (... *wird schon von selbst folgen*).

61 *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 802/B 830.

62 See AA 8:22.

63 See AA 27/2.2:1328.

64 AA 8:22 and AA 27/2.2:1328.

65 See AA 27/2.2:1327f. On the twin conception of "bindingness" and "obligation" (*Verbindlichkeit, Verpflichtung*), see Günter Zöller, "'Without Hope and Fear.' Kant's *Naturrecht Feyerabend* on Bindingness and Obligation," forthcoming in *Reading Kant's Lectures*, ed. Robert Clewis. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.

66 See AA 27/2.2:1327f. For Kant's differential treatment of (juridical) law and morality in the first *Critique*, see the account of the moral world order (*moralische Welt*) in *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 808/B 836. On the extension of the distinction between morality and legality from its original function to demarcate law and ethics to differentiate between legalism and spiritualism within ethics, see AA 5:71 (*Critique of Practical Reason*).

67 See AA 6:218-221.

68 On Kant's specifically modern retake on ancient and early modern republicanism, see Günter Zöller, "'True Republic.' Kant's Legalist Republicanism in Its Historical and Philosophical Context." Forthcoming in *Kant's Doctrine of Right*, ed. Jean-Christophe Merle. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Recebido / Received: 01/10/14

Aprovado / Approved: 10/11/14

SOME IMPLICATIONS FROM THE PRIMACY OF THE GOOD WILL¹

Julio ESTEVES²

There are two opposed tendencies in the interpretation of the good will in its relation to the gifts and other goods: either the interpreters consider the value of the gifts and other goods in isolation or apart from their combination with a good will, which is an abstraction; or they consider the value of the good will completely apart from its relation to the gifts and other goods, which is also an abstraction. I dealt with the first interpretative tendency in an earlier paper,³ by showing that Kant is right in his thesis of the centrality and primacy of the good will in its relation to the gifts of nature and fortune listed in the opening paragraphs of *Groundwork I*.⁴ Here I would like to deal with the second interpretative tendency, which can be seen in authorized Kant's interpreters, such as Karl Ameriks and Allen Wood. In what follows, I will first summarize the main points of my previous article and then move on to draw some implications from the distinctiveness of the good will in order to clear some widespread misconceptions about it.

Reduced to its essentials, my argument is that there is a very widespread misunderstanding of the opening paragraphs of *Groundwork I*. This occurs when Kant's interpreters want to apply to the gifts of nature and fortune the alleged predicate 'conditionally good' or 'good in a conditioned sense', as if such gifts were intrinsically endowed with a peculiar kind of goodness, even when *taken in isolation* or considered in and for themselves, i.e. apart from their combination with a good will. But 'conditionally good' is supposed to be a kind of *relational* predicate. Therefore, strictly speaking, it means that 'good' can be applied to the gifts *only* on the *condition* that they are combined or united with a good will. So, while or insofar as the gifts do not fulfill the condition of being combined with a good will, they are *not good at all*, in *any sense* that the word 'good' may have. This analysis highlights the primacy and centrality of the good will as a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition of the goodness of the gifts.

I tried to make clearer the primacy and centrality of the good will in its relation to the gifts by appealing to the Aristotelian concept of substance and categories. According to Aristotle, the category of substance has primacy over the remaining categories in the sense of being the condition of application of 'being' to each of them. Thus, we can say of things under the remaining categories that they are only because or insofar as they are *in* the substance, that their being depends on the substance. So, although 'being' *means* something *different* when

applied to each different category, it is always said in reference or relation to a determinate thing, namely, the substance.⁵ That is why Aristotle says that the substance is the *ultimate subject of predication*.

Analogously, in the opening paragraphs of the *Groundwork*, Kant is not dealing so much with the distinction between different senses of ‘good’, but with the relationship between determinate qualities and properties (the gifts of nature and fortune) and a determinate entity or substance, namely, the good will. Kant maintains that their existence in a good will is the condition on which those gifts can be good and receive the predicate ‘good’. Thus, their goodness depends on a relation or combination with a good will, which primarily makes it possible that they can be taken for good. In a word, the good will is the *ultimate subject of value predication*, the ultimate condition of attribution of goodness to whatever could be related to it, such as the gifts of nature and fortune and even our actions. However, it is important to emphasize that those gifts are not good *in the same sense* as the will is good. Instead, each gift is good in accordance with the pattern of goodness or standard of excellence appropriate to it, for goodness or excellence in courage is not the same as in intelligence, or in moderation of passions, etc., and also each gift in its excellence serves different purposes. However, the gifts of nature and fortune can be good in accordance with their own patterns of goodness or standards of excellence, only if they fulfill the condition of being in a good will. Finally, the good will is the only thing which is good, also in accordance with its own pattern of goodness, without depending on any further conditions except those it imposes on itself.

We can understand now that it is an abstraction to confer any positive value on the gifts of nature and fortune taken in isolation, i.e. independently and apart from their occurrence in a good will. In fact, we can also consider in isolation the place a substance occupies, how long it lasts, its quantity, the accidents which inhere in it, etc. But, evidently, this way of considering them is an abstraction, since those things can concretely exist only in a substance. Similarly, according to Kant, courage, health, moderation in passions, happiness, can exist as good things only in a good will.

Now the question becomes why exactly is the good will the necessary condition of the goodness of the gifts of nature and fortune? It is worth noting that, despite their diversity, Kant considers those qualities, properties and states altogether just as “gifts” or “presents”, whether as gifts of nature (*Naturgaben*) or as gifts of fortune (*Glücksgaben*). This is indeed noteworthy, because the existence of some of them in a man is not always entirely due to good fortune or luck. On the contrary, health, riches, power, honor, and even courage or resolution, are in most cases the result of human striving. This means that it is in considering them exactly as mere gifts or presents, i.e. in abstraction or apart from the *activity* of a good will, that Kant takes them to be devoid of any goodness. To understand Kant’s point here, we could adapt the famous incorporation thesis: the gifts of nature and fortune must be *incorporated* by a good will through its *activity* in order to become good things.

Thus, it is in virtue of its activity that a will is the ultimate condition of the goodness of the gifts of nature and fortune. Now, given that the goodness of the gifts depends on their being incorporated by the activity of a good will, the goodness of the latter cannot in turn depend on anything else. So the

specific goodness a will possesses must lie *entirely* in its own activity, or simply in its willing in accordance with the universal moral law represented by us as a categorical imperative. That is why a good will can never be a gift. The thesis of the complete independence of the good will when it comes to its goodness is expressed in a famous passage of the *Groundwork*.

A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations. Even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose – if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good will were left (not, of course, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as they are in our control) – then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself.⁶

So, the goodness of the gifts of nature and fortune depends ultimately on their relation to the activity of a good will, which in turn does not depend on anything beyond itself and its good willing for its goodness. The goodness of a will lies specifically in its sincere *intention* to achieve the morally good ends it aims at, even if, despite all its activity and efforts made, a ‘stepmotherly nature’ makes it impossible for it to achieve such ends. For, the circumstances in the world in which actions take place, and which determine their success, are usually given independently of the will, and it would not be *fair* to consider the goodness of a will on the basis of something that largely does not depend on it, like its actual success in achieving its morally good intentions.

There are two opposed tendencies in the interpretation of the good will in its relation to the gifts and other goods: either the interpreters consider the value of the gifts and other goods in isolation or apart from their combination with a good will, which is an abstraction; or they consider the value of the good will completely apart from its relation to the gifts and other goods, which is also an abstraction. I dealt with the first interpretative tendency in my previous paper. Here I would like to deal with the second interpretative tendency, which can be seen in authorized Kant’s interpreters, such as Karl Ameriks and Allen Wood.

I begin with the criticism developed by Karl Ameriks in his article on the good will.⁷ The basis of his criticism is the traditional distinction between the alleged predicate ‘conditioned or qualified good’, which means a goodness of a thing, such as the gifts, that, although good in a sense, would not be approved in some context, and the predicate ‘unconditioned or unqualified good’, which means the goodness characteristic of the good will, the only thing that could be approved in whatever context it might appear. Although I reject such a distinction as operative in the opening paragraphs of the *Groundwork*, I must discuss Ameriks’ criticism, because it concerns the alleged primacy and privileged place of the good will vis-à-vis the gifts of nature and fortune.

Ameriks begins discussing one of the possible interpretations of Kant’s seminal concept, namely, the good will as a component in a situation, or as the “particular intention interpretation”. So, in contradistinction to other components in a situation of action, it would

be impossible to conceive of a context where a good will understood as a good intention would not be approved by an “impartial spectator”, while those gifts, or, in Ameriks’ words, the other “value bearers”, such as moderation in passions or prosperity, could occur in circumstances in which its possession would not be approved. Ameriks calls into question such alleged asymmetry between the will and other value bearers, as he finds support in a concession made by Paton, according to which a good will could occur in contexts which as a whole would not be approved. Paton seeks to excuse the good will from being of qualified goodness in such contexts by attributing the badness to another component also present in them. According to Paton, “the harm done by a stupid good man was due to his stupidity and not to his goodness [...] a good will as such cannot issue in wrong actions”.⁸ That said, Ameriks asks why not reverse the argument and “excuse” a quality, such as moderation in passions, and claim that it is the other component of the situation, the orientation of the will, that it is really responsible for the whole context being disapproved, while the quality of moderation would remain as something good in itself? Besides, if Kant maintains that a bad will can turn a gift, like moderation in passions, into something bad, why not once more reverse the argument and claim “that stupidity can turn a ‘good’ man’s will into a bad thing?”⁹ Hence, Ameriks concludes that “there is no clear asymmetry between the good will and apparently good ‘objective’ items”,¹⁰ which means that the good intention is only a mere component among others in situations of action.

In fact, it seems that we have a problem here. For, according to Paton’s suggestion, perhaps we would have to admit that Marie Antoinette may have been a person of good will, and that her infamous suggestion that the poor should eat cake, once they had no bread, should be attributed to her stupidity or ignorance in relation to the real conditions of her people, and not to her character as such. Now, we must once again consider the relationship between the will and the gifts, or, in Ameriks’ words, the remaining “value bearers”, both to answer his criticism and to understand the problems with Paton’s interpretation.

Granted, according to Kant, to have a good will is not the same as to be moderate in passions, intelligent, courageous, and not even healthy or happy, etc., because such qualities or states can also be found in a bad man’s will, which turns them into something bad. However, this does not mean that, as Allen Wood claims, “the good will [can] be treated as something that might exist apart from (or even in opposition to) any or all of these other goods”.¹¹ For, if, as Kant says, some of those gifts “are even conducive to this good will and can make its work much easier”,¹² or “seem to constitute part of the *inner* worth of a person”;¹³ in other words, if, from the viewpoint of a good will, some of those qualities and properties are not *morally* irrelevant, then a good will as such might not be insensitive to lack of them, and still less be in opposition to them. For, if it is an abstraction to consider the goodness of those qualities and properties apart from their relation or inherence in a good will on the one hand, it is also an abstraction to consider a good will apart from the manifold morally relevant qualities which can be related to it on the other hand. This would be tantamount to considering a substance apart from the place it occupies, the time it lasts, their accidents, etc. At this point, Ameriks could then reply that, given that Kant “does allow that properties such as talents and temperaments can have some moral value (a ‘qualified’ value, to be sure) as long as they are founded in a good will [,] what is still unclear, though, is what the original reason is for affirming this claim rather

than saying that a will is good only when grounded in an ‘objective’ nature that is kind, not stupid, etc.”¹⁴

In fact, as far as I understand, Kant only says that the gifts of nature and fortune must be combined with a good will in order to be taken for good. This does not entail that a good will could be good without being combined with at least some of those gifts, insofar as the good will itself acknowledges that they are morally relevant. Granted, as we saw above, given that the goodness of those gifts depends on the combination with the good will, the goodness of the latter could not depend on anything else. That is why the *specific* goodness of a good will must lie entirely in its own good activity, in its mere good intentions, or in the form of its willing in accordance with the universal moral law. But, the expressions ‘to will’, and ‘to have an intention’, are characterized by what Brentano called ‘intentionality’ or ‘directedness to an object, or state of affairs’. So, it is an empty abstraction, only useful for analytical purposes, to consider the goodness of a good will as consisting merely in its morally good intentions, period; because a morally good intention, like any other, must be the intention to achieve something, for instance, to develop those “talents and temperaments” which are morally relevant and praiseworthy. So, *in a sense*, Ameriks is right in saying that a will is good only when, if not grounded in, as he says, it is at least combined “with an ‘objective’ nature that is kind, not stupid, etc”. Indeed, as Kant very consistently claims later, the *complete* goodness of a finite rational being’s will must, *ideally*, include not only morally relevant talents or temperaments, but also happiness, inasmuch as the latter is at least not morally indifferent. For, “to need happiness, to be also worthy of it, and yet not to participate in it cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a rational being”, or with “the judgment of an impartial reason”.¹⁵ In other words, from the moral point of view of an impartial spectator, a finite rational being’s good will should also be combined with happiness. But, if the complete and concrete goodness of a good will comprises its morally good intentions *plus* what Ameriks calls ‘objective goods’, and even happiness, we should always bear in mind that the latter can contribute to the goodness of the whole only because they are combined with the former in the first place.¹⁶ So, in opposition to Ameriks, the morally good intention is not a “mere component” among others in a situation, but a privileged component in the sense of turning the alleged “objective goods” effectively into something good and capable of contributing to the goodness of the whole in the first place.

But the main problem with Ameriks’ view is that he conceives of the relationship between what he calls “objective goods” and the good will, as it were, in *static* terms. According to his view, we should conclude that a good will in the highest degree will be that one which *happens* to be accompanied of all those morally relevant qualities and properties in the highest degree, as if the presence of the latter *per se* could *aggregate* more value to a good will, while their absence would *degrade* or even completely *remove* its value. However, if Kant is right in claiming that those qualities and properties owe their value ultimately to their combination with a good will, then they would be for themselves incapable of removing or aggregating any value to whatever may be, and much less to a good will. Now, the good will is a substance which has a peculiar kind of activity, namely, an activity in accordance with the moral law. Indeed, according to Kant’s famous definition, the “*will* is a kind of causality of the living beings insofar as they are rational”.¹⁷ So, we should conceive of the relationship between it

and those gifts in *dynamical* terms. Since those qualities and properties can acquire positive value, only if they are combined with a good will, then it is by developing and cultivating such qualities through its peculiar activity, that a will *aggregates or incorporates positive value to itself* in the first place. Reciprocally, as long as a will fails in incorporating or cultivating such qualities through its activity, it removes value from itself, and does not qualify to be a good will. That is why it is even a *duty* for a good will to try overcoming its natural limitations and, as it was said above, developing its morally favorable natural dispositions.¹⁸ In sum, one should not think of the goodness and praiseworthiness of those qualities and properties, as Ameriks does, as if they for themselves could add, aggregate, or even subtract some goodness *externally* to the activity of a good or of a bad will. On the contrary, they must be *internally* incorporated, developed, or even underdeveloped by the activity of a good or of a bad will in order to possess positive or negative value.

Having said that, we are now in a position to see that the situation Ameriks suggests simply might not occur. For, stupidity could not turn a good will into something bad simply because, for conceptual reasons, a person's good will might not be stupid; a person's good will might not be indulgent to stupidity. However, by the same token, Paton is not right in his attempt to excuse a good will by attributing to stupidity a harm done. For, the will is itself responsible for the stupidity it indulges, or does not try to overcome. But, at this point, at the basis of something I admitted above, Ameriks and Wood could object that, despite all the activity and efforts made by a good will, a "stepmotherly nature" could make it absolutely impossible for a morally good intention to "prevail" over its natural stupidity. As a result, I should also admit either that a good will might exist unaltered as a mere good intention along with the non-eradicated stupidity (Wood), or that stupidity could turn a will's morally good intention into something bad (Ameriks). Now, assuming that a person can have absolutely no power or control over his natural stupidity, I would reply that such a handicapped person would be also incapable of even forming the notion or concept of what it is like to have a good will as a morally good intention either. So, again for conceptual reasons, a person's good will could not be stupid, because an unalterable stupid person could not have a good will. Thus, stupidity and possession of a good will are completely incompatible with each other: the activity of a good will must exclude the influence of stupidity, while the presence of an unalterable stupidity must exclude the possession of a good will. Anyway, I think we usually take stupidity to be not mere innate ignorance, like a natural flaw, but rather a moral flaw, a kind of ignorance resulting from a lack of effort in developing natural good dispositions.¹⁹ However it may be, if Marie Antoinette was actually ignorant of the real conditions of her people, either she was to blame for a stupidity which she could have overcome, or she was innately incapable of overcoming it. In both cases, she was not a person of a good will,²⁰ and should have not been the queen of France.²¹ So, I agree that Paton is right in claiming that "a good will as such cannot issue in wrong actions". But it seems that he does not understand that such a claim is correct only because the activity of a good will excludes, for conceptual reasons, the presence or exercise of components, such as stupidity, ignorance or lack of moderation in passions, which are conducive to bad actions. Last but not least, in what concerns the asymmetry between those qualities and properties, or, in Ameriks' words, the remaining "value bearers", and the

good will, which is the core of his criticism, I think that by now it suffices to note that it is an asymmetry analogous to that which exists between the substance and the remaining categories, so that the substance, i.e. the good will, has primacy because it is the ultimate “value bearer”.

Allen Wood argues that Kant’s claim that the good will is good without limitation amounts to what he calls the “nondiminisability and nonincreasability theses”, according to which the goodness of the good will cannot be diminished nor increased by any of its circumstances or effects or by any combination with other goods. Obviously, Wood gets inspiration for his interpretation of the good will from the Principle of the Persistence of Substance in the First Analogy of the *Critique of Pure Reason*: “In all change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor diminished in nature.”²² Analogously, according to Wood, the quantum of goodness in a good will is neither increased nor diminished by any circumstances or combination with other goods. So we agree in the interpretation of the good will as a kind of substance. However, whereas I use the Aristotelian model of substance and categories to account for the significance of the good will, Wood recurs to Kant’s model of substance. Now, I would like to show that, although Wood’s proposal may seem more desirable from the point of view of Kant’s system, the Aristotelian model of substance I use is more adequate to understand the good will in its relation to other goods.

As I observed above, there are two opposed tendencies in the interpretation of the good will in its relation to the gifts and other goods. Now, Wood’s thesis of the undiminisability and unincreasability of the goodness of the good will is an obvious case of the second interpretative tendency, namely, the tendency to consider the value of the good will completely apart from its relation to the gifts and other goods. However, it is not so easy to show why Wood’s interpretation is mistaken. For when I criticized Kant’s interpreters for estimating the goodness of the gifts in isolation or apart from their combination with a good will, I was simply doing justice to their own concession that such gifts can be taken to be good only on the condition of their being combined with a good will. But I myself have admitted that a good will is the only thing that does not depend on anything else to receive the predicate good. So, it seems that, being unconditionally good, a good will must be good once and for all, and Wood is right in his claim that “the good will is absolutely good, in this sense, because its goodness does not vary with its relation to any other thing, and therefore is possessed entirely in itself or apart from any relation that the good will may stand to other goods”.²³ Now, as Wood makes clear in the sequence of the text, the other goods whose combination with a good will would leave its goodness unaltered are the “effects and consequences” of its actions. For, as he says, “the good will of course aims at good results, and with good fortune achieves them. But they form no part of its own worth, and do not add the least bit to it”.²⁴

So, Wood’s claim amounts to what I call the specific goodness of the good will. Since the circumstances of the world do not depend on the good will, its success in achieving the ends it aims at does not count in our estimation of its goodness, which consists in its willing in accordance with the moral law. In what concerns their specific goodness, i.e., their sincere intention to achieve good results, there cannot be degrees of goodness in a good will, and a good will is as good as any other. So Wood’s interpretation is right as far as it goes. But the

consequences and effects a good will aims at and sometimes, with good fortune, is successful in achieving are not the only goods that can be combined with it. There are other goods whose combination with a good will is not a question of fortune or luck. And such goods do have influence on the amount and degree of goodness of the good will, namely, the gifts Kant mentioned. Granted, taken merely as gifts, as “presents”, whether as gifts of nature (*Naturgaben*) or as gifts of fortune (*Glücksgaben*), the gifts as such depend on good or bad luck. But, as we saw above, considered merely as gifts, they have no value at all. It is only insofar as they are incorporated or developed by a good or a bad will through its *activity*, that they can be taken to be good or bad things. Consequently, the combination of a good or a bad will with such gifts does not depend on good or bad fortune, and can be imputed to a will. Now, this runs against the claim that, as Wood puts it, “no addition of any other good to the good will can increase its goodness”,²⁵ or, alternatively, that the lack of any other good in the good will can diminish its goodness. So Wood would say that the addition of any good, such a gift, by a good will to itself would not increase its goodness and turn it into something better. According to him, given two agents, A and B, if they have a good will, then A’s good will is as good as B’s good will, and the incorporation of a gift by the former would not turn it into something *morally better*. Now, I think that Wood’s suggestion that a good will A could not be *morally better* than a good will B must be mistaken, because Kant talks of a bad will being *morally worse* than another.

In fact, in the beginning of *Groundwork* I, Kant establishes a comparison between two agents endowed with a bad will or, what amounts to the same thing, the same agent endowed with a bad will considered in two different situations. Kant compares a very cool, self-controlled scoundrel (bad will A) and another who is devoid of such qualities (bad will B). Kant shows that, far from possessing some positive value in themselves, self-control and moderation in the passions are incapable of adding anything whatsoever to the bad will A in order to turn it into something good or better than the bad will B devoid of such qualities. On the contrary, in Kant’s own words, without the principles of a good will, moderation in affects and self-control “can become extremely evil, and the coolness of a scoundrel makes him not only far more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than we would have taken him to be without it”.²⁶

So the bad will A and the bad will B are equally morally bad, insofar as they have maxims contrary to the moral law. But whereas bad will A is endowed with self-control and moderation in the passions, bad will B is devoid of such qualities. As a result, we must take bad will A to be not only more dangerous but also immediately more abominable than bad will B. According to Kant, the bad will A capable of self-control is more dangerous than the bad will B incapable of self-control, that is, worse in the *prudential* sense, because the former is more able to achieve the bad results it aims at, the reason why we should be particularly worried about it. But the bad will A is also “immediately more abominable in our eyes”, that is, taken apart from its ability to achieve such bad results, it is *morally worse* than the bad will B. Suppose that the bad will A uses all its coolness and moderation of passions trying to actualize a bad end, in fact, the very same bad end that the bad will B aims at. But, in contradistinction to the bad will A, the bad will B is lucky and successful in achieving such bad end. However, in spite of its failure

in actually achieving that bad end, the bad will A still is immediately more abominable in our eyes, in a word, is *morally worse* than the bad will B.

A cool and self-controlled scoundrel is morally worse than a scoundrel devoid of such qualities, presumably because the former executes his crimes without showing any vestige of respect for his victims. But I think that Kant's claim could be perfectly extended to the combination of a bad will with the other gifts he mentioned. In fact, a very intelligent and healthy scoundrel is not only more dangerous, but also immediately more abominable in our eyes than a stupid and unhealthy scoundrel, simply because the former uses otherwise good qualities in the service of villainous deeds. Finally, it seems intuitively plausible to claim that a happy scoundrel is immediately more abominable and so morally worse than an unhappy scoundrel. Indeed, Kant says that "an impartial rational spectator can take no delight in seeing the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced with no feature of a pure and good will".²⁷ So, it seems safe to claim that happiness and prosperity make a scoundrel immediately more despicable in the eyes of an impartial rational spectator.

Besides, within Kant's moral philosophy, it is possible to establish a comparison not only between a bad will A and a bad will B, but also between two morally bad courses of action. We take as an example Nero's activity during the burning of Rome. As it is famously told, Nero fiddled while Rome burned. What could possibly be the point of Nero fiddling during the burning of Rome? Of course, his fiddling was nothing but the expression of contempt for his people. Now, he could have chosen a different way to express contempt for his people, for example, by holding a private feast in the palace. Such course of action would have been bad enough. But since he chose to express overtly and publicly contempt and disregard for his people by fiddling, Nero became more abominable in our eyes, and, the better he fiddled, the worse, morally speaking, his action was.

Now, if it is the case that a bad will A could be more abominable than a bad will B, parity of reasoning requires us to admit that a good will A could be more praiseworthy than a good will B. Granted, A's good will is as good as B's good will, insofar as their maxims are in accordance with the moral law. However, the good will A does increase its goodness by incorporating or developing more and more morally relevant gifts, thereby becoming morally better than the good will B that fails in such an endeavor. Of course, there are limits to the extent that failure could be allowed in the endeavor of incorporating morally relevant gifts. For, as we saw above, a good will is incompatible with stupidity, with complete lack of moderation in passions, with arrogance, etc. However, there are *degrees* in the way in which such gifts are developed or incorporated by a good will A and a good will B. So the good will A can be more successful, for instance, in developing and maintaining moderation in passions than the good will B, so that the former must be taken to be morally better than the latter. This is so because moderation in passions and other gifts require *experience* to be appropriately developed. So, although a good will is incompatible with stupidity, which Kant defines as "the lack of the power of judgment",²⁸ it is the case that the capacity to judge must be "sharpened by experience".²⁹ So a good will A can be more experienced in the practice of moral judgment and, to that extent, morally better than a less experienced good will B.³⁰ Therefore, the whole

of goodness a good will actually achieves makes a difference in our estimation of it, insofar as success (or lack thereof) is not due to fortune. The more morally relevant gifts a good will actually achieves through its activity, the better it is. Indeed, since happiness is not morally irrelevant, it must be admitted that a good will A combined with happiness is morally better than a good will B that fails in achieving happiness.

The point is that the goodness of a good will should not be conceived as a *fixed quantum*. Instead, as I observed above, we should conceive of the good will as a kind of substance capable of a peculiar kind of causality, namely, an activity in accordance with the moral law. So we should conceive of the relationship between the good will and the gifts in *dynamical* terms. Therefore, the good will in its activity must be conceived as a continuous striving for the morally better, ideally, for the highest good, the summum bonum, it is in principle able to achieve.

In contradistinction to recent interpretations, I have been trying to show that Kant's concept of a (good) will plays a foundational and primary role in his analysis of common moral cognition in *Groundwork* I. However, it is easy to show that that could be extended to the rest of the book (perhaps to the rest of his entire practical philosophy). In fact, the pivotal passages in the other two sections of the *Groundwork* also start from the concept of the will. So, in *Groundwork* II Kant starts from the concept of a determinate kind of causality, a causality of a rational being, which, in opposition to any other causality in nature, "has the capacity to act *in accordance with the representation* of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will", in search of such principles, among them the one that is represented by finite rational being like ourselves as a categorical imperative. Finally, when he wants to provide a proof that the categorical imperative is actually valid for finite rational beings in *Groundwork* III, Kant appeals to an indirect proof. Accordingly, he shows first that freedom is necessarily presupposed as a property of that capacity or power, namely the will, analyzed in the previous section, from which it follows analytically the validity of the categorical imperative for a will as the law of its freedom.³¹

REFERENCES

- Ameriks, K. "Kant on the Good Will", in *Interpreting Kant's Critiques*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003.
- Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Ed. By Jonathan Barnes and transl. by W.D. Ross, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Esteves, J. "The Primacy of the Good Will", *Kant-Studien* 105 (2014), 83–112.
- Kant, I. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Ed. and transl. by Paul Guyer & Allen Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- _____. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Ed. and transl. by M. J. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- _____. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Ed. and transl. by M. J. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Paton, H. J. *The Categorical Imperative: a Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy*. London: Hutchinson & Co, 1947.

Wood, A. W. *Kant's Ethical Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

_____. "The Good without Limitation", in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Christoph Horn and Dieter Schoenecker, Berlin and New York : Walter de Gruyter, 2006.

ABSTRACT: There are two opposed tendencies in the interpretation of the good will: the interpreters consider either the value of the gifts of nature and fortune in isolation or apart from their combination with a good will or the value of the good will completely apart from its relation to the gifts. I dealt with the first interpretative tendency in a previous paper. Here I draw some implications from my thesis of the primacy of the good will in order to deal with the second interpretative tendency, which can be seen in authorized Kant's interpreters, such as Karl Ameriks and Allen Wood.

KEYWORDS: good will, substance, condition of the goodness, gifts of nature and fortune.

NOTES

1 I would like to thank Fred Rauscher for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper and also for correcting and improving the English of it. I would like to thank CAPES for granting me a scholarship to work as a Visiting Research Scholar in the Department of Philosophy at Michigan State University, where a substantial part of this paper was written.

2 Julio Esteves is professor at Northern Fluminense State University and a CNPq researcher. Among his articles on Kant's philosophy are "Mußte Kant Thesis und Antithesis der dritten Antinomie der 'Kritik der reinen Vernunft' vereinbaren?", "The Primacy of the Good Will" and "The Alleged Incompatibility between the Concepts of Practical Freedom in the Dialectic and in the Canon of the Critique of Pure Reason" in *Kant-Studien*; "The Noncircular Deduction of the Categorical Imperative in *Groundwork III*" in *Kant in Brazil*.

3 "The Primacy of the Good Will", *Kant-Studien*. Volume 105, Issue 1, 2014, 83–112.

4 I use the following English translations: *Critique of Pure Reason* (KrV), Ed. and transl. by Paul Guyer & Allen Wood. Cambridge 1998. *Critique of Practical Reason* (KpV), Ed. and transl. by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge 1997. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (GMS). Ed. and transl. by M. J. Gregor. Cambridge 1998. Citations are to the volume and page of the German text followed immediately by reference to the corresponding page numbers in the English translations.

5 Cf. *Metaphysics* 1003 a30-b19.

6GMS, AA 04: 394.13-26.

7 "Kant on the Good Will", in: *Interpreting Kant's Critiques*, Oxford 2003, 193-211.

8 Paton, Herbert. J.: *The Categorical Imperative*. London 1947, 40.

9Ameriks, "Kant on the Good Will", 196.

10See Ameriks, "Kant on the Good Will", 195.

11 See *Kant's Ethical Thought*, Cambridge 1999, 22.

12 GMS, AA 04: 393:7-8.

13 GMS, AA 04: 394:8 (emphasis from the original).

14 Ameriks, "Kant on the Good Will", 198.

15 KpV, AA 05:110:92-3.

16 So, completely in line with *Groundwork I*, Kant states in the Second *Critique* "that *virtue* as worthiness to be happy is the *supreme condition* of whatever can even seem to us desirable and hence of all pursuit of happiness and ... is therefore the *supreme good*" (KpV, AA 05:110:92, emphasis from the original).

17 GMS, AA 04: 446:52 (emphasis from the original).

18 Fred Rauscher objected here that in the 3rd example of application of the Categorical Imperative, Kant says we ought to develop those talents for "all sorts of ends". – The appeal to Paton is of no help here. He says that Kant means the development of talents in general, but "particularly those talents which distinguish man from the brutes" (op. cit., p.155). Now, man has distinctively, for example, the particular talent to promote things like the Holocaust. Is it a duty, in Kantian sense, to develop such a talent? Of

course not. This is exactly the point Fred Rauscher is making. But, if one reads carefully Kant's text, one will see that, although he talks vaguely and indistinctly of developing talents "useful for all sorts of purposes", he means thereby only "fortunate natural predispositions" (seiner gluecklichen Naturanlagen). I think that such "fortunate natural dispositions" are exactly what I referred to as "morally favorable natural dispositions", in my paper. They are called "favorable natural dispositions" because they are not conducive to actions contrary to the call of duty. Of course, such fortunate natural dispositions and talents can serve for all sorts of (morally good) ends, and ought to that extent be developed.

19 Otherwise, the imperative "don't be stupid!", very common in daily life, would make no sense.

20 Fred Rauscher tries to save Marie Antoinette from the accusation of being a person of a bad will, by arguing that it depends on the precise time I judge her action. If I correctly understand his point, he thinks that we may regard her "advice" to the French people as the best she could do at the basis of the knowledge then available to her. – Granted, at the basis of my present state of knowledge, if I witness a person having a heart attack, I will call 911, instead of trying to do something by myself, since I am not trained in CPR. But, given that I am aware that such a thing might happen to me (namely, to witness a person's heart attack, not to have one!), one could justifiably claim that I am blameworthy for not having studied CPR in order to be prepared for such a situation, in accordance with duty of beneficence. Otherwise, I am not eligible to be a person of a good will. However, I could reply in my defense that I am so a clumsy and unskillful person, that, even having studied CPR, I would better call 911 in cases of heart attack. But, imagine Marie Antoinette trying to exculpate herself by arguing that, given her ignorance on the real conditions of her people, her infamous advice was the best thing she could have done. Now, I think that, in contradistinction to a particular skill, like CPR, in which not everyone is expected to be trained, or, once trained, to be able to exercise, a queen is justifiably expected to be aware of the real conditions of her people, because it does not concern to a particular or contingent skill that must be studied, but a talent that every human being has to have, simply insofar as he or she possesses and exercises reason.

21 It should be stressed that I am dealing here with the good will as a particular component in a situation, and not with what Ameriks calls the "the general capacity view" of the good will. As Ameriks correctly says, a good will as a general capacity is compatible with a bad particular intention, and, I add, even with stupidity too, because a capacity is something one does not lose, even when one fails to exercise it in a particular circumstance. As he correctly observes, "it is obviously a general capacity of persons to will that must be meant as the source of [the] value ... that grounds their being respected as absolute ends" (Ameriks, "Kant on the Good Will", 199). So, although she was to blame for her ignorance in relation to the real conditions of her people, Marie Antoinette should not have been so brutally executed.

22 KrV, B/ 224.

23 "The Good without Limitation", in *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. Christoph Horn and Dieter Schoenecker, Berlin and New York : Walter de Gruyter 2006, 28.

24 See "The Good without Limitation", 27-8.

25 See "The Good without Limitation", 29.

26 GMS, AA 04: 394:8-12.

27 GMS, AA 04: 393:9-11.

28 KrV, A 133/B 172.

29 GMS, AA 04: 389: 15.

30 I think that such a view is reflected in the proverb: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions". For the morally good intentions of a less experienced good will, when acted upon, may have undesirable bad consequences. - Note that this must be distinguished from the case of Marie Antoinette discussed above. For, being the Queen of France, at that point, she was reasonably expected to have a power of judgment appropriately sharpened by experience.

31 See in that regard my "The Noncircular Deduction of the Categorical Imperative in *Groundwork* III". In: F.Rauscher, D. Perez eds., *Kant in Brazil*. North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy. Rochester: Rochester University Press 2012, 155-72.

Recebido / Received: 07/09 /14

Aprovado / Approved: 29/09/14

WHEN THE STRICTEST RIGHT IS THE GREATEST WRONG: KANT ON FAIRNESS

Alice Pinheiro WALLA¹

I. THE RIGHT OF THE STATE TO REDISTRIBUTE.

To the supreme commander there belongs **indirectly**, that is, insofar as he has taken over the duty of the people, the right to impose taxes on the people for **its own preservation**, such as taxes to support organisations providing for the poor, founding homes and church organisations, usually called charitable or pious institutions.

The general will of the people has united itself into a society which is to maintain itself perpetually; and for this end it has submitted itself to the internal authority of the state in order to maintain those members of the society who are unable to maintain themselves. For reasons of state (*Von Staats wegen*) the government is therefore **authorized** to constrain the wealthy (*die Vermögenden*) to provide the means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide for even their most necessary natural needs. The wealthy have acquired an **obligation to the commonwealth**, since they owe their existence to an act of submitting to its protection and care, which they need in order to live; **on this obligation the state now bases its right** to contribute what is theirs to maintaining their fellow citizens. (MS 6: 325-6, my emphasis)²

The above passage belongs to Kant's account of the *Right of the State* (*Staatsrecht*) in the public right section of the *Doctrine of Right*. More precisely, it is part of the "general remark on the juridical effects that follow from the nature of the civil union" (*Allgemeine Anmerkung von den rechtlichen Wirkungen aus der Natur des bürgerlichen Vereins*). In this passage, Kant speaks not of a duty, but of a **right** which pertains to the supreme commander (*Oberbefehlshaber*) **indirectly**, as *Übernehmer der Pflicht des Volks* (as "overtaker" of the duty of the people). It is important to note that Kant is here explaining a right pertaining to the *executive* power of the state. In the previous sections, Kant explained the rights of the three powers of the state, as personified by the legislator (*Gesetzgeber*, RL §46), the commander (*Regierer*, §48) and the judge (*Richter*, §49), the so called *trias politica* (MS RL §45 at VI: 313); the "general remark" is clearly connected to these sections: § A refers to the former discussion of the right of the legislator in §§ 51-52, B refers to the discussion in § and C.³

Since the role of the *Oberbefehlshaber* consists not in making laws but in *enforcing* the laws of the *Gesetzgeber* (the legislative), there is reason to understand *Übernehmer* in the sense of *Ausführer* (the one that *executes*) of the duty of the people (whatever this duty is).⁴ Kant is therefore not saying that the supreme commander has a *duty* to provide for the poor, but that it has the *right* to tax the rich to support the poor, as the executive power in the state. The function of the supreme commander does is thus to *enforce* the duty of the people. The translation of *Übernehmer* as "taking over" the duty of the people is thus misleading. It suggests that the duty of the people has been somehow *transferred* to the supreme commander, who is

now the bearer of that obligation. In a similar line of (mis-) interpretation, Allen Rosen argued that the ruler takes *over the duty of benevolence* of the people (by which Rosen must mean *benevolence*), since “no other duty fits the description.” The ruler has thus a duty of benevolence towards its subjects which is derived “without reducing or eliminating” individuals ethical duty of benevolence. The right to tax is thus derived *indirectly* from the duty of benevolence of the people, Rosen argues.⁵

But what is the duty of the people (*Pflicht des Volks*) the *Oberfehlshaber* is enforcing with taxation of the rich? It cannot be the duty of benevolence of individuals: as an ethical duty, benevolence implies the free adoption of the moral end (the happiness of others) by individual agents. Benevolence cannot be coerced from outside by the state. However, since Rosen argues that the state has *itself* a duty of benevolence, it would be taxing individuals as a means to comply with *its own duty*, and not to make individuals comply with *theirs*. However, there still are several problems with this interpretation. Firstly, even if the *Oberhaupt*, who is a *physical* person, is also the bearer of duties of virtue, one should not confuse the *ethical motivation* of the *Oberhaupt* to comply with the regulative idea of Right (which is always *uncoerced*, since there is no greater authority above him) with the assumption that the *Oberhaupt* qua representative of the people has only duties of *virtue* towards the people. As I shall argue, whatever duties the *Oberhaupt* qua *Oberhaupt* has towards the people, these must be understood as juridical duties, although *non coercible* ones. This is necessary, in order to avoid state paternalism; a benevolent *Oberhaupt*, that is, one which uses state means to make people happy, is a form of despotism in Kant’s account. This does not apply to the *moral* *Oberhaupt*, who guides himself by the idea of the general will, even though he is not externally coerced to do so. I shall discuss this view in the next section, in conjunction with Kant’s criticism of Hobbes in *Theory and Practice*.

Kant argues that the general will of the people has united itself into a society, which is to perpetuate itself. For this end, namely, the perpetuation of civil society, the general will of the people has subjected itself to the internal state power, in order to maintain those members of society which cannot support themselves. For “a reason of state” (*Von Staatswegen*), which seems to follow directly from the previous argument about the united will of the people, the government is therefore justified (*ist also die Regierung berechtigt*) to constrain the rich to provide the means for the preservation of the poor. Kant then adds that the *existence* of the rich is at the same time an *act of subjection* to the protection and providence of the Commonwealth (*gemeinen Wesen*) to which they have obligated themselves (*wozu sie sich verbindlich gemacht haben*). In other words, the state bases its right to contribute what belongs to the rich to the preservation of their fellow citizens *on the existence of the rich*.⁶ Provision for the poor seems therefore to follow from the idea of a united will of the people. But what does this exactly mean?

In the *Common Saying*, providing for the poor was included among the state policies of “public happiness” such as population control, restrictions on imports or any other incentive to flourishing (TP VIII: 299). Since these policies aim to improve the strength and stability of the commonwealth and not to “make people happy against their will”, the state is *permitted* to implement laws aimed at public happiness. In the above passage of the *Doctrine of Right* (from the section on “The Right of States”), Kant seems to be making the same claim, namely, that

the preservation of the *state* itself requires maintaining those members of society who are not able to meet their basic needs. However, a closer look at the original shows that provision for the poor is not thought as a means to preserve the state, but the *people*. The aim of taxation of the rich is thus directly the preservation of members of the state, and not a mere means to the perpetuation of the state.

Mary Gregor's translation is ambiguous and could be interpreted as if "its own preservation" refers to the *state*, instead of to the *people*. However, Kant was himself aware of the ambiguity and added a parenthesis to show that "its own preservation" refers to the people (*des Volks*) and not to the state (*Dem Oberbefehlshaber steht indirect, d.i. als Übernehmer der Pflicht des Volkes, das Recht zu, dieses mit Abgaben zu seiner (des Volks) eigenen Erhaltung zu belasten*. MS VI: 326, my emphasis). This is reinforced further in the same passage:

This can be done either by imposing a tax on the property or commerce of citizens, or by establishing funds and using the interest from them, **not for the needs of the state** (for it is rich) **but for the needs of the people**. (MS 6: 326, my emphasis)

In contrast to the clearly instrumentalist passage in the *Common Saying*, the passage of the *Metaphysics of Morals* does not *reduce* provision for the poor to the perpetuation of the civil order. As Kant observes, the state has a right to charge the people with the duty of not knowingly let abandoned children perish despite the fact that these children are "an unwelcome addition to the population". There is no indication that saving and providing for "unwanted" children is an instrument for the preservation of the commonwealth.

Kant argues that providing for abandoned children should be done in a way that offends "neither rights nor morality," whether by imposing a special tax on wealthy unmarried people (*Hagestolzen beiderlei Geschlechts (worunter die vermögenden Ledigen verstanden werden)*)⁷ "who are partly to blame for there being abandoned children" or in another way (MS VI: 326-7). A *Hagestolze* is someone who remains unmarried *by choice*, although he or she has the financial means to start a family. Although the term is now restricted to older unmarried persons (50 years old onwards, usually of the male sex), Kant clearly has the first definition in mind. *Hagestolze* met traditionally with strong social disapproval and were also disadvantaged in terms of rights, as remaining unmarried was not only against the states' interest in high birth rates, but also associated with indecent behaviour. In Prussia, as Germany, there was a special legislation concerning heritage rights of wealthy unmarried people (*Hagestolzenrecht*).

As Kant notes, children were abandoned either out of necessity or out of shame (*Not oder Scham*). Assuming that the *Hagestolzen* would be averse to marriage but not to sexual life, they would be responsible for the latter, namely those born "out of lock" and abandoned for reasons of "social decency." By mentioning the taxation of unmarried people as a means of social redistribution, Kant could have had in mind precisely the Prussian *Hagestolzenrecht*. However, Kant's judgment on the matter is not that taxing the *Hagestolzen* is the uncontroversial rightful way to provide for abandoned children, but that in the lack of a better solution, i.e. one that violates "neither rights nor morality," taxing wealthy unmarried persons would be the best *possible* way to do so.

Kant justifies the right of the state to tax the wealthy to maintain the poor with the argument that the wealthy owe their existence (as a social class) to the public protection of their property and perpetuation of their social standing (through heritage laws, by enforcing private wills etc...). But their very existence as *beati possidentes* presupposes their subjection and consequently their obligation to the state. Based on that obligation, the state has a right “to contribute what is theirs to maintaining their fellow citizens.” Because the state has a *right*, it is also authorized to *coerce* what would be otherwise left to the good will of individual citizens. In his article “Poverty and Property in Kant’s system of Rights”, Ernst Weinrib argues that the destitute would not be able to consent to entering the state, since accepting a property regime would imply denying oneself access to the basic means of subsistence.⁸ In contrast to the pre-civil condition, in which all resources distinct from someone’s body are at everyone’s disposition, a property regime introduces the dependence of some on the property of others for their subsistence. Because property entails the danger of some persons being reduced to a mere means to others, it seems incompatible with the innate right and the duty of rightful honour (*honeste vive*). Ernst Weinrib sees in Kant’s introduction of a public duty to support the poor the only way of reconciling property with innate right. Because a public duty to support the poor is the precondition for a state in which property is consistent with innate right, unless this duty is fulfilled, the state “forfeits its legitimacy.”⁹

Despite the plausibility of Ernst Weinrib’s argumentation, the problem is Kant’s insistence that the state’s failure to be just *does not undermine its legitimacy*. A legitimate state is in Kant’s conception only the *republican state*, or *the state in the idea*. Although the well-being (*Heil*) of the state lies in the greatest possible conformity of the constitution with the principles of right (*salus reipublicae suprema lex est*, MS VI: 318), all existing state forms and consequently all existing states are merely approximations of the ideal republic in which alone the law is “self-ruling” and depends on no specific person (*wo das Gesetz selbstherrschend ist, und an keiner besonderen Person hängt*, MS RL §52 at VI: 340). Nevertheless, existing states must be regarded as legitimate.

The different forms of states are only the *letter (littera)* of the original legislation in the civil state, and they may therefore remain as long as they are taken, by old and long-standing custom (and so only subjectively), to belong necessarily to the machinery of the constitution. But the *spirit* of the original contract (*anima pacti originarii*) involves an obligation on the part of the constituting authority to make the *kind of government* suited to the idea of the original contract. Accordingly, even if this cannot be done all at once, it is under obligation to change the kind of government gradually and continually so that it harmonizes *in its effect* with the only constitution that accords with right, that of a pure republic, in such a way that the old (empirical) statutory forms, which served merely to bring about the *submission* of the people, are replaced by the original (rational) form, the only form which *makes freedom* the principle and indeed the condition for any exercise of *coercion*, as is required by a rightful constitution of a state in the strict sense of the word. (MS RL §52 at VI: 340-1)

Kant’s theory of the state provides the principles for an approximation to the ideal *Rechtstaat*. In principle, every state is able to reform itself and evolve as close as possible to the ideal republic. The historical origin of a given state (whether it has started with injustice or is the product of a revolution) is therefore irrelevant for its legitimacy. Despite Kant’s vehement

rejection of a right to revolution, he argues that if a revolution succeeds, the people has a duty to obey the new government, regardless of the injustice or violent means behind its access to power (MS VI: 323). Although a revolution is never justified, the newly instituted government must be nevertheless regarded as legitimate. The legitimacy of the pre-republican states lies neither in the way it was created, nor in the degree of its conformity with the principles of right. The distinctive feature of Kant's theory of the state is that state legitimacy is *future oriented*: it lies in the duty to bring existent constitutions as close as possible to the ideal republic.¹⁰ A government which does not provide for the poor would be no less legitimate in Kant's account than one which does. Weinrib's account of the state duty to provide for the poor as the condition for the legitimacy of the state fails, at least as an interpretation of Kant's legal theory.

The recent secondary literature on the Kantian state's provision for the poor leaves us with good suggestions concerning what Kant should have said, given his theoretical commitments, or how the shortcomings of Kant's legal theory can be improved. Unfortunately, none of these contributions has succeeded in explaining why the state ought to provide for the poor independently from those instrumental reasons of state, which are uncontroversial in Kant scholarship. In the following section I shall develop an interpretation of the supreme commander's duty to provide for the poor based on Kant's account of wide right or *Billigkeit* (*fairness*). I back up this claim with a passages of the *Metaphysics of Morals* and of Kant's lectures in which Kant questions the character of the duty of beneficence as a duty of virtue, given the fact that need is often the result of previous injustice. The problem is that although the destitute have a right to *collective aid*, unlike *strict right*, these rights cannot be juridically enforced. This has led to the wrong conclusion that the state or the supreme commander has a duty of virtue towards its subjects.

III. THE COURT OF CONSCIENCE AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE

Consider the following passage of the *Common Saying*:

I will surely not be reproached, because of these assertions, with flattering monarchs too much by such inviolability; so, I hope, I will also be spared the reproach of overstating the case in favour of the people when I say that the people too has its inalienable rights against the head of state, although these cannot be coercive rights. (TP VIII: 303)

In this passage, Kant is making an objection against Hobbes, according to whom the head of state has no obligations towards its subjects and therefore *cannot do them wrong* (*de Cive*, Chap. 7, §14). Kant adds that Hobbes would be right if one understood wrong (*Unrecht*) as that kind of violation (*Läsion*) which involves a corresponding a right to coerce (*Zwangsrecht*) by the part of the wronged person against the one who wrongs her. However, such a proposition, namely, that subjects have coercive rights against the head of state, would be "appalling" (*erschrecklich* TP VIII: 304). The conclusion we can derive from the above passage is that, contra Hobbes, subjects *have* inalienable rights against the head of state, although subjects cannot *coerce* the head of state to respect these rights. In this sense, the *implications* of

Kant's theory may be the same as the Hobbes'; for what is a right which cannot be externally coerced? The question is thus why Kant thinks we should acknowledge such non-coercive rights of the people and which are those rights.

Kant's reason for denying subjects coercive rights against the head of state is that to enforce them would require another coercive power *above the state*. Consequently, the supreme commander would no longer be the supreme commander (MS VI: 319). Because coercive rights against the commander would be self-contradictory and the laws underlying these alleged rights are not fit for external legislation, Bernd Ludwig concludes that these laws cannot be juridical ones. The only motive (*Triebfeder*) the supreme commander could have for bringing the government closer to the idea of the original contract (the united will of the people) would be self-constraint (*Selbstzwang*), i.e. *ethical* motivation. Whether the supreme commander would orient herself by the idea of the rights of the people would thus depend on whether she is a *moral* politician (*moralischer Politiker*, see TP VIII: 372). Natural right is thus the "doctrine of virtue of the government."¹¹

However, we do not have to go into the domain of Ethics and regard the duty of the supreme commander towards its subjects as a duty of virtue. As Kant stresses, subjects have rights, despite the fact that these are non-enforceable ones. Ludwig argues that such rights are not addressed in the *Doctrine of Virtue* because they are significant neither to the person who has an ethical duty nor to the person to whom the duty is directed.¹² Since ethical duties must be self-compelled, they cannot be claimed from outside with appeal to the notion of a corresponding right. The notion of rights is therefore superfluous to Ethics. Although this is correct, we do not need to disagree with Kant's understanding of Ethics for rejecting the interpretation of the right of the people against the *Oberhaupt* as ethical rights.

As Kant stresses in his lectures, ethics is opposed to *strict right* but *not to right as such*.¹³ Since the state is required for the omnilateral enforcement of right, public right must be regarded as *ius strictum*, that is, as including only those laws which can be externally coerced. However, Kant acknowledges that there are juridical rights which cannot be externally enforced, i.e. rights in a wider sense (*ius latium*, MS VI: 234). Identifying the rights of subjects as *wide rights* instead of transforming them into ethical (pseudo-) rights has the advantage of making better sense of Kant's objection against Hobbes. It neither plays down the notion of rights nor renders it an "appalling proposition" by accepting the right to coerce the head of state. Furthermore, there is another important reason for maintaining the notion of rights in this case. It is only when individual's have rights that they can be said to be *wronged*. Identifying where states can wrong their subjects is of great importance for the improvement of existing governments even if subjects cannot legally coerce respect for their rights. As I will show in this section, this is precisely the reason why Kant acknowledges non-coercive rights of the people against the head of state. In contrast, no one is wronged if I fail to comply with my duty of benevolence towards them. True, I fail to treat them as ends in themselves, but am not using them merely as means to my ends.

Kant's discussion of wide right appears in the context of his concern to distinguish the "wavering principles" of *ius aequivocum* (ambiguous right) from the "firm basic principles" of

strict right, which are the principles of the state. As Kant stresses, “without making incursions into the domain of ethics, there are two cases which lay claim upon a decision about rights”, (*ohne ins Gebiet der Ethik einzugreifen, gibt es zwei Fälle, die auf Rechtsentscheidung Anspruch machen*, MS VI: 233). These are equity or fairness (*aequitas, Billigkeit*) and the right of necessity (*Nothrecht, ius necessitatis*), both instances of ambiguous right. Only equity turns out to be a true matter of right (=right without coercion) whereas necessity is coercion without right and consequently no true right at all.

As I shall explain, *ius aequivocum* is the tendency to mistake objective Right with the subjective verdict of a court of justice. In other words, *ius aequivocum* is a *vitium subreptionis*. The fact that Kant associates equity with ambiguous right does not disqualify equity *as such* as genuine source of rights: it is not a matter of beneficence or kindness to others, but of *justice*, based on the principle of right and not on the principle of ethics.¹⁴ Equity belongs to the category of ambiguous right because despite having a right, the right holder does not have the conditions required for a judge to determine how her claim can be satisfied (MS VI: 234). The ambiguity of equity lies on the distinction between *what is right in itself* as opposed to what is *laid down as right*, that is, *statutory law*. Although we can recognize as private individuals what would be a fair decision in a given situation, a public court of law must orient itself by statutory laws for its verdict.

The question here is not merely what is *right in itself*, that is, how every human being has to judge about it on his own, but what is right before a court, that is, what is laid down as right. [...] It is a common fault (*vitium subreptionis*) of experts on right to *misrepresent*, as if it were also the objective principle of what is right in itself, **that rightful principle which a court is authorized and indeed bound to adopt for its own use (hence for a subjective purpose)** in order to pronounce and judge what belongs to each as his right, although the latter is very different from the former. (MS VI: 297, my emphasis)

A condition of public right requires that rights conflicts be settled by a public court of justice and not by the private agents themselves, as is the case in the state of nature. The interesting (and confusing) aspect of Kant’s theory in this respect is that although judgments of rights in the state of nature are “private”, they nevertheless are said to be *objective* (“right in itself”), whereas the decision of a public court of justice has despite its public validity a *subjective* character. “Subjective” in this case refers to the *principles* a court of justice is constrained to apply in its judgment, for statutory laws are *empirical* principles, as opposed to purely rational principles of right. Although a judge in her own private judgment will be able to recognize the equity claims of a certain person, as a *public* judge her judgment will be constrained by different (subjective) criteria from her judgment as a private person.

The right of necessity (*Nothrecht*) is the “seeming” right to take the life of an innocent in order to save one’s own life. Kant uses as an example the classic plank of Carneades: someone pushes another shipwreck from a plank in order to save herself from drowning. In contrast to other theorists who recognize a right to self-preservation, Kant argues that such an action can never be in accordance with the law, even if necessary to preserve one’s life. The agent is guilty not only from an ethical, but also from a *juridical* perspective: she is *wronging* an innocent person.

The true reason why such actions from “necessity” are nevertheless not punished by law is that it is not possible to *prevent* them with threats of punishment (MS VI: 236). Even if penal law were to punish with death whoever kills an innocent to save her life, this would not have the intended effect (deterrence) because a “threat of an ill that is still *uncertain* (death by a judicial verdict) cannot outweigh the fear of an ill that is *certain* (drowning).” No punishment threatened by the law could be greater than the imminent loss of the agent’s own life (MS VI: 235-6). Unless an agent is *ethically motivated* to spare the life of an innocent at the cost her own preservation, she would have no sufficient *prudential* reasons for doing so, at least psychologically. The *impossibility* of deterring anyone in such a condition is what creates the illusion that killing an innocent to preserve one’s life is *if not a right*, then at least *permissible* (not against right) or excusable. This is the reason why the right of necessity must be included under *ius aequivocum*: the tendency to mistake *Nothrecht* for a real right lies on the conflation between what is *prescribed* (or in this case, *prohibited*) by right itself (objectively, as the *court of conscience*) and what a court of justice *must decide* (subjectively). Although from the perspective of objective right we have the violation of another’s right, a court of justice will not punish this violation.

Although also part of *ius aequivocum*, equity claims are *genuine* juridical rights although no *coercive* rights.¹⁵ They are juridical because they are based on the principle of right and non-coercive because no judge can be appointed to render a public decision concerning this right (MS VI: 234). Kant gives the example of a trading firm (*Maskopei*)¹⁶ whose terms is that partners are to share profits equally. However, one partner has worked more than the others and therefore loses more when the company meets with reverses. By equity, the hard working partner would be entitled to more compensation than the other partners. Another example is the domestic servant whose agreed wage loses value due to inflation (*verschlechterte Münzsorte*, MS VI: 234). Equity would require that the servant be compensated accordingly. However, Kant argues that a court of justice would reject both equity claims. The reason lies on the available conditions for the decision of a public court of justice (MS VI: 296). Since there were no specifications in the contract concerning such possibilities, the judge would have no *determinate* conditions for making a judgement, since she is constrained to base her decision on what is *publicly stated* in the contract (*Declaration*).¹⁷ We thus have a case in which our conception of what would be just in a given situation, i.e. the verdict of *the court of conscience*, departs from what the *court of justice* must regard as just in the same case. Although the *court of conscience* declares that the more strictly we apply the statutory right, the more we *wrong* the person who has an equity claim (*summum ius summa injuria*), the court of justice is not allowed to proceed otherwise, if it is to preserve its public character. Equity is “a mute divinity who cannot be heard” (MS VI: 234) by a public court of justice (although it can still be heard by the court of conscience, i.e. by reason). The only possibility to address the equity claim in this case is that the other party (the other partners in the trading company, the servant’s employer) recognizes the equity claim and freely chooses to waive her right to enforce the precise terms of the contract.

The ambiguity of wide right lies in a tendency to conflate the verdicts of private and public reasoning about rights (or of *commutative* and *distributive* justice). Natural law can be recognized by everyone *a priori*: it is what is right *in itself*, before the court of conscience (*forum*

poli: the marketplace or also the court of heaven, MS VI: 235). Statutory right, in contrast, is based on *actual* civil constitutions and therefore on empirical principles (MS VI: 297). Given its public character, a court of justice (*forum soli*, the earthly court)¹⁸ is not allowed to make use of “guesses” (presumptions) concerning what is right in itself, but must restrict itself to contracts and existing regulations. But what does Kant mean when he says a judge would be “guessing” when judging an equity claim? In a lecture, Kant argues that if the intentions of agents could be made public, i.e. if we could know with certainty what the parties *actually intended* when making a contract, equity would no longer go unheard (Quote). This suggests that the problem with equity would be a mere epistemic limitation. A public judge would have to “guess” people’s original intentions, while having no appropriate evidence for his verdict. But this is implausible. Anyone can understand that it is a disadvantage to lose money when a currency is depreciated and that no one would have agreed to those terms if she could foresee inflation. It seems also clear that no one would willingly agree to do more for her company if she knew it would mean greater loss to herself at the end. If the parties did not state these details in the contract, it was because they did not foresee changes in the background conditions directly affecting her interests in the contract. If so, what is actually left for a judge to guess?

I take Kant to mean that the difficulty lies not on whether there is an equity claim or not, but on the possibility of determining *the extent* to which the equity claim can be satisfied. As Kant formulates in the *Maskopei* example of the *Doctrine of Right*, a judge would not have determinate information (*data*) to decide *how much* according to the contract the person should be compensated (*keine bestimmten Angaben (data) hat, um, wie viel nach dem Kontrakt ihm zukomme, auszumachen*, MS VI: 234). The problem is thus not indeterminacy concerning the possible intentions of the involved parties, but the public need for an efficient *unified* standard for decision making. This idea is further developed in Kant’s discussion of “subjectively conditioned acquisition through the verdict of a public court of justice”. Kant discusses in this section the different standards for determining the rightful owners of objects in the state of nature and in the civil condition.

In the state of nature, what belongs to each is determined by commutative justice, as a matter of personal rights. In a condition of distributive justice, however, what belongs to each person must be determined in accordance with public principles, which enable public justice to function *most readily* and *surely*. Although distributive justice is about “giving each what belongs to them”, this will be done differently from the way one would reason in the state of nature, i.e. in accordance with the principles of commutative justice. For the sake of a court’s verdict (*in favorem iustitia distributivae*), A’s *personal right* against B, who stole her horse, has to be treated instead as a right *to a thing*, namely as the right of C to the horse she acquired legally in the market. This is because although the seller’s acquisition of the horse is unlawful (the horse is stolen), C bought the animal in accordance with the rules of the market. Although *commutative justice* establishes the personal right of A against B in regard to her horse, and would thus recognize A as the legal owner, *distributive justice* will recognize C as the legal owner of the horse. This is because having to investigate the title of possession of every seller before buying something would go to infinity. Thus customers are not bound to investigate this every time. In a condition of distributive justice, what matters for rightful acquisition is merely that

it be *formally* correct, as specified in accordance with statutory laws (MS VI: 301). Conversely, a *right to a thing* in the state of nature may be treated as a *personal right* in order to satisfy the subjective conditions required for the verdict of a court of justice, as in the proposition “purchase breaks a lease” (*Kauf bricht Miete*, MS VI: 303)

So it is only for the sake of a court’s verdict (*in favorem iustitiae distributivae*) that a right to a thing is taken and treated not *as it is in itself* (as a right against a person) but as it can be *most readily* and *surely judged* (as a right to a thing), and yet in accordance with a pure a priori principle. - On this principle various statutory laws (ordinances) are subsequently based, the primary purpose of which is to set up conditions under which alone a way of acquiring is to have rightful force, conditions *such that a judge* can assign to each what is his *most readily and with least hesitation*. (MS VI: 302)

The reason why one must abide by what is laid down as right, as opposed to what we can recognize as right in itself, is that it is a necessary condition for the existence of a functioning system of public laws.¹⁹ For the sake of the same “public interest” in maintaining a system of public justice, equity must “remain unheard” by a court of justice. Unless judges restrict their verdicts to the application of statutory laws, a condition of public justice would be made superfluous and be replaced by the principles of private right. By this it becomes clear that the civil condition for Kant is not merely the use of state coercion for enforcing pre-civil rights; it also requires a the introduction of unified system of positive laws, whose institution will lead to different results from what we recognize as just according to common sense reasoning about justice. There is therefore a “price” to pay for living under a condition of distributive justice. The reason why we must be willing to pay this price, however, is not self-interest, but the fact that we have a *duty* to enter the civil condition and improve existing constitutions and forms of government towards the ideal republic.

IV. STATE PROVISION FOR THE POOR AS AN IDEAL OF JUSTICE.

What I have others must do without: - my powder takes away the flour of others (...) The sum of welfare does not increase according to the proportion of earnings: and I am always unjust, when I take away a considerable part of their welfare, since I only add a little to my own. (Praktische Philosophie Herder, XXVII: 51, my translation)²⁰

Kant is well aware of the historical and political sources of social inequality, which brings about both the needy person, who must depend on the beneficence of others and the “benefactor,” who is in a position to help. There are several such statements in Kant’s works in which he attempts to dispel the illusion that we are dealing of a meritorious duty instead of a duty of indebtedness. Although most of these passages can be found in Kant’s lectures and notes, there are also clear statements in Kant’s published, late works, which confirms that Kant did not abandon or revise his position. Consider the casuistic question Kant poses to the reader in the *Doctrine of Virtue*:

Having the resources to practice such beneficence as depends on the goods of fortune is, for the most part, a result of certain human beings being favored through the injustice of the government, which introduces an inequality of wealth that makes others need their beneficence. Under such

circumstances, does a rich man's help to the needy, on which he so readily prides himself as something meritorious, really deserve to be called beneficence at all? (MS VI: 454)

Given the systemic character of economic inequality, the duty to help alleviate the need of others acquires a problematic status. While it is true that as mere needy, vulnerable beings we are naturally dependent on each other's help and must thus regard ourselves as "united by nature in one dwelling place so that [we] can help each other" (MS VI:453), poverty-related dependence cannot be addressed in the same way. As the result of the injustice of actual governments, by which some are disadvantaged while others are benefited, helping others in need must be seen as a matter of *juridical* instead of ethical duty. We often fail to recognize this due to the complexity of systematic injustice: not only because the historical sources of injustice lie in the past, but because no particular individuals can be identified as perpetrators. As a distinctive feature of systemic injustice, Kant observes that...

One may take a share in the general injustice, even though one does nobody any wrong by civil laws and practices. So if we now do a kindness to an unfortunate, we have not made a free gift to him, but repaid him what we were helping to take away through a general injustice. For if none might appropriate more of this world's goods than his neighbour, there would be no rich folk, but also no poor. Thus even acts of kindness are acts of duty and indebtedness, arising from the rights of others." (Moral Collins, XXVII: 416)

And again...

If we have taken something away from a person and do him a kindness when in need, that is not generosity but a poor recompense for what has been taken from him. Even the civil order is so arranged that we participate in public and general oppressions, and thus we have to regard an act we perform for another, not as an act of kindness and generosity, but as a small return of what we have taken from him in virtue of the general arrangement. All acts and duties, moreover, arising from the right of others, are the greatest of our duties to others. (Moral Collins, XXVII: 432)

As these passages make clear Kant believes that the needy in this case have a *right* to help, as compensation for the injustice underlying their condition. The help they get from the charity of others is but a small, if not cynical compensation for the wrongs done to them in the first place in virtue of the "general arrangement." It is important therefore to clarify which is the right in question: it is **not a right to the beneficence of others** (for there is no such a right), but **a right to reparation or at least compensation for their condition of dependence** which forcefully results from the general arrangement of society. The poor has been wronged by society not because individuals are not beneficent enough, but because their economic dependence is a side effect of civil society. Beneficence as such cannot compensate the poor for the wrong done to them in society. The problem is that although this duty implies corresponding rights, it is not possible to identify *who should satisfy the claims of the poor and to what extent these claims must be satisfied*. A person could be entitled to more compensation for suffered wrongs than the mere provision for her basic needs (for instance, a poor person whose grandparents were slaves or whose family property was stolen during the Nazi regime).

This past injustice is the cause of the present generation's disadvantage, just as inheritance rights enable wealth to be conserved within several generations and enlarges inequality between the members of society (TP VIII: 293, ll. 14-9). Compensation would require the possibility of determining how much a person has been the victim of systematic injustice, which seems, if not impossible, wholly unpractical for the system of justice. The indeterminacy of these rights in regard to its *addressees* (who has the duty to address these rights?) and to its *extent* (how much should be given to the person as a compensation?) has led to the illusion that a person who cannot provide for her most basic needs has *no right to subsistence* and that her survival must be instead the object of other's beneficence. If someone cannot claim a right to be helped *from me*, it does not entail that she has no right to subsistence at all.²¹ The diffusion of responsibility in this case can only be addressed as a matter of a *social duty*.

There is a clear a parallel between the impossibility of claiming subsistence rights against the state and satisfying equity claims in a court of justice; both are based on rights we can recognize privately through reason (as objective rights) but which fall out of the scope of public statutory laws. Both are matters of *wide right*. Strict right cannot address social inequality, as *material* injustice; it can only address *formal* inequality before the law, according to what is publicly specified in statutory laws ("laid down as right"). The reason for this is not that the Kantian state is a *Rechtsstaat*, whose function is only to apply the pure principles of Right, but the fact that distributive justice cannot appeal to the principles of commutative justice for compensating systemic injustice, since this would require investigating how each person came to be disadvantaged in society, as opposed to mere personal lack of industry or imprudence. We have therefore an *ambiguous right scenario* in which (i) our private intuitions about justice *differ* from a public conception of what is just and (ii) we tend to take the public verdict of justice to be what justice commands *objectively*. While equity tells us that victims of systemic injustice have a right to compensation, strict right does not see poverty and destitution as a violation of rights (no one is harming or taking away anything from the poor; no one is excluding them from opportunities of working their way up). The problematic aspect of Kant's theory of right is that while we must commit ourselves to a public system justice as a necessary condition for civil society, we nevertheless have the resources for recognizing rights which cannot be properly addressed by public justice.

The poor have thus an *equity claim* to compensation for their disadvantage in society. This means that granting a right to basic subsistence would be, again, "only a small return of what we have taken from him in virtue of the general arrangement". In other words, the poor has *at least* an equity right to basic subsistence against the commonwealth although this will be a *non-enforceable right* against the head of state. My interpretation is supported by Kant's claim that provision for those members who cannot provide for themselves can be derived from the united will of the people (*allgemeine Volkswille*, MS RL §C at VI: 326). As discussed before, the idea of the united will of the people is a device for evaluating the justice of a given law or state policy. Although in existing governments, legislation must be made *as if* it can be regarded as originated from the united will of the people (that is, even if the people itself cannot *actually* agree with the law), in the *ideal* republic legislation would be directly derived from the will of the people: what they must or cannot choose for themselves as rational beings. Provision for the poor would be thus a necessary law of the *republica noumenon*, provided there

were citizens who could not provide for themselves as a consequence of the social contract. However, unlike the Hobbesian state, the rationale of the Kantian state is not *self-preservation*, but the realization of Right.²² Providing for the poor belongs to the primary tasks neither of the executive power nor of the Kantian state. However, insofar as the executive power is bound to execute the laws providing from the united will of the people, and the united will of the people *wants the preservation of its members*, the head of state has an *indirect* right to provide to the poor, as the supreme proprietor (*Obereigentümer*) of the land. The role of this right is thus a merely *regulative* one: it is a right governments *ought* to address if they are to be closer to the ideal just state, but which failure to enforce does not undermine their legitimacy.²³ We can therefore conclude that although the Kantian state is no welfare state, the duty to approach the ideal just state will require the adoption of welfare policies. The institutionalization of aid has also advantages over individual beneficence in solving the problem of basic subsistence rights. It is also more compatible with the requirement to preserve dignity of persons. This is illustrated by one of Kant's comments on the second part of Gottfried Achenwall's *Ius Naturae* (*Erläuterung Achenwall* XIX: 578 N. 8000) in which Kant expresses some thoughts concerning provision for the poor.²⁴

[Poor houses. The helpless poor must be fed and when they are children, cared after. Why? Because we are humans and not beasts. This follows not from the rights of the poor as citizens but from their needs as human beings. **Not without debt (*nicht schuldfreye*), then otherwise it would be only a few.** Who should feed them? It is not the question, whether the state or the citizen, since when the state feeds them, the citizen also feeds them, therefore [the question is] only whether it should depend on the free will of the citizens or on coercion- as a gift or as a contribution (taxation). The latter brings about a concurrence of the candidates to aid: it is a *modus acquirendi* and also a title of claims. Who should however determine the [degree of] helplessness? The magistrate, who knows his citizens? And the contribution happens through collection, done by those who are even here the most liberal. The encouragement and directions in general through the cleric. All private beneficence can stay, but it is ignored by the magistrate and by the cleric. These are *opera supererogationis*. (*Erläuterung Achenwall*, XIX: 578 (N. 8000, 3-4. J 117), my translation and emphasis).

In the comment, Kant argues that the duty to help does not follow from the right of the poor as citizens, but from their needs as human beings. This is because “we are humans and not beasts”. Kant seems to be treating poverty as the object of a duty of beneficence. He adds however a very ambiguous, elliptic sentence: *nicht schuldfreye, denn da würde es wenige sein*. At first, Kant seems to be saying that the poor is itself to blame, otherwise there would be few poor people. But this seems implausible when considering that Kant is also talking about children: *hülfflose Arme müssen ernährt und, wenn sie Kinder sind, gepflegt werden*. Further, the idea that the poor is responsible for their own condition contradicts Kant's emphasis in the lectures that beneficence is just a poor compensation for previous injustice. Similar passages are very common in Kant's lectures and notes and the idea is by no means dismissed in the published works.²⁵ Therefore, it is implausible that Kant would now be condemning the poor for their situation. It makes more sense to interpret *nicht schuldfreye* as referring to the persons who have a duty to help: their obligation to help is not free of debt, that is, is by no means purely meritorious.²⁶ Their responsibility also explains the high number of persons in a situation of need. However, the question of who must

carry out provision for the poor, whether the state or citizens themselves, is secondary, for even when the state takes over this duty, it is ultimately the citizens who are the providers. The question is thus merely *how* this should be done, whether through the free will of the citizens (as a “free gift”) or via state coercion (as taxation). Taxation has the advantage of turning provision for the poor into a *modus acquirendi* and also into an *entitlement* (*titulus der Ansprüche*).

When helping others, we are morally required to avoid humiliation to the person helped and creating *dependence; begging*, a practice not only humiliating, but also “closely akin to robbery,” since it manipulates the feelings of pity of other persons, ought to be avoided.²⁷ Contributions should be collected neither by voluntary contributions, assets gradually accumulated nor pious institutions, but by legal levies only. Pious institutions make poverty “a means of acquisition for the lazy” and impose an unjust burden on the people (MS VI: 326). Institutions ought to be regularly reformed in order adapt to the needs of the time, to avoid dependency and begging and to ensure that the taxation of the wealthy is *just*.²⁸ This is only possible if collection of contributions and provision for the poor has a public, institutional character. By creating an entitlement to state help, the state makes it possible to *select* the candidates for help, thereby avoiding dependence. The most vulnerable and destitute in society is thus liberated from having to beg for help and their needs can be treated as they ought to, namely as matters of *right*.

However, not being able to determine with exactitude the extent to which a person has been affected by general injustice, it is not possible to determine how much one should be compensated. Similarly to equity cases, an official determining whether a person is entitled to state aid would have to appeal to what is certain by the standards of statutory law. All we have before us is the degree of concrete disadvantage (one’s ability to provide for herself), but no record of the systemic disadvantages suffered by agents and their ancestors. While having to reconstruct a history of injustice for each individual would be too burdensome, if not impossible, granting basic aid to the poor would not impair the functioning of a system of distributive justice.

REFERENCES

KANT’S WORKS

Cited according to: *Kant’s gesammelte Schriften*, which is commonly referred to as *Akademie-Ausgabe* (Academy Edition), the first volumes of which were edited by the Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften and later by other academies, Berlin: Reimer/de Gruyter (1902 et seq.).

PUBLISHED WORKS

“Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis” [“On the Saying: that may be correct in theory, but is of no use in practice”] (1793), Academy Edition, vol. 8, pp. 273–314.

Die Metaphysik der Sitten [The Metaphysics of Morals] (1797), Academy Edition, vol. 6, pp. 203–493.

PREPARATORY WORK (VORARBEITEN).

Erläuterungen zu G. Achenwalls *Iuris naturalis pars posterior* [Reflections on G. Achenwall's *Iuris naturalis pars posterior*], Academy Edition, vol. 19 (1934), pp. 321–613.

LECTURES

Moral Mrongovius I [Mrongovius notes on Kant's moral philosophy], Academy Edition, vol. 27.

Moral Collins [notes transcribed for or by Collins, 1784-1785], Academy edition, vol. 27.

Moral-Brauer. Accessed via *Kant im Kontext III*, Komplettfassung Werke, Briefwechsel, Nachlass auf Cd-Rom.

OTHER WORKS

Reinhard Brandt, *Eigentumstheorien von Grotius bis Kant*, Frohmann-Holzboog, 1974.

Byrd and Hruschka, *Kant's Doctrine of Right. A Commentary*, Cambridge University Press, 2010

Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm*. 16 Bde. in 32 Teilbänden. Leipzig 1854-1961. Digital edition of the Trier Center for Digital Humanities, University of Trier.

Höffe, "Der Kategorische Rechtsimperativ," In: *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*, Akademie Verlag, 1999.

Bernd Ludwig, *Kants Rechtslehre*, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988.

Allen Rosen, *Kant's Theory of Justice*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993

Ernest J. Weinrib, "Poverty and Property in Kant's system of Rights." *Notre Dame Law Review*, No. 78, Vol. 3, April 2003.

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I put forward an interpretation of the Kantian state that offers an alternative to the traditional minimalist and to recent welfare interpretations of the Kantian state. I show that although the Kantian state has no duty to redistribute, Kant's conception of equity or fairness (*Billigkeit*, MS RL VI: 234) allows the state to recognize redistribution as belonging to the ideal republic (*republica noumenon*), towards which all states have a non-coercible obligation to strive. I back up my interpretation with passages of the *Metaphysics of Morals* and of Kant's lectures in which Kant questions the character of the duty of beneficence as a meritorious duty, given the fact that need is often the result of previous injustice of governments. The problem is that although the destitute have a right to collective aid, unlike strict right, these rights cannot be juridically enforced. This has led to the wrong conclusion that the state or the supreme commander has a duty of virtue towards its subjects and that the poor have no right to aid.

KEYWORDS: Kant's legal philosophy, economic justice, beneficence, equity, redistribution.

NOTES

1 Dr. Alice Pinheiro Walla a Lecturer in Philosophy at University College Cork, Ireland and a post-doctoral researcher in the ERC project "Distortions of Normativity" at the University of Vienna. Her area of specialization is Immanuel Kant, especially his moral, legal and political thought. She is also interested in Moral philosophy, Political philosophy and History of philosophy. She has a Magister degree (Mag.Phil) from the University of Vienna (2006), a Masters of Letters in Philosophy (M.Litt) and Ph.D in Philosophy from the University of St. Andrews (2012).

2 „Dem Oberbefehlshaber steht indirect, d.i. als Übernehmer der Pflicht des Volks, das Recht zu, dieses mit Abgaben zu seiner (des Volks) eigenen Erhaltung zu belasten, als da sind: das Armenwesen, die Findelhäuser und das Kirchenwesen, sonst milde oder fromme Stiftungen genannt.

Der allgemeine Volkswille hat sich nämlich zu einer Gesellschaft vereinigt, welche sich immerwährend erhalten soll, und zu dem Ende sich der inneren Staatsgewalt unterworfen, um die Glieder dieser Gesellschaft, die es selbst nicht vermögen, zu erhalten. Von Staats wegen ist also die Regierung berechtigt, die Vermögenden zu nötigen, die Mittel der Erhaltung derjenigen, die es selbst den nothwendigsten Naturbedürfnissen nach nicht sind, herbei zu schaffen: weil ihre Existenz zugleich als Act der Unterwerfung unter den Schutz und die zu ihrem Dasein nöthige Vorsorge des gemeinen Wesens ist, wozu sie sich verbindlich gemacht haben, auf welche der Staat nun sein Recht gründet, zur Erhaltung ihrer Mitbürger das Ihrige beizutragen.“ (MS VI:326)

3 Bernd Ludwig has rearranged §§45-50 of the *Right of the State (Staatsrecht)* and set the *Allgemeine Anmerkung* in conformity with its title, at the end of Staatsrecht section. See Ludwig, *Kants Rechtslehre*, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988.

4 According to the *Grimm* dictionary of the German Language, *Übernehmer/übernehmen* can be understood both in a wide or narrow sense. In the wide sense: entrepreneurs, negotiatores, operis conductores [Apinus gloss. novum (1728) 201] In the narrow sense: der unternehmer, richtiger doch weniger vorkommend übernehmer ist derjenige, welcher gewerbemässig eine bauarbeit ... ausführt Schönemark-Stüber hochbaulex. 856.

5 Allen Rosen, *Kant's Theory of Justice*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993, p. 179.

6 Weil **Ihre Existenz** zugleich ein Akt der Unterwerfung...ist...**auf welche** der Staat nun sein Recht gründet, zur Erhaltung ihrer Mitbürger das Ihrige Beizutragen.

7 Mary Gregor's translation of *Hagestolzen* as "elderly unmarried people" is therefore not appropriate.

8 Ernest J. Weinrib, "Poverty and Property in Kant's system of Rights." *Notre Dame Law Review*, No. 78, Vol. 3, April 2003.

9 Ernst J. Weinrib, op. cit. p.818.

10 See Bernd Ludwig, *Kants Rechtslehre*, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988, pp. 170-171 and Reinhard Brandt, *Rechtsphilosophie der Aufklärung, Symposium Wolfenbüttel 1981*, Walter de Gruyter, 1982, p. 268.

11 Ludwig, *Kants Rechtslehre*, pp. 172-1 (see also footnote 169).

12 Ibid., p. 173.

13 „Die Ethic wird dem *Iure stricto* entgegengesetzt und nicht dem *Iure* überhaupt.“ *Moral Mrongovius*, XXVII: 1421u, *Moral Collins*, XXVII: 272u, *Moral Brauer*, Me 41u-42.

14 *Die Billigkeit (objektiv betrachtet) ist keineswegs ein Grund zur Aufforderung bloß an die ethische Pflicht Anderer (ihr Wohlwollen und Gütigkeit), sondern der, welcher aus diesem Grunde etwas fordert, fußt sich auf sein Recht (...)* (MS VI: 234) [Equity (considered objectively) is in no way merely a basis for calling upon another to fulfill an ethical duty (to be benevolent and kind). One who demands something on this basis stands instead on his right, except that he does not have the conditions that a judge needs in order to determine by how much and in what way his claim could be satisfied]

15 „Die Billigkeit ist ein Recht, welches aber keine Befugniß giebt, den andern zu zwingen, es ist ein Recht aber kein Zwangs-Recht [...]Denn damit einer mich zu zwingen befugt sey, so muß erstlich die Handlung aus dem Recht des andern gelöst entspringen [**Collins/ Brauer: dem Recht des andern selbst entsprungen seyn**], denn aber muß sie auch auf äußerlich hinreichende Bedingungen der Imputation des Rechts [256] beruhen, diese werden durch Beweise, die äußerlich sufficient sind, dargethan. Coram foro interno ist die Billigkeit strenges Recht, aber nicht coram foro externo. Die Billigkeit ist also ein Recht, wo die Gründe der äußeren Imputation coram foro externo nicht gelten, wohl aber vor dem Gewissen gelten.“ *Moral Mrongovius*, XXVII: 1552-3, *Moral Collins*, XXVII: 433u, *Moral Brauer* Me 269.

16“Genossenschaft” in modern German.

17 See *Moral Mrongovius*, XXVII: 1552-3, *Moral Collins*, XXVII: 433u, *Moral Brauer* Me 269.

18 See Höffe, “Der Kategorische Rechtsimperativ,” p.51

19Similarly, Byrd and Hruschka argue that the rationale of the rules of distributive justice is to protect the proper functioning of the public judiciary itself. Unless contracts are enforced, distributive justice would lose its meaning. *Kant's Doctrine of Right. A Commentary*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 225-6.

20 (...) *was ich habe: müssen andre entbehren: – mein Puder entzieht andern das Meel: (...) Nach der Proportion des Erwerbs steigert sich nicht die Summe der Wohlfart: und ich bin stets ungerecht, wenn ich vielen einen beträchtlichen Zusatz zu ihrer Wohlfahrt wegnehme: da ich nur einen unbeträchtlichen meiner eignen zusezze.*

21 In the state of nature, there would be presumably *no need* to postulate a individual right to subsistence, since persons would not be legally prohibited from satisfying their basic needs by simply using the natural resources available to them. A right to

subsistence seems only to arise when providing for one's subsistence can be hindered. This hindrance is however only indirectly due to the introduction of private property. The real cause instead the radically unequal distribution of wealth, where some have a lot and others have nothing.

22 Reinhard Brandt, *Eigentumstheorien von Grotius bis Kant*, Frohmann-Holzboog, 1974, p.180-1.

23 See *Erläuterungen Achenwall*, XIX: 504, N. 7737 „Die idee des socialcontracts ist nur die Richtschnur der Beurtheilung des Rechts und der Unterweisung der prinzen imgleichen einer möglichen Vollkommenen Staatserrichtung, aber nach dieser idee hat das Volk nicht wirkliche rechte. Es scheint nichts natürlicher, als daß, wenn das Volk rechte hat, es auch eine Gewalt habe; aber eben darum, weil es keine rechtmäßige Gewalt etabliren kann, hat es auch kein strictes recht sondern nur ein ideales.

24 „Armenanstalt. Hülflose Arme müssen ernährt und, wenn sie Kinder sind, gepflegt werden. Warum? weil wir Menschen und nicht Bestien sind. **Dieses [folgt] fließt nicht aus dem Rechte der Armen als Bürger sondern aus ihren Bedürfnissen als Menschen. Nicht schuldfrey; denn da würden es wenige seyn.** Wer soll sie ernähren? Es ist nicht die Frage, ob der Staat oder der Bürger, Denn wenn sie der Staat ernährt, so ernährt sie auch der Bürger, sondern nur, ob es vom freyen Willen des Bürgers oder vom Zwange abhängen soll — als Geschenk oder als Contribution (Steuer). Das letztere bringt Concurrenz der Candidaten zur Verpflegung hervor: es ist ein *Modus acqvirendi* und auch ein *titulus* der Ansprüche. Wer aber soll die Hülflosigkeit bestimmen? Der Magistrat, der seine Bürger kennt? Und der Beytrag geschieht durch collecten durch die, welche selbst hiebey am freygebigsten sind. Die Aufmunterung und Verweise im Allgemeinen durch Geistliche. Alles Privatwohlthun kann bleiben, aber es wird von Magistrat und Geistlichen ignorirt. Es sind *opera supererogationis*.“ (Erläuterung Achenwall XIX: 578 (N. 8000, 3-4. J 117).

25 See for instance GMS IV: 423 and MS VI: 345.

26 *Die Wohlthätigkeit gegen andere, muß mehr wie eine Schuldigkeit, als wie eine Großmuth und Gütigkeit angepriesen werden, und ist es auch in der That, denn alle gütige Handlungen sind nur kleine Ersetzungen unserer Schuldigkeit.* (Moral Mrongovius, XXVII: 1570) [The beneficence towards others should be praised more as a indebtness than as a gracious act and goodness, and it is in fact like this, because all beneficent actions are only small compensations of our indebtness. My translation]

27 *Durch Almosen werden die Menschen erniedriget. Es wäre besser auf eine andere Art dieser Armuth abzuhelfen, damit nicht Menschen so niedrig gemacht würden, Almosen anzunehmen.* Moral Mrongovius XXVII: 1570) [Through monies persons are humiliated. It would be better to help the poor in another way, so that persons are not humiliated by having to accept monies. My translation]

28 So hat man gefunden: daß der Arme und Kranke (den vom Narrenhospital ausgenommen) besser und wohlfeiler versorgt werde, wenn ihm die Beihülfe in einer gewissen (dem Bedürfnisse der Zeit proportionirten) Geldsumme, wofür er sich, wo er will, bei seinen Verwandten oder sonst Bekannten, einmiethen kann, gereicht wird, als wenn – wie im Hospital von Greenwich – prächtige und dennoch die Freiheit sehr beschränkende, mit einem kostbaren Personale versehene Anstalten dazu getroffen wer|den. – Da kann man nun nicht sagen, der Staat nehme dem zum Genuß dieser Stiftung berechtigten Volke das Seine, sondern er befördert es vielmehr, indem er weisere Mittel zur Erhaltung desselben wählt (MS VI: 367)

Recebido / Received: 07/10/14

Aprovado / Approved: 22/11/14

REMARKS ON “THE ONLY ORIGINAL RIGHT BELONGING TO EVERY MAN BY VIRTUE OF HIS HUMANITY”

*Andrea FAGGION*¹

INTRODUCTION

The concept of freedom is at the heart of Kant’s philosophy. It “constitutes the keystone of the whole structure of a system of pure reason” (KpV, AA 05: 04). However, speaking of “the” concept of freedom at Kant’s philosophy might be misleading. Depending on the philosophical field, Kant works with a different concept of freedom thus that one can find several concepts of freedom subtly connected to each other at his philosophy. Mistaking one for another carries serious consequences. In this paper, I will discuss some issues related to the concept of freedom to be found at Kant’s philosophy of law.

At least in our society, it seems to me that nobody is openly against a right to freedom. Nonetheless, the meaning of that juridical concept of freedom is a matter of permanent dispute among philosophers. This is why I believe a deep understanding of the Kantian concept of freedom in the context of his defense of a right to freedom should be useful to enlighten the contemporary debate.

In the first section of this paper, I deal with Kant’s definition of freedom as “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MS AA 06: 237). This definition is contained at Kant’s introduction of freedom as a right. I hope to show that such a definition should be treated as the liberal definition of freedom, in the sense of Isaiah Berlin’s classical paper “Two Concepts of Freedom”. In the second section, I intend to clarify the condition under which, according to Kant, one can claim a right to freedom: her freedom must be able to “coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (MS AA 06: 237). My claim here is that such a universal law does not imply a political law. In the last section, I analyze the justification of our right to freedom as an innate or original right. It is at issue the relation between a right to freedom in the sense above and our human condition. I claim that the right to freedom is implied by the second formula of the categorical imperative.

I.

I am starving. A very wealthy man offers me a job. According to his offering, I should be paid with three meals a day for every working day. I will certainly starve to death whether I refuse his offering. Am I free to accept his offering?

It appears to me that the answer to this type of question divides philosophers. Clearly, the answer depends on our concept of freedom. If it is at issue the internal freedom of choice, then a determinist can say that my physiological needs determine my choice thus that I am not free to accept or refuse the job.²

Nevertheless, in this paper, I am not primarily concerned with the internal freedom of choice, i.e. choice's independence from subject's own wishes and needs. After all, a juridical relation is not a relation internal to the self. Indeed, a juridical relation is not only external to the self, it is a relation among selves (MS AA 06: 230).

This being so, our question is whether my freedom is being impaired by the wealthy man in that context, and not by my wishes and needs. Lets see. At first, I am starving to death. Disregarding if I work or not, I die. All the paths lead to death. Then, the wealthy man interferes in my situation by offering to pay for my work with meals. Now, I have two options while I had only one before. Now, I can choose between dying or working for meals. Hence, since the wealthy man's interference expands my options, it does not seem right to say that the wealthy man's choice constrains my choice.

Lets think about another situation now. A man just says: "or you work for me, or I kill you". It is a totally different situation. That man's interference in my situation is actively making any other possible option besides working for him less eligible for me by a threat of physical harm. His interference narrows my options. Since an act of his choice has such an effect on my choices, it seems perfectly reasonable to claim that my choice is being constrained by another's choice. To sum up, freedom as a right is not about the number of options available to one's choice, it is all about one's range of options being narrowed or not by the interference of another's choice.

At this point, I realize what my reader is feeling, and I happily agree with Herbert Hart that "it will be pedantic to point out to them [to those starving] that though starving they are free" (Hart, 1955, p. 175, n. 02). However, I also totally agree with Hart when he notices that this truth is "exaggerated by the Marxists whose *identification* of poverty with lack of freedom confuses two different evils" (Hart, 1955, p. 175, n. 02).

Keeping in mind Kant's clarification of the concept of right as concerning external and practical relations of one person to another - and not concerning relations between one's choice and another's wishes or needs (as in acts of beneficence and callousness) - (MS AA 06: 230), it is very useful to appeal to Hart's definition of coercion for a better understanding of the overall point of a right to freedom as a right not to be constrained by another's choice: "*Coercion* includes, besides preventing a person from doing what he chooses, making his choice less eligible by threats" (Hart, 1955, p. 175, n. 02).

I would like to complement Hart's definition of coercion by specifying the mentioned threats as "threats of using of force", since a threat might be merely a suggestion that something unpleasant will happen if an order is not followed. For instance, if a person warns me that she is not talking to me anymore if I work today, I am not under coercion. The person is actually making one of my options - working - less eligible for me. However, she is not doing that by threatening to take away from me something which belongs to me (as my life or a piece of my body), but by threatening not to share with me something which belongs only to her (herself). Therefore, that person is not properly narrowing my options: the range of options I would have anyway without her interference.

I hope the remarks above can make more precise Kant's own definition of coercion as "a hindrance or resistance to freedom" (MS, AA 06: 231), that seems too general to me. I believe those remarks are also coherent with Berlin's important clarification of the concept of coercion. Accounting for the notion of negative freedom, that is freedom in the sense of the classical liberal tradition, i.e. noninterference, Berlin explains:

Coercion is not [...] a term that covers every form of inability. If I say that I am unable to jump more than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind, or cannot understand the darker pages of Hegel, it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or coerced. Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings within the area in which I could otherwise act. (Berlin, 2002, p. 169)⁵

Provided that we understand what "independence from being constrained by another's choice" means, i.e. independence from coercion, from now on, we can analyze the condition under which we can claim such a right not to be coerced.

II.

Our original right to freedom, for Kant, is to be claimed if and only if our freedom "can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law" (MS, AA 06: 237). Does such an assertion imply that one is free always that and only when one takes part in a political community which determines what is allowed and what is forbidden for everyone?

According to Kant, the right not to be coerced corresponds to the right to be her *own master* (MS, AA 06: 237). Thus, one can understand that Kant is claiming that the negative and the positive concepts of freedom to be found in Berlin's work - i.e. noninterference (as explained in the previous section) and self-government - are analytically connected. That reading seems natural when Berlin claims that: "The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his *own master*" (Berlin, 2002, p. 178, my italics).

Moreover, one can remember what Kant claims in the general introduction to *The Metaphysics of Morals*: "a person is subject to no other laws than those he gives to himself (either alone or at least along with others)" (MS, AA 06: 223, my italics). Since the point at issue here is "the freedom of a rational being under moral laws" (MS, AA 06: 223), it seems safe to say that Kant believes that freedom as noninterference - independence from being constrained

by another's choice - is the same as the political right of participation in political legislation: the positive sense of freedom. The rationale in the identification between the negative and the positive sense of freedom would be the thesis according to which, in self-government, my choice would be constrained by my own choice, not by another's choice.

If that is so, then Kant is completely in odds with the classical liberal tradition, and, certainly, Berlin's work is one of the best sources for us to understand why is so. The core point here is that, inside classical liberal tradition, questions like "who governs me?" or "by whom I am ruled?" are logically distinct from questions like "am I interfered with?" or "how far can political authority interfere with me?":

Freedom in this sense [noninterference] is not, at any rate logically, connected with democracy or self-government. [...] The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process by which my life is to be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that for a free area for action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for the same thing. (Berlin, 2002, pp. 177-178)

Before going back to Kant's account of the right to freedom in order to know if he really conflates two different questions whereas liberals do not, I believe we need a deeper understanding of the alleged logical difference between the two types of questions mentioned above. Are liberals right in logically separating claims for noninterference and claims for political inclusion? At first glance, after all, it seems that my being part of the government precludes the possibility that my choice is being constrained by another's choice.

All things considered, it is at issue here if my claim for noninterference makes sense against a political authority which includes myself in the process of legislation. If the negative concept of freedom is to be identified with the positive concept, then I can claim a right not to be interfered with only against other fellow citizens who act in disaccord with the political law. In other words, the positive concept of freedom would provide content to the negative concept of freedom insofar as I only can determine whether I am being interfered with based on a political law - i.e. a universal law - which I give "along with others".

Along centuries, liberals have been warning us against the danger of believing that "The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of its tyrannising over itself" (Mill, 1989, p. 06). Indeed, Mill explains why the fact that I give laws "along with others" does not preclude the possibility that my choice is constrained by another's choice:

It was now perceived that such phrases as 'self-government', and 'the power of the people over themselves', do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, consequently, *may* desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein. (Mill, 1989, pp. 07-08)

In other words, Mill is describing a logical possibility whose reality has spread worldwide: the tyranny of society against the individual. Certainly, at this point, one will remind us that Kant would never endorse the legitimacy of a law based on majority acceptance. Kant would not be so naive not to realize that the rule of majority could be the most serious danger against our right of independence from being constrained by another's choice. But then what does it actually mean to give a law "along with others"? Is there a Kantian meaning of being her own master that precludes a conflict with the right of noninterference?

Whatever answer one can find in Kant's political philosophy, its root should be the distinction between *will* and *choice*. *Will*, for Kant, is practical reason itself, therefore, the ground determining choice. By its turn, *choice* is a "a faculty to *do or to refrain from doing as one pleases*" insofar as "it is joined with one's consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one's action" (MS, AA 06: 213). Thus, *will* is a faculty of legislation; *choice*, a faculty of execution. Insofar as will is practical reason, the law it gives is universal. In this sense, it is a law I give "a long with others": those endowed with practical reason.⁴

Now, it is crucial to make a point regarding the legislation of practical reason: nobody is originally entitled to speak on behalf of practical reason. In other words, political authority is not natural. Since the only one innate right is freedom, I do not have to obey other human being more than she has to obey me. This is exactly what Kant means by a right to be "his own master": "innate *equality*, that is, independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them; hence a human being's quality of being *his own master (sui iuris)*..." (MS, AA 06: 237) is an authorization contained in the principle of innate freedom. It does not seem to be something very far from Berlin's description of a man, as "a being with a life of his own to live" (Berlin, 2002 p. 175).⁵

Since, according to Kant, the quality of being *his own master* is nothing else than an expression of *formal or juridical equality*: the ideal according to which no human being is naturally or originally subordinate to other, since every human being is equally endowed with will or practical reason. Therefore, political legislation, i.e. the special authority of a group of legislators is not analytically contained in the concept of an innate right to freedom.⁶ But then what does it mean the universal law according to which my freedom must coexist with the freedom of every other thus that I can claim a right to freedom?

I suggest that Kant should be read as asserting that my claim not to be constrained is legitimate if and only if others' legitimate actions would not be hindered whether an action of the same type as mine were universally allowed. It seems to me that this reading is coherent with §§D and E of the Introduction of the Doctrine of Right, in whose Appendix it is to be found our passage about innate right. In §E, Kant speaks of a law of reciprocal coercion in accord with the freedom of everyone under the principle of universal freedom as the construction of the concept of right as authorization to use coercion (MS, AA 06: 232). In §D, authorization to use coercion is accounted of in terms of a hindering of a hindrance to freedom. This being so, it seems safe to say that I can claim a right not to be constrained by another's choice if and only if my choice does not constrain any other choice.

But why do I have such a right? Because I am a human being, Kant says. Why is that so?

III.

Freedom as defined in the first section, under circumstances specified in the second section, is “the only original right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity” (MS, AA 06: 237). Why does humanity ground such a right? How is that so?

Certainly, we can disregard a reading according to which Kant would be deriving a right from our physiological constitution as *homo sapiens*. There rest two alternatives: a weak and a strong sense of humanity. On one hand, the weak concept of humanity would be the one found in the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, where humanity is the quality of “a living and at the same time *rational* being” (RGV, AA 06: 26). Humanity, in this weak sense, does not imply a moral personality, i.e. “the freedom of a rational being under moral laws” (MS, AA 06: 223); or, in the terms of the *Religion*, “the susceptibility to respect for the moral law *as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice*” (RGV, AA 06: 27). In other words, in the weak sense of humanity, a human being is endowed with merely empirical practical reason, but not necessarily with pure practical reason. On the other hand, in the strong sense, humanity *is* the same as moral personality.

In *The Metaphysics of Morals*, the concept of humanity seems to be employed always in the strong sense (for instance, MS, AA 06: 239; 295; 387; 404; 456 and all the many passages in which Kant speaks of the dignity of humanity in one’s own person as well as in another person). Indeed, in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, when Kant explicitly distinguishes humanity from animality, he defines humanity as the “capacity to set oneself an end - any end whatsoever” (MS, AA 06: 392). I understand that a being endowed with a merely empirical practical reason would be capable to set oneself means, but not ends. My reading seems to be confirmed, when, a few pages forward, Kant claims that “humanity would dissolve [...] into mere animality” (MS, AA 06: 400) without moral feeling understood as “a susceptibility on the part of free choice to be moved by pure practical reason (and its law)” (MS, AA 06: 400). In other passage, Kant is even clearer about the confluence of humanity and moral personality in *The Metaphysics of Morals*:

Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a means by any human being (either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, and so over all *things*. (MS, AA 06: 462)

Undoubtedly, this passage leads us to the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. In spite of its not being a juridical work, it is there that one should look for the concept of humanity grounding the right to freedom. In a few words, the right not to be constrained by another’s choice is the same as a right not to be treated merely as a means whatever are another’s ends:

a human being and generally every rational being exists as an end in itself, *not merely as a means* for the discretionary use for this or that will, but must in all its actions, whether directed towards itself or also to other rational beings, always be considered *at the same time as an end*. (GMS, AA 04: 428)

Not only can we find the same claim about humanity as an end in itself in *The Metaphysics of Morals* and in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, but it is the last work explicit - though subtil - about the juridical implications of such a moral concept of humanity. There, Kant asserts that the idea of a being that “may not be used merely as a means [...] *limits all choice*” (GMS, AA 04: 428). Furthermore, Kant claims that the principle of humanity “is the supreme *limiting condition of the freedom of actions* of every human being” (GMS, AA 04: 430-431, my italics).

Those claims only can mean that my moral right not to be constrained by your choice amounts to your moral obligation not to use me merely as a means or resource for your ends, and vice-versa: your equal moral right implies my equal moral obligation towards you. This is why the innate right to freedom is at the same time a limiting condition to everyone’s external freedom of actions. In other words, one needs to recognize another’s having a will of oneself, asking for consent instead of coercing her to act as one wants her to, unless, as we have seen above, another’s own act amounts to a coercion against other choice. To sum up, the innate right to freedom *belonging to every human being by virtue of her humanity* is the only way whereby all human beings can take account of each other as ends in themselves.⁷

FINAL REMARKS

The innate right to freedom being at the same time a limiting condition to external freedom is the Kantian way to conciliate autonomy and right as an authorization to use coercion. Moreover, I would like to suggest, it is the only way to ground a moral right to freedom avoiding problems like the well-known “is-ought gap”. If Kant’s premise were morally neutral - as our capacity to figure out means for natural ends -, how could he infer a moral right not to be enslaved by others? Without a moral premise like human dignity, the obligation not to treat others as mere things would be at most a hypothetical imperative.

This being so, in spite of Kant’s very useful distinction between ethics and right, it is in order to keep in mind that right in the strict sense, according to Kant, it is still moral. Therefore, it is not possible to reconstruct the foundations of the most essential right - the original right to freedom - without employing moral elements.

REFERENCES

- Berlin, Isaiah. "Two Concepts of Freedom". In: *Liberty*. Hardy, Henry (Ed.). Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Hart, Herbert. L. A. "Are There Any Natural Rights?" *The Philosophical Review*, v. 64, n. 02, Apr. 1955, pp. 175-191.
- Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Practical Reason*. In: *Practical Philosophy*. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- _____. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Gregor, Mary J.; Timmerman, Jens (Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- _____. *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Wood, Allen; di Giovanni, George. (Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- _____. *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Gregor, Mary J. (Ed. and Trans.). Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Mill, John S. *On Liberty*. Collini, Stefan (Ed.). Cambridge University Press, 1989.

ABSTRACT: Kant compares a merely empirical doctrine of right to the wooden head in Phaedrus's fable, i. e. a head that has no brain (MS AA 06: 229). An a priori right may be acquired or innate. According to Kant, there is only one innate right (MS AA 06: 237). That only one innate right is freedom. In that context, freedom means "independence from being constrained by another's choice" (MS AA 06: 237). As a moral right, such a right implies reciprocity. This being so, it is a right to be held "insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law" (MS AA 06: 237). The reason why it is an innate right is that it is a "right belonging to every man by virtue of his humanity" (MS AA 06: 237). This paper aims to clarify a few issues regarding our innate right to freedom. To start with, we need a deeper understanding of the meaning of freedom as independence from being constrained by another's choice. I will claim that such an independence should be understood as absence from fraud and violence. Following, it is in order to analyze the condition according to which freedom is a right: coexistence with the freedom of every other in accord with a universal law. I will claim that such a condition does not imply political authority. Finally, we have to handle the connection between the innate right to freedom and our humanity. I will claim that the innate right to freedom cannot be disconnected from the second formula of the categorical imperative.

KEYWORDS: freedom, right, humanity, Kant, liberalism

NOTES

1 Professor of the Department of Philosophy and of the Graduate Program in Philosophy at the State University of Londrina. Professor of the Graduate Program in Philosophy at the State University of Maringá. PhD in philosophy received from the State University of Campinas in 2007. Post-doctoral research in philosophy done at the State University of Campinas, 2009-2011, and at the University of Colorado at Boulder, 2011.

2 "Freedom of choice is this independence from being determined by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The positive concept of freedom is that of the ability of pure reason to be of itself practical" (MS, AA 06: 213). At this passage, clearly, Kant is talking about two points of view regarding internal freedom of choice: negative and positive, but always internal.

3 Berlin points out that one can claim that her inability to get something is due to social arrangements whereby she is prevented from having enough money whereas others are not. Thus, one can claim that the poor are victims of coercion. However, it is to be noticed that such a claim does not amount to an assimilation between poverty and lack of freedom or coercion. That claim depends on a particular social and economic theory about the causes of poverty (Berlin, 2002, p. 170).

4 Confirming my reading, in the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant speaks of the idea of humanity as such, including me as "giving universal law along with others" (MS, AA 06: 450). At this point, he is talking about mutual benevolence. As it is well known, according to Kant, benevolence cannot be the subject of political legislation at all. It is the matter of an ethical law. Hence, it is perfectly possible to understand the meaning of giving law "a long with others" outside the political discourse.

5 Indeed, Kant speaks of a quality of being "his own master" where many liberals speak of a quality of being the owner of himself. Kant explains the difference: "someone can be his own master (*sui iuris*) but cannot be the owner of *himself* (*sui dominus*) (cannot

dispose of himself as he pleases) – still less can he dispose of others as he pleases – since he is accountable to the humanity in his own person” (MS, AA 06: 270).

6 It must be noticed that I am not claiming that, according to this passage, political authority is impossible. I am just claiming that, according to Kant, political authority cannot be natural. If it is possible, it should be the result of a contract among free and equal men.

7 Certainly, this is the negative way of taking account of other human beings as end in themselves. The positive way of doing that - acts of beneficence - belongs to ethics.

Recebido / Received: 02/11 /14

Aprovado / Approved: 28/12/14

DEFENDING KANT AFTER DARWIN: A REASSESSMENT OF *IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH A COSMOPOLITAN PURPOSE*

Luigi CARANTI¹

After decades in which scholars have looked with suspicion at the teleology Kant defends in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* (1784), recently the essay, as well as Kant's progressive view of history in general, seems to have been enjoying renewed attention combined with a more benevolent attitude (e.g. Flach 2005, 2006; Fliege 2014). Among the questions still debated is the *status* of Kant's teleology and in particular: a) whether it is meant to have theoretical validity (Kleingeld 1995, 31; Kleingeld 2001, 210) or, like the postulates in the second critique, its use is only practical (Wood 2005, 111-2, Guyer 2000, 372-407); b) whether its theoretical ambitions are the same as those of any empirical science (Kaulbach 1975; 65; Rauscher 2001; 51) or do not extend further than the regulative function played by the ideas of reasons (Williams 1983, 20; Kleingeld 1995, 110-116); c) whether we have today any reasons to believe the progressive view of history Kant proposes (no matter whether for theoretical or practical purposes), given past and present atrocities, as well as the worldview currently offered by science.

This paper situates itself within this debate and argues that Kant's teleology in *Idea* can be salvaged only if the mechanism of social unsociability, considered as the true center of the essay, is a) detached from the – by contemporary standards – hardly defensible notion of 'natural dispositions' and b) understood in conjunction with general premises about human nature and the world that Kant takes as self-evidently true. From this perspective, Kant's teleology is reduced to the affirmation that, given certain constant features of human beings (mainly, limited benevolence and ability to see their best interest through experience) as well as relatively constant objective circumstances in the external world, an approximation of human affairs towards the 'cosmopolitan constitution' is more likely than its opposite or a condition of stagnation. Contrary to all previous interpretations of *Idea*, it will be argued that the status of this thesis extends beyond the merely regulative function of guiding our historical research towards some unity. The paper affirms that Kant's goal in *Idea* is more ambitious: the goal is that of providing reasons to believe that non-linear progress towards the cosmopolitan constitution, rather than regress or stagnation, is the most likely development of human affairs.

The paper is structured as follows. The first section focuses on the preliminary methodological remarks Kant offers before the nine propositions of *Idea*. The second section analyzes, criticizes, and discards the first three propositions. The third section, devoted to the last six propositions, introduces the 'Separability Thesis', i.e. the hermeneutical suggestion that

the mechanism of social unsociability, with all the far-reaching consequences it generates for human affairs, can be reformulated in such a way that it becomes independent of the first three propositions. The fourth and final part reformulates the last six propositions of *Idea* with no reference to the idea of “natural dispositions”. This reformulation is also offered as the most plausible teleological argument one can construct out of the material Kant offers in the essay.

1. THE METHODOLOGY OF ‘UNIVERSAL HISTORY’

In the introductory remarks to the essay, Kant sketches what seems to be a methodology for ‘universal history’, a project whose ambition he himself – no doubt – recognizes as problematic. Kant draws our attention to the rates of births, marriages and deaths in (large enough) societies to show that even phenomena that seem *par excellence* left either to sheer chance or to the free choice of individuals are influenced by objective factors, and as such are predictable with a certain degree of precision. We know in fact that birthrates, for example, are greatly influenced by the policy that a country adopts for young people in terms of accessibility to the job market, public nurseries, subsidies for maternity leave, level of women’s education, religion, and so. Hence, at least regarding whether they are going to increase or decline, birthrates are as predictable as any other natural phenomenon.²

The existence of such regularities opens up the possibility of looking at the whole of human affairs as a *system* in which certain general tendencies can be identified. This identification presupposes that we have a rough knowledge of what humans are and of what the institutions in which they live can become, just to paraphrase Rousseau. It also presupposes that the objective circumstances in which they live are constant enough. However, if these conditions are met, there is no *a priori* reason that rules out the possibility of looking at history (the totality of human events) as a system in which regularities can be detected. With this methodological proviso in mind, let us approach the nine propositions through which Kant attempts to show that history is moving towards a cosmopolitan end.

2. THE FIRST THREE PROPOSITIONS

As reconstructed by Kleingeld (1995; 126-128), Kant borrows the first steps of the validation of his progressive view of history from the biologist J.F. Blumenbach. Blumenbach modified the then dominant biological paradigm, known as ‘Evolutionismus’ or “Theory of individual Pre-formation.” He denied that organisms develop from miniature versions of themselves that already include all characteristics we observe in a grown-up individual. Rather, individual development is conceived as the result of the interaction between prefixed, God-given specific dispositions and the environment in which the individual grows up.³ Clearly, both the concept of a set of capacities implanted by God in each species, as well as the formation of new characteristics as a result of the encounter between this set and the natural environment resonate in the first three propositions. They in fact state that: (1) the natural dispositions of all natural creatures are destined towards a full and complete development; (2-3) in human beings,

the chief natural feature, to which all other human dispositions are subordinate, namely reason, is best developed only in society. God gives humans reason but only through the interaction with a specific natural environment (civil society, best if of a republican sort) can this natural capacity fully develop.⁴

There is a lot to quarrel with in Kant's first three propositions as they are presented. Just to mention one problem, they set the whole proof of *Idea* on a circular path. In the first proposition, in fact, Kant assumes that all natural dispositions of a creature are "destined" to develop fully and in conformity with their *telos*. The subsequent propositions spell out the necessary conditions that enable that development. The argument thus seems to be moving from a teleological premise to a more specific teleological conclusion: from the assumption that nature has an end for all species (the full development of their preformed natural dispositions) to the identification of the specific end for the human species (the development of reason), and to the means nature provides to reach that end.

Leaving aside the circularity of the argument, there is a simple reason why we -- readers of the XXI century -- should dismiss Kant's first three theses. They are incompatible with the now dominant scientific paradigm, i.e. Darwinian or neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory. Contemporary science can account for the differentiation and the evolution of the species without making any reference to a pre-fixed, God-given set of characteristics for each species. What Kant called "natural dispositions", and we now call "genetic materials," is not fixed and can change through the combined influence of the two key factors of contemporary biology, i.e. mutation and natural selection. In the context of a Darwinian biology, especially if amended by later developments (e.g. Mendel), the by-and-large creationist model Kant operates with is denied and there is no room for his talk of prefixed and constant "natural capacities of a creature".⁵

So far, so obvious. What is perhaps less evident is that contemporary biology is so distant from Kant's scientific horizon that it enables what for Kant is utterly impossible. In a famous passage of the third critique (§75), Kant argues that mechanical natural laws alone "unordered by any intention" will never be able to explain "how even a mere blade of grass is produced". Actually, Darwinian biology can account for the 'production' of all features that constitute a specific kind of grass from merely mechanical laws, resting on the combined effects of mutation and selection, and without resorting to any 'intention' by nature, God or the like. As Kleingeld succinctly puts it, "[Darwinian theory] has removed teleology from biology" (Kleingeld 1995; 130). This is important because it already places constraints on any foundation of a progressive view of history that wishes to remain faithful to contemporary science. Any prediction as to the future state of human affairs, any 'universal history' we might dare to write today will have to refrain from attributing to individuals or species any pre-established end. It follows that it will have to arise out of a mechanical consideration of human interactions, combined with very general causal laws about human beings and the environment (physical and political) in which they live. In other words, any 'teleology' acceptable to contemporary standards will have to avoid the circularity of starting from teleological premises (like those noticed above in Kant's argument) and arise from considerations of human affairs viewed in a systemic perspective.

3. THE LAST SIX PROPOSITIONS

Fortunately, we do not need to defend the first three theses to save Kant's fundamental intuition in *Idea*. We can abandon the outdated view of nature as tending towards the realization of all prefixed "natural dispositions" and retain the mechanism of unsocial sociability with its consequences for the evolution of human institutions, at the domestic and international level. To be sure, in proposition 4 Kant connects the mechanism of social antagonism to natural dispositions by saying that nature employs the former to enable the full development of the latter. However, the series of predictable social transformations brought about by social unsociability would occur even if there were no "natural dispositions" which need to develop. All that is necessary for the mechanism in question to work is that humans truly, as Kant says, "cannot bear" their neighbours, who compete with them for scarce resources, and whom "yet cannot bear to leave" (IaG, AA 08: 21.9-10). In other words, for the mechanism to be triggered it is sufficient that humans and the environment in which they live be conceived according to rather uncontroversial and solid assumptions concerning our limited benevolence, the fact that we do not live in a world endowed with infinite resources (the circumstances of justice), and the capacity to see what is in our best interest and to learn from past mistakes.

This is what could be called the Separability Thesis: the theory of "natural dispositions" and the theory that spells out the consequences of social unsociability are separable and independent. One can believe in social unsociability (proposition 4) as well as accept the account that spells out the predictable institutional repercussions of such a mechanism (propositions 5-9) without endorsing the "natural dispositions talk" in which they are embedded. Not accidentally, Kant himself will introduce the concept of unsocial sociability in the First Supplement of *To Perpetual Peace* after an account of nature completely different from the one introduced by the first three propositions.⁶

Detaching social unsociability from natural dispositions is obviously still insufficient to ground a progressive view of history. At most, we have removed one obstacle. Something needs to be said to prove that the causal story and the chain of conditions of possibility envisaged in propositions 4 through 9 are plausible. Three crucial points, however, are already clear. To begin with, the only teleology that can be defended within *Idea* is, so to speak, a teleology without natural purposes. Holding that history has a predictable (albeit non-linear) development is fully compatible with saying that nature does not have any plan for us. In fact, the reformed and de-dogmatized teleology we are about to defend is closer to predictions concerning the evolution of complex systems (e.g. the distribution of molecules of gas in a controlled environment or changes in births rates caused by certain policies in large societies, as in Kant's example) than to providential perspectives on our destiny. Secondly, precisely because this new teleology rests on empirical causal mechanisms, its validation cannot stop with the proof that such a perspective is necessary for finding some unity in the otherwise lawless aggregate of human events. Its validation will have to rest, quite simply, on the truth of those mechanisms. Finally, even abstracting from the last point, there is a general reason why we have to reject all readings (e.g. Williams 1983, 20; Kleingeld 1995: 132, Fliege 2014, 167) that construe the status of Kant's teleology merely in regulative terms. The idea that without a progressive view history would be an aggregate non-

amenable to reason is simply false. In fact, a view that attributes to history a *regressive* tendency would be as useful as Kant's for that purpose. It would 'systematize' history just as well. It follows that the justification of any progressive view of history (including Kant's own) needs more than the simple thought that such a view is 'good for science' or the like.⁷ What is needed, quite simply, is a good argument showing that progress (measured in terms of approximation to the cosmopolitan constitution) is more likely than regress or stagnation.

4. TOWARDS A RECONSIDERATION OF KANT'S TELEOLOGY

With this much clarified, let us have a fresh look at the reasons Kant offers in the last six propositions to prove that history is progressing. This is our central question: once Kant's propositions are purged of all references to "natural capacities," are we left with a material that enables us to construct a compelling argument? The new argument can be formulated in six steps.

1. "Unsocial sociability is "obviously rooted in human nature" (IaG, AA 08: 20.34) and dictates the necessity to live in society. Through competition, it fosters the development of human talents.
2. Intellectual talents lead humans from barbarism to culture, which in turn is the first step towards moralization. What used to be an aggregate of amoral individuals who stick together because they cannot afford to live in isolation gradually becomes a society in which individuals accept the limitations of their freedom according to a universal law: "a *pathologically* enforced social union is transformed into a *moral* whole" (IaG, AA 08: 21.16-17);
3. A "perfectly just civil constitution" (IaG, AA 08: 22.18) which assigns equal spheres of freedom to all consociates is the institutional setting that best enables human coexistence and best coheres with the growing moral capacity of individuals.
4. This institutional achievement is difficult to reach and yet nothing in human affairs rules it out as impossible.⁸ Actually, given humans' capacity to learn and to improve from culture to morality, the outcome is favored by objective factors.
5. There cannot be any "perfectly just civil constitution" in one state without a "law governed external relationship with other states" (IaG, AA 08: 24.3-4). Some form of global institution is necessary to remove anarchy from international affairs and this is in turn necessary to establish a just domestic regime. A "federation of peoples" therefore serves the interest of individuals and states. It follows that it is reasonable to assume that a lawful, peaceful yet competitive international system (IaG, AA 08: 23.26-29) will be reached one day.
6. Experience already give us *some* hints that the system of international relations has certain features that facilitate that achievement: a) "The mutual relationships between states are already so sophisticated that none of them can neglect its internal culture without losing power and influence in relation to others" (IaG, AA 08: 27.29-31); b) civil freedom can no longer be so easily infringed without disadvantage to all trades and industries, and

especially to commerce” (IaG, AA 08: 27.34-35); c) conflict is generally against commerce, which makes the peaceful, diplomatic resolution of international controversies not only in the interests of the conflicting parties, but also of other states that are linked to them by relation of economic interdependence. In sum, experience shows some signs suggesting that the ‘system’ of human affairs tends towards a “universal *cosmopolitan existence*” (IaG, AA 08: 28.34-35).

Nothing in this long argument makes a reference to natural ends or to ends of nature, let alone to a plan of providence. All we have comes from considering human affairs as a system in which certain forces will exercise their effect, *if certain general circumstances remain stable*. The mechanism of social unsociability combined with general premises about the environment in which humans live suggest that our world, the world of human actions, with all its unintended consequences, is a world biased towards the cosmopolitan constitution. The argument is not only compatible with contemporary science, but asks us to accept rather uncontroversial assumptions regarding our nature (mainly our limited benevolence and our ability to learn) as well as to consider certain features of our environment as constant. If one rejects the argument, it should be shown which of the mechanisms that Kant relies on does not apply or fails to yield the expected effects. An *a priori* rejection of such a view on the grounds that it is ‘metaphysical’, too ambitious or worse, incompatible with critical standards, is not acceptable.

This is obviously not to say that Kant’s ‘universal history’, even if reconstructed most charitably as we have attempted to do, is free of difficulties. It is debatable, for example, whether it relies on a thought that, encompassing the totality of experience, is in tension with the limitations imposed on our cognition by the first critique. In fact, without an all-embracing stretch of one’s cognition, how could one rule out the possibility that the same natural mechanisms that today make progress more likely will not change in the future? Or, even if we assume that human nature is stable, it could be that the same mechanisms become inert or even counterproductive because they are inserted into a new set of objective circumstances (for example, a dramatically insufficient amount of vital resources for the world’s population). And what if some passion were to become so dominant in the constitution of future human beings as to impede the perception of their best interests?

These and other objections are fully legitimate and should be addressed. The goal of this paper, though, was to come up with a teleological view that is not ruled out by our best science from the onset, i.e. even before doubts regarding the specific mechanisms Kant appeals to arise. Secondly, the goal was precisely to draw the boundaries of the field in which the confrontation with the critics should occur. In our reconstruction, the battlefield is that of systemic analysis of complex systems.⁹ Thirdly, the goal was to show that *Idea* is mainly about the objective grounds we have to adopt a progressive view of history. On our reading *Idea* is neither about the heuristic opportunity to endorse a certain perspective, nor about the necessity, for practical purposes, to do so. Downplaying the ambitions of the essay to the attempt to make a case for the regulative or practical importance of adopting such a view is far from prudent. As we have seen, it exposes Kant to too obvious retorts.

REFERENCES

- Fiegle, T. (2014), “Teleology in Kant’s Philosophy of History and Political Philosophy.” In Goldman, A., Patrone T., Formosa, P., (eds) *Politics and Teleology in Kant*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014, 163-179.
- Flach, W. (2005), “Zu Kants geschichtsphilosophischem ‘Chiliasmus’”, *Phänomenologische Forschungen*, 167-74.
- Flach, W. (2006), “Erreichung und Errichtung. Üben die empiriologische Orientierung der Kantischen Geschichtsphilosophie”, in R. Hiltcher, S. Klinger and D. Sü’ (eds), *Die Vollendung der Transzendentalphilosophie in der ‘Kritik der Urteilskraft’* (Berlin: Ducker & Humboldt), 183-9.
- Kaulbach, F. (1975) “Welchen Nutzen gibt Kant der Geschichtsphilosophie?” *Kant-Studien* 66 (1), 65-84.
- Kleingeld, P. (1995) *Fortschritt und Vernunft: zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Kleingeld, P. (2001) “Nature or providence? On the theoretical and practical importance of Kant’s philosophy of history” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 75, (2), 201-219.
- Guyer, P. (2000) *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rauscher, F., (2001) “The nature of ‘wholly empirical’ history” in *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongress*, ed. Volker Gerhard, et.al. Bd.4. (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 44-51.
- Wood, A. W. (2005) *Kant*. Malden: Blackwell.
- Yovel, Y. (1980) *Kant and the Philosophy of History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

ABSTRACT. The paper argues that Kant’s teleology in *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* can be salvaged only if the mechanism of social unsociability, considered as the true center of the essay, is a) detached from the – by contemporary standards – hardly defensible notion of ‘natural dispositions’ and b) understood in conjunction with general premises that Kant does not make explicit, but rather takes as self-evidently true. In this perspective, Kant’s teleology is reduced to the affirmation that, given certain constant features of human beings (mainly, limited benevolence and ability to see their best interest through experience) as well as relatively constant objective circumstances of the world we live in (mainly, availability of finite yet sufficient resources and sustainable growth in a competitive yet peaceful system), an approximation of human affairs towards the ‘cosmopolitan constitution’ is the most likely outcome. The paper moves the first steps towards a defense of this thesis by reformulating Kant’s argument in a way to make it compatible with contemporary science.

KEYWORDS: Teleology, Evolution, Progress, History, Social Unsociability.

NOTES

1 Luigi Caranti (Ph.D. Boston University) is associate professor of political philosophy at the Università di Catania. He worked as researcher in various international institutions including the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, the Australian National University and the Philipps-Universität – Marburg. His studies mainly concern the philosophy of Kant. Caranti has provided contributions on the theoretical, practical, aesthetic and political dimensions of Kant’s thought. Recently, his interests focus on the theory of human rights, democratic peace theory, and the scientific and philosophical debate concerning the causes of world poverty. Caranti has directed projects funded by the European Commission. In particular, the EU-Australia student and faculty exchange program and 6 research projects (3 Marie Curie grants, 3 DAAD grants) for which he has attracted about 0.8M€. Caranti is the author of four monographs including *La pace fraintesa. Kant e la teoria della pace*

democratica (Rubbettino 2012), *Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy* (University of Toronto Press 2007). His recent articles are “The Guarantee of Perpetual Peace: Three Concerns” in *Politics and Teleology in Kant* (University of Wales Press, 2014), “Democracy and Human Rights” and “Kant’s Theory of Human Rights” in *The Handbook of Human Rights* (Routledge 2011). In the past Caranti has published in national and international peer reviewed journals such as *Kant Studien*, *Theoria*, *Journal of Human Rights*, *Rivista di Filosofia*.

2 The example of weather predictions is along similar lines. We may not know whether next summer is going to be hotter, but we know that if we keep on polluting, the average temperature on our planet will increase.

3 In other words, at the beginning God created all species with their generic dispositions, but the development of an individual is left to nature which has the power to generate new features out of the ‘package’ of generic preformed features implanted by God.

4 The shift from individual to specific pre-formation allows Kant to conceive of the development of reason (our chief capacity as determined by God) as occurring not in the limited time span of an individual life but in the succession of many individual lives as occurring in the history of the species.

5 Species are not fixed entities in the contemporary paradigm and alleged ‘specific’ dispositions are even less so.

6 There, nature does not push to develop the pre-fixed disposition of the species, but enables humans to live in all areas of the world, then spreads them everywhere through war, and ultimately forces them to enter into (more or less legal) relationships.

7 One may think that it rests on the thought that we need to assume this perspective to make sense of our practical life, but this is clearly not Kant’s strategy in *Idea*, where this thought is, at best, never made explicit.

8 It is difficult because it rests on the fulfilment of three conditions: a) a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, b) great experience tested in many affairs of the world (e.g. a comparative evaluation of the results brought about by republican and despotic regimes); 3) “above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience” (IaG, AA 08: 23.26-29).

9 In our case, admittedly, a very complex one, i.e. the totality of human affairs.

Recebido / Received: 04/09/14

Aprovado / Approved: 25/10/14

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY OF ADAM FERGUSON AND IMMANUEL KANT

Sandra ZÁKUTNÁ¹

Kant's philosophy of history concentrated in his short political writings is an important part of his philosophical legacy. His approach to political themes was influenced not only by political situation and events of his present, e.g. American or French Revolution, but also by other philosophers of his era. Well-known is his philosophical dialogue with Jean Jacques Rousseau who influenced him in answering his fourth question "What is man?". Another important source of ideas which shaped Kant's position in the matter of philosophy of history were definitively Scottish philosophers, especially David Hume, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. According to Norbert Waszek the major continental impact of Scottish Enlightenment thought was in German-speaking countries (2006, p. 55). In the article *The Scottish Enlightenment in Germany and its Translator, Christian Garve (1742-98)* Waszek provides interesting information about the facts how books of Scottish authors, and translations of these books, formed Kant, Lessing, Schiller, or Hegel. He also quotes Goethe to illustrate the influence of Scottish thought on Germany: "We Germans who aspire to the most universal culture have for many years been aware of the merits of the respectable Scots" (Goethe in Waszek 2006, p. 55).²

In this article I will try to focus on the issue of progress in history represented by formation and development of civil society, the role of people and people as citizens in it, the question of conflict as the main driving impulse, and the portrayal of possible future in the works of Adam Ferguson and Immanuel Kant. Civil society and the nature of political society were key topics in 18th century philosophical debates together with themes concerning patterns of progress of societies, types of governments, international relations, and descriptions of possible further development of history. The article will deal with Ferguson's *Essay on the History of Civil Society* and Kant's short writings *Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History*, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*, and *Perpetual Peace*.³

1. FIRST STEPS TOWARDS CIVIL SOCIETY

Adam Ferguson opens his *Essay on the History of Civil Society* by words that in nature everything is formed in degrees and that in the case of man the progress continued to the greatest extent:

Not only the individual advances from infancy to manhood, but the species itself from rudeness to civilization. Hence the supposed departure of mankind from the state of their nature; hence our conjectures and different opinions of what man must have been in the first age of his being (Ferguson, 1995, p. 7).

His *Essay* wants to map human and social progress as a process of human ability to use one's own mind which can assure the development and he illustrates it on several examples in the first part of the work. He writes:

The latest efforts of human invention are but a continuation of certain devices which were practised in the earliest ages of the world, and in the rudest state of mankind. What the savage projects, or observes, in the forest, are the steps which led nations, more advanced, from the architecture of the cottage to that of the palace, and conducted the human mind from the perception of sense, to the general conclusions of science (Ferguson, 1995, p. 14).

In the work *Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History* Kant explains the position of man cosmologically – man lives on this planet and should be proud of it. However, he must be able to escape the state of nature and enter the state of society. This was done in small steps through instinct of food, sexual instinct, anticipation of the future and, finally, realisation that he is the true end of nature (MAM, AA 08: 114; p. 225). Man was able to overcome everything on earth thanks to his capacity of reason that caused human progress and development of mankind as such. In the *Second Proposition* of the work *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* he writes that [r]eason, in a creature, is a faculty which enables that creature to extend far beyond the limits of natural instinct, the rules and intentions it follows in using its various powers, and the range of its projects is unbounded” (IaG, AA 08: 18–19; p. 42). In the *Third Proposition* Kant introduces the idea that a human being “should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason” (IaG, AA 08: 19; p. 43).

Both, Ferguson and Kant, claim that man is able to improve and agree that it is thanks to the ability to use reason. They provide anthropological explanation of history, Ferguson mentions man's principle of progression, his desire of perfection, and says that man employs the powers that nature has given to him (Ferguson, 1995, p. 14) and that “[h]is powers of discernment, or his intellectual faculties, which, under the appellation of *reason*, are distinguished from the analogous endowments of other animals” (Ibid., p. 16).

The fact that people were endowed with the faculty of reason means that human being is not dependent on instinct any longer. Since this moment the success of people has been based on their acts and their own use of reason. It is a gradual process and people can come to the full development of their predispositions at its end. In *Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History* Kant describes the moment of understanding man's own capacity of reason by the understanding that man himself is the end of nature – because his reason enabled him to overcome instincts and he understood that he could use what nature gave him for his own prospect. Man, compared to other animals, was governed by instincts, too, but the difference is that he has disposition for rationality and it is reason which does not allow him to go back to natural state of savages. Through his own curiosity he could explore himself as a rational being and became independent on nature. This was his entrance to history – on one hand, step of great courage, on the other hand, full of danger – because he had to rely only on himself.

The question how an individual can help the overall progress of society was also discussed by both of the philosophers. In Ferguson's philosophy of history the abilities came from generation to generation and each new generation built on the level of knowledge achieved by the previous. The improvement is obvious but he adds that we cannot do it without progress of individuals because species can develop only if individuals progress. Kant shares the same opinion: every individual should be motivated to progress because the most important attribute of a rational individual is the ability to develop inherited experience or knowledge. Thanks to this, each generation – generation of individuals – is able to move forward.

However, an individual never lives alone and all his natural predispositions can be developed only in a social institution in which all his qualities – good or bad – are being present. When Kant says, “[t]he means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society [...] By antagonism, I mean in this context the *unsocial sociability* of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up” (IaG, AA 08: 20; p. 44), he describes tendency of people with two opposite verbs – to *associate* with one another (to live in society) and to *isolate* from one another (to live as an individual) (IaG, AA 08: 20–21; p. 44). People are social beings, they like and need society for full-valued life, but at the same time, an individual wants to be an outstanding personality and is driven by “the desire for honour, power, or property, [...] to seek status among his fellows, whom he cannot *bear* yet cannot *bear to leave*” (IaG, AA 08: 21; p. 44). While people want to live in peace, nature wants them to live in unsociable sociability to be active and to develop their predispositions. It is important not to rely on harmony or peaceful life and “[n]ature should thus be thanked for fostering social incompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires for possession or even power” (IaG, AA 08: 21; p. 45). Conflict becomes an active principle which motivates people to make progress but to fulfil the end of nature and develop the natural predispositions it is necessary for human beings to use their own reason. Nature causes many evils to human beings, nevertheless, these are helpful in the process of achieving greater development of natural predispositions and subsequently of moral, cultural and civilized society.

2. ACTIVITY AND CONFLICT AS MAIN IMPULSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

The idea of progress is a common motive for Scottish Enlightenment philosophers and I. Kant. Civil society becomes a new term and at the same time a necessary institution representing human natural environment. However, we cannot say that the progress to civil society is a temporal movement, it is rather a key condition for social and civil life of people. Ferguson describes people who are active and it is their natural behaviour to act as members of society and for the good of it. He writes:

To act in the view of his fellow-creatures, to produce his mind in public, to give it all the exercise of sentiment and thought, which pertain to man as a member of society, as a friend, or an enemy, seems to be the principal calling and occupation of his nature. If he must labour, that he may subsist, he can subsist for no better purpose than the good of mankind; nor can he have better

talents than those which qualify him to act with men. Here, indeed, the understanding appears to borrow very much from the passions; and there is a felicity of conduct in human affairs, in which it is difficult to distinguish the promptitude of the head from the ardour and sensibility of the heart. Where both are united, they constitute that superiority of mind, the frequency of which among men, in particular ages and nations, much more than the progress they have made in speculation, or in the practice of mechanic and liberal arts, should determine the rate of their genius, and assign the palm of distinction and honour (Ferguson, 1995, p. 33).

Kant says that an inevitable step in human progress and the highest intent of mankind is when people achieve civil society “which can administer justice universally” (IaG, AA 08: 22; p. 45). It is a just society based on antagonism, and at the same time, on freedom. This freedom – “*freedom under external laws* [...] combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly *just civil constitution*” (IaG, AA 08: 22; pp. 45–46) – in which nature attains its goals, is the basic requirement for this kind of society. Kant knows that this achievement is a long process and human beings have to and will have to try hard to do their best to come closer to this type of constitution. He emphasizes that the problem to achieve civil society “is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race” (IaG, AA 08: 23; p. 46).

This progress cannot be perceived to be an easy linear process neither in Ferguson’s nor Kant’s explanation. It is a period full of changes that all follow an important aim, which is the establishment of civil society, and there are many problems and conflicts that have to be faced during this process. Thus, history of civil society is not for them a history of peace but it is a long way on which the practice of war is necessary. Ferguson says that without it and without the rivalry of nations, “civil society itself could scarcely have found an object, or a form” (1995, p. 28). When dealing with human affairs, he says that every consequence should be drawn from a “principle of union” or a “principle of dissention” and continues that “[t]he state of nature is a state of war or of amity, and men are made to unite from a principle of affection, or from principle of fear” (Ferguson, 1995, p. 21).

Conflict is an essential part of progress, it is something constructive and positive which assures further social development. It can be accepted if it leads to a virtuous aim, and to achieve it, every single individual has to participate on it by his activity. Man can cultivate himself only in society when he is doing his duties as a good citizen. Citizens then become a vital part of social progress because only their eagerness and activity can assure that freedom and equality will be guaranteed and law will be respected. Ferguson understands activity as basic principle of human nature and it characterizes not only progressive people but also progressive nations when he says that “great and powerful states are able to overcome and subdue the weak; polished and commercial nations have more wealth, and practise a greater variety of arts, than the rude” (1995, p. 60).⁴

One of the basic conditions of civil society, which human beings should be aware of, is to be a good citizen and „active citizenship” then becomes a crucial category in understanding the problem. Society cannot exist without people, and with the help of good will, they become citizens with respect to duty and law. Kant introduces something that can be called legal-

practical reason and starts to deal with the concept of good citizen while good man remains only an ideal. It was only thanks to reason that people were able to introduce law and every step in history was based on development of public law and later progress towards international commonwealth. Kant describes civil state, regarded purely as a lawful state, as based on the following *a priori* principles: “1) the *freedom* of every member of society as a *human being*, 2) the *equality* of each with all the others as a *subject*, 3) the *independence* of each member of a commonwealth as a *citizen*” (TP, AA 08: 290; p. 74).

Realization of reason in man is thus partially achieved by formation of civil society universally administering right and justice, but pursuing Kant’s main idea of philosophy of history – which is the idea of perpetual peace – it requires some further steps. Here Kant compares relations among states to relations among people. He writes that: “[t]he problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved” (IaG, AA 08: 24; p. 47). The similarity is in the fact that there exists the same antagonism among states as there is among men. State of peace is achieved through antagonism, people entered society because of antagonism and nature’s aim is to do the same with states. Thus, states enter the state of peace and security only “after many devastations, upheavals and even the complete inner exhaustion of their powers” (Ibid.). These negative experiences would not have been necessary if states had listened to reason “abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation (*Foedus Amphictyonum*), from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will” (Ibid.).

Ferguson’s point of view in the *Essay on the History of Civil Society* is different. He is quite sceptical in the possibility of several states joining one greater political body, and adds that “the admiration of boundless dominion is a ruinous error; and in no instance, perhaps, is the real interest of mankind more entirely mistaken” (1995, p. 61). For him, the most important thing is that every individual, as well as every state, should be active and says:

But the happiness of men, in all cases alike, consists in the blessings of a candid, an active, and strenuous mind. And if we consider the state of society merely as that into which mankind are led by their propensities, as a state to be valued from its effect in preserving the species, in ripening their talents, and exciting their virtues, we need not enlarge our communities, in order to enjoy these advantages. We frequently obtain them in the most remarkable degree, where nations remain independent, and are of a small extent.

He realistically describes relationships among states, speaks of equality, tolerance and independence of nations but does not avoid topics of “real politics” as enlarging territories, unequal treaties, annexation, war, etc. To the issue of problematic relationships between nations of Great Britain he adds: “where a number of states are contiguous, they should be near an equality, in order that they may be mutually objects of respect and consideration, and in order that they may possess that independence in which the political life of a nation consists” (1995, p. 61). He illustrates it by an example that when it was possible that the kingdoms of Spain

were united, and when the fiefs in France were annexed to the crown, it is no longer expedient for the nations of Great Britain to continue disjoined.

3. VISIONS OF FUTURE HISTORY

Based on political experience and everyday reality, Ferguson is also quite sceptical towards suggesting clear scenarios of future. He writes that every step, even in the most enlightened ages, is “made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design” (1995, p. 119). Ferguson emphasizes that human nature is always full of expectations and forgets disappointments of the past to have new hopes for future, but it does not mean that there is anything certain, clear, or pre-planned in human future.

According to Kant, the last step of development of human nature is the federation of states represented by the idea of perpetual peace. Although in *Idea* he comes to the inevitable occurrence of war from the intention of nature, not of man, and it is further developed in the writing *Perpetual Peace*, everything should be subordinated to the goal, which is “externally–perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely” (IaG, AA 08: 27; p. 50). Firstly, it is the evil that motivates mankind to move forward and, secondly, the enlightenment that influences the government. In the state of enlightenment there is no need for war and states should realize that instead of permanent preparations for war it is necessary to set laws which would guarantee secure cosmopolitan state for free and equal citizens. States must gradually realize that wars are extremely dangerous and expensive and that the only way how to live a good life is to “indirectly prepare the way for a great political body of the future, without precedent in the past” (IaG, AA 08: 28; p. 51).

Cosmopolitanism is understood as result of growing enlightenment in which human beings are capable to understand the importance of society and commonwealth. Kant is looking for an ideal form of social coexistence of people and nations in the future. He knows that is not going to be easy, because of human nature and antagonism, but he tries to find a way how to achieve it and hopes that mankind is able to enter a phase where all the conditions for the highest aim of nature, “a universal *cosmopolitan existence*” (IaG, AA 08: 28; p. 51), would be fulfilled. In this type of society, there are new rules on which people have agreed, and state guarantees people’s rights and their freedom.

This is connected with the way how politics should look like. He says that it should always go hand in hand with morality and the most important moral task is “to bring about perpetual peace, which is desirable not only as a physical good, but also as a state of affairs which must arise out of recognising one’s duty” (ZeF, AA 08: 376; p. 122). Politics should be connected with the idea of public right and, according to him, it can rely on morality because its rules should be also the basis of politics. Why? In case of morality, we know that its rules are good, and this cannot be told about politics. He says:

A true system of politics cannot therefore take a single step without first paying tribute to morality. And although politics in itself is a difficult art, no art is required to combine it with morality. For as soon as the two come into conflict, morality can cut through the knot which politics cannot untie. The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance (ZeF, AA 08: 380; p. 125).

When we follow Kant's argumentation, we see that in the relationship of what *is* and what *ought to be*, he always prefers what ought to be, and he asks how it is possible to achieve realization of public right. He says that "if we consider it absolutely necessary to couple the concept of right with politics, or even to make it a limiting condition of politics, it must be conceded that the two are compatible" (ZeF, AA 08: 372; pp. 117–118). The question of morality and politics and their mutual relationship in Kant's philosophy is based on justice and respect for human rights and the movement from the state of nature, which is characterized by war, towards the state of peace cannot be achieved without the notion of law. True system of politics is then connected with the idea of public right and it can rely on morality because its rules should be also the basis of politics.

Based on these ideas we can see that Ferguson's and Kant's portrayal of possible future is not the same and it is also connected with how they see the relationships among states. On one hand, Ferguson, using words of F. Oz-Salzberger, "was not concerned with demonstrating that mankind moves along a preconditioned course towards elevated future. Fergusons history is indeterminist and open-ended. His good polity is not a theoretical artefact projected into a dim future, but an imperfect reality." (1995, p. xx). Ferguson did not provide any descriptions of the ways how the world should look like in future or how it should progress. In the *Essay* we see his own experience when judging the era of his present, and the realistic point of view is also present in his non-prophetic description of future. On the other hand, Kant focuses on future which is represented by approaching the idea of perpetual peace, and he presents a concept of an ideal politics based on law, duty and justice.

ABSTRACT: The paper compares central issues of philosophy of history of A. Ferguson and I. Kant. It deals with their explanation of origins and development of civil society, and characterizes its basic features, focusing on progress motivated by fruitful conflict and tension among individuals and nations. It also focuses on the role of citizens in civil society and the question of their activity. Then, in connection with Ferguson's and Kant's views on relationships among states the paper discusses their different portrayal of possible future history.

KEYWORDS: Kant – Adam Ferguson – philosophy of history – man – civil society – progress.

REFERENCES

- FERGUSON, A.: *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995.
- KANT, I. *Kants gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe*. Edited by the Koeniglichen Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900-.
- _____. *Political Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought)*. 2nd Edition, transl. by H. B. Nisbet, ed. H. S. Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.
- KLEMMME, H. E. (ed.). 2000. *Reception of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany. Six Significant Translations, 1755-1782*. Bristol: Thoemmes Press 2000.
- OZ-SALZBERGER, F. Introduction. In: FERGUSON, A.: *An Essay on the History of Civil Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995.
- _____. Ferguson's Politics of Action. In: HEATH E. – MEROLLE V. (eds.) *Adam Ferguson: History, Progress and Human Nature*. London: Pickering & Chatto 2008, pp. 147 – 156.
- WASZEK N.: *The Scottish Enlightenment in Germany, and its Translator, Christian Garve (1742–98)*. In: HUBBARD, T. – JACK, R.D.S. (eds.): *Scotland in Europe*. Amsterdam/New York: Editions Rodopi B.V. 2006, pp. 55 – 72.
- YOVEL, Y. 1980. *Kant and the Philosophy of History*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1980.

NOTES

- 1 Sandra Zákutná is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Presov, Slovakia. She works on political philosophy, especially Kant's, and Enlightenment philosophy.
- 2 For more information about translations of the works of Scottish Enlightenment philosophy in German and comments on details of particular translations see KLEMMME, H. E. (ed.). 2000. *Reception of the Scottish Enlightenment in Germany. Six Significant Translations, 1755-1782*. Bristol: Thoemmes Press 2000.
- 3 All English translations of Kant's works are cited from Kant, I.: *Political Writings (Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought)* 2nd Edition, transl. by H. B. Nisbet, ed. H. S. Reiss. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991.
- 4 More on the importance of activity in Ferguson's thought can be found in: F. Oz-Salzberger: Ferguson's Politics of Action. In: Heath E. – Merolle V. (eds.) *Adam Ferguson: History, Progress and Human Nature*. London: Pickering & Chatto 2008, pp. 147 – 156.

Recebido / Received: 17/11/14

Aprovado / Approved: 20/12/14

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: A KANTIAN APPROACH

Joel Thiago KLEIN¹

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part I rebuild the meaning of the Kantian concept of public use of reason and its relation to the freedom to speak and to think. In the second part, I present a proposal to update these concepts to think about the freedom of the press in contemporary democratic societies.

1. KANT AND A REPUBLICAN FREEDOM OF OPINION

Kant was one of the most arduous defenders of freedom of speech and think, or of the so-called “freedom of the pen”:

(...) *freedom of the pen* - kept within the limits of esteem and love for the constitution within which one lives by the subjects' liberal way of thinking, which the constitution itself instills in them (and pens themselves also keep one another within these limits, so that they do not lose their freedom) - is the sole palladium of the people's rights. For to want to deny them this freedom is not only tantamount to taking from them any claim to a right with respect to the supreme commander (...), but is also to withhold from the latter - whose will gives order to the subjects as citizens only by representing the general will of the people - all knowledge of matters that he himself would change if he knew about them and to put him in contradiction with himself. But to instill in a head of state concern that unrest in the state might be aroused by [the subjects'] thinking independently and aloud is tantamount to awakening in him mistrust of his own power or even hatred of his people. (TP, AA 08: 304)²

But the recovery of his perspective in order to think the current freedom of the press needs to be done carefully. The first question that needs to be answered is about the exact meaning of the Kantian expression “freedom of the pen” and what its scope.

Freedom of opinion and freedom of the pen, so essential to the possibility and promotion of enlightenment, is thought by Kant essentially as a freedom of *the public use of reason*, which “must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among human beings; the *private use* of one's reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted without this particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment.” (WA, AA 08:37)³

The definition of public use of reason is quite peculiar: it is “that use which someone makes of it *as a scholar* before the entire public of the *world of readers*.” (WA, AA 08:37) This

use tacitly supposes that, in a certain context, there is a community of equals in which dialogue is established through common principles. This is realized primarily because Kant emphasizes that only can make a public use of reason that individual who behaves as a scholar in the subject matter and, moreover, that this attitude can only occur before the general public of the world of readers. This restriction does not intend to establish a kind of technocracy and meritocracy supported on erudition, but tries to prevent the public use of reason of falling into mere exposure of unreflective and meaningless opinions. As the scholar's audience is the general public of the lettered world, it means that the public use of reason needs to consider both the principles of a rational debate, since one would not expect less of a community of scholars, and the accumulated knowledge and perspectives adopted by the community in question.

In order to the public use of reason be truly free it can not suffer any external constraint, i.e., it should be regulated only by principles that are internal accepted to the community. This means, on the one hand, that the government or the State should not exercise any force on the public use of reason:

The freedom to think is opposed first of all to *civil compulsion*. Of course it is said that the freedom to *speak* or to *write* could be taken from us by a superior power, but the freedom to *think* cannot be. Yet how much and how correctly would we *think* if we did not think as it were in community with others to whom we *communicate* our thoughts, and who communicate theirs with us! Thus one can very well say that this external power which wrenches away people's freedom publicly to *communicate* their thoughts also takes from them the freedom to *think* - that single gem remaining to us in the midst of all the burdens of civil life, through which alone we can devise means of overcoming all the evils of our condition. (*WDO*, AA 08: 144)

It also means that "*Caesar non est supra grammaticos*" (*WA*, AA 08: 40). However, on the other hand, when there are differences of opinion between the participants in a public debate, it is not allowed to request any interference or foreign aid, because in that case there would be what Kant calls an illegal conflict (Cf. *SF*, AA 07: 29-32). The illegality arises from the appeal either to the prejudices and feelings of the mass or to the feelings of the legislator, which ignore the subject matter or are not willing to follow the rules for a correct public use of reason. In this sense, the conflict ceases to be a debate and becomes a mere dispute or discussion. In a dispute what is important is winning at any cost while a debate has always as a fundamental principle the intention of arrive at the truth either as near thereto as possible.⁴

The illegitimacy of the public use of reason does not occur only when there are external constraints, but also when there are internal constraints. This constraint occurs when there is appeal to arguments from authority or to some alleged higher ability for understanding. On the first case, Kant offers an example in matters of religion, that is, when

some citizens set themselves up as having the custody of others (...), and instead of arguing they know how to ban every examination of reason by their early influence on people's minds, through prescribed formulas of belief accompanied by the anxious fear of the dangers of one's own investigation. (*WDO*, AA 08:145)

About the second kind of coercion Kant thinks in the case of the alleged genius and his sentimentalist exaltation, which has the maxim of a lawless use of reason, in order, as genius supposes, to see further than one can under the limitation of laws. According to Kant, the natural consequence of this case:

is that if reason will not subject itself to the laws it gives itself, it has to bow under the yoke of laws given by another; for without any law, nothing - not even nonsense - can play its game for long. Thus the unavoidable consequence of *declared* lawlessness in thinking (of a liberation from the limitations of reason) is that the freedom to think will ultimately be forfeited and because it is not misfortune but arrogance which is to blame for it – will be *trifled away* in the proper sense of the word. (*WDO*, AA 08:145)⁵

The freedom of individual to the authority of thinking of others does not mean, however, that freedom of thought is a complete refusal of others' opinions, or a refusal of the legitimacy of consistency with the thoughts of others. In other words, if, on the one hand, the public use of reason requires the denial of a discussion based on arguments from authority, on the other hand, it does not lead the individual to a kind of "logical egoism" which entails relativism and skepticism:

The *logical egoist* considers it unnecessary also to test his judgment by the understanding of others; as if he had no need at all for this touchstone (*criterium veritatis externum*)? But it is so certain that we cannot dispense with this means of assuring ourselves of the truth of our judgment that this may be the most important reason why learned people cry out so urgently for *freedom of the press*. For if this freedom is denied, we are deprived at the same time of a great means of testing the correctness of our own judgments, and we are exposed to error. One must not even say that *mathematics* is at least privileged to judge from its complete authority, for if the perceived general agreement of the surveyor's judgment did not follow from the judgment of all others who with talent and industry dedicated themselves to this discipline, then even mathematics itself would not be free from fear of somewhere falling into error. (*Anth.*, AA 07: 128-129).

The true freedom of reason "has no dictatorial authority, but whose is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his *veto*, without holding back." (*KrV*, B 766) ⁶ That is, the public use of reason requires that all act like citizens with equal rights and duties. Thus, there is an opposition between the conception of a republican reason and a monarchical reason, in which someone was imposed or presented as absolute sovereign and whose teachings were taken as a criterion of truth.

If one borrows the criteria presented by Kant in order to qualify a republican constitution in the political realm, then it can be said, *mutatis mutandis*, that the republican constitution that must govern the public use of reason needs to be based on three principles: first, the freedom of its members, i.e., the capacity to not obey any law but that which one can consent; second, the dependence of all in relation to a single common legislation; and third, the equality of all, so anyone cannot legally bind other without undergoing simultaneously and in the same way to the same law (See *ZeF*, AA 08: 349ff).

Every external legislation requires guardians. In the case of legislation of a republican reason, Kant assigns this role to the faculty of philosophy and to the philosophers. The figure

of philosopher represents those citizens who, by devoting themselves to the careful study of human reason and its various theoretical developments and by their “original” commitment with the truth and their disassociation with the offices of power, carefully caring for compliance of laws.⁷ But that does not attribute to them any privilege, they also are submitted under all the three principles of a republican public use of reason, just like all its citizens.

In summary, the public use of reason presupposes always a two-way street, in which all move according to the same laws, with no privileges and by free choice. Nobody can be forced to make a public use of reason, but by choosing to do so, one immediately accepted the condition of a citizen of a republic, whose laws are consistently enforced and clarified by the philosophers. The two-way street requires that an opinion is always open to dialogue and debate. This extends even to philosophers when they propose some clarification of legislation, i.e., they must do so always in accordance with the rules of the public use of reason. *The public use of reason therefore presupposes both a particular agent’s attitude and a certain environment to make it happen. If one disconsider some of these two aspects, the legitimacy of public use becomes compromised.*

But if, on the one hand, the public use of reason must be independent of any outside interference, therefore, it should be free from social and state censorship, the private use of reason, on the other hand, does not have this privilege. The private use of reason is “that which one may make of it in a certain civil post or office with which he is entrusted.” (WA, AA 08:37) About this use Kant emphatically states:

[for] many affairs conducted in the interest of a commonwealth a certain mechanism is necessary, by means of which some members of the commonwealth must behave merely passively, so as to be directed by the government, through an artful unanimity, to public ends (or at least prevented from destroying such ends). Here it is, certainly, impermissible to argue; instead, one must obey. (WA, AA 08:37)

It is often emphasized in this passage the permissibility of restricting the private use of reason, but the Kantian thesis is far stronger: *there is even a need for such restriction*, at the risk of public ends cannot be achieved. It could be said that it is understandable, since Kant is thinking on public officers or functions, but the examples that follow show that the scope of the restriction is much higher. Three examples are presented: an army officer, a citizen as a taxpayer and a clergyman. To the first and the latest we can actually speak about public officers or public functions, but on the second it does not seem to be the case, because the condition of being a citizen and a taxpayer is not a function to which one submits by individual choice, but is a condition legitimized and ordered by practical reason through the figure of a “contract”. This shows that, at the end, the private use is not just an individual situation which someone chooses to be submitted, but it is also a social condition. In this sense, one can say that the private use of reason can be attributed to all individuals and in different forms, because it refers to the different social roles that an individual assume, and for each role there may be certain rules that need to be followed so that society could exist and works in accordance with a general will. Thus, for example, the same individual could have a private use of reason as a

father, as a citizen taxpayer, another as driver, other in perform his/her profession and so many more, and for each role and social context there may be some pattern of conduct that can be held civilly liable and required. This does not mean that everything which is done in each “social role” needs and should be publicly ruled, but some essential things can and should be. Otherwise, there would be no state, no society and no common basis to ensure the possibility of mutual coexistence. Ultimately, it can be said that the very possibility of positive law, from the perspective of law enforcement, depends on the possibility of a distinction between public and private use of reason and the restraint and regulation of the latter.⁸

2. THE ACTUALIZATION OF KANT’S PROPOSAL: A REPUBLICAN FREEDOM ON THE PRESS

The purpose of this section is to present some thoughts on which could mean to employ the distinction between public use and private use of reason into the realm of media, i.e., in the conduct of journalists and press. There is of course a big difference between the historical and political context of the Kantian theory and the XIX century, but it is believed that is valid and also necessary to redeem these categories for thinking the issue of regulation of the media today. The possibility of talking about a republican freedom in the press, depends on an update of the Kantian proposal, which I seek to make here at least from the consideration of four aspects: a) in implementing the distinction of public and private use of reason to journalistic activity; b) thinking these categories not only at the individual but also at institutional level in the sense of a particular media company; c) distinguishing the uses of reason in the media according to different moments; d) distinguishing the uses of reason in the media according to different procedures.

The first aspect seeks to understand how the distinction between public and private use of reason may refer to the press. We accept and agree that the State regulates a number of private uses of reason in different areas: education, health, safety, traffic. The question that arises is then: should this be different in relation to the press, to the professional journalist? I see no argument for that. But what exactly would be the public and private use of reason of a reporter and journalist, for example? Although the boundaries are not always completely clear in a given situation, I think there is an essential difference between “publish news and information” and “publish opinion and commentary”. In the private use we could talk about production of first information about events and people while in the public use of reason, we could speak of comprehension of events and people. In a certain way, this seems to be recognized when we distinguish between Newscast and Journalism.

Whether this distinction is correct, then, when we cross it with the rules of public and private use of reason, we could said the following: what is expected of a journalist under the freedom of his private use of reason, i.e., what is expected from him as a social duty is to present news and information in an impartial and reliable way. This is what we expected from journalists as such and if they do not do this, then the freedom of entire civil society is disrespected. It is the united will of the people, through the figure of the state, which ensures legitimacy for

some people engaging themselves in the journalist profession and what is expected of them is that they inform facts and news. If they do not exercise his profession in an impartial and convenient way, the journalists could be punished in the same way that a doctor is, when they make medical mistakes considered unacceptable to their profession as such. In relation to the public use of reason, journalists must also have the right to publicly expose their opinion on the facts and news that they describes and present, but in that case they would be making a public use of reason and should be subject to other rules. While in the public use of reason journalists would be presenting *opinions* about events and people, in the private use of reason they should *present information about events and people*.

The second aspect concerns the fact that in its original context the Kantian categories of public and private use of reason were applied to a certain way in which individuals should act in different situations. If we remained at that level, we could only talking about the private and public use of reason of journalists, which would lead us to a very narrow understanding of what happens in contemporary society. Generally speaking, journalists, while professionals of information, do not act independently, but in a more or less integrated way with the perspective of publishing media company in which they work. This means that the communication company itself, while receiving a public concession to present news and opinions, also needs to be considered, in a broad sense, as an agent, therefore, as being subject to regulation of the distinction between public and private use of reason. Therefore, the media company may, in accordance with what is expected in relation to the *private use of reason*, be punished in case it presents news that are below the minimum standard of fairness and trustworthiness that is expected in society, as well as in the *public use of reason* it has the right to publicly defend its point of view and its opinion.

The third aspect concerns the criterion for distinguishing the uses of reason, both of journalist and of the media company, *according to their appropriate moments*. As noted in the previous section, the Kantian proposal is that, in some cases, the same agent should not perform *at the same time* the freedom of private use and the freedom of the public use of reason. In the case of journalists, it would mean that they should not present news and opinions on the same matter, or in the same program. In the case of the News section, they are not allowed to exercise the freedom of the private use of reason, i.e., they should just report the news and not mix them with opinions. In the case of a communication company the situation is somewhat more complicated, because the very programming of the station or the newspaper itself is also a *medium* in which the freedom of the public use of reason becomes possible, both for the broadcaster and journalists as well as for all other members of society. This means that every communication company, while dependent on a public allowance, must ensure internally into its programming the possibility of the public use of reason, i.e., the programming must be equally open for different opinions and interpretations about the news. The media should present themselves as *the medium* in which must also occur the public use of reason, both of the journalists and the company itself, as well as of the various individuals in general. Considering that companies are the *medium* of communication and also communication subjects and that they must ensure both a private and public use of reason, then the spatiotemporal criteria should also apply to the programming of the station or to the composition of the newspaper. In

this case, the spaces for the presentation of opinion and for presenting news must be carefully separated, i.e., the private and public use of reason cannot be exercised simultaneously. Therefore, the same television program and the same section of a newspaper should not contain simultaneously both news and opinions.

The fourth aspect concerns the *formal criteria to distinguish the correct employment* of the private and the public use of reason in the press. As we saw, according to Kant, the public use of reason requires both a specific audience and a specific scholar's attitude. Two questions arise inevitably: 1. who would be the "reading public" in the case of the press; 2. what would be a "scholar attitude" on the part of journalists and the media? In fact, in order to make sense of these questions in the context of the press itself, one must realize that what is at stake when we speak about the attitude of the viewers/readers and journalists/writers, is not the attempt to constraint who in fact would be the public and who would be the commentators. What is at stake is a form of to qualify the behavior of each of the parties. In the case of the public's attitude as "reading public", viewers/readers should be regarded as capable to listen different opinions and evaluate them for themselves, i.e., on the television or in the news section in question, it should not be present any conclusion or indication about which opinion is the best. This evaluation and decision should be left up to each individual viewer / reader, who takes part of the process as "reading public".

From the perspective of the "scholar who decides to make use of the word", the attitude that is expected is that one presents his opinion according to basic rational criteria, i.e., they must respect the logical rules of good reasoning and the body of knowledge accumulated by mankind. In this case, for example, the opinion that the "black people are inferior to the white people" does not contradict the rules of logical argumentation but clearly contradicts the historical, cultural, scientific and moral knowledge accumulated by mankind. Whether anyone wants to question this aspect as legitimately belonging to the very body of knowledge, then this individual must have the freedom, *but not in the general press* (because that would be racist propaganda), but in the "specialized press" of the community that presents itself as the guardian of that body of knowledge, i.e., that individual must again assume the posture of a scholar, but now facing the *academic* community, hence he/she needs to behave according to the rules of the academic community and present consistent arguments that are able to convince the other members, if this is not possible, then such individual should silence and his judgment will be considered only an unfounded prejudice. Therefore, it can be seen that the freedom of the public use of reason leaves open the possibility of discussing any opinion whatsoever, but not according to a barbarian and unregulated freedom that relies on force and prejudice.

Now from the perspective of the media as both subject and medium, it can be said that television programs or newspaper sections must necessarily present minimal conditions to ensure plurality, because they are themselves a medium for the arena in where the freedom of public use of reason must take place. Although no one can guarantee that all positions in society find a space in the arena of public use of reason, that does not mean that a sample of the main representative opinions could not and should not be considered. In this case, the most appropriate model of journalism, as a distinct category of Newscast, is one in which the theme in question is always, as

conditio sine qua non, subject to different assessments according to the rules of a *republican reason*, i.e., the journal must be made in the form of debate, and the major positions concerning the divergence in society must be represented by different citizens and journalists. All of them should have the same exposure conditions and they opinions must be confronted simultaneously. As the appropriate way to make a public use of reason in media organizations, it should be prioritize the form of a joint dialogue with different persons, i.e., a debate with a mediator in the case of television, or a comments section at the newspaper where different commentators representing different perspectives discuss on the same topic, for example.

Based on these four aspects, I do not claim to have exhausted the theme in relation to employment of Kantian distinction of private and public use of reason in relation to the press, but I just wanted to presented an indication of the way in which the reflection might be developed. I believe the employment of these categories is not only fruitful, but also required for thinking the freedom of the press, both from the perspective of individual interest and from the interests of democratic society. Only insofar that there is some rules and responsibility, there may also be the valuable freedom of expression, understood here not as freedom to form and to manipulate opinions, but as freedom of information and freedom of expression. According to Kant, the only true freedom which is social and civilly legitimate is the republican freedom. Therefore, also the press in order to be truly free and to fulfill its social function for enlightenment should be considered according to the criteria of a republican freedom.

3. FINAL REMARKS

I have defended the idea that from the Kantian categories of public and private use of reason it is possible to legitimize some state or civil regulation of journalistic activity without violating the right to freedom of the press. This is possible since journalistic activity is thought of as an activity that encompasses both a private use and a public use of reason. In this sense, when the media presents facts or news, it is making a private use of its reason and, therefore, its activity can be regulated and could be punished if it does not make proper use of the social function that it occupies. On the other hand, journalists and the media should also have the right to make a public use of reason, but in this context and use, there are also certain rules that must be respected. These rules, in turn, are the rules of republican reason, in a Kantian sense. Thus, according to Kantian philosophy, the restriction and regulation of the media's private use of reason is indeed necessary for the preservation of the right of freedom of thought and expression of all citizens. In other words some kinds of rules that regulate the freedom of the press are fundamental in order to ensure the possibility of enlightenment and the possibility of political and democratic progress of the society.

ABSTRACT: This paper presents an interpretation of the Kantian concepts of public and private use of reason in relation to the topic of the legitimacy of freedom of the press. In this case, I intend not only an interpretation of the Kantian texts but also an update of Kantian philosophy in a sense that tries to recontextualize some arguments and concepts for thinking about the modern question of freedom of the press in democratic societies.

KEYWORDS: public and private use of reason; republican freedom; freedom of the press

REFERENCES

- HÖFFE, O. Eine republikanische Vernunft. Zur Kritik des Solipsismus-Vorwurfs. In: *Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne*. Hrsg. Schönrich G. und Kato Y. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp a. M., 1996, 396-407.
- Kant, I. *Gesammelte Schriften*. Hrsg.: Bd. 1-22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff.
- _____. “An answer to the question: What is enlightenment” in M. Gregor (transl. and ed.), *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- _____. “Anthropology from a pragmatic point view”, R. Loudon (transl). in G. Zöllner, R. Loudon (eds.), *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- _____. *Critique of pure reason*, P. Guyer and A. Wood (transl.). Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- _____. “On a recently prominent tone of superiority in philosophy”, in H. Allison, P. Heath (eds.), *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- _____. “On the common saying: that may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice” in M. Gregor (transl. and edited), *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- _____. “The conflict of the faculties”, M. Gregor and R. Anchor (transl.), in A. Wood, G. Di Giovanni (eds.), *Religion and Rational Theology*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- _____. “The Jäsche Logic”, J.M.Young (Trasl. and ed.), *Lectures on Logic*. Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- _____. “Toward Perpetual Peace” in M. Gregor (transl. and ed.), *Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- _____. “What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?” A. Wood (Transl.), in A. Wood, G. Di Giovanni (eds.), *Religion and Rational Theology*. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- KLEIN, J. T. A resposta kantiana à pergunta: que é esclarecimento? in *Ethic@* (UFSC), v. 8, p. 211-227, 2009.
- WALDRON, J. Kant’s Positivism, in Waldron, J. *The Dignity of legislation*. Cambridge University Press, 1999, p .36-90.

NOTES

1 Professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN), Brazil, jthklein@yahoo.com.br . This work has received funding from CAPES/DAAD and CNPQ (Processo: 477298/2013-3, Chamada: Universal 14/2013).

2 All references to Kant’s works are from the standard volume number and pagination of *Kants Gesammelte Schriften* (Hrsg.: Bd. 1-22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie

der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter 1900ff), and the translations are from the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*.

3 A detailed analysis of the relationship between enlightenment, public use of reason and other central aspects of Kant's practical philosophy is found in my paper: Klein (2009).

4 The characterization of Logic and Philosophy as an art of disputation is severely criticized by Kant: "In earlier times dialectic was studied with great industry. This art expounded false principles under the illusion of truth and then sought, in conformity with these, to maintain things in accordance with illusion. Among the Greeks the dialecticians were the lawyers and orators, who were able to lead the people wherever they wanted, because the people allow themselves to be misled by illusion. At that time dialectic was thus the art of illusion. For a long time, too, it was expounded in logic under the name of the *art of disputation*, and as long as it was, all of logic and philosophy were the cultivation of certain garrulous souls for fabricating any illusion. Nothing can be less worthy of a philosopher, however, than the cultivation of such an art." (*Log*, AA 09: 16s.) This criticism can be expanded to any public use of reason and public debate.

5 See also: "That superior persons philosophize, should it even be up to the peaks of metaphysics, must be regarded as greatly to their credit, and they deserve indulgence in their (scarcely avoidable) clash with the school, since they do, after all, condescend to the latter on a footing of civil equality. But that would-be philosophers behave in a superior fashion can by no means be indulged in them, since they elevate themselves above their guild-brothers, and violate the inalienable right of the latter to freedom and equality in matters of mere reason." (*VT*, AA 08: 394)

6 See also Höffe, 1996.

7 Cf. "This does not mean, however, that a state must give the principles of philosophers precedence over the findings of lawyers (representatives of the power of the state), but only that they be given a *hearing*. (...) That kings should philosophize or philosophers become kings is not to be expected, but it is also not to be wished for, since possession of power unavoidably corrupts the free judgment of reason. But that kings or royal peoples (ruhng themselves by laws of equality) should not let the class of philosophers disappear or be silent but should let it speak publicly is indispensable to both, so that light may be thrown on their business; and, because this class is by its nature incapable of forming seditious factions or clubs, it cannot be suspected of *spreading propaganda*." (*ZeF*, AA 08: 369)

8 This point is also stressed by Waldrom (1999).

Recebido / Received: 04/12/14

Aprovado / Approved: 23/12/14

ANTROPOLOGÍA CRÍTICA Y LENGUAJE COMÚN O DEL SUELO LINGÜÍSTICO DE LA EXPERIENCIA ANTROPOLÓGICA EN LA LECTURA FOUCAULTIANA DE KANT¹

CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND COMMON LANGUAGE OR ABOUT THE LINGUISTIC GROUND OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL EXPERIENCE IN FOUCAULDIAN READING OF KANT

Marco DÍAZ MARSÁ²

INTRODUCCIÓN

En el año 2008 la editorial Vrin publicó el trabajo de Foucault sobre *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht de Kant* (en adelante *ApH*), inédito hasta la fecha. Se trata de un texto introductorio a la obra kantiana que, junto a la traducción al francés de *ApH* (también editada en Vrin en el mismo volumen³), constituyó la tesis complementaria de Foucault, redactada entre 1959 y 1960.

Una de las aportaciones más enjundiosas de este trabajo es, a nuestro juicio, la revisión crítica y sistemática que ofrece del tema de lo *a priori* kantiano, a partir de un examen detallado de las nociones de *tiempo y lenguaje* en *ApH*⁴. En el presente artículo pretendemos centrarnos exclusivamente en la cuestión del lenguaje, en su *relación estructural* con la definición del hombre como *Weltbürger*. Intentaremos mostrar, en el marco de una lectura de la *Antropología* y de la mano de Foucault, la singular manera en que, en el espacio de esa investigación kantiana, el hombre halla su definición como el *ciudadano del mundo*, y, por tanto, ni como el existente dotado de un alma inmortal -por la que estaría destinado a un reino espiritual- ni como un *puro Homo natura*, en la apropiación más absoluta de una naturaleza que haría del hombre su juguete. Será, pues, en el marco de análisis de aquella noción, la de *Weltbürger*, que habrá de delimitarse la *condición problemática* del hombre (problemática a efectos de su conocimiento y clasificación): la propia de un ser sin esencia (*Wesen*⁵), que es *persona* y no *cosa*⁶; la de un existente, igualmente, *cuya especie es al mismo tiempo su género*; y ello por ser «un ser enteramente diferente» de los animales (es decir, no simplemente un ser que difiere de ellos *en* el interior del género), a los que *sobrepasa* o *trasciende*, pero no porque, por su poder (*Können*), el de un «tener el yo en su representación»⁷, se arranque a la condición vital-terrenal (el yo es un *existente*, tal como queda establecido en los “paralogismos” de *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*⁸)-,

sino porque, por él –por ese *Können* que es el de un *Wissen-*, instaura, en la naturaleza, un *doble orden de ser*: terrenal y racional. El hombre podrá determinarse así como el «terrestre dotado de razón»⁹, jugándose su ser en la relación y la tensión nunca resuelta de lo sensible y lo racional.

1. LA DETERMINACIÓN LINGÜÍSTICO-DIALÓGICA DE LO ANTROPOLÓGICO DEN KANT

Ahora bien, el hombre es *Weltbürger porque habla y mientras habla*, es decir ahí donde organiza su vida en el intercambio del lenguaje, en la forma de una relación con el otro que se ejerce como comunicación –algo manifiestamente distinto de la asimilación (consumo) o la utilización (uso):

De hecho el hombre de la antropología es el *Weltbürger*, pero no en la medida en que forma parte del tal o cual grupo social o de tal institución, sino pura y simplemente porque habla. Es en el intercambio de lenguaje que, a la vez, alcanza y cumple él mismo lo universal concreto. Su residencia en el mundo es originariamente una estancia dentro del lenguaje¹⁰.

El hombre es, pues, hombre (no animal ni divino) como ciudadano del mundo, por tal ciudadanía se diferencia –e, insistimos, no precisamente por especificación sino por ruptura-, en la naturaleza, como un ser sensible-racional, como un *terrestre* dotado de *razón*, que hace de esta razón *principio público de organización vital*. Ello lo separa radicalmente del resto de los seres (tanto de las bestias como de los dioses, que carecen de existencia pública) al constituirse en el ejercicio de tal principio el plano de una «habitación universal del hombre en el mundo»¹¹, un plano lingüístico-universal que es preciso distinguir de aquel de una «apropiación total de la naturaleza» (en el que el hombre hace un uso instrumental de su razón *al servicio del vivir*), así como también de aquel otro abierto como «ciudad de los espíritus» (donde la razón deja de ser *terrenal*).

Es necesario subrayar que esta ciudadanía universal no se halla aquí definida por el carácter social, tampoco por lo puramente estatal-institucional. Foucault, antes bien, la establece a partir de una correspondencia con el lenguaje, que recuerda mucho a la que Aristóteles ya apuntara en el libro primero de la *Política*. El hombre era en esa obra el *πολιτικὸν ζῷον* (el animal político, no social) *porque hablaba*, en esto residía la razón de su ser político¹². Del mismo modo, en la lectura foucaultina de Kant, el hombre es ciudadano del mundo «pura y simplemente porque habla»¹³. Ahora bien, ello no significa que lo definitorio del hombre sea aquí algo así como la capacidad de hablar, y habrá de decirse más bien que, desde una perspectiva antropológico-pragmática, *hay hombres* no donde existen seres que tiene la capacidad de hablar, sino ahí y sólo ahí donde una vida se organiza en el intercambio del discurso y, con ello, en la forma de lo genuinamente común, del *convivium* (ello hace del hombre una propiedad del lenguaje y no a la inversa).

2. DEL PROGRAMA A SU REALIZACIÓN. DEL *WELTBÜRGER* AL *GEMÜT*

Con todo, la investigación antropológica anunciada de manera programática en el prólogo de *ApH* como estudio del *Welbürger* –investigación que habría de reenviar, con cierta facilidad, a la apertura del lenguaje como la morada del hombre en el mundo- se desarrolla efectivamente como analítica del *Gemüt* ¿Hay aquí una contradicción? Y si no es así, ¿de qué manera el estudio de la estructura del *Gemüt* puede constituir un estudio cosmopolita del hombre como ciudadano o habitante del mundo? Ferhat Taylan se plantea en *Geist, Gemüt et Seele: les transformations des figures kantiennes de l'intériorité chez Foucault* la siguiente pregunta:

¿N'est paradoxal de vouloir construire une figure de l'homme comme citoyen ou habitant du monde, tout en renvoyant cette extériorité à la forme intérieure de l'esprit (du Gemüt)?¹⁴

Ahora bien, tal contradicción o paradoja sólo lo sería si el *Gemüt* fuera concebido como una instancia cerrada y separada, interior e inmóvil (no cosmopolita), y confundido con el alma (*Seele*); es decir, sólo habría paradoja si el *Gemüt* fuera concebido *psicológicamente*. Al respecto Foucault es tajante:

Y sin embargo la Antropología, tal como podemos, leerla, no deja ningún lugar a la psicología, cualquiera que ella sea. Ella se da incluso explícitamente como rechazo de la psicología, en una exploración del *Gemüt*, que no pretende ser conocimiento de la *Seele*¹⁵.

Y es que el *Gemüt*, señala Foucault, no es *Seele*¹⁶, nada tiene que ver con la «noción metafísica de una substancia simple e inmaterial»¹⁷ y, por ende, no debe confundirse con el objeto de una psicología racional. Pero hay que hacer notar también que *ApH*, como estudio del *Gemüt* y en la obediencia a una dialéctica trascendental radicalizada¹⁸, no sólo impugna la psicología racional clásica: hace también estallar su versión pretendidamente crítica, como forma de disciplina de la razón (disciplina que supondría en secreto una antropología fundamental o, al decir de Foucault, una analítica *del sujeto*). Del mismo modo torna impracticable cualquier psicología empírica que hiciera del *Gemüt* una instancia puramente pasiva. Y ello porque el *Gemüt* mantiene relación con lo que en *ApH* se denomina *Geist*, de manera que, por tal relación, aquél será arrancado de la pasividad.

El *Gemüt* –dice Foucault- «es y no es *Geist*»¹⁹; ¿Qué significa tal afirmación? ¿Cómo se determina el *Geist* en *ApH*? Por el *Geist*, cuya presencia en *ApH* –en consideración de Foucault- es discreta pero decisiva²⁰, hay, en el *Gemüt*, *actividad*, esa actividad que lo aleja de todo programa de psicología, tanto empírica como racional. Y es que el «*Gemüt* no es simplemente “lo que es”, sino “lo que él hace de sí mismo”»²¹. Lo que él hace de sí mismo en tanto habitado por el *Geist*. Sería preciso detenerse mínimamente en este punto. Foucault se apoya en la breve definición que Kant da en *ApH* del *Geist*: «*Geist* ist das belebende Prinzip im Menschen»²². Tal vivificación, a partir del principio del *Geist*, ha de ser *durch Ideen*: «Eine Rede, eine Schrift, eine Dame der Gesellschaft ist Schön, aber ohne Geist». Para que el brillo de la belleza –de una persona o de una cosa- tenga espíritu y, por él, despierte interés y ponga en movimiento,

despierte a la imaginación poniendo ante ella un «amplio espacio de juego (*einen Grossen Spielraum*)»²³, es preciso que tal brillo, tal belleza vivificante, lo sea de las ideas, *durch Ideen*. Ello reenvía, a nuestro juicio de una manera muy evidente, a la figura de Sócrates, tal como ella opera en los diálogos platónicos. Así, Sócrates, que no era nada, nada más que el brillo de tales ideas (las ideas, entonces, pero como *forma de vida*), ponía fuera de sí a los jóvenes atenienses, invirtiendo las relaciones de la erótica tradicional griega. Sócrates tenía *Geist* y eso le hacía irresistible. A nuestro juicio, desde estos mismos parámetros ha de ser comprendido en Kant ese movimiento que es vivificación a través de ideas. Unas cuantas páginas después de aquellas que contienen la definición señalada, Kant recogerá todo lo dicho, mas esta vez haciendo una referencia explícita al *Gemüt*: «Man nennt das durch Ideen belebende Prinzip des Gemüts Geist»²⁴. El *Geist* es, pues, el principio vivificante del *Gemüt* a través de ideas. Es y no es el *Gemüt*; es el *Gemüt* pero, digamos, comprendido en su movimiento y actividad, lleno de vida, justamente la que procurarían las ideas (conceptos necesarios de la razón que, sin tener en la experiencia objeto alguno que les corresponda, mantienen sin embargo una cierta relación con la experiencia), concebidas como principios (ni como fuerzas, ni facultades) de vivificación de la experiencia (ni como principios constitutivos, ni como principios regulativos).

Por tal movimiento el *Gemüt* no podrá considerarse un mero ser viviente (de ser así la antropología no sería pragmática, sino fisiológica, y trataría de lo que la naturaleza hace del hombre²⁵) o algo análogo a la vida orgánica, mucho menos la vida del absoluto (nos movemos aquí en un horizonte crítico de finitud), y ocurre más bien que la dimensión del *Gemüt* no se tomará aquí como la de aquello *que es*, sino como la de un poder y un deber de hacer de sí mismo.

3. LA CONSTITUCIÓN LINGÜÍSTICA (NO PSICOLÓGICA) DEL *GEMÜT* Y EL TRABAJO ANTROPOLÓGICO COMO INVESTIGACIÓN DE LOS USOS DEL LENGUAJE.

Irrumpe ahora el *Gemüt* como dimensión cosmopolita, abierta y activa. Totalidad estructural, pero totalidad en efectivo y perpetuo movimiento, bajo la condición de un lenguaje común y en un intercambio de ideas que vivifica y llena de espíritu. La dimensión del *Gemüt*, como estructura abierta, es, pues, también la dimensión exterior del hombre como ciudadano del mundo: dimensión en perpetuo movimiento en el intercambio vivificante de un lenguaje común. Se subraya así la constitución lingüística -no psicológica- del *Gemüt* y, con ello, de lo antropológico. Ello se deja ver en diferentes momentos del texto.

Así, el lenguaje, en su lectura foucaultiana, aparecerá en *ApH* como el índice de un *equilibrio* entre la síntesis trascendental y la posibilidad de una «partición empírica, manifestada bajo la doble forma del acuerdo (*Übereinstimmung*) y de la comunicación (*Mitteilung*)»²⁶.

La medida de este equilibrio puede rastrearse en la correspondencia contemporánea a los trabajos de edición de *ApH*. Así, en la última carta que Kant dirige a Beck el 1 de Julio de 1794, el autor de *ApH* retomará los temas mayores de *KrV* –la relación con el objeto, la síntesis de lo múltiple, la validez universal de la representación- pero esta vez definidos y articulados a partir del problema de la comunicación. Frente a Beck, que concebiría la unidad sintética de la conciencia como la operada por una realidad cerrada sobre sí misma, allende toda

afectividad, y determinaría el lazo de la representación con el objeto como un *lazo interior* al acto mismo de la representación, Kant hará jugar los poderes de la exterioridad, el rodeo, sin atajo posible, por un lenguaje, que abrirá la unidad sintética a la comunicación y el encuentro con el otro. Se esboza, de este modo, en el marco de un análisis del problema de lo que Beck llama la *Beilegung*, -la imputación (*imputation*) de una representación objetiva, la cuestión de la operación constituyente por la que una representación, en tanto que determinación del sujeto, se halla referida a un objeto que difiere de ella, y por la cual ella llega a ser el elemento del conocimiento-²⁷ la idea de una *apercepción discursiva*. Así, Kant hará notar que la representación no está *destinada* (*dévolue*) a un objeto que se hallaría *más allá* de ella, de tal modo que su objetividad ha de depender de su «relación con algo otro», por la que ella llega a ser universal y comunicable. Ese “algo otro” no es sino la *unidad sintética de apercepción*. Ahora bien, Kant en su respuesta a Beck lleva el asunto mucho más lejos: sin duda se hace depender la objetividad de la representación de una composición, que retrotrae a los poderes sintéticos de un *Ich denke* universal, sin embargo, esta universalidad se teje aquí como lenguaje y en comunicación con los otros (universalidad y publicidad aquí se solapan). Ello hace que el acto de la composición objetiva remita a una efectiva comunidad lingüística que abre la síntesis trascendental a una *facticidad* constitutiva:

La síntesis trascendental no se da nunca sino equilibrada en la posibilidad de una partición empírica (*partage empirique*), manifiesta bajo la doble forma del acuerdo (*Übereinstimmung*) y la comunicación (*Mitteilung*).²⁸

Ahora bien, ello no significa solamente que «el sujeto no se encuentre ahí determinado por la manera en que es afectado» (afectado por la cosa) y «que se determina como sujeto en la constitución de la representación»²⁹, y es preciso comprender que dicha *constitución*, por la que las representaciones devienen comunicables, *se hace ella misma en común en el espacio de juego del lenguaje*.

La *Antropología* puede presentarse así como la elucidación de un «lenguaje ya hecho – explícito o silencioso–», a la base de una experiencia universal:

La Antropología es la elucidación de este lenguaje ya hecho –explícito o silencioso– por el cual el hombre extiende sobre las cosas y entre sus semejantes una red de intercambios, de reciprocidad, de comprensión sorda, que no forma exactamente ni la ciudad de los espíritus, ni la apropiación total de la naturaleza, sino esta habitación universal del hombre en el mundo.³⁰

Es pues lo lingüístico, mucho más que lo psicológico, el «suelo real de la experiencia antropológica»³¹. Sin embargo, «la lengua no está aquí dada como sistema a interrogar, sino mas bien como elemento que va de suyo, en el interior del cual uno se encuentra situado de partida; instrumento de intercambios, vehículo de diálogos, virtualidad de acuerdo» Es más, «la lengua es el campo común de la filosofía y la no filosofía. Es en ella donde una u otra se confrontan – o más bien comunican»³², en tanto la filosofía se desenvuelve en el elemento de una lengua común que utiliza, explícita e interroga.

En esta lingüisticidad de la experiencia antropológica descansará el carácter *popular* de un texto filosófico como *ApH*.³³ Su popularidad no podrá referirse entonces a una cierta naturaleza del contenido, tampoco a la forma en que él se expresa; ella se cifrará, más bien, «en la manera de administrar la prueba»³⁴, en una evidencia que descansa en el lenguaje común:

Decir que un texto es popular porque los lectores pueden encontrar ejemplos por ellos mismos, es decir que hay entre el autor y su público, el fondo no dividido de un lenguaje cotidiano, que continúa hablando, sin transición y sin intercambio, una vez la página ha quedado en blanco.³⁵

En un pasaje de la *Lógica*, Kant distinguirá la *popularidad afectada* en el conocimiento, esa degeneración del gusto que se llama *galantería*, consistente en sacrificar el rigor de escuela en el conocimiento para el trato personal o para el mundo, de lo que llamará verdadera popularidad (*wahrhaft populäre*)³⁶. Ésta no es un añadido de estilo (tampoco una carencia de éste), sino un rasgo del conocimiento, una perfección (*Vollkommenheit*) del mismo, que no se halla reñida con el rigor de escuela, antes al contrario, lo supone siempre, de tal manera que éste está siempre presente en el conocimiento popular, si bien de tal manera que su armazón técnico resulta imperceptible, como las líneas trazadas con lápiz sobre las que se escribe, que después se borran. Pero entonces la popularidad no podrá ser rudeza, ni ingenuidad y será determinada por Kant como un conocimiento, propio de hombres que frecuentan un ambiente refinado. Tal conocimiento tiene un carácter mundano, es *eine Welt und Menschentkenntniss*, un «conocimiento de los conceptos, del gusto y de las inclinaciones de los hombres» que, asentado en las «expresiones habituales», procura una evidencia completa (*vollständige Einsicht*) sobre su contenido. Una extensión que jamás podría alcanzar un conocimiento puramente escolar, que siempre, desarraigado de la certeza que procura el lenguaje común, deja dudas «de si el examen no ha sido unilateral y si el conocimiento mismo tiene acaso un valor que le sea reconocido por todos los hombres».

La certeza que procura un conocimiento popular no descansará, pues, es argumentos diferentes o mejores que aquellos aportados por un conocimiento técnico, sino en un lenguaje *común* -compartido por el que escritor-filósofo y el lector, que inmediatamente se reconoce en lo escrito- que constituye la «extensión exterior» de un conocimiento «por cuanto que se extiende exteriormente entre muchos hombres». De este modo, los ejemplos aportados, la utilización frecuente de modismos y de expresiones hechas y el análisis recurrente de una pluralidad de campos semánticos del lenguaje cotidiano procuran un clima de total evidencia en *ApH*, donde «el todo es dado en la inagotable multiplicidad de lo diverso. Las variadas pruebas que da no dejan jamás la impresión de ser parciales»³⁷.

De este modo, el lenguaje común constituye aquí la forma de la universalidad del conocimiento, así como de su certeza. Nos hallamos entonces muy lejos de la idea de evidencia cartesiana -tal como, por ejemplo, se pergeña en las *Meditaciones* cartesianas- de esa evidencia que exigiría arrancarse a las ilusiones del lenguaje común. Frente a ella, lo evidente es aquí *lo que aparece a todos*, acaso porque en la soledad, en el «ocio tranquilo», en el «retiro en soledad»³⁸, se pueden ver cosas muy claras que no son verdad (Machado). El lenguaje cotidiano, común, se delinea así como forma de un sentido *común* que es sentido de realidad; un sentido que no remitiría a estructuras

trascendentales interiores universales, sino a una efectiva y afectiva comunidad lingüística. Ahora bien, siendo así las cosas, un lenguaje que se aleje de lo común (en el doble sentido de la expresión “común”), de su forma popular, necesariamente perderá pío en la realidad. Desde aquí la empresa de una filosofía analítica del lenguaje ideal, así como su pretensión de superación de la metafísica mediante análisis lógico del lenguaje, pueden presentarse como la plasmación de la patología de una razón que habría perdido su sentido común.

Frente a este modo de consideración, en *ApH* el lenguaje cotidiano no es nunca *superado*, no es eliminado en beneficio de una terminología que habría que fijar y justificar, y de la cual se supone que reproduce la articulación lógica de lo real en el espacio de la naturaleza. Ocurre, más bien, que jamás es cuestionado, siendo acogido en la «totalidad de una práctica»³⁹, que nunca se pone en duda. El lenguaje cotidiano llega así a constituir «el soporte y la substancia misma del análisis»⁴⁰ (cfr. por ejemplo, el § 46 de *ApH*): «En el nivel antropológico –dice Foucault– no hay lenguaje mistificado, ni incluso vocabulario erróneo»⁴¹.

La antropología puede aparecer así como una suerte de «idiomática general»,⁴² arraigada «en un sistema de expresión y de experiencia que es un sistema alemán»⁴³. Con todo, lo estamos viendo, se halla constituida por proposiciones que exhiben una inmediata universalidad. Pero el latín no es ya aquí, tal como ocurría en *KrV*, el garante de tal universalidad. Ya no se tratará entonces de llevar a cabo esa operación meticulosa por la que se hacía acompañar todo término o expresión alemana por su correspondiente latino, de tal manera que la universalidad enlazaba en esa obra con una latinidad implícita y esencial. La referencia al latín era así en *KrV* «sistemática y esencial»⁴⁴. En *ApH* las referencias al latín son igualmente frecuentes y pueden servir, por ejemplo, para distinguir una ambigüedad de sentido, mas aquí el latín no ocupa el lugar de la claridad esencial a la que siempre se ha de volver, y se mantiene en el mismo nivel de espesura que la lengua alemana. La referencia a aquella lengua no tiene otro valor que el de una indicación o el de una referencia aclaratoria. Ello significa que el camino real del pensamiento en *ApH* no pasará ya por la latinidad⁴⁵ y su universalidad se establecerá a través de otro tipo de operaciones con el lenguaje. Así, se identificará y precisará la red semántica de tal o cual término mediante una totalización del dominio verbal emparentado con el mismo, que concederá una extrema atención a las innumerables flexiones lingüísticas en que se desplaza y singulariza el sentido. Siendo así las cosas, las facultades ya no conformarán el hilo conductor del análisis, se liberarán y se advertirán, más bien, en la malla de las palabras de un lenguaje cotidiano⁴⁶.

Este desplazamiento de objeto de consideración tendrá para la reflexión filosófica una gran importancia. La universalidad a la que ella aspira ya no podrá tener una forma latina, y su lenguaje ya no buscará, en el espacio de una finitud crítica, las figuras prístinas que habrían de corresponder a la pureza inmaculada de las facultades, encontrando ahora, en una lengua materna dada, tanto su punto de origen como el campo de exploración de usos lingüísticos en que las facultades del *Gemüt* ofrecen su faz concreta, relacional y operatoria. Ahora bien, y esto es decisivo, que el lenguaje filosófico se halle ligado de este modo a una lengua materna, no vuelve parciales o relativos sus sentidos, únicamente ubica críticamente el descubrimiento de su universalidad en dominios verbales, las lenguas maternas, que son los de una universalidad concreta⁴⁷.

Con todo, Kant no tematizará esta continuidad entre la no filosofía y la filosofía, entre las significaciones de la lengua común y el discurso filosófico. Tal relación será utilizada permanentemente, más no interrogada en cuanto tal. La lengua aparece en *ApH* como un elemento común que va de suyo, como el vehículo de diálogos y el instrumento de intercambios y acuerdos en que se teje y desteje la urdimbre lingüística de la experiencia. Foucault podrá referirse así al «Banquete kantiano»⁴⁸, haciendo notar la insistencia por parte de Kant en esas formas minúsculas de sociedad que son las *comidas en común*, donde el lenguaje como conversación, como *Unterhaltung*, deviene la forma fundamental de un «discurso que, de uno al otro y, entre todos, nace y se cumple». «Imagen particular de la universalidad» (de la *universalidad pública*), en la *Tischgesellschaft* se plasma la idea de una sociedad en la que «cada uno se encuentra a la vez vinculado y soberano»⁴⁹. Desde este punto de vista, es decir, desde el punto de vista antropológico, «el grupo que tiene valor de modelo no es ni la familia (grupo comunitario, pero no universal) ni el estado, comprendido como una forma coactiva que se impondría desde el exterior: es la *Tischgesellschaft*» (que procurará nuevos parámetros para pensar lo estatal), ella, cuando se ajusta a sus propias reglas, procura una presencia a lo universal. De este modo, en el elemento autoreglamentado de esta comunidad universal de la conversación, donde los derechos de cada uno son inmanentes a la discusión, «la articulación de las libertades y la posibilidad, para los individuos, de formar un todo, pueden organizarse sin la intervención de una fuerza o de una autoridad externa y sin renuncia ni alienación. Hablando en la comunidad de un *convivium*, las libertades se encuentran y espontáneamente se universalizan. Cada uno es libre, pero en la forma de la totalidad»⁵⁰. El hombre se determina así como *Weltbürger*, como un ciudadano del mundo, mas no porque pertenezca a tal o cual grupo social o institución, sino porque *habla*, porque habita en el lenguaje: «su residencia en el mundo es originariamente estancia dentro del lenguaje»⁵¹.

RESUMEN: Este artículo presenta la lectura foucaultiana de *ApH* de Kant, enfocada a partir de la cuestión del lenguaje como dimensión antropológico-crítica. Desde esta perspectiva lo lingüístico-dialógico, y no tanto lo psicológico, se ha de revelar como el verdadero suelo de la experiencia antropológica. En el marco de este análisis foucaultiano el programa de una investigación del hombre como *Weltbürger*, en tanto ser que habla y que hace del lenguaje su forma de residencia en el mundo, se desarrollará, sin contradicción, como analítica del *Gemüt*, comprendido éste como una totalidad estructural abierta y en movimiento, que encuentra en los usos del lenguaje común su esencia, su certeza y su principio de vivificación.

PALABRAS CLAVE: antropología, lenguaje, mundo, comunidad, *Gemüt*

ABSTRACT: This article presents Kant's *ApH* foucauldian lecture, focused from the question of language as an anthropological-critical dimension. From these perspective the linguistical-dialogic, and not so the psychological, it is to be revealed like the true floor of the anthropological experience. In the context of this foucauldian analysis the investigation program of man as "Weltbürger", that is, as a being that talks and makes of language its form of residence in the world, will develop, without contradiction, as an analysis of the "Gemüt", understanding this as an open and moving structural totality, that finds its essence, its certainty and its principle enlivening in the uses of common language

KEYWORDS: anthropology, language, world, community, *Gemüt*.

REFERENCIAS

- ARISTÓTELES, *Política*, Madrid: Gredos, 1999.
- DÁVILA, J. GROS, F. *Michel Foucault, lector de Kant*, Merida: Universidad de los Andes. Consejo de publicaciones, 1998
- DEKENS, O., *L'Épaisseur humaine. Foucault et l'archéologie de l'homme moderne*, Paris: Kimé.
- DESCARTES, R., *Meditaciones metafísicas*, Madrid: Gredos, 1987.
- DÍAZ MARSÁ, M., “L'idée de sensibilité transcendante dans l'introduction à l'Anthropologie de Kant” en el monográfico de *Rue Descartes, L'homme après sa mort, Foucault après Foucault, Collège international de philosophie, Paris, N° 75, 2012/2013p. 34-45*
- DÍAZ MARSÁ, M. “Sensibilidad y temporalidad en la *Introduction à l'Anthropologie* de Foucault. Apuntes foucaultianos para la cuestión facticidad y trascendentalidad en el pensamiento kantiano” en J.J. GARCÍA, M.J. CALLEJO, RODRÍGUEZ, R. (eds.) *La libertad del mundo. Homenaje a Juan Manuel Navarro Cordón*, Madrid, Escolar y Mayo, 2014.
- DÍAZ MARSÁ, M. “Facticidad y trascendentalidad en el estudio foucaultiano de *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* de Kant” en Azafea. Revista de Filosofía. Ed. Universidad de Salamanca, n° 13, 2011, pp.179-220.
- DÍAZ MARSÁ, M. *Modificaciones. Ontología crítica y antropología política en el pensamiento de Foucault*, Madrid: Escolar y mayo, 2014.
- FIMIANI, M.P., *Foucault y Kant. Crítica Clínica Ética*, Buenos Aires: Herramienta ed., 2005.
- FOUCAULT, M., “Introduction à l'Anthropologie” en Kant, *Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique* (trad. Michel Foucault), Paris: Vrin, 2008.
- HAN, B., *L'ontologie manqué de Michel Foucault*, Grenoble: Millon, 1898.
- KANT, I., *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1973.
- KANT, I., *Lógica*, Madrid: Akal, 2000, pp. 108-110.
- KANT, I., *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Stuttgart: Reclam, 2006.
- LEBLANC, G. (ed.) *Foucault lecteur de Kant: le champ anthropologique*, Lumières, n° 16 (2º semestre 2010), Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires, 2010.
- NAVARRO CORDÓN, J. M., “El concepto de transcendental en Kant”, en *Anales del seminario de Metafísica*, vol. 5, n° 5, Madrid: Servicio de publicaciones de la Universidad Complutense, 1970, pp. 7-26.
- SABOT, P. *Para leer Las palabras y las cosas de Michel Foucault*, Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión, 2007.
- SARDINHA, D., (ed.) *L'homme après sa mort, Kant après Foucault*, Rue Descartes, Collège international de philosophie, n° 75, 2012/3.
- SARDINHA, D., “Différence entre l'anthropologie pragmatique et l'anthropologie métaphysique” en *L'homme après sa mort, Kant après Foucault*, Rue Descartes, Collège international de philosophie, n° 75, 2012/3.
- TAILAN, F., «Geist, Gemüt et Seele: Les transformations des figures kantienne de l'intériorité chez Foucault» en Le Blanc, G., ed., *Foucault lecteur de Kant: le champ anthropologique*, Lumières, n° 16 (2º semestre 2010), Bordeaux: Presses Universitaires, 2010, p. 33.
- VANDEWALLE, B., “L'analyse du dispositif anthropologique dans les Dits et écrits de Michel Foucault” en MOREAU (ed.), *Lectures de Michel Foucault. Sur les “Dits et écrits” volumen 3*, pp. 53-59.

NOTAS

1 Este trabajo forma parte de una investigación realizada en el marco del proyecto de investigación Naturaleza humana y comunidad II: H. Arendt, K. Polanyi y M. Foucault. Tres recepciones de la antropología política kantiana en el siglo XX (ref. FFI2009-12402), financiada por el ministerio de Educación de España.

2 Marco Díaz Marsá (Madrid, 1971) es Doctor en Filosofía por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid y profesor en el Departamento de *Filosofía Teórica* de la Facultad de Filosofía de esa misma Universidad. Sus estudios de doctorado y postdoctorado, con Becas FPU del Ministerio de Educación de España y de la Fundación Caja de Madrid, se han centrado en el problema “ontología y libertad” en el pensamiento de Michel Foucault, así como en sus raíces kantianas y heideggerianas. Ha publicado multitud de trabajos sobre Michel Foucault, algunos de ellos basados en su relación específica con Kant. Se destacan para esta ocasión “L ’idée de sensibilité transcendante dans l’introduction à l’Anthropologie de Kant” (en *Rue Descartes, Collège international de philosophie, Paris*. Monográfico dedicado a la lectura foucaultiana de ApH de Kant. N° 75, 2012/2013p. 34-45) y el libro *Modificaciones. Ontología crítica y antropología política en el pensamiento de Foucault* (Madrid: Escolar y Mayo, 2014). Estos trabajos fueron realizados en el marco de una investigación más general, llevada a cabo por el grupo de investigación de la UCM *Metafísica, crítica y política*, al que pertenece el autor desde el año 2005.

3 Kant, I., *Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique* & Foucault, M., *Introduction à l’Anthropologie* (en adelante IAK), Paris: Vrin, 2008.

4 Kant, I., *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (en adelante ApH), Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1973.

5 Ya en los *Collegentwürfe* de 1770-80, mucho antes de la edición de ApH (1798) se decía: «nosotros no investigamos aquí al hombre según su modo de ser natural» Lanst Schriften, Akademie , XV, 2te Hälfte, pp. 659-660

6 ApH, ed. cit., p. 407.

7 *Ibidem*.

8 KrV, B418-B 432, sobre este asunto cfr. Diaz Marsá, M., “L ’idée de sensibilité transcendante dans l’introduction à l’Anthropologie de Kant” en el monográfico de *Rue Descartes, L ’homme après sa mort, Foucault après Foucault, Collège international de philosophie, Paris*,. N° 75, 2012/2013p. 34-45

9 ApH, p. 339.

10 Foucault, M., *IAK*, ed. cit., p. 64-65.

11 *IAK*, p. 61

12 «la razón por la cual el hombre es un ser político, más que cualquier abeja o que cualquier animal gregario, es evidente (...) el hombre es el único animal que tiene palabra» Aristóteles, *Política*, (I, 1253a), Madrid: Gredos, 1999, p. 50

13 Foucault, M., *IAK*, p. 64.

14 Taylan, F., «Geist, Gemüt et Seele: Les transformations des figures kantienne de l’intériorité chez Foucault» en Le Blanc, G., ed., *Foucault lecteur de Kant: le champ anthropologique*, Lumières, n° 16 (2º semestre 2010), Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2010, p. 33.

15 Foucault, M., *IAK*, p. 35.

16 *IAK*, p. 37.

17 *IAK*, 36.

18 Cfr. *IAK* p. 77 y ss.

19 *IAK*, p. 37.

20 *Ibidem*.

21 *IAK*, p. 39.

22 Kant, I., *ApH*, ed. cit., p. 544

23 *Ibidem*.

24 *ApH*, p. 573.

25 *ApH*, p. 399

26 Foucault, M., *IAK*, p. 21.

27 *IAK*, p. 20.

- 28 *IAK*, p. 21.
29 *Ibidem*.
30 *IAK*, p. 61.
31 *IAK*, p. 62.
32 *IAK*, p. 63-64.
33 *IAK*, p. 59.
34 *Ibidem*.
35 *IAK*, p. 60
36 Kant, I., *Lógica*, Madrid: Akal, 2000, pp. 108-110.
37 Foucault, *IAK*, p. 59
38 Descartes, R., *Meditaciones metafísicas*, Madrid: Gredos, 1987, p. 16.
39 Foucault, M., *IAK*, p. 60.
40 *Ibidem*.
41 *Ibid.*
42 *Ibid.*
43 *IAK*, p. 61.
44 *IAK*, p. 62.
45 *Ibidem*.
46 *IAK*, p. 63.
47 *Ibidem*.
48 *IAK*, p. 64.
49 *Ibidem*.
50 *Ibid.*
51 *IAK*, p. 65.

Recibido / Received: 04/11/14

Aprovado / Approved: 12/12/14

LA NOTION DE 'SYSTÈME' CHEZ WOLFF, LAMBERT ET KANT

Henny BLOMME¹

1. INTRODUCTION

Il faut le dire dès le départ: les notions de 'système' et de 'science' qui figurent dans l'œuvre kantienne ont très peu en commun avec leur signification actuelle. Comme il en va avec beaucoup de termes clés utilisés par Kant, si l'on veut saisir leurs connotations véritables il faut pouvoir les situer par rapport au contexte de la philosophie allemande du 18^{ème} s. Kant n'aime pas les néologismes et reprend normalement les concepts de la tradition, de ses collègues morts ou vivants. Par conséquent, l'interprète de sa philosophie est obligé de se verser dans les usages conceptuels de l'époque. Mais le plus souvent, lorsque Kant reprend des éléments d'autres penseurs, il les reforme. Lors de ce processus de réappropriation, le sens traditionnel ne disparaît pas, mais une ou plusieurs couches sémantiques supplémentaires viennent s'y accrocher. D'où le fait que beaucoup de termes chez Kant exploitent (consciemment ou inconsciemment) une ambiguïté. C'est une des difficultés qu'un lecteur débutant de Kant doit toujours affronter: si Kant donne plusieurs définitions et/ou explications d'un même terme, celles-ci ne semblent jamais tout à fait coïncider et l'effort de trouver une définition qui soit cohérente avec toute occurrence ne mène jamais très loin. En effet, pour beaucoup de concepts mobilisés par la philosophie kantienne ('transcendental', 'apparition', 'métaphysique', 'idéalisme'), il est impossible de les expliquer de façon univoque et on n'arrivera pas à une vraie compréhension des textes en essayant de fixer une définition lexicographique. Dans ce qui suit, je ferai abstraction de ce qui est pour ainsi dire ordinaire dans l'utilisation kantienne des notions de 'système' et 'science' afin de déceler leur sens spécifiquement kantien. Je propose, dans un premier temps, de trouver cette spécificité en confrontant la conception kantienne du système aux conceptions de Wolff et de Lambert. Puis j'offrirai une analyse de la notion kantienne de 'système' à partir de la première et troisième *Critique*, pour conclure avec quelques réflexions sur la connexion entre idées transcendantales et système.

2. KANT ET WOLFF

Lorsque Kant parle d'un ensemble de connaissances comme système, cela veut dire que l'organisation de cet ensemble a été guidée par une idée unificatrice de la raison. Or, cette idée...

[...] est le concept rationnel de la forme d'un tout, pour autant que, grâce à celui-ci, aussi bien l'étendu du divers que la position respective des parties entre eux, soient déterminées *a priori*.²

Ainsi, l'idée de système est la forme par excellence, et c'est elle qui, en dernier lieu, motive tout jugement. Elle est l'idée régulatrice qui donne la forme d'une matière logique (l'agrégat des concepts, des jugements et des syllogismes), en ce qu'elle motive la pensée à effectuer, à l'intérieur de cette matière logique, des liaisons. En tant qu'expression d'une loi fondamentale de la pensée considérée d'après sa forme, cette idée peut être caractérisée comme principe logique de la raison, exigeant que l'on réalise autant que possible l'unité de la connaissance. L'architectonique de la raison pure est alors la doctrine qui rend possible d'éviter un modèle de la connaissance qui ne nous présenterait qu'un agrégat de concepts et jugements disparates. Ainsi, l'architectonique fait appel à un refus qui, bien que non spécifiquement kantien, ne manquera pas de résonner jusque dans les dernières phrases de l'œuvre, à savoir: le refus d'honorer avec le titre de science un ensemble de connaissances dont le principe de collection a été un pur rassemblement. Mais encore faut-il que la forme systématique ne soit pas simplement fondée sur un principe empirique (comme chez Linné). Le système que nous donne l'architectonique est dicté par la raison elle-même, et négliger l'architectonique de la raison pure aurait pour conséquence que la raison humaine risque de ne plus se reconnaître dans les productions de sa faculté de connaître. C'est pour cette raison que l'architectonique de la raison appartient éminemment à une critique de la raison pure.

Dans une réflexion des années 1776-1778, lorsqu'il veut donner un exemple d'une œuvre qui n'a pas été guidée par une architectonique, Kant fait référence aux écrits de Wolff:

Wolf faisait de grandes choses dans la philosophie: mais il ne faisait que se précipiter et augmentait la connaissance sans la trier, la changer et la transformer par une critique spécifique. Ses œuvres sont donc très utiles en tant qu'entrepôt [*Magazin*] de la raison, mais non pas comme une architectonique de celle-ci. Mais peut-être, même si ce n'était pas à approuver chez Wolf, est-ce quand même conforme à l'ordre de la nature, que tout d'abord les connaissances, où du moins les efforts de l'entendement, sont multipliés sans vraie méthode et [seulement] après soumises à des règles. Enfants.³

En d'autres termes: la connaissance ne reçoit sa valeur que lorsqu'elle est inscrite dans le système qui est dicté par la raison elle-même. En général, sans architectonique, nous ne voyons dans le seul rassemblement des connaissances qu'une activité en quelque sorte enfantine. Nous pourrions avoir facilement ici l'impression que Kant pense de l'œuvre de Wolff comme un lieu quelque peu poussiéreux où sont stockées aléatoirement des connaissances, plutôt que comme le support inévitable pour éterniser un événement de la pensée. Formellement, une accumulation de connaissances qui n'est pas accompagnée d'une pensée de la systématité, ne fait qu'aboutir à la simple érudition. Cette activité ne serait donc en fin de compte pas si différente de l'activité de l'enfant qui essaie de rassembler le plus grand nombre de cailloux, non pas pour les ordonner ou pour y trouver des ressemblances, mais seulement pour en avoir plus que son copain. Mais, bien sûr, Kant n'irait pas jusqu'à dire que l'œuvre de Wolff, comme collection de connaissances, n'a pas plus d'attrait que le sac de l'enfant, contenant une collection tout à fait aléatoire de cailloux. Ce qui est vrai cependant, c'est que, pour Kant, tout comme l'activité de l'enfant qui rassemble des cailloux, le pur rassemblement de connaissances est une activité vaine, dont le résultat ne présente pas beaucoup d'intérêt:

On a noté beaucoup de pensées perspicaces et bonnes, mais en ne gagnant rien; puisqu'elles n'ont pas de lieu dans un quelconque système, parce qu'on n'a pas encore trouvé l'abrégié de ce dernier.⁴

Toutefois, le problème de l'absence d'une architectonique dans l'œuvre de Wolff ne se résume pas du tout à un quelconque manque de systématisme et la réflexion que nous venons de citer ne saurait donc être dirigée contre lui. C'est ce qui prouve qu'il faut établir une distinction stricte entre la présence d'une architectonique (au sens kantien) et la présentation systématique ou la conscience de la nécessité d'une telle présentation. En effet, comment sinon comprendre le fait que, dans la préface à la deuxième édition de la *KrV*, Kant dit que son futur système de la métaphysique devra suivre «la méthode sévère du fameux Wolff, le plus grand des philosophes dogmatiques»?⁵

Tout le monde qui a pris connaissance de l'œuvre de Wolff avouera qu'il serait manifestement faux de dire que Wolff n'a pas vu l'importance du système.⁶ Non seulement trouve-t-on dans son œuvre un témoignage impressionnant de la science de son époque, mais, par-dessus tout, Wolff semble avoir réussi de façon exemplaire à garder une vue totale sur son œuvre. Cela se manifeste aussi bien par la présentation systématique des disciplines dont il traite que par le vaste réseau de références qui font preuve d'une connaissance précise de l'ordre instauré et de ce qui a été traité (ou est encore à traiter) sous telle ou telle rubrique. Ce qui plus est, chez Wolff, aussi bien les mathématiques que la philosophie sont guidées par une méthode scientifique uniforme, qui n'est autre que l'application précise des règles logiques qu'on trouve présentées dans un «*systema logicum*» – recueil de propositions véridiques qui sont liées entre elles et à leurs principes (définitions et observations) –, et c'est pourquoi l'application de la méthode scientifique à un quelconque domaine de la connaissance humaine fait de ce domaine nécessairement un système de connaissances.

Or que veut dire ici ce terme de 'système'? Dans un essai de 1729, où il parle explicitement de la nécessité de la forme systématique pour la philosophie (*De differentia intellectus systematici & non systematici*), Wolff détermine un regroupement de connaissances comme système si la vérité d'une proposition est prouvée par d'autres propositions que nous reconnaissons comme vraies. Ce n'est que si l'on suit la méthode scientifique, qui consiste à soumettre les liaisons des connaissances à ce qui suit directement du concept général d'une chose et de la nature de l'esprit humain, qu'une telle interdépendance des propositions sera réalisée et qu'on arrivera à une présentation systématique du domaine de la connaissance en question. La forme de la méthode scientifique est donc déterminée par le concept de la chose en général et par l'essence de l'esprit humain, dont il est traité dans l'ontologie, la logique et la psychologie.⁸ Si maintenant on poursuit jusqu'à son terme la possibilité du concept d'une chose en général, on trouvera que cette possibilité repose en dernière instance sur les deux principes qui tirent leurs origines de la nature même de notre esprit, à savoir le principe de non contradiction et le principe de raison suffisante.⁹

Pour Wolff, l'exemple éminent de la connaissance comme système est donné par les *Elementa* d'Euclide, parce que dans cette œuvre, les propositions sont très fortement liées entre elles. Or, selon Wolff, même chez ce géomètre, la méthode n'est pas choisie en fonction du sujet à étudier, mais en fonction du rapport entre la nature de l'esprit humain et le concept d'une

chose en général. Ainsi, selon Wolff, la plupart des axiomes du système élémentaire d'Euclide peuvent être reconduites aux concepts élémentaires qu'il a énumérés dans son ontologie. Pour Wolff alors, un tel système est également possible – et même nécessaire – en philosophie. Dans l'histoire de la philosophie occidentale après Euclide, c'est surtout chez Aristote (*Organon*) et chez Descartes qu'il voit des exemples d'une telle philosophie systématique.¹⁰ Il est clair donc que, pour Wolff, la méthode d'Euclide n'est pas limitée à la géométrie; elle est universelle en ce qu'elle est déterminée par la nature de l'esprit humain lui-même. Autrement dit: la méthode euclidienne est la méthode tout court pour toute science qui se veut systématique.

3. LAMBERT, CRITIQUE DE LA CONCEPTION WOLFFIENNE DE SYSTÈME

C'est cette conscience de l'importance du système, dont fait preuve l'œuvre de Wolff, que loue Lambert dans son *Anlage zur Architectonic*: «L'honneur d'introduire une méthode, une méthode correcte et utile, en philosophie, était réservée à Wolff.»¹¹ Lambert est d'accord avec Wolff, là où ce dernier décrit le système d'Euclide comme archétype de toute méthodologie. Or, voici ce qu'on lit ensuite chez ce même Lambert (§ 12. de son *Anlage zur Architectonic*):

On ne peut pas dire que Wolf ait utilisé complètement la méthode euclidienne. Dans sa métaphysique, les postulats et les constructions (*Aufgaben*)¹² sont presque totalement absents, et la question de savoir ce qu'on devrait définir, n'y est pas tout à fait décidée.¹³

Puis, Lambert donne une explication du problème d'une certaine incongruité entre méthode en mathématiques et méthode en métaphysique. Il s'avère que la facilité de l'application de la méthode euclidienne en mathématiques naît de la possibilité de «mettre devant les yeux les objets». En effet, en géométrie le concept n'est que le nom d'une chose que l'on peut «voir devant les yeux»:

Pour Euclide, il était facile de donner des définitions et de déterminer l'utilisation de ses mots. Il pouvait mettre devant les yeux les lignes, les angles et les figures, et par là connecter immédiatement des mots, des concepts avec la chose. Le mot n'était que le nom de la chose, et parce qu'on voyait celle-ci devant les yeux, on ne pouvait douter de la possibilité du concept. A cela s'ajoute, qu'Euclide disposait de la liberté illimitée de supprimer dans la figure – qui n'est en vérité qu'un cas spécial ou unique de la proposition générale, qui néanmoins sert d'exemple –, tout ce qui n'y appartient pas [à la proposition générale], ou n'est pas présent dans le concept. La figure présentait donc totalement et purement le concept. Mais comme elle ne donne pas la possibilité générale de celui-ci [du concept], Euclide prenait soin de précisément exposer celle-ci [la possibilité générale du concept], et à cette fin il utilise ses postulats, qui représentent des possibilités – ou faisabilités («*Thulichkeiten*») – générales, inconditionnées, et en soi pensables, ou bien simples, qu'il présente sous la forme de constructions (*Aufgaben*).¹⁴

Pour Kant, cet état de choses donne la raison pour laquelle la métaphysique et la philosophie en général ne peuvent s'appuyer sur la méthode euclidienne. Les géomètres, lorsqu'ils déterminent les propriétés d'une figure, peuvent recourir à une intuition, ce que les philosophes ne peuvent pas en expliquant un concept. Mais pour Lambert, c'est le signe de la justesse d'une conviction selon laquelle la philosophie, tout comme la géométrie, doit

chercher des «cas» (c'est-à-dire: des exemples) des concepts et propositions abstraits, afin de les construire et de déterminer leurs propriétés. Selon Lambert, à l'image du système d'Euclide, la métaphysique doit elle aussi indiquer la validité des concepts par des postulats et des axiomes, et c'est ce qui manque encore trop chez Wolff. Ce que Lambert reproche donc à Wolff, c'est qu'il n'a pas su appliquer de façon satisfaisante la méthode euclidienne dans sa propre *Vernunftlehre* et dans sa propre métaphysique. De ce constat, Lambert ne déduit pas que l'idée-même d'une méthodologie universellement valide fait défaut. Tout au contraire, il y voit pour ainsi dire un manque de persévérance méthodologique:

On pourra facilement conclure de ceci, qu'en métaphysique, les concepts et propositions en soi abstraits doivent être éclairés par la présentation (*Vorlegung*) d'un cas unique ou d'un exemple bien choisi, mais que leur généralité et leur étendu doivent être déterminés par des *postulata* et des *axiomata*, et que surtout les *postulata* doivent indiquer au moins des possibilités générales et inconditionnelles de construire des concepts et que les limitations lors de la possibilité de concepts composés doivent être déterminées par des principes. Comment cela doit se faire, on n'en trouve dans la doctrine wolffienne de la raison aucune ou très peu de règles, et dans la métaphysique aucun ou très peu d'exemples.¹⁵

Comme Lambert, Kant loue Wolff pour avoir introduit en philosophie la discipline méthodique: il a montré pour la première fois de façon exemplaire «comment, par l'établissement légitime des principes, détermination claire des concepts, rigueur recherchée des preuves, l'empêchement des sauts téméraires dans les inférences, il faut adopter l'allure certaine d'une science». ¹⁶ Toutefois, comme le montre la *Refl* 5035 citée plus haut, il est clair que Kant n'accepte pas du tout la doctrine wolffienne du système. Ce qu'il loue chez Wolff, c'est d'avoir procédé de façon systématique, ce qui en fait le premier philosophe dogmatique qui était vraiment guidé par une méthode; mais en même temps Kant réfute cet enseignement de Wolff qui tient que la méthode euclidienne est une méthode universelle qui saurait être appliquée sans limitations en philosophie. Les mathématiques peuvent partir de définitions; la philosophie ne peut pas.¹⁷

Dans un fragment pour une «théorie du système», Lambert décrit les propriétés du système et donne un principe du système. Le fragment commence avec l'assertion suivante:

Pour autant qu'un système soit la totalité d'idées et de propositions qui, prises ensemble, peuvent être considérées comme un tout, chaque science peut être vue comme système.¹⁸

Lambert parle ici clairement d'une totalité d'éléments qui sont rassemblées sous la forme d'un système. C'est cette priorité des éléments qui disparaît dans le concept de système chez Kant, ce qui signifie une vraie révolution du concept du système. Normalement, le système est distingué d'autres ensembles par le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement d'une multitude d'éléments ordonnés, mais que, de plus, les éléments forment une totalité. Les parties de la totalité – les éléments – dans un système sont liées entre elles comme parties contemporaines. Dans le cas du système, la totalité consiste de parties de telle manière que cette totalité ne disparaît pas lors de situations ou de conditions différentes. C'est une telle conception du système que Lambert soutient. Mais chez Kant, le système est cette forme de nos connaissances où la totalité précède

aux parties. La conséquence en est que la complétude du système est donnée par une division *a priori*; et cette division *a priori* est une division du tout qui est donnée par l'idée du système en question. Cela veut dire que c'est l'idée du système qui donne un tout et ce tout peut être divisé par la suite. Or cette division se fait à partir de l'idée du tout elle-même.

Cependant, dans la suite du fragment d'une théorie du système, Lambert écrit des choses qui sont difficilement concevables, si l'on ne conçoit pas le système comme division dictée par un principe plus haut. Et une fois qu'on accepte cette conception, il est difficile de ne pas soutenir le point de vue kantien. En effet, après avoir indiqué la présence d'une subordination et d'une connexion comme des présupposés structurels de tout système, Lambert pose une règle de base du système:

Règle de base du système: Ce qui précède doit, en vue de l'entendement, rendre clair, en vue de la raison, rendre certain, en vue de l'exercice (*Ausübung*), rendre possible, ce qui suit.¹⁹

Limitons-nous à l'ordre qui est ici supposé: Ce qui précède doit rendre clair, rendre certain et rendre possible ce qui suit. On pourrait en effet se demander de quel ordre il peut s'agir, s'il n'est pas basé, comme chez Wolff, sur les principes de non-contradiction et de raison suffisante. Ne doit-on pas en quelque sorte supposer un ordre quasi architectonique, qui naît lorsqu'on part d'un principe unique pour descendre vers les parties du système? La suite du passage donne quelques repères, parce que Lambert se demande encore jusqu'où il faut avancer analytiquement et à partir d'où il faut avancer synthétiquement lors de l'établissement de cet ordre:

La question est de savoir jusqu'où on devrait dans ceci [dans l'établissement du système] procéder analytiquement ou synthétiquement? Analytiquement, jusqu'à ce qu'on ait développé les concepts fondamentaux et les principes. Synthétiquement à partir de là. Dans la doctrine de la nature, ceci [procéder synthétiquement] est nécessaire parce qu'on y doit tirer les concepts de l'expérience.²⁰

Même si l'on peut reconnaître ici des caractéristiques de la conception kantienne du système, on voit pourquoi, en réalité, Lambert en reste fort éloigné: il ne connaît pas les jugements synthétiques *a priori*. Pour lui, la base du système est donnée par des concepts et des propositions fondamentaux qui sont trouvés par analyse. Lorsqu'il s'agit de spécifier à partir de quoi ces concepts et propositions de base peuvent être déduits analytiquement, Lambert parle de «premières idées, qui sont déduites *genetice* l'une de l'autre».²¹ Chez lui, la présentation de ces idées revient somme toute à une analyse et une tentative d'épuration de la langue. Les concepts doivent surtout être déterminés de façon univoque: «Chaque mot ne devrait être rien de plus que le nom d'une chose connue au préalable.»²² Or, même si un philosophe détermine et circonscrit précisément ses concepts, maint lecteur a des difficultés de s'en tenir aux définitions données. Ainsi il se fait que ce que dit le philosophe et ce qu'il conclut correctement est considéré comme aléatoire. Mais ce mal n'est pas universel: ici aussi, la logique et la géométrie peuvent servir d'exemple. Là, on trouve une multitude de mots qui ont une signification très déterminée et fixe (temporellement constant). Or, en philosophie, on se précipite. Selon Lambert, c'est cette précipitation intempestive qui est une des sources principales des doctrines contradictoires en philosophie:

Ce qui est indéterminé dans les concepts donne de fausses explications. Les divisions sont souvent incomplètes et il y a des éléments manquants. Les preuves sont paralogiques, très souvent parce qu'on a deux termes mineurs (*Mittelbegriffe*). [...] ²³

Ainsi, on peut voir la théorie du système de Lambert comme l'antithèse de celle de Wolff. Chez Wolff, on pouvait décrire la forme systématique comme dépendant du principe de la logique formelle: le principe de non-contradiction, et du principe de raison suffisante. De son côté, Lambert veut baser le système sur certaines idées premières (comme on les trouve chez Locke), qui peuvent être déduites analytiquement l'une de l'autre, mais qui doivent aussi être trouvées à partir de l'expérience. Le fondement ultime du système n'est donc pas donné par les principes fondamentaux que Wolff reprend de Leibniz; ces principes ne sont que des mesures qu'on peut utiliser pour juger si le système est correct ou non. Pour Lambert, ils sont les principes formels les plus hauts qui doivent être respectés lors du développement (analytique et synthétique) du système, mais ils ne donneront pas le contenu de ce système. Ainsi, chez Lambert, la présentation systématique et la détermination des termes utilisés sont exigées par la méthode euclidienne, mais ce qui doit être présenté dans le système philosophique – son contenu – n'est jamais aussi clairement déterminé que l'exigeraient les mathématiques. On doit penser chez Lambert à ce que dit Kant sur la déduction empirique des concepts²⁴: de certains concepts premiers, on peut chercher les causes occasionnelles de leur genèse dans l'expérience. Le problème bien sûr est que, même si l'entreprise de monter à partir de perceptions particulières à des concepts généraux «a sans doute une grande utilité»,²⁵ une telle déduction physiologique ne peut jamais être plus *qu'une explication de la possession* de certains concepts; elle ne sera jamais une déduction qui pourra présenter des concepts comme des concepts *a priori* et encore moins pourrait-elle prouver «le droit» propre qui revient à ces concepts, notamment de se rapporter *a priori* à l'expérience. Chez Wolff, la base du système, c'est le principe logique; chez Lambert, c'est les éléments ou concepts fondamentaux eux-mêmes, mais gagnés sans principe ou fil conducteur qui rendrait leur présentation apodictique. On peut considérer que Kant va proposer une synthèse de ces deux conceptions de système.

4. LE SYSTÈME CHEZ KANT. PREMIÈRE ET TROISIÈME CRITIQUE

Chez Kant, la forme systématique n'est pas seulement requise pour la scientificité d'un certain domaine de la connaissance, mais elle est l'expression de la raison elle-même. C'est pour autant qu'elle est expression de la raison que l'architecture de la raison pure est dite d'en être l'art. Par conséquent, chez Kant, la forme systématique n'est pas seulement expression de l'entendement, ni pour autant qu'on le considère comme entendement «logique», dirigé par le principe de non-contradiction (comme chez Wolff), ni même pour autant qu'on le considère comme entendement discursif. Il n'est pas difficile de voir que, chez Kant, l'idée de système ne saurait être réduite à un principe de la logique formelle; le fait que la forme systématique est également inscrite comme principe logique dans la seule forme de la pensée – indépendamment de tout objet donné – n'épuise pas toute son importance. Mais que signifie au juste l'exigence

systématique pour notre entendement, sachant non seulement que l'idée de système est donnée par la raison, mais aussi que notre entendement est un entendement *discursif*!

La nature discursive de notre entendement fait que la logique formelle doit être considérée comme une limite de la logique transcendantale. Chez Kant, la logique formelle n'est donc pas formelle parce qu'elle concerne la pensée en général mais parce qu'elle décrit le cas illusoire où nous ne penserions rien de déterminé. Ainsi, pour Kant, l'abstraction de tout contenu déterminé de la pensée n'est pas ce qui fait que nous saurions nous approcher de la vraie nature de celle-ci, mais ce qui pour ainsi dire nous en éloigne. Du point de vue de la philosophie transcendantale, il n'y a pas de logique formelle tout à fait indépendante, parce qu'elle dépend comme discipline d'une abstraction «forcée» à partir d'une pensée discursive dont le fait d'être forme de la connaissance ne peut être réduit à la simple formalité de la logique formelle.

C'est pourquoi, du point de vue transcendantal, la signification logique de l'idée de système n'est qu'une signification secondaire; bien que les lois de la logique formelle vailent pour la pensée en général, elle ne décrit les formes de la pensée que comme formes purement réceptives pour une matière logique. Ce n'est que dans un cas limite, celui où la pensée ne pense rien de déterminé – ce cas donc où la pensée n'est pas proprement pensée de quelque chose – que sa formalité peut être conçue comme formalité purement logique et que sa description comme pure réceptivité d'une matière logique devient effective en tant que présentifiée par une abstraction. Ce n'est que couplée à la connaissance transcendantale de la discursivité de l'entendement humain que l'idée de système reçoit sa signification proprement transcendantale. En effet, ce n'est que le point de vue transcendantal qui fait voir que la raison, en exigeant d'elle-même la systémativité, ne reste pas dans l'immanence d'une sphère purement (et pour ainsi dire innocemment) rationnelle, mais exige en réalité une unité générique qui règne dans les choses mêmes. Ainsi, du point de vue transcendantal, l'idée de système ne renvoie pas exclusivement à la forme d'une auto-présentation de la pensée, mais, plus important, à la forme nécessaire de toute représentation de la nature comme unité des choses mêmes. L'idée de système exige de concevoir l'empirique lui-même comme ayant sa place dans un système de la raison. C'est pourquoi l'idée de système chez Kant ne peut être réduite à la forme systématique de notre entendement, à l'intérieur duquel le principe de systémativité repose sur la topique des formes du jugement comme fonctions de la pensée. La systémativité ne signifie pas uniquement celle des catégories, pendants logico-transcendants (à validité objective) des fonctions de la pensée, puisque l'idée de système réclame par-dessus tout une unité collective. L'unité non-distributive que l'idée de système nous oblige de réaliser en tant qu'un tout de la connaissance n'est pas une condition d'objectivité de l'entendement, mais une idée régulatrice de la raison.

On voit ici dans quelle mesure la première *Critique* va déjà dans la direction de la troisième. C'est en effet déjà dans l'architectonique de la raison pure qu'est fondé *in nuce* le principe de la réflexion sur les choses empiriques qui commande les différents points de vue sur l'idée de système, d'une part comme «simple» forme logique, exigeant une classification du divers empirique, et, d'autre part, comme concept universel, exigeant une spécification du divers sous un concept donné.²⁶ Dans une note de la première introduction à la *KU*, Kant résume très bien cela:

A première vue, ce principe [de la réflexion sur les objets donnés de la nature] n'a pas du tout l'air d'une proposition synthétique et transcendantale, mais paraît être plutôt tautologique et appartenir à la seule logique. Puisque celle-ci enseigne comment on peut comparer une représentation donnée avec d'autres et, par le fait d'en extraire ce qu'elle a de commun avec plusieurs [autres représentations] comme une caractéristique pour l'utilisation générale, en faire un concept. Seulement, [lorsqu'il s'agit de demander] si, par rapport à chaque objet, la nature a encore à en exhiber beaucoup d'autres comme objets de comparaison [*Gegenstände der Vergleichung*] qui ont en commun avec lui maint trait dans la forme, là-dessus elle [la logique] n'enseigne rien; plutôt cette condition de la possibilité de l'application de la logique à la nature est-elle un principe de la représentation de la nature comme un système pour notre faculté de juger, dans lequel le divers, divisé en genres et espèces, rend possible de ramener, par comparaison, toutes les formes actuelles de la nature à des concepts (de plus ou moins grande généralité). Il est vrai, certes, que l'entendement pur enseigne déjà (mais aussi par des principes synthétiques) qu'il faut penser toutes les choses de la nature comme contenues dans un système transcendantal d'après des concepts *a priori* (les catégories); mais la faculté de juger, qui cherche aussi des concepts pour les représentations empiriques comme telles (la [faculté de juger] réfléchissante) doit en outre admettre à cette fin, que la nature en sa diversité illimitée soit parvenue à une telle division de celle-ci en genres et espèces qui rend possible pour notre faculté de juger de trouver de l'harmonie dans la comparaison des formes de la nature et d'aboutir à des concepts empiriques et l'enchaînement mutuel de ceux-ci, en s'élevant à des concepts plus généraux également empiriques: c.-à-d. la faculté de juger présuppose un système de la nature également d'après des lois empiriques, et cela *a priori*, par conséquent par un principe transcendantal.²⁷

Du point de vue transcendantal, une condition de l'application de la logique à la nature ne peut être traitée comme appartenant à la seule logique formelle. L'entendement pur (la première *Critique*) enseigne qu'il faut penser la nature comme contenue dans un système d'après des concepts et lois *a priori*; la faculté de juger (troisième *Critique*) enseigne qu'également les lois empiriques doivent être pensées comme liées dans un système. Mais aussi bien la première que la troisième *Critique* nous enseignent-elles cela à partir d'un principe transcendantal: d'une part architectonique de la raison pure, d'autre part principe de la faculté de juger. Dans l'architectonique, la pensée détermine sa propre forme en se couplant à un objet en général et prescrit la systématisme à toute connaissance. Dans la troisième *Critique*, la pensée détermine sa forme en se référant à ce qui est spécifié comme objet universel des sens, objet de la réflexion non-transcendantale en général: la nature au sens matériel du terme. Maintenant, du point de vue transcendantal – c'est-à-dire: à partir d'une réflexion transcendantale sur ce principe de la réflexion non-transcendantale –, il faut dire que l'objet de cette dernière se spécifie lui-même «en vue» de notre réflexion possible sur lui:

[...] on spécifie le concept universel en amenant le divers sous lui. En effet le genre (considéré logiquement) est pour ainsi dire la matière ou le substrat brut que la nature, par plusieurs déterminations, façonne en espèces et sous-espèces particulières. Aussi peut-on dire que la nature se spécifie elle-même suivant un certain principe (ou l'idée d'un système) par analogie avec l'usage de ce terme chez les juristes, quand ils parlent de la spécification de certaines matières brutes [...] Le principe propre de la faculté de juger est donc: la nature spécifie ses lois générales en empiriques, conformément à la forme d'un système logique, au profit de la faculté de juger.²⁸

Ainsi, alors que la première *Critique* démontre quels sont les principes objectifs de la possibilité de la nature au sens formel, la troisième apporte un principe subjectif de cette

possibilité. Ceux-là concernent la possibilité de l'expérience et de ses objets, celui-ci la possibilité de la nature *comme nature connue* et donc en «conformité avec l'entendement humain dans son activité nécessaire de trouver pour le particulier, que lui offre la perception, l'universel, et pour le divers la liaison (qui est en vérité l'universel pour chaque espèce) dans l'unité du principe».²⁹ L'actualité de ce principe du jugement réfléchissant est démontrée par l'excellent exemple des recherches de Linné, que Kant apporte dans une remarque ajoutée dans la section V de la première introduction à la *KU*:

Linné aurait-il pu espérer de développer un système de la nature, s'il avait dû compter avec le fait que, s'il trouvait une pierre qu'il nommait granit, celle-ci, d'après sa constitution interne, pouvait être différente de chaque autre ayant cependant la toute même apparence, et qu'il ne pouvait donc qu'espérer de trouver des choses uniques, pour l'entendement pour ainsi dire isolées, mais jamais une classe de celles-ci, qui pourraient être ramenées sous des concepts de genres et d'espèces?³⁰

5. L'IDÉE DE 'SYSTÈME' COMME FIL CONDUCTEUR DE L'*OPUS POSTUMUM*

Pour Kant, il est clair que la systématique de la nature in *sensu materiali* doit également reposer en dernière instance sur l'entendement. Lorsque nous effectuons le rapport d'une apparition particulière à l'unité de la nature en général, afin de déterminer sa place à l'intérieur du système de la connaissance empirique, cet acte doit être reconduit, non à une unité en soi des choses mais à l'exigence de généralité que la raison humaine pose à elle-même. Dans la liasse XI de l'*OP* (appartenant au 11^{ième} projet), Kant fait ainsi la différence entre une physique au sens matériel qui est «système de la nature» – comme la classification de Linné – et une physique au sens formel, qui est le système de ce qui lie l'empirique et qui est soumis à des principes philosophiques:

Physices principia: la physique *quoad formale* est *complexus coniunctorum empiricus*: *quoad materiale systema naturae* comme *Linnaeus* — doit s'appeler *Scientiae naturae principia philosophica empiricae opposita*³¹

Lors du jugement réfléchissant, qui essaie de trouver le général pour le particulier, nous voyons très bien comment l'exigence de systématique n'est que la manifestation de cette exigence de généralisation. Ce n'est qu'au moyen d'une telle généralisation, qu'il faut comprendre autant comme la recherche d'un concept pour une multitude d'intuitions que comme la recherche d'un concept plus général pour des concepts plus particuliers, que l'unité de la nature peut être conçue, et le système en est la traduction formelle. Par conséquent, en dernière instance, l'unité de la nature n'est autre que l'unité de la raison:

Rapporter les apparitions à l'unité du monde. Unité du système, *i.e.* de la totalité.

L'unité du monde est l'unité de la nature dans la totalité. La dernière est l'unité de la nature et a [est guidée par] des principes de l'entendement. L'autre n'a que des principes de la raison, d'après lesquels la nature dans sa totalité est rapportée à quelque chose à l'extérieur de la nature comme un fondement de la possibilité de celle-ci. En effet, la liaison dans la nature est contingente, parce qu'elle repose sur beaucoup de choses. Le fondement de celle-là [de cette liaison] doit être unité de la cause. L'unité de la nature est donc déduite de l'unité originelle de l'être originaire. L'unité

absolue est unité de la raison. La totalité absolue est opposée à l'hypothétique. L'unité absolue de la synthèse repose sur les conditions de la généralité absolue.³²

Que le «système de la nature» de Linné, pour être système proprement dit, doive être lui aussi guidé par des principes non-empiriques est clair. La conséquence en est que le concept de système empirique, auquel Kant semble encore tenir dans les *MAN*,³³ devra être tout à fait supprimé. Dans le 11^{ième} projet de l'*OP*, Kant commence à le répéter abondamment, comme pour garder constamment devant l'esprit cette évidence: le concept de 'système empirique' est contradictoire. Voici trois passages; dans la troisième que nous citons, Kant parle d'une *contradictio in adiecto*:

[...] un système de toute connaissance empirique des forces motrices de la matière qui n'est pas pour cela un système empirique parce qu'un tel concept contient une contradiction [...]³⁴

La physique est la science des forces motrices de la matière pour autant qu'elle puisse être reçue par l'expérience. Comme science elle est un système de la connaissance: comme science de la nature elle est une connaissance systématique des forces motrices de la matière [:] enfin, comme physique elle est un système de connaissance empirique de ces forces; – mais pas pour autant un système empirique – puisque cela serait une contradiction en soi parce que tout système signifie un principe sous lequel le divers des représentations données est rassemblé selon un ordre.³⁵

La physique est le principe qui contient aussi bien ce qui est subjectif dans la perception des forces motrices que ce qui est objectif dans la liaison de celles-ci en vue de la fondation de l'expérience et [qui fait que] la spontanéité de la composition, d'après la forme *a priori*, précède la réceptivité des forces motrices et sert à celle-ci comme règle, ce qui n'est possible que par le rapport à un système de ce qui est empirique dans la connaissance, mais non pas [par le rapport à] un système empirique (*contrad. in adjecto*)³⁶

L'empiricité en tant que telle garantit la non-scientificité, tandis que la systématité est caractéristique pour la scientificité; cependant, un système de ce qui est empirique dans notre connaissance doit être scientifique.

Chacun qui a lu les introductions programmatiques qui sont reprises tout le long du manuscrit de l'*OP* se rappellera l'obstination avec laquelle Kant répète qu'un agrégat de connaissances, un rassemblement dont le principe est tiré de l'expérience, ne saurait être appelé une science. Dans l'*OP*, le refus de l'agrégat devient le fil conducteur pour les développements ultimes, centrés sur l'expérience externe. Au lieu d'un agrégat, il faut un système; au lieu d'un agrégat de perceptions, il faut unité de l'expérience; au lieu d'un agrégat de soi-disant principes empiriques, il faut des principes synthétiques *a priori*: seuls de tels principes peuvent garantir l'unité de l'expérience. Un survol chronologique de quelques passages qui sont marqués par le refus de l'agrégat devrait convaincre de sa fonction, à l'intérieur de l'*OP*, en tant que catalyseur du raisonnement. En même temps, un tel survol pourra mettre en avant combien il est difficile de surestimer dans quelle mesure l'exigence d'une systématité de la pensée elle-même était importante pour Kant.

Commençons avec un passage qui se trouve sur la dernière des feuilles volantes (*L. Bl. 6*) qui précèdent l'*Oktaventwurf* et qui date de 1795 ou de 1796:

Une science de la nature seulement empirique ne peut jamais constituer un système mais seulement un agrégat fragmentaire continuellement croissant;³⁷

Nous rencontrons ensuite cette conception du système dans l'*Oktaventwurf* de la liasse IV. (Cet *Oktaventwurf* est le premier ensemble plus vaste de réflexions et date de 1796.) Un projet de «préface» commence ainsi:

Le concept d'une science de la nature (*philosophia naturalis*) est la représentation systématique des lois du mouvement des objets extérieurs dans l'espace et le temps pour autant que celles-ci puissent être reconnues *a priori*, donc comme nécessaires; puisque [en ce qui concerne] leur connaissance empirique, où il s'agit de la connaissance contingente qui peut seulement être acquise par expérience, cela n'est pas de la philosophie mais seulement un agrégat de perceptions dont la complétude en tant que système est néanmoins un objet pour la philosophie.³⁸

La dernière phrase n'est peut-être pas aussi claire qu'elle aurait pu l'être. Kant ne veut bien sûr pas dire que l'agrégat de perceptions arrive à lui seul à une complétude qui en fait un système et que ce serait ensuite la philosophie qui aurait ce système comme objet. Bien au contraire, c'est l'objet et la tâche de la philosophie de garantir la complétude en tant que système.

Dans l'esquisse d'une préface datant d'entre juillet 1797 et juillet 1798 (2^{ième} projet), nous lisons:

Non pas tous les traitements philosophiques méritent le nom d'une philosophie comme science [; ils ne méritent notamment pas ce nom] s'ils ne sont pas développés comme liés dans un système. Philosophier fragmentairement signifie [:] faire des expériences avec la raison, uniquement dans la pensée, qui, aussi longtemps qu'elles n'ont pas encore pu, par la division du tout, être assigné leur place déterminée et leur parenté avec les autres, n'ont pas beaucoup de fiabilité [...]³⁹

Bien qu'il ne soit pas ici explicitement question de l'agrégat, ce passage s'accorde tout à fait à l'idée de l'architectonique comme on la trouve dans la *KrV*. La liaison entre l'idée de l'architectonique et le refus de l'agrégat n'est jamais très loin: toutes les disciplines de la philosophie doivent être liées dans un système.

Dans la période d'août 1798 à septembre 1798 (3^{ième} projet «*a-c Übergang*»), le refus de l'agrégat est repris dans le cadre de la conception d'une science transitoire entre métaphysique et physique, que Kant vient d'élucider:

Il y aura une section spécifique de la doctrine de la nature qui n'a en vue rien d'autre que la recherche complète de tous ces éléments et l'ordre systématique de ceux-ci pour en faire un tout, sans lequel même la physique ne serait qu'un agrégat seulement fragmentaire, par conséquent la doctrine de la nature exige encore, outre qu'une métaphysique et une physique, un traitement sous le titre d'une transition de l'une à l'autre.⁴⁰

Ensuite, dans la période septembre – octobre 1798 (4^{ième} projet), il est dit:

[...] il est impossible de constituer un système par des concepts simplement empiriques. Il y aura toujours un agrégat rassemblé d'observations de telle ou telle propriété de la matière qui, bien qu'il puisse croître considérablement, ne le pourra que fragmentairement, et dans la recherche duquel on peut s'arrêter où l'on veut parce que l'idée qui constitue un tout intérieurement fondé qui à la fois se limite lui-même fait défaut; mais un tel [tout] ne peut être fait que par des concepts *a priori*.⁴¹

Dans la période d'octobre à décembre 1798 (5^{ème} projet «*Elementarsystem*»):

[...] le système des forces motrices de la matière [...] sans lequel même la recherche de la nature peut seulement se présenter fragmentairement comme agrégat mais jamais comme systématique d'après un principe [...]⁴²

Décembre 1798 – janvier 1799 (6^{ème} projet «*Farrago*»)⁴³:

Le système doctrinal des forces motrices de la matière (*Philosophia naturalis*) doit se fonder sur des principes *a priori* pour qu'il soit scientifique et non pas un agrégat simplement fragmentaire tiré de la seule empirie, comme quoi il ne peut livrer une véritable science//de la nature et même pas non plus un précepte à la recherche//de la nature parce que sans aucuns principes on ne sait même pas comment et où on doit raisonnablement chercher.⁴⁴

Janvier – février 1799 (7^{ème} projet):

Pour arriver à la physique en tant que système de la science empirique de la nature, il faut que soient développés d'abord des principes *a priori* de l'unité synthétique des forces motrices dans la science de la nature, d'après la forme développés complètement dans la transition à la SN. [science de la nature] en général [...] [; principes,] qui contiennent une propédeutique de la physique comme une transition *a priori* à celle-ci et qui peuvent être déduits du simple concept de celle-ci. — Cette propédeutique est elle-même un système qui contient la forme du système *a priori*. Ce ne peut être un agrégat fragmentaire qui contient ce tout de la possibilité d'une physique, puisque comme un tout donné *a priori* ce doit nécessairement être un système qui n'est pas apte à une diminution ou une augmentation.⁴⁵

Février – mai 1799 (8^{ème} projet «*A Elementarsystem*»):

L'empirique est un agrégat fragmentaire et appartient à la physique.⁴⁶

Dans la période suivante, de mai à août 1799 (l'important 9^{ème} projet «*Übergang 1-14*»), l'antagonisme classique entre agrégat et système est aussi transposé à la problématique de l'existence du calorique: s'il doit être pensé comme existant, le calorique doit nécessairement l'être au sein d'un système:

Le calorique est la matière étendue dans l'espace qui peut seulement être pensée comme existant dans un système et non comme un agrégat de parties.⁴⁷

Comme l'expérience doit être une (et, comme Kant le répète suffisamment: si l'on parle de plusieurs expériences, il ne s'agit en réalité que de plusieurs perceptions à l'intérieur de

l'unité qu'on appelle expérience), elle doit être elle aussi système et non pas seulement agrégat de perceptions:

[...] tous ces concepts [calorique, matière de la lumière, etc.] ont comme but d'avoir un principe matériel de l'unité de l'expérience possible qui lie toutes les expériences [lire: perceptions] en une, sans lequel et sans la forme duquel il n'y aurait pas un tout coordonné de l'expérience, [expérience] qui ne serait alors qu'un agrégat des perceptions et non expérience comme système.⁴⁸

Août – septembre 1799 (10^{ième} projet «*Redactio 1-3*»):

Nota. La transition etc. est la composition (*coordinatio, complexus formalis*) des concepts *a priori* en vue d'un tout de l'expérience par l'anticipation de leur forme pour autant qu'elle soit nécessaire pour un système empirique de la recherche de la nature (pour la physique). Ces anticipations doivent par conséquent constituer elles-mêmes un système qui n'est pas ordonné par l'expérience comme agrégat mais *a priori* par la raison et [qui est? / qui fonctionne comme?] un schéma en vue de l'expérience possible comme un tout etc.⁴⁹

Au cours du 11^{ième} projet, le refus de l'agrégat est répété dans le contexte de la méthode et de la possibilité de la philosophie transcendantale elle-même, mais celle-ci est toujours rapportée à la science de la transition. C'est à partir du 11^{ième} projet que Kant commence à thématiser de nouveau le projet d'une philosophie transcendantale en général. On est ici dans la période d'août 1799 à Avril 1800:

Possibilité de la philosophie transcendantale c.-à-d. des propositions synthétiques *a priori*, non pas par tâtonnement comme pour [aboutir à] un agrégat mais d'après des principes dans un système où non pas des perceptions *Sparsim* (puisque celles-ci sont empiriques), mais le principe de la possibilité de l'expérience *coniunctim*, comme unité de la détermination complète de l'objet, précède, et par le fait de fonder la transition des Pr.[incipes] mét[aphysiques] de la S[cience de la] N[ature] à la physique par des anticipations des forces motrices intérieures et //extérieures (dans la sensation et dans la construction des concepts [donc, respectivement] philosophiquement et mathématiquement) dans un système//de la connaissance.⁵⁰

Or, le contexte antérieur est toujours présent. On ne peut surtout pas parler de l'expérience comme d'un agrégat de perceptions: l'expérience est une. Elle est unité collective et non distributive:

Un agrégat fragmentaire de perceptions n'est pas encore expérience mais celle-ci n'a lieu que sous forme d'un système de celles-là, au fondement duquel il y a une certaine forme (de leur liaison) *a priori*. L'expérience est unité absolue de ce système et on ne peut parler d'expériences mais bien de perceptions comme empiriques (représentations des sens accompagnées de conscience) [...]⁵¹

Pour lier objectivement d'après un principe le divers des représentations empiriques comme l'apparition (subjective) dans un agrégat des perceptions en vue de l'unité de l'expérience, on a besoin de l'entendement qui fait de l'agrégat des perceptions un système et qui compose, non pas à partir de l'expérience mais pour le but de celle-ci, *a priori*, d'après un principe de la possibilité de l'expérience les forces motrices affectant le sens.⁵²

La justification de la connaissance synthétique *a priori* dans la philosophie transcendantale par le billet du refus de l'agrégat sera conservée dans les projets ultérieurs. Ainsi, dans la *Beylage II* de la période avril à décembre 1800 (12^{ième} projet «*Beylage I-IX*»), on lit:

Des propositions synthétiques *a priori* sont réelles et respectivement nécessaires parce que sans elles même la représentation empirique des sens (perception) [est] seulement un agrégat et non pas un système d'après un principe de son unité synthétique, c.-à-d. qu'aucune expérience n'ait lieu au sens de celle vers laquelle un progrès [un avancement] des Pr.[incipes] métaphys. de la S[cience de la] N[atature] à la physique est postulé; et des propositions synthétiques *a priori* sont absolument nécessaires à cela, parce qu'elles contiennent les conditions de la possibilité de l'expérience, sans être pourtant elles mêmes déduites de l'expérience et [parce qu'elles] contiennent le principe *a priori* non pas [puisé] à partir d'elle mais pour elle (en vue d'elle).⁵³

Enfin, dans le 13^{ième} projet, qui regroupe tout ce qui fut écrit dans la période relativement longue de décembre 1800 à février 1803, on trouve, sous le titre général d'un «passage à la limite de tout savoir», ce passage très similaire:

Transition des Pr.[incipes] métaphysiques de la S.[cience de la] N.[ature] se fait d'après des *principes a priori* et qui présupposent, notamment en vue de la possibilité de l'expérience qui est une unité absolue et non pas un agrégat glané (*compilatio*) qui peut être rapiécé à partir des perceptions (*observatio et experimentum*), une totalité formelle de l'expérience possible comme unité.⁵⁴

Mais parmi les réflexions de cette période ultime, on rencontre encore un autre usage du refus de l'agrégat, par lequel la philosophie théorique est reliée de nouveau à la philosophie pratique. Et dans le contexte de ce refus de laisser une abîme entre le théorique et le pratique, Kant procède à une réévaluation des idées transcendantales. Pour avoir une conception d'ensemble de l'idée kantienne de système, il nous faut également étudier cette dernière phase de sa pensée. C'est ce que nous faisons brièvement dans la section finale de ce texte.

6. UNE RÉÉVALUATION DE LA FONCTION DES IDÉES TRANSCENDANTALES

Dans les notes du dernier projet de l'*Opus postumum*, en pensant à nouveaux frais le statut de la philosophie transcendantale (ni métaphysique, ni ontologie, ni épistémologie), Kant se penche de nouveau sur les idées transcendantales. Du point de vue transcendantal, il faut bien avouer que ces idées aient une valeur objective, non pas en ce qu'elles seraient constitutives de l'expérience comme le sont les catégories, mais en ce qu'elles sont à l'origine de ce qui est systématique, non seulement dans la connaissance, mais dans l'expérience elle-même. L'expérience en tant que système repose sur des idéaux et ce n'est que par rapport à ces idéaux que toute perception particulière peut être dite anticipée. Autrement dit: l'empirique est anticipé par le système parce que toute perception encore à faire aura nécessairement une place dans le système. La régulation de l'idée est double: d'une part, les idéaux de la raison sont régulateurs par rapport à l'activité de connaître parce qu'ils *inaugurent* l'expérience comme unité (pas de système de l'expérience sans idées de la raison). D'autre part, les idées de la raison

sont régulatrices par rapport à l'objectivité en ce qu'elles instaurent pour celle-ci l'exigence de scientificité: parce que l'expérience n'est objective que pour autant qu'elle soit système.

On comprend alors mieux certains passages à première vue surprenants, comme celui-ci:

Phil.[osophie] tr.[anscendantale] est la conscience du pouvoir d'être soi-même à l'origine du système de ses idées, aussi bien du point de vue théorique que du point de vue pratique. Les idées ne sont pas de simples concepts mais des lois de la pensée que le sujet se prescrit lui-même. Autonomie.⁵⁵

Ce qui est expliqué par la fin du passage qui vient juste avant:

La phil.[osophie] trans.[cendantale] contient un système enfermé dans ses limites mais seulement d'après le formel de son objet (la mathématique, même si [elle est] connaissance synthétique *a priori* n'est qu'instrument de la ph.[ilosophie] tr.[anscendantale]).

Elle est la connaissance synthétique *a priori* à partir de concepts, qui fait abstraction de tout contenu (c.-à-d. de tous objets), et [elle est] donc seulement le formel du sujet théorique spéculative et moral pratique qui s'autodétermine. (L'autonomie des idées non pas à partir de l'expérience mais pour l'expérience non pas comme un agrégat des perceptions mais comme principe de les fonder comme unité *a priori*.)⁵⁶

Et ce qui est ensuite élucidé par une distinction entre philosophie transcendante du point de vue objectif et philosophie transcendante du point de vue subjectif.

Philosophie transcendante considérée subjectivement ou objectivement. Dans le premier cas elle est le système de la connaissance synthétique à partir de concepts *a priori*. Dans le deuxième [cas] elle est autonomie des idées et le principe des formes auxquelles les systèmes au sens théorique//spéculative et au sens moral//pratique doivent être conformes⁵⁷.

Ainsi, bien qu'on ne puisse assigner aux idées de la raison une *réalité* objective (voir l'avertissement de la dialectique transcendante), on peut toutefois dire qu'elles ne sont pas sans *valeur* objective, puisque ce sont elles qui donnent la forme systématique pour la connaissance en général.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

BAUM, Manfred, „Systemform und Selbsterkenntnis der Vernunft bei Kant“ in: Fulda, Hans Friedrich & Stolzenberg, Jürgen (éds.), *Architektonik und System in der Philosophie Kants*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002, pp. 25-40

LA ROCCA, Claudio, „Il conflitto delle interpretazioni: Kant, Eberhard, Meier e l'ermeneutica filosofica“ in: *Fenomenologia e società*, XVIII, 2-3, 1995, pp. 84-108.

LAMBERT, Heinrich Johann, „Anlage zur Architectonic (oder Theorie des Einfachen und des Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntniß)“ in: ARNDT, Hans Werner (éd.), *Johann*

Heinrich Lambert. *Philosophische Schriften III-IV*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965.

LAMBERT, Johann Heinrich, „Theorie des Systems“, in: ARNDT, Hans Werner (éd.), Johann Heinrich Lambert. *Philosophische Schriften VI: Logische und philosophische Abhandlungen 1. Band*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967, pp. 510-518

MARCUCCI, Silvestro, ‘Système philosophique et système scientifique: Kant et Linné’ in: SCHÜßLER, Ingeborg (dir.) & ERISMANN, Christophe (éd.), *Années 1796-1804. Kant. Opus postumum*, Paris: Vrin, 2001, pp. 107-125

SCARAVELLI, Luigi, “Osservazioni sulla Critica del Giudizio”, in: Id., *Scritti kantiani*, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1973, pp. 337-528.

WOLFF, Christian, “De differentia intellectus systematici & non systematici”, in: WOLFF, Christian, *Horae subsecivae Marburgenses. (Gesammelte Werke Abt. II, Bd. 34.1; édité et préparé par Jean Ecole)*, Hildesheim: Olms, 1983, pp. 107-154

_____, “De Notionibus directricibus & genuino usu philosophiae primae”, in: WOLFF, Christian, *Horae subsecivae Marburgenses. (Gesammelte Werke Abt. II, Bd. 34.1; édité et préparé par Jean Ecole)*, Hildesheim: Olms, 1983.

ZÖLLER, Günter, „Die Seele des Systems« : Systembegriff und Begriffssystem in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie“ in: Fulda, Hans Friedrich & Stolzenberg, Jürgen (éds.), *Architektonik und System in der Philosophie Kants*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002, pp. 53-72.

ABSTRACT: Kant’s conception of a ‘system’ doesn’t correspond to that of his predecessors, nor has it much in common with the actual meaning of systematicity. We discuss the particularities of Kant’s account by showing how it differs from Wolff’s and Lambert’s and how it is closely linked with his understanding of the structure of synthetic a priori cognition. We then argue that the idea of system functions as a leading threat in the *Opus postumum*, by illustrating how it reappears in each of the thirteen evolving projects that constitute Kant’s last “work”. This brings us to a reconsideration of the role of the transcendental ideas. Although the latter do lack objective reality, they are not without value for objectivity. Indeed, the human quest for knowledge can only lead to objective cognitions if the latter are embedded in a system that is ultimately grounded on an idea of reason itself.

KEYWORDS: Kant, System, Science, Wolff, Lambert, Transcendental Ideas, Architectonic, *Opus postumum*, Objectivity.

NOTES

1 Henny Blomme is visiting professor (PNPD-CAPES), at the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte. He was recently Postdoctoral Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science (Berlin), Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Edinburgh, and Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for Classical German Philosophy (Bochum). Recent Publications on Kant include “Die Rolle der Anschauungsformen und der Selbstaffektion in der B-Deduktion“ (2015), “The Conception of Chemistry in the Danziger Physik” (2015), “L’être de l’ombre” (2014), as well as a forthcoming book “Kant et la matière de l’espace” (Olms). In September 2015, he will receive the quinquennial Junior International Kant Prize (Preis Silvestro Marcucci), awarded by the jury of the Kant-Gesellschaft.

2 *KrV* A 832; B 860; *PI I 1384. Pour référer aux œuvres de Kant, nous utilisons les sigles proposés par les Kant-Studien (voir: http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf). Le siglum est suivi par l’indication du volume et de la page dans l’Edition des œuvres complètes de Kant - la fameuse *Akademieausgabe* (AA) – à l’exception des références à la *Critique de la raison pure* (*KrV*) qui, suivant l’usage, sont données en indiquant les pages dans l’édition de 1781 (A) et celle de 1787 (B). Pour les traductions françaises, nous renvoyons aux trois tomes de l’Edition de la Pléiade des œuvres de Kant, en indiquant le tome (respectivement PI I, PI II et PI III) et la page. Un astérisque précédant l’indication du volume signifie que la traduction a été modifiée. L’absence de référence à une édition française indique que nous donnons nous-mêmes une traduction.

3 *Refl* 5035: „Wolf that große Dinge in der philosophie; er ging aber nur vor sich weg und erweiterte die Erkenntnis, ohne durch eine besondere Critick solche zu sichten, zu verändern und umzuformen. Seine Werke sind also als ein Magazin der Vernunft sehr nützlich, aber nicht als eine architectonic derselben. Vielleicht ist dieses, ob es zwar an Wolfen selbst nicht eben zu billigen war, doch in der Ordnung der Natur, daß allererst ohne richtige Methode die Kenntnisse, wenigstens die Versuche des Verstandes vervielfältigt und nachher unter Regeln gebracht werden. Kinder.“

4 *Refl* 4994: „Es sind viel scharfsinnige und Gute Gedanken aufgezeichnet worden, aber auf bloßen Verlust; denn sie haben keine Stelle in irgend einem system, weil man den Abris zu diesem noch nicht gefunden hat.“

5 *KrVB* XXXVI: „In der Ausführung [...] des Plans, den die Kritik vorschreibt, d. i. im künftigen System der Metaphysik, müssen wir dereinst der strengen Methode des berühmten Wolff, des größten unter allen dogmatischen Philosophen, folgen [...]“

6 Pour les indications suivantes sur le système chez Wolff, voir surtout: BAUM, Manfred, „Systemform und Selbsterkenntnis der Vernunft bei Kant,“ et ZÖLLER, Günter, „Die Seele des Systems« : Systembegriff und Begriffssystem in Kants Transzendentalphilosophie“. Ces deux textes se trouvent dans: FULDA, Hans Friedrich & STOLZENBERG, Jürgen (éds.), *Architektonik und System in der Philosophie Kants*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002 – pp. 25-40 pour le texte de Baum et pp. 53-72 pour le texte de Zöller. C'est un recueil important pour le thème abordé. Cependant, dans une collection dont le titre contient les mots 'système' et 'architectonique', l'absence d'un texte qui compare le concept de système et d'architectonique chez Lambert et Kant est déplorable. Dans nos yeux, la théorie du système et l'architectonique chez Lambert ont été pour Kant une source plus proche et autrement plus importante que le système dogmatique de Wolff. C'est pourquoi, dans la suite, nous attacherons proportionnellement plus d'importance à la comparaison avec Lambert.

7 WOLFF, Christian, „De differentia intellectus systematici & non systematici“, in: WOLFF, Christian, *Horae subsecivae Marburgenses*. (Gesammelte Werke Abt. II, Bd. 34.1; édité et préparé par Jean Ecole), Hildesheim: Olms, 1983, pp. 107-154.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 133: „Enimvero qui ex opere noster Logico perspexerunt, methodum, quam Euclides tenuit, non ab objecto, quod tractat, derivari, sed ex ipsa entis notione generali & mentis humanae natura deduci [...]“

9 WOLFF, Christian, „De Notionibus directricibus & genuino usu philosophiae primae“, *Op. cit.*, p. 311: „Deduximus philosophiam primam omnem ex principio contradictionis & ratio sufficientis, rebus existentibus non invitis: a quibus eadem notiones a posteriori derivantur, quae ex istis principiis a priori consequuntur.“

10 WOLFF, Christian, „De differentia intellectus systematici & non systematici“, *Op. cit.*, pp. 115-116: „Inter veteres Aristotelem intellectum habuisse systematicum, ex Organo ipsius apparet: quod, si ad lectionem afferantur sufficiunt, ita conscriptum esse apparet, ut veritas una per alias demonstraretur, simulque notio intellectus systematici in praecipis ibidem propositis contineatur. Neque ullus dubito, Aristotelem eam theoriam, quam in Organo suo proposuit, ex attenta lectione Elementorum Euclidis derivasse [...]“; p. 118: „Inter recentiores philosophos, qui nomen clarissimum fuere consecuti, Cartesius intellectus systematici exemplum praebet, quemadmodum ex ejusdem Meditationibus & Principiis liquet [...]“.

11 LAMBERT, Heinrich Johann, *Anlage zur Architectonic*, *Op. cit.*, p. 8 (§ 11): „Die Ehre, eine Methode, eine richtige und brauchbare Methode in der Weltweisheit anzubringen, war Wolffen vorbehalten.“

12 Normalement, on traduirait *Aufgaben* par «exercices», mais au vu de la référence à Euclide et du contexte de la méthode chez Kant, je pense que la traduction par «constructions» est plus éclairante.

13 LAMBERT, Heinrich Johann, *Anlage zur Architectonic*, *Op. cit.*, p. 9 (§ 12): „Man kann nicht sagen, daß Wolf die Euclidische Methode ganz gebraucht habe. In seiner Metaphysic bleiben die Postulata und Aufgaben fast ganz weg, und die Frage, was man definiren solle, wird darinn nicht völlig entschieden.“

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10: „Eucliden war es leicht, Definitionen zu geben, und den Gebrauch seiner Wörter zu bestimmen. Er konnte die Linien, Winkel und Figuren vor Augen legen, und dadurch Worte, Begriffe und Sache unmittelbar mit einander verbinden. Das Wort war nur der Name der Sache, und weil man diese vor Augen sah, so konnte man an der Möglichkeit des Begriffes nicht zweifeln. Dazu kommt noch, daß Euclid die unumschränkte Freyheit hatte, in der Figur, welche eigentlich nur ein besonderer oder einzelner Fall des allgemeinen Satzes ist, dabey aber statt eines Beyspieles dienet, alles wegzulassen, was nicht dazu gehöret, oder was nicht in dem Begriffe vorkömmt. Die Figur stellte demnach den Begriff ganz und rein vor. Hingegen da sie die allgemeine Möglichkeit desselben nicht angiebt, so hatte Euclid die Sorgfalt, diese genau zu erörtern, und hiezu gebraucht er seine Postulata, welche allgemeine, unbedingte und für sich gedenkbare, oder einfache Möglichkeiten, oder Thuligkeiten vorstellen, und die er in Form von Aufgaben vorträgt.“

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11: „Man wird hieraus leicht den Schluß machen können, daß in der Metaphysic, die an sich abstracten Begriffe und Sätze durch Vorlegung eines einzeln Falles oder eines wohlgeählten Beyspieles aufgekläret, ihre Allgemeinheit und ihr Umfang aber durch *Postulata* und *Axiomata* bestimmt werden sollen, und daß besonders die *Postulata* wenigstens allgemeine und unbedingte Möglichkeiten angeben sollen, Begriffe zu bilden, und die Einschränkungen bey der Möglichkeit zusammengesetzter Begriffe durch Grundsätze bestimmt werden müssen. Wie dieses angehen könne, davon kommen in der Wolfischen Vernunftlehre wenige oder keine Regeln, in der Metaphysic wenige oder keine Beyspiele vor.“

16 *KrV* B XXXVI; *Pl I 752: „[Wolff, ...] der zuerst das Beispiel gab (und durch dies Beispiel der Urheber des bisher noch nicht erloschenen Geistes der Gründlichkeit in Deutschland wurde) durch gesetzmäßige Feststellung der Prinzipien, deutliche Bestimmung der Begriffe, versuchte Strenge der Beweise, Verhütung kühner Sprünge in Folgerungen der sichere Gang einer Wissenschaft zu nehmen sei[...]“

17 Pour une comparaison des conceptions méthodiques et systématiques entre, d'une part, Kant et, d'autre part, Wolff et ses successeurs, on peut se référer également à deux études de Claudio La Rocca, notamment «Il conflitto delle interpretazioni: Kant, Eberhard, Meier e l'ermeneutica filosofica» In: *Fenomenologia e società*, XVIII, 2-3, 1995, pp. 84-108 et «Lèggere la 'Critica della ragione pura'» In: *Studi kantiani*, XII, 1999, p. 197sq.

18 LAMBERT, Johann Heinrich, „Theorie des Systems“, in: ARNDT, Hans Werner (éd.), *Johann Heinrich Lambert. Philosophische Schriften VI: Logische und philosophische Abhandlungen 1. Band*, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967, pp. 510-518: XLVII. Fragment, p. 510: „Jede Wissenschaft und jeder Theil derselben, kann als ein System angesehen werden, in so ferne ein System der Inbegriff von Ideen und Sätzen ist, die zusammengenommen als ein Ganzes betrachtet werden können.“ Comparer cela à ce que Kant dit dans les *MAN* (AA IV, 468; Pl II, 364) – mais cela justement *avant* d'avoir montré que seule une liaison rationnelle des connaissances (donc d'après des principes *a priori*) a droit au titre de science proprement dite –, à savoir que chaque «[...] doctrine s'appelle science, dès lors qu'elle doit former un système, c'est-à-dire un tout de la connaissance ordonné par des principes.» («Eine jede Lehre, wenn sie ein System, d. i. ein nach Prinzipien geordnetes Ganze der Erkenntnis sein soll, heißt Wissenschaft [...]“)

19 LAMBERT, Johann Heinrich, „Theorie des Systems“, *Op. cit.*, p. 510: „Grundregel des Systems: Das vorhergehende soll das folgende klar machen, in Absicht auf den Verstand, gewiß in Absicht auf die Vernunft, möglich, in Absicht auf die Ausübung.“

20 *Ibid.*: „Es fragt sich, wie ferne man hierinn analytisch oder synthetisch gehen sollte? Analytisch, bis die Grundbegriffe und Grundsätze entwickelt sind. Synthetisch von da an. In der Naturlehre ist dieses nothwendig, weil wir da die Begriffe aus der Erfahrung entlehnen müssen.“

21 *Ibid.*

22 *Ibid.*, p. 513: „Jedes Wort sollte weiter nichts als der Name einer vorher erkannten Sache seyn.“ Bien sûr, ce principe lui-même n'est pas du tout clair aussi longtemps qu'on n'a pas répondu à la question de savoir: 'Qu'est-ce qu'une chose?' On voit ici comment, d'une part, Lambert veut penser en philosophie selon le paradigme des mathématiques et de la logique, et comment, d'autre part, ses affirmations contiennent déjà les raisons pour lesquelles il s'agit d'une entreprise illusoire.

23 *Ibid.*: „Die Uebereilung verstößt wider alle Arten der logischen Regeln, und ist eine der Hauptquellen der philosophischen Streitigkeiten. Das Unbestimmte in den Begriffen giebt irrige Erklärungen. Die Eintheilungen sind öfters unvollständig und haben Lücken. Die Beweise sind paralogistisch, gar ofte deswegen, weil man zwey Mittelbegriffe hat.“

24 Voir *KrV* A 85; B 117; Pl I 843: «[...] la déduction empirique, qui montre de quelle manière un concept a été acquis par l'expérience et la réflexion sur celle-ci, et qui ne concerne donc pas la légitimité, mais le fait, d'où résulte la possession.» („[...]die] empirische Deduktion, welche die Art anzeigt, wie ein Begriff durch Erfahrung und Reflexion über dieselbe erworben worden, und daher nicht die Rechtmäßigkeit, sondern das Factum betrifft, wodurch der Besitz entspringt.“)

25 *KrV* A 86; B 119; Pl I 843.

26 Plus explicitement que dans l'architectonique (où il est présent plutôt comme une conséquence non exprimée), c'est dans l'appendice à la dialectique transcendantale qu'on retrouve déjà au sein de la première *Critique* le principe du jugement réfléchissant. On peut se référer au fameux commentaire que Luigi Scaravelli a donné de l'appendice. (Voir: SCARAVELLI, Luigi, «Osservazioni sulla 'Critica del Giudizio'», in: Id., *Scritti kantiani*, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1973, pp. 337-528.).

27 *EEKUAA* XX 211-212: „Dieses Princip hat beim ersten Anblick gar nicht das Ansehen eines synthetischen und transscendentalen Satzes, sondern scheint vielmehr tautologisch zu seyn und zur bloßen Logik zu gehören. Denn diese lehrt, wie man eine gegebene Vorstellung mit andern vergleichen und dadurch, daß man dasjenige, was sie mit verschiedenen gemein hat, als ein Merkmal zum allgemeinen Gebrauch herauszieht, sich einen Begriff machen könne. Allein, ob die Natur zu jedem Objecte noch viele andere als Gegenstände der Vergleichung, die mit ihm in der Form manches gemein haben, aufzuzeigen habe, darüber lehrt sie nichts; vielmehr ist diese Bedingung der Möglichkeit der Anwendung der Logik auf die Natur, ein Princip der Vorstellung der Natur, als eines Systems für unsere Urtheilskraft, in welchem das Mannigfaltige, in Gattungen und Arten eingetheilt, es möglich macht, alle vorkommende Naturformen durch Vergleichung auf Begriffe (von mehrerer oder minderer Allgemeinheit) zu bringen. Nun lehrt zwar schon der reine Verstand, (aber auch durch synthetische Grundsätze), alle Dinge der Natur als in einem transscendentalen System nach Begriffen *a priori* (den Kategorien) enthalten zu denken; allein die Urtheilskraft, die auch zu empirischen Vorstellungen, als solchen, Begriffe sucht (die reflectirende), muß noch überdem zu diesem Behuf annehmen, daß die Natur in ihrer grenzenlosen Mannigfaltigkeit eine solche Eintheilung derselben in Gattungen und Arten getroffen habe, die es unserer Urtheilskraft möglich macht, in der Vergleichung der Naturformen Einhelligkeit anzutreffen und zu empirischen Begriffen, und dem Zusammenhange derselben untereinander, durch Aufsteigen zu allgemeinem gleichfalls empirischen Begriffen zu gelangen: d. i. die Urtheilskraft setzt ein System der Natur auch nach empirischen Gesetzen voraus, und dieses *a priori*, folglich durch ein transscendentales Princip.“

28 *EEKU AA XX 215-216*: „Man drückt sich richtiger aus, wenn man anstatt (wie im gemeinen Redegebrauch) zu sagen, man müsse das Besondere, welches unter einem Allgemeinen steht, specificiren, lieber sagt,) man specificire den allgemeinen Begriff, indem man das Mannigfaltige unter ihm anführt. Denn die Gattung ist (logisch betrachtet) gleichsam die Materie, oder das rohe Substrat, welches die Natur durch mehrere Bestimmung zu besondern Arten und Unterarten verarbeitet, und so kann man sagen, die Natur specificire sich selbst nach einem gewissen Princip (oder der Idee eines Systems), nach der Analogie des Gebrauchs dieses Worts bey den Rechtslehrern, wenn sie von der Specification gewisser rohen Materien reden. [...] Das eigenthümliche Princip der Urtheilskraft ist also: die Natur specificirt ihre allgemeine Gesetze zu empirischen, gemäß der Form eines logischen Systems, zum Behuf der Urtheilskraft.“

29 *KU AA V 186*: „[Wenn man also sagt: die Natur specificirt ihre allgemeinen Gesetze nach dem Princip der Zweckmäßigkeit für unser Erkenntnißvermögen, d.i.] zur Angemessenheit mit dem menschlichen Verstande in seinem nothwendigen Geschäfte, zum Besonderen, welches ihm die Wahrnehmung darbietet, das Allgemeine und zum Verschiedenen (für jede Species zwar Allgemeinen) wiederum Verknüpfung in der Einheit des Principis zu finden [: so schreibt man dadurch weder der Natur ein Gesetz vor, noch lernt man eines von ihr durch Beobachtung (obzwar jenes Princip durch diese bestätigt werden kann).]“

30 *EEKU AA XX 215-216*: „Konnte wohl Linnäus hoffen, ein System der Natur zu entwerfen, wenn er hätte besorgen müssen, daß, wenn er einen Stein fand, den er Granit nannte, dieser von jedem anderen, der doch eben so aussehe, seiner inneren Beschaffenheit nach unterschieden seyn dürfte und er also immer nur einzelne für den Verstand gleichsam isolirte Dinge nie aber eine Classe derselben, die unter Gattungs- und Artsbegriffe gebracht werden könnten, anzutreffen hoffen dürfte?“ Pour quelques informations utiles concernant une comparaison des conceptions du système de Kant et de Linné, je peux renvoyer à un texte français de Silvestro Marcucci: 'Système philosophique et système scientifique: Kant et Linné' que l'on trouve dans le collectif suivant: SCHÜßLER, Ingeborg (dir.) & ERISMANN, Christophe (éd.), *Années 1796-1804. Kant. Opus postumum*, Paris: Vrin, 2001, pp. 107-125.

31 *OP XI V 2*; *AA XXII 485*: „*Physices principia*: die Physik *quoad formale* ist *complexus coniunctorum empiricus: quoad materiale systema naturae* wie *Linnaeus* — soll heißen *Scientiae naturae principia philosophica empiricae opposita*“ Comparer avec *OP XI V 3*; *AA XXII 491*, où Kant distingue entre la composition empirique des «choses de la nature dans un système», ce qui donne «(d'après Linné) un système de la nature» et «les lois de la nature pour autant qu'elles sont données dans l'expérience et pour l'expérience [...] par l'entendement, [...] c.-à-d. *a priori*».

32 *Refl 5120*; *AA XVIII 97-98*: „Beziehung der Erscheinungen auf die Welteinheit. Einheit des Systems, d.i. des All. Die Welteinheit ist die Natureinheit im Ganzen. Die letzte ist die Natureinheit und hat principien des Verstandes. Die andre hat blos principien der Vernunft, darnach die Natur im Ganzen auf etwas ausser der Natur als einen Grund der Möglichkeit derselben bezogen wird. Denn die Naturverknüpfung ist zufällig, weil sie auf viel Wesen beruht. Der Grund derselben muß Einheit der Ursache seyn. Natureinheit ist also abgeleitet von der ursprünglichen Einheit des Urwesens. Die absolute Einheit ist einheit der Vernunft. Das absolute All wird dem hypothetischen entgegengesetzt. Die absolute Einheit der Synthesis beruht auf den Bedingungen der absoluten allgemeinheit.“

33 Voir *MAN AA IV 467-468*; *Pl II 364*: «Une théorie s'appelle science, dès lors qu'elle doit former un système, c'est-à-dire un tout de connaissance ordonné par des principes. Comme ces principes sont des propositions fondamentales qui rassemblent des connaissances en un tout selon une liaison soit empirique, soit rationnelle, on devrait de même diviser la science de la nature, aussi bien la théorie des corps que la théorie de l'âme, en science historique de la nature et science rationnelle de la nature.»

34 *OP X III 4*; *AA XXII 310*: „Der Übergang von den Met. A. Gr. zur Physik als einem System aller empirischen Erkenntnis der bewegenden Kräfte der Materie welches darum aber kein empirisches System ist weil ein solcher Begriff einen Widerspruch in sich enthält geschieht also durch den Begriff des Ganzen der Verhältnisse der bewegenden Kräfte der Materie unter einander [...]“

35 *OP X V 2*; *AA XXII 328*: „Physik ist die Wissenschaft von den bewegenden Kräften der Materie in so fern sie durch Erfahrung erworben werden kann. Als Wissenschaft ist sie ein System der Erkenntnis: als Naturwissenschaft ein systematisches Erkenntnis von den bewegenden Kräften der Materie als Physik endlich ein System empirischer Erkenntnis dieser Kräfte; — aber hiemit nicht ein empirisches System — denn das wäre ein Widerspruch in sich selbst weil ein jedes System ein Princip bedeutet unter welchem das Mannigfaltige gegebener Vorstellungen zusammengeordnet ist.“

36 *OP X II 1*; *AA XXII 297*: „Die Physik ist das Princip das Subjective der Wahrnehmung der bewegenden Kräfte zugleich als das Objective der Verknüpfung derselben zur Gründung der Erfahrung enthalte und die Spontaneität der Zusammensetzung, der Form nach *a priori* vor der Receptivität der bewegenden Kräfte vorhergehe und dieser zur Regel diene welches nur durch Beziehung auf ein System des Empirischen der Erkenntnis, nicht aber ein empirisches System (*contrad. in adjecto*) möglich ist.“(Peut-être que le début de ce passage n'a pas été correctement transcrit: il semble manquer un deuxième *das*. En tout cas, ma traduction repose sur cette supposition et on devrait lire alors: «Die Physik ist das Princip das das Subjective der Wahrnehmung etc...») Que le concept d'un système empirique soit contradictoire, c'est répété durant toute la liasse X et au début de la liasse XI. Pour la liasse X, comparer avec les passages suivants (page, ligne(s)): *AA XXII 346, 22; 352, 31; 359, 24; 361, 15; 364, 21; 381, 4; 384, 1; 386, 26 - 387, 2; 390, 8; 392, 23-24; 395, 14; 398, 26-28; 403, 14-15; 405, 1-2; 406, 14*. Pour la liasse XI, voir: *AA XXII 448, 30-31; 473; 2-3*

37 *OP IV L.Bl. 6* ; XXI 474: „Blos empirische Naturwissenschaft kann nie ein System ausmachen sondern allenfalls nur ein fragmentarisches immer wachsendes Aggregat;“ Pour cette période, comparer *OP IV. L.Bl.6* ; AA XXI 477, 482, 484, 485, 487, 488.

38 *OP IV Okt. 20*; AA XXI, 402: „Der Begriff von einer Naturwissenschaft (*philosophia naturalis*) ist die systematische Vorstellung der Gesetze der Bewegung der äußern Gegenstände im Raume und der Zeit so fern jene *a priori* mithin als nothwendig erkannt werden können; denn das empirische Erkenntnis derselben was das Zufällige nur durch Erfahrung erwerbliche Erkenntnis dieser äußeren Erscheinungen betrifft so ist das nicht Philosophie sondern nur ein Aggregat von Wahrnehmungen dessen Vollständigkeit als eines Systems doch ein Gegenstand für die Philosophie ist.“

39 *OP VIV 2*; AA XXI 524: „Alle philosophische Bearbeitungen verdienen nicht den Nahmen einer Philosophie als Wissenschaft wenn sie nicht als in einem System verbunden aufgestellt werden. Fragmentarisch philosophiren heißt nur im Denken mit der Vernunft Versuche machen die so lange ihnen noch nicht durch die Eintheilung des ganzen ihre bestimmte Stelle und Verwandtschaft mit den Andern hat angewiesen werden können wenig Zuverlässigkeit haben [...]“

40 *OP II III 1*; AA XXI 180: „So wird es einen besondern Abschnitt der Naturlehre geben der nichts weiter beabsichtigt als die vollständige Aufsuchung aller jener Elemente und die systematische Anordnung derselben zu einem Gantzen ohne welche selbst die Physik ein blos fragmentarisches Aggregat seyn würde, mithin erfordert die Naturlehre überhaupt außer der Metaphysik und Physik noch eine Behandlung unter dem Titel des Überganges von der einen zur Andern.“

41 *OP II I 1*; AA XXI 161: „Es ist [...] unmöglich aus blos empirischen Begriffen ein System zu zimmern. Es wird jederzeit ein zusammengestoppeltes Aggregat von Beobachtungen dieser oder jener Eigenschaft der Materie bleiben was zwar ansehnlich aber doch immer nur fragmentarisch wachsen kann und in welcher Nachforschung man still stehen kann wo man will weil es an der Idee mangelt welche ein innerlich begründetes und zugleich sich selbst begrenzendes Gantze ausmacht; ein solches aber kann nicht anders als nach Begriffen *a priori* zu Stande kommen.“ Comparer pour cette période *OP II*; AA XXI 163-164, 168, 174, 180 – *OP IV*; AA XXI 360, 363, 367 – *OP V II 3*; AA XXI 508.

42 *OP VIII IV 4*; AA XXII 165: „[...] das System der bewegenden Kräfte der Materie [...] welche selbst die Naturforschung nur fragmentarisch als Aggregat nie aber systematisch nach Einem Princip hervortreten kann [...]“

43 Notons que le mot latin 'farrago' qu'utilise Kant dans l'*OP* a été importé tel quel dans l'anglais et le français. A l'origine, un 'farrago' signifie un mélange de grains qu'on fait pousser pour servir aux animaux. La signification figurée est celle de l'agrégat: un mélange confus d'idées ou de choses disparates.

44 *OP VI I 2*; AA XXI 619-620: „Das Doctrinalsystem nun von den bewegenden Kräften der Materie (*Philosophia naturalis*) muß sich auf Principien *a priori* gründen damit es scientifisch und nicht aus bloßer Empirie geschöpft ein blos fragmentarisches Aggregat sey als welches es keine wahre Natur// Wissenschaft auch nicht einmal eine Vorschrift zur Natur// Forschung liefern kan weil man ohne jene Principien nicht einmal weiß wie und wo man vernunftig suchen soll.“ Comparer AA XXI 622, 630, 639, 641, 642.

45 *OP IX 3(1)*; AA XXII 241: „Um zur Physik, als einem System der empirischen Naturwissenschaft zu gelangen müssen vorher Principien *a priori* der synthetischen Einheit der bewegenden Krafte in der Naturwissenschaft entwickelt werden der Form nach in dem Übergange zur NW. überhaupt vollständig entwickelt werden, (Axiomen der Anschauung, Anticipationen der Wahrnehmung etc) welche eine Propädevik der Physik als einen Übergang zu derselben *a priori* enthalten und analytisch aus dem bloßen Begriffe derselben abgeleitet werden. — Diese Propädevik ist selbst ein System welches die Form des Systems der Physik *a priori* enthält. Es kann nicht ein fragmentarisches Aggregat seyn was dieses Gantze der Möglichkeit einer Physik enthält denn als ein *a priori* gegebenes Ganze muß es nothwendig ein System seyn welches keiner Verminderung oder Vermehrung fähig ist.“

46 *OP II IV 1*; AA XXI 183: „Das empirische ist ein fragmentarisches Aggregat und gehört zur Physik.“

47 *OP V VII 4*; AA XXI 553: „Der Wärmestoff ist die im Raum verbreitete Materie die nicht als ein Aggregat von Theilen sondern nur als in einem System existierend gedacht werden kann [...]“

48 *OP V IX 2*; AA XXI 585: „[...] alle diese Begriffe aber zwecken darauf ab um ein materielles Princip der Einheit möglicher Erfahrung welche alle Erfahrungen zu Einer verbindet, zu haben ohne welche und deren Form kein Zusammenhängendes Gantze der Erfahrung die alsdann nur Aggregat der Wahrnehmungen nicht Erfahrung als System seyn würde statt findet.“

49 *OP XII VI 4*; AA XXII 584: „Nota. Der Übergang etc ist die Zusammenstellung (*coordinatio, complexus formalis*) der Begriffe *a priori* zu einem Gantzen möglicher Erfahrung durch Anticipation ihrer Form so fern sie zu einem empirischen System der Naturforschung (zur Physik) erforderlich ist. — Diese Anticipationen müssen daher selbst ein System ausmachen was nicht von der Erfahrung als Aggregat fragmentarisch sondern *a priori* durch die Vernunft geordnet ist und ein Schema zur möglichen Erfahrung als einem Ganzen etc“

50 *OP XI II 1* („BB“); AA XXII 439-440: „Möglichkeit der transsc. philosophie d.i. synth. Sätze *a priori* nicht durch herumtappen als zu einem Aggregat sondern nach Principien in einem System wo nicht Wahrnehmungen *Sparsim* (denn die sind empirisch) sondern das Princip der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung *coniunctim* als Einheit der durchgangigen Bestimmung des Objects vorher geht und der Übergang von den met. A. Gr. der N. W. zur Physik durch Anticipationen der innerlich// und äußerlich bewegende

Kräfte (in der Empfindung und der Construction der Begriffe philosophisch und mathematisch) ein Erkenntnis// system zu begründen.“ Comparer AA XXII 438.

51 *OP XI III 2*; AA XXII 457: „Ein fragmentarisches Aggregat von Wahrnehmungen ist noch nicht Erfahrung sondern diese findet nur in einem System derselben welchem eine gewisse Form (ihrer Verknüpfung) *a priori* zum Grunde liegt statt. Die Erfahrung ist absolute Einheit dieses Systems und man kann nicht von Erfahrungen wohl aber von Wahrnehmungen als empirischen (Sinnenvorstellungen mit Bewusstseyn) [...]“

52 *OP XI III 4*; AA XXII 466: „Das Manigfaltige empirischer Vorstellungen als Erscheinung (subjectiv) in einem Aggregat der Wahrnehmungen zur Einheit der Erfahrung nach einem Princip objectiv zu verknüpfen dazu gehört Verstand welcher aus dem Aggregat der Wahrnehmungen ein System macht und nicht aus der Erfahrung sondern zum Behuf derselben die den Sinn afficiende bewegende Kräfte *a priori* nach einem Princip der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung zusammensetzt.“ Comparer pour cette période *OP XI*: AA XXII 426, 433, 446, 447, 448, 451, 454, 455, 456, 459, 460 etc.

53 *OP VII II 4*; XXII 27: „Synthetische Sätze *a priori* sind wirklich und respectiv nothwendig weil ohne diese auch die empirische Sinnenvorstellung (Wahrnehmung) ein bloßes Aggregat aber kein System nach einem Princip ihrer synthetischen Einheit, d.i. keine Erfahrung statt findet als zu der ein Fortschreiten von den metaphys. A. Gr. der N.W. zur Physik postulirt wird; und synthetische Sätze *a priori* sind hiezu absolut nothwendig, weil sie die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung enthalten, ohne doch selbst von der Erfahrung abgeleitet zu seyn und nicht aus ihr sondern für sie (zum Behuf derselben) *a priori* das Princip derselben enthalten.“

54 *OP I I 2*; XXI 15: „Übergang von den metaphysischen A. Gr. der N. W. zur Physik geschieht nach *principien a priori* und zwar zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung welche eine absolute Einheit, nicht ein gestoppeltes (*compilatio*) Aggregat ist und aus Wahrnehmungen geflickt werden kan (*observatio et experimentum*) setzen ein formales Gantze möglicher Erfahrung als Einheit voraus.“

55 *OP I VII 2*; AA XXI 93: “Tr. Phil. ist das Bewusstseyn des Vermögens vom System seiner Ideen in theoretischer so wohl als practischer Hinsicht Urheber zu seyn. Ideen sind nicht bloße Begriffe sondern Gesetze des Denkens die das subject ihm selbst vorschreibt. Autonomie.“

56 *Ibid.* ; AA XXI 92: “Die Transc. Phil. enthält ein in seinen Grenzen eingeschlossenes System aber nur dem Formalen ihres Objects nach (die Mathematik obgleich synthetisches Erkenntnis *a priori* ist nur Instrument der Tr. Ph.) Sie ist die von allem Inhalt (d.i. allen Gegenständen) abstrahirende synthetische Erkenntnis *a priori* aus Begriffen also bloß das Formale des theoretisch speculativen und moralisch practischen sich selbst bestimmenden Subjects. (Die Autonomie der Ideen nicht aus der Erfahrung sondern für die Erfahrung nicht als einem Aggregat der Wahrnehmungen sondern als Princip sie als Einheit *a priori* zu begründen).“

57 *Ibid.* ; AA XXI 93: “Transc. Phil. subjectiv oder objectiv betrachtet. Im ersteren Fall ist sie das System synthetischer Erkenntnis aus Begriffen *a priori*. Im zweyten ist sie Autonomie der Ideen und das Princip der Formen denen die Systeme in theoretisch// speculativer u. moralisch//practischer Absicht gemäs seyn müssen.“ Comparer avec *OP I VII 4* ; AA XXI 101-102 : “Transc : Phil. ist subjectiv u. logisch betrachtet das synthetische Erkenntnis *a priori* aus Begriffen : objectiv aber betrachtet das System der Ideen (Dichtungen) der reinen Vernunft dem Formalen ihrer Erkenntnis nach von der Mathematik und Physik unterschieden und das Ganze der Objecte derselben.“

Recebido / Received: 02/11/14

Aprovado / Approved: 21/12/14

KANT E IL FONDAMENTO CERCATO DEL SAPERE. A PARTIRE DALLA POLEMICA CON EBERHARD

Giulio GORIA¹

1. INTRODUZIONE

Non è azzardato pensare che l'affresco di relazioni tra dogmatismo, scetticismo e filosofia critica presentato nella *Critica della ragion pura* fosse apparso ad Eberhard come un troppo precoce annuncio di addio alla metafisica come scienza della verità. Il che condurrebbe a considerare la polemica innescata sul *Philosophisches Magazin* a partire dal 1788, dunque un solo anno dopo l'uscita dell'*opus magnum* kantiano, non come una stanca difesa del razionalismo tedesco. Infatti se con Kant ha inizio quel corso che - almeno secondo una certa interpretazione - esaurirà con Nietzsche la potenza della metafisica come volontà di verità epistemica, va d'altra parte ricordato che il criticismo non è affatto liquidatorio rispetto ai progressi realmente compiuti dalla metafisica. Ed allora, senza azzardo si può anche provare a dare una continuità maggiore, anche rispetto a quella mai rivendicata dal suo stesso autore, tra la risposta kantiana a Eberhard ed il testo su *I Progressi della metafisica*²: perché se è evidente che sul punto del dogmatismo le argomentazioni de *I progressi* vadano viste come una continuazione della polemica con Eberhard, è sul nodo di un certo atteggiamento dogmatico assunto dalla metafisica - e cioè su un certo suo modo di intendere assicurati i principi che ne fanno la scienza della verità - che si gioca la questione soltanto superficialmente polemica di questo scritto, che merita dunque essere misurata oltre il carattere polemico dell'occasione.

2. L'ABITO CRITICO TRA DUE VIE IMPERVIE

Se c'è un elemento che colpisce e che forse troppo facilmente si rischia di relegare ad una questione di tono giustificata dall'occasione, è proprio questa: tanto lo scritto d'apertura di Eberhard quanto la risposta kantiana fanno di Leibniz, della filosofia di questo "grand'uomo", la loro propria bandiera e vessillo. Eberhard, infatti, intende rivendicare l'autentica dottrina di Leibniz contro la filosofia critica, e per ciò pretende di essere inteso come se fosse Leibniz stesso, Kant da parte sua è interessato ben più che a mostrare l'originalità della *Critica* a provare, questo sì, che solo a partire dalla novità di essa è possibile apprezzare la bontà della filosofia di Leibniz. Vale a dire, che la maniera migliore per non fare torti alle intenzioni che muovono lo spirito degli scritti di Leibniz sarebbe quello di intendere i suoi tre *enunciati* (*Grundsätze*) fondamentali - principio di ragion sufficiente, dottrina delle monadi, dottrina dell'armonia prestabilita - come principi soggettivi, "relativi dunque ad una critica della ragione" (AA O8: 249; p. 134)³.

Che questa insolita apologia di Leibniz volta a sottrarlo al dogmatismo dei suoi seguaci nasconda in fondo l'intento polemico di togliere i ferri dell'argomentazione al proprio avversario

è ben possibile. Ma questo giro di ragioni, documentabili o meno che siano, potrebbe non esaurire il senso delle battute che chiudono lo scritto del 1790. Qual è però la strada percorsa dalla soluzione critica per evitare l'ingiustificata *fiducia* o *sfiducia* riposte nella ragione pura da parte di dogmatismo e scetticismo? Che poi, come si legge nella *Critica*, il problema soltanto in seconda battuta risieda in questa maggiore o minore fiducia, è avvertimento utile anzitutto ad evitare che si proceda come se la storia da cui proviene l'interrogazione circa il senso della verità potesse sottomettersi ad una questione a discrezione di ciascuno.

Ciò che consente di fare tutt'uno di dogmatismo e scetticismo è per Kant allora sì una questione di atteggiamento, o per dir meglio di *abito* filosofico, ma la loro "fanciullezza" - comune dunque ad entrambi - sta nel non aver avuto alcuna cura per "la ragione in tutta la sua potenza e capacità di conoscenze pure a priori". Perché se al dogmatismo va imputata l'inversione dei fattori che consentono di guadagnare ai concetti il luogo della loro verità e cioè il loro carattere oggettivo, è poi lo stesso abito scettico ad inciampare nello scoglio del proprio stesso dubbio, dopo aver sospeso il giudizio sull'uso trascendentale e su un'estensione della conoscenza incurante delle condizioni concernenti la validità dei propri principi. Infatti, se esso non ha occhio che per i fallimenti dei tentativi dogmatici, non si trarrà mai fuori dall'illusione - che per Kant poi è di grande impaccio - di ritenere che questi fatti si presentino *da se stessi* come fatti. In una cecità poi non così distante da quella di chi vorrebbe fornire dimostrazione di un'estensione della conoscenza al di là degli oggetti dei sensi prendendo le parole - i concetti - come se queste valessero di per sé come semplici parole. Senza concedere la giusta attenzione dunque ai *modi* della loro manifestazione, o come sarebbe meglio dire con termini più propri: "senza esaminare sistematicamente tutte le specie di sintesi a priori dell'intelletto" (*KrVA* 767 B 795).

Ben si spiega allora perché nello scritto di risposta a Eberhard l'esordio kantiano intenda anzitutto dare il corretto accesso alla questione circa il senso della verità scandendo quali siano ed in che ordine vadano poste le giuste domande. Soltanto dopo essere risaliti alle condizioni indispensabili ad indicare come siano possibili proposizioni sintetiche *a priori*, è dato concludere che i caratteri irrinunciabili della verità - universalità e necessità - debbono poter essere esibiti e resi manifesti; come a voler dire, che non c'è verità che non posseda il carattere della manifestabilità.

Ecco anche spiegata la ragione per cui qualora si limiti alla censura dei fallimenti *di fatto* dei tentativi dogmatici, lo scettico rimane non solo un "uomo *di fatti*" e nulla più di questo; ma così facendo rovescia inevitabilmente la propria *volontà* scettica di verità nel bersaglio del dubbio stesso che egli solleva contro l'avversario: anche nel caso della preliminare assunzione di questo abito non è affatto concesso far seguire alla *restrizione* della conoscenza rispetto all'ammaestramento dall'esperienza la delimitazione *logicamente* qualificata della conoscenza medesima. Servirà allora un diverso percorso, che investighi e scopra con lo stesso abito insieme *estensione* e *limiti* della conoscenza. Infatti, nella questione "come sono possibili i giudizi sintetici *a priori*" - che apre per brevi cenni e chiude con una trattazione più estesa il nostro scritto polemico - "ne va" anzitutto del fatto che questa delimitazione va riportata a "principi che possano avere per conseguenza una necessaria rinuncia al diritto delle affermazioni

dogmatiche” (*KrVA* 768 B 796). Rinuncia che sarà pienamente ottenuta nel momento in cui la logica trascendentale della verità sarà scandita nella serie delle *proposizioni pure* dell’intelletto, senza cui un oggetto non può essere in alcun modo pensato, compagine questa che dunque non potrà essere contraddetta senza rinunciare ad ogni contenuto, ogni oggetto e dunque ogni verità possibile. Incontrovertibilità, questa a cui l’*Analitica dei principi* metterà capo, che non ha miglior enunciazione rispetto alla formulazione secondo cui l’intelletto puro, a cui sono da imputare i *Grundsätze*, non è solo l’unità condizionante ogni unificazione del molteplice, ma soprattutto “la sorgente stessa di ogni verità” (*KrVA* 237 B 296).

3. EBERHARD E LA QUESTIONE DELLA PREDICAZIONE

lo scritto kantiano del 1790 *Über eine Entdeckung* si sviluppa, dopo una *Introduzione*, attraverso due sezioni, di cui – dopo che la prima aveva esaminato il concetto di ragione sufficiente, quello di essere semplice ed il metodo per elevarsi dal sensibile al non sensibile – solo la seconda è dedicata alla possibilità dei giudizi sintetici *a priori*.⁴ Un ordine dell’argomentazione che, pur prestandosi a quello seguito dall’attacco sul *Philosophisches Magazin*, rispetto ad esso non cela l’esigenza di inversione completa, solo a voler seguire la necessità *critica* degli argomenti. Così farà il nostro interesse, che convoglierà sul nucleo polemico che da ultimo era emerso, le proposizioni sintetiche per una metafisica, sul quale si gioca la battaglia decisiva del criticismo, nella veste *preliminare*, però, della loro possibilità considerata entro le condizioni *essenziali* della nostra facoltà conoscitiva. Precisazione quest’ultima niente affatto accessoria se a partire da essa Kant va edificando lo scarto in fondo decisivo per la caratterizzazione del criticismo nei confronti del furore dogmatico rispetto alla validità assoluta dei principi. D’altra parte la questione in gioco con Eberhard risulta comprensibile con piena coerenza sotto questo punto di vista: lo strenuo sforzo polemico va indirizzato alla difesa dell’esigenza inaggirabile di questo dubbio metodico, un *dubbio* preliminare *di proroga* rispetto alla possibilità delle proposizioni sintetiche della metafisica. La stessa distinzione tra giudizi analitici e sintetici possiede la sua virtù radicale per Kant nella capacità di condurre alla questione critica generale intorno alla possibilità della metafisica in generale. Una volta dunque formulata la distinzione tra tipi di giudizio, questa va indirizzata alla domanda concernente la possibilità di una estensione della conoscenza indipendentemente dalla esperienza.

Da questo punto di vista, è sin dalla cornice generale con cui Eberhard affronta da par suo nell’articolo *Über die Unterscheidung der Urtheile in analytische und synthetische* (1789) l’algida questione dei giudizi sintetici *a priori* che si palesa la rinuncia a preservare da parte dell’atteggiamento dogmatico l’incidenza di questo dubbio di proroga. Ne sia testimonianza il corso che l’argomentazione di Eberhard assume differenziando i predicati del giudizio in base alla relazione che essi intrattengono con l’essenza del soggetto; essi possono essere del tutto o parzialmente identici con l’essenza, ed in tal caso i giudizi che esprimono tali elementi essenziali (*essentialia*) sono giudizi identici. Nel caso invece in cui venga attribuito al soggetto un predicato non essenziale, ciò che nei termini di Eberhard prende il nome di *affezione*, il giudizio sarà non-identico. Ne risulta che l’identità fa capo alla sussistenza dell’inclusione del predicato nell’essenza del soggetto: nel caso in cui il predicato non sia neanche in qualche

modo identico all'essenza (non vi sia in qualche modo incluso) il giudizio è sintetico. I giudizi analitici sono quelli “in welchen das Prädikat das Wesen des Subjekts selbst oder eines seiner wesentlichen Stücke ist (...) im Prädikat nichts als das, was im Begriffe des Subjekts wirklich enthalten war”; continua poi: “Es gibt also Urtheile a priori oder nothwendige Wahrheiten, deren Prädikate Attribute des Subjekts sind; das ist: Bestimmungen, die nicht zum Wesen des Subjekts gehören, aber in diesem Wesen ihren ausreichenden Grund haben”. (EBERHARD, *Ph. M.*, I, p. 313-14).

Questi giudizi corrispondono da un lato ai kantiani giudizi sintetici *a priori*, dall'altro sono il frutto dell'interpretazione della distinzione kantiana nei termini di una teoria della predicazione di stampo marcatamente leibniziano. Differenti forme di giudizio sono determinate dal modo in cui il predicato è relazionato al concetto del soggetto; perciò giudizi sintetici *a priori* presentano un predicato nella veste di attributo del soggetto del giudizio, ossia una qualità che consegue dall'essenza pur non essendo analiticamente contenuta in essa. Considerato entro tale abito – come un *rationatum* dell'essenza – l'attributo traspare quale un elemento che definisce la possibilità *reale* della cosa. Quella possibilità reale che Leibniz nelle *Meditazioni sulla conoscenza, la verità e le idee* riteneva non poter essere conferita dalla semplice evidenza di quanto si comprende nella definizione; evidenza che rimarrebbe soggettiva, non garantendo la possibilità reale della cosa, come nell'esempio addotto da Leibniz stesso dell'idea del moto più veloce. Ciò che invece rende possibile il conosciuto è l'unità (*idem-esse*) delle realtà dell'oggetto, da cui segue che rendere chiara e distinta una rappresentazione esplicandone la possibilità comporta rilevarne la mancanza di contraddizione⁵. Emerge così la cornice ontologica entro cui Eberhard compie la distinzione tra giudizi, e tale da segnare insieme la distanza dalla prospettiva kantiana. L'inquadramento in questione è segnato dall'affermazione di una possibilità interna della cosa, che sarebbe l'essenza reale espressa dalla definizione reale⁶.

Entro questi binari la risposta alla ossessiva questione concernente la possibilità dei giudizi sintetici *a priori* non richiederebbe poi estrema fatica: questi sono possibili per il principio di ragion sufficiente, deducibile da ultimo da quello di non-contraddizione. Da qui la banalità dell'operazione kantiana, che avrebbe dato nomi nuovi a qualcosa di già ben conosciuto, ed insieme il suo vizio, per aver introdotto confusione in una differenza esclusivamente di tipo *logico*, aprendo questo ambito con l'appello *preliminare* e critico al sensibile dell'intuizione.

D'altra parte, che valga o meno il giudizio intorno alla distinzione kantiana tra analisi e sintesi, che si ridurrebbe ad un gioco di parole capace solo di diluire la portata ontologica del complesso leibniziano formato da essenza ed attributo, non sembra potersi sminuire l'abilità del critico per aver saputo *magnificamente* equivocare il punto fondamentale della comprensione kantiana del giudizio. Ciò a cui Eberhard risulta sordo è che nei giudizi sintetici *a priori* kantiani i concetti (le note espresse nel predicato) si predicano delle intuizioni e non di altri concetti, secondo una forma del giudizio, dunque, tale che le intuizioni rivestono la funzione di parte *costitutiva* della sintesi che esprime il contenuto del giudizio. Questa la ragione in virtù di cui intendere l'intuizione come il referente oggettivo a sé stante del giudizio è un equivoco tanto grande quanto in fondo profonda l'origine leibniziana di questa obiezione del dogmatismo, dei cui seguaci forse Eberhard rimane il più consapevole⁷.

Quanto detto consente di trarre una prima affermazione che riguarda direttamente la polemica con Eberhard. Lo scontro infatti non verte intorno ai caratteri ed ai crismi che sono da attribuire al senso della verità; quanto la *Critica della ragion pura* sostiene *apertis verbis* circa lo statuto fondamentale dei *principi puri* (Grundsätze) non fa arretrare di un passo intorno all'esigenza di intendere la loro qualificazione logica alla stregua dell'incontrovertibilità, pena il venir meno del luogo in cui ogni giudizio empirico, vero o falso che sia, risulta possibile. Piuttosto il passo preliminare preparato secondo quel dubbio prorogante (*Zweifel des Aufschubs*: AA O8: p. 227) la questione dei giudizi di sintesi concernenti una metafisica possibile consente di focalizzarsi su questo, che cioè tale oggettività dell'orizzonte del giudizio non proverrebbe più dagli oggetti stessi, bensì sarebbe ad esclusiva discendenza da un luogo altro e diverso rispetto ad essi: un intelletto puro, una coscienza pura e trascendentale rispetto a cui gli oggetti assumerebbero la caratura fenomenica, mantenendo però - e alquanto sorprendentemente - una prerogativa del tutto inconoscibile sotto il titolo di cose in sé.

Esposizione ridotta all'osso questa, che potrebbe però ben derivare dall'assunto dogmatico sopra ricordato riguardo alla autonomia dell'intuizione sensibile e che in fondo consente quella confusione - che è Kant stesso a denunciare nella *Entdeckung* - tra principi logico-formali della conoscenza e principi trascendentali, tale da permettere al suo avversario leibniziano l'obiezione, per Kant del tutto maliziosa, di scarsa originalità rivolta alla *Critica della ragion pura*. Giacché infatti in questo modo di porre la differenza fenomenica gioca un ruolo decisivo senza dubbio quel punto di vista per cui l'analisi trascendentale è essa sottoposta e *sottomessa* alla distinzione tra una soggettività, da ultimo allocata nella coscienza pura, ed un polo oggettuale, che immancabilmente si riparerebbe dietro il fenomenismo della conoscenza. Una via che dopo Eberhard - ed in verità con una profondità difficilmente paragonabile - Hegel stesso batterà, senza farsi mancare modi sferzanti: "è come - si legge nella *Introduzione della Scienza della Logica* - se si attribuisse a un uomo un intendimento esatto, aggiungendo però che egli non sia capace di intendere nulla di vero, ma solo il non vero. Quanto sarebbe insulsa questa proposizione, altrettanto è insulsa una conoscenza vera che non conosca l'oggetto quale è in sé" (HEGEL, WdL: 27/27).

Questa critica - che in Hegel ormai giunge a compiuta esplicitazione - coglie un aspetto essenziale del criticismo, aspetto di cui mai Kant fa mistero. E cioè: appartiene costitutivamente al criticismo la frattura tra metodo trascendentale volto alla fondazione del conoscere ed il conoscere stesso. Sintetico questo, analitico il primo. Solo che nell'esteriorità tra il metodo del conoscere e l'esperienza vera non v'è paradosso alcuno; e meno che mai quello insulso che comporterebbe la posizione di un lato oscuro dell'oggetto e dunque la *certezza* d'un limite invalicabile al di là dell'orizzonte limitato della certezza. Eccoci giunti allora al punto, giacché *reale* per l'esperienza possibile risulta essere soltanto la distinzione rivolta a cogliere che le forme pure dell'intuizione e dell'intelletto non sono ricavabili *dal* e dunque non sono riducibili *al* contenuto dell'esperienza. Una considerazione che consente di comprendere un nodo cruciale in riferimento al nostro argomento. Per quanto infatti Kant acconsenta a riconoscere la possibilità che un concetto determinato possa avere una conformazione stabile ed obiettiva, da questo non consegue che esso esprima come tale un'essenza reale. Il concetto rimane una rappresentazione generale di note comuni a più oggetti, che rendono possibile un atto *regolato*

di unificazione. La *materia* del concetto può essere data o prodotta, mediante astrazione o comparazione, ciò che però risulta decisivo sta nel fatto che questa materia non è costruita a partire da una essenza reale comprendente un complesso finito di caratteri essenziali (Cfr. AA 09: § 110; KrV A 320 B 377). Nelle lezioni kantiane sulla *Logica* così viene definito il giudizio: “Un giudizio è la rappresentazione dell’unità della coscienza di rappresentazioni diverse, ossia la rappresentazione del loro rapporto in quanto esse costituiscono un concetto” (AA 09: § 17). La definizione dice: in quanto funzione d’unità, il giudizio è funzione rappresentativa, rappresenta l’unità. L’attività determinante è rivolta a ciò che dev’essere unito in modo tale che l’unione presenti anzitutto l’unità in relazione a cui il molteplice è connesso. Il carattere del giudizio è tale che insieme all’unità riflessa di ciò che viene unito sia rappresentato il rapporto tra le rappresentazioni connesse.⁸ Venendo meno il riferimento all’essenza reale, dunque analiticità e sinteticità non possono che venire definite a partire da questa struttura del giudizio, dunque a partire da una comprensione operativa della funzione del giudizio stesso. Questa funzione conoscitiva però non si esercita soltanto come attività unificante termini – soggetto e predicato – già determinati, ma insieme come attività che mette capo all’unità oggettiva dell’appercezione⁹. Questa duplice struttura corrisponde alla duplice analisi che la indaga: logica una, trascendentale l’altra; entrambe esercitantesi però su di una medesima forma logica della predicazione. Prima di soffermarci specificamente su tale punto, rileva fare ancora un’ultima considerazione in merito allo statuto dell’analisi critica, dacché sembra che più di una ragione della opposizione polemica di Eberhard derivi da una mancata comprensione di essa.

Adegua è quell’analisi che esprime l’esigenza di non poter fare a meno tanto della relazione originaria tra rappresentazione ed oggetto, tra appercezione pura ed intuizione, quanto del suo fondamento. Così, la sola distinzione che l’analisi trascendentale concepisce è quella tra *forma* e *contenuto*; tra le forme che appartengono tanto al soggetto quanto all’oggetto ed i contenuti in cui tanto il soggetto come l’oggetto appaiono. Ed è questa l’unica possibile separazione perché essa è la sola che nella concreta struttura dell’esperienza possa essere assorbita. Una distinzione dunque a cui tutte le altre sono sottoposte e sottomesse; esattamente l’inverso di ciò che si poteva dedurre dalla formulazione *dogmatica* del fenomenismo kantiano da cui siamo partiti. L’analisi dell’esperienza non fornisce alcuna consistenza ad una separazione tra un soggetto ed un oggetto, essendo entrambi – soggetto ed oggetto – termini ricompresi nelle relazioni dell’esperienza stessa. E se cade questa distinzione viene meno anche la possibilità di relegare il segno del noumeno al lato in ombra dell’oggetto per poi estendere la comprensione logico-ontologica del giudizio alle cose in generale senza la limitazione al fenomeno.

Pare sia questo un buon modo di porre la questione in gioco tra principi logico-formali e principi trascendentali e che in maniera esplicita articola la polemica che stiamo esaminando. Un buon modo anzitutto per afferrare i termini con cui Eberhard stesso la poneva e con grande facilità risolveva: giudizi sintetici *a priori* – a questo si può ridurre la sua tesi - sono possibili per il principio di ragione, deducibile in ultima istanza dal principio di identità. Il punto chiave è espresso da Kant nello scritto del 1790 in apertura della sezione dedicata ai giudizi sintetici *a priori*¹⁰. Ciò che l’appercezione trascendentale conferisce al soggetto del giudizio non è contenuto logicamente nel predicato poiché costituisce la sensibilizzazione oggettiva (la *schematizzazione*) delle note di questo: la sua esposizione (*Darstellung*) nell’intuizione sensibile *a priori*. La forma del

giudizio è pensata secondo la irriducibilità tra pertinenza necessaria ad un concetto e contenuto. L'intuizione sensibile pura pertiene ad un concetto a cui conferisce validità oggettiva – referenza possibile alle sue note – ma non entra a far parte del contenuto del concetto.

Il fulcro della soluzione kantiana risiede nel rifiuto di questa deducibilità o illecita parificazione tra pertinenza necessaria e contenuto. D'altra parte secondo Eberhard ciò che pertiene necessariamente a qualcosa deve essere contenuto in esso. Così la formulazione decisiva offerta nella *Entdeckung*:

Dunque né il nome di un attributo né il principio di ragione sufficiente distinguono i giudizi sintetici da quelli analitici; ma se i primi sono intesi come giudizi a priori, allora sulla base di questa denominazione si può dire nient'altro che il predicato di essi è fondato necessariamente in qualche modo nell'essenza del concetto del soggetto, quindi è un attributo, ma non solo in seguito al principio di non contraddizione. Ma come esso, in quanto attributo sintetico, entri in connessione con il concetto del soggetto, visto che non può essere tratto da questo analizzandolo, non è possibile desumerlo dal concetto di attributo e dalla proposizione che esiste un qualche fondamento di esso; (...) la Critica però indica questo fondamento di possibilità con chiarezza, e cioè che deve essere la pura intuizione, sotteso al concetto del soggetto, con la quale in rapporto alla quale è possibile, anzi: con la quale soltanto è possibile collegare a priori un predicato sintetico con un concetto. (AA 08: 242; p. 126)

L'affermazione rileva il nucleo cardine intorno a cui ruota in questo scritto la considerazione trascendentale - e non semplicemente logica – della distinzione tra analitico e sintetico; considerazione entro cui è possibile delineare quella caratteristica funzione semantica dell'intuizione come parte del contenuto del giudizio. Una funzione già pienamente operante nella *deduzione trascendentale* delle categorie, ma che – seguendo l'osservazione di Moltke Gram – darebbe luogo a due diverse teorie della predicazione, entrambe al lavoro già nella *Critica* del 1781. Una prima che seguirebbe la formulazione kantiana della distinzione tra giudizi analitici e sintetici presente nell'*Introduzione*¹¹ come una questione relativa all'essere contenuto del concetto del predicato nel concetto del soggetto. Una formulazione, questa, che Gram sviluppa secondo posizioni leibniziane non così dissimili nel fondo da quelle che furono di Maas ed Eberhard, per giungere a rilevare che essa non offrirebbe una adeguata base per rifiutare l'obiezione che vorrebbe vedere nei giudizi sintetici a priori giudizi copertamente analitici¹². Differente sarebbe invece la teoria della predicazione all'opera nella deduzione trascendentale ed anche nella risposta a Eberhard. Una teoria per cui nei giudizi sintetici i concetti sono predicati dell'intuizione e non di altri concetti, confermando così una funzione dell'intuizione pura in cui anziché risultare oggetto a sé stante del giudizio essa partecipa alla sintesi costituente il contenuto del giudizio stesso.

Nel tentativo di spiegare la compatibilità delle due formulazioni in modo dunque che la definizione del giudizio sintetico come relazione tra concetti converga con la sua forma “deduzione” è stato proposto di riportare tale ambiguità ad un doppio uso kantiano del termine “concetto”, che nel suo valore più esteso sarebbe tale da indicare anche le forme della sensibilità; senza trascurare poi che si può acconsentire all'ipotesi che la formulazione del giudizio sintetico presente nell'*Introduzione* è all'interno di un giro di argomentazioni che con ogni probabilità hanno come referente Hume più che Leibniz, ed il problema sollevato dallo scetticismo di

poter connettere secondo una relazione necessaria due distinti concetti¹³. Sulla scorta delle intenzioni che mira a saldare la compatibilità di queste due formulazioni solo superficialmente in contraddizione tra loro, quel che ci sembra possibile proporre è la considerazione della formulazione del principio di tutti i giudizi sintetici fornita nell'Analitica dei principi, che costituirà la condizione preliminare e necessaria per esaminare anche l'esempio di un determinato giudizio sintetico, di cui Kant fa considerazione nei *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe*, in cui entrano in relazione due concetti puri, appoggiandosi entrambi al sostegno sensibile fornito dal sostrato contenente tutte le rappresentazioni.

4. IL PRINCIPIO DI TUTTI I GIUDIZI SINTETICI

la priorità che investe la distinzione tra giudizi analitici e sintetici non è nella *Critica della ragion pura* “un mero armeggiare con le parole”; è invece il passo decisivo verso una conoscenza fondata. Infatti, soltanto dopo aver condotto a termine il maggiore tra i suoi compiti, quello di assicurare la possibilità e le condizioni della validità dei giudizi sintetici *a priori*, la logica trascendentale perviene al proprio scopo di “determinare l'estensione e i limiti dell'intelletto puro” (KrV A 154 B 193). Un ben noto testo della *Critica* recita:

Nei giudizi sintetici, peraltro, sono costretto a uscire fuori (*hinausgehen*) dal concetto dato, per prendere in esame il suo rapporto con qualcosa del tutto differente (*etwas ganz anderes*) da ciò che vi era pensato. Di conseguenza qui non si ha mai un rapporto di identità, né uno di contraddizione, e il giudizio in se stesso non è in grado di rivelare né la verità né l'errore. (KrV A 154 B 194).

Viene portato all'attenzione un *movimento* (*hinausgehen*, è il termine kantiano): il giudizio analitico si arresta al concetto dato per attribuire qualcosa dell'oggetto rappresentato, diversamente il sintetico, che indica una relazione *tra* concetti rivolgendosi ad un «qualcosa del tutto differente (*etwas ganz anderes*)». Domandiamo: il “movimento” indicato appartiene all'oggetto ed al giudizio quale forma *vera* in cui l'oggetto è espresso, ovvero appartiene al pensiero che ne compie l'analisi? Se per confrontare *sinteticamente* due concetti è necessario un terzo («*ein Drittes*») elemento, esso non è un *altro* in quanto derivato dal concetto del soggetto, bensì «il solo in cui possa sorgere (*entstehen*) la sintesi dei due concetti»; *terzo* in quanto condizione *altra* dai concetti del giudizio. Nella *Entdeckung* ricorre una espressione del tutto simile:

Infatti con l'espressione “sintesi” viene indicato chiaramente che oltre al concetto dato deve aggiungersi ancora qualcosa come sostrato che renda possibile andare con i miei predicati al di là di esso. (AA O8: 245; p. 130).

«Come sostrato» significa: come ciò *su cui* l'intelletto deve poggiare per ottenere l'unità nell'oggetto; dal momento che in questione, ora, è l'unità di tutte le intuizioni contenuta nei concetti puri dell'intelletto, questi si riferiranno all'«insieme (*Inbegriff*)» - il *tempo* - che è *forma* interna a priori di tutte le nostre rappresentazioni. Il movimento *analizzato* ha ora duplice direzione: non soltanto quella tra concetti, che permette di connettere diversi predicati, ma insieme quella diretta ad oggetti *rappresentati* e, dunque per un verso *sussumente*, per altro verso

determinante l'intuizione. A ben vedere, però, la natura del medio di tutti i giudizi sintetici - il tempo, che ha valore di sostrato - lungi dal rompere l'unità del giudizio, la afferma: il molteplice dell'intuizione, infatti, non è solo "presentato per una conoscenza possibile", come nella semplice forma dell'intuizione, bensì sussunto; non v'è precedenza logica alcuna, infatti, del "momento ricettivo" l'intuizione rispetto al "momento *determinante*" il modo in cui una intuizione può «servire» all'*unità* del giudizio («wie sie zu Urteilen *diene*n kann», PR, § 20, cors. nostro). Il tempo lì dove è luogo di ricezione degli oggetti tutti in quanto fenomeni è, al tempo stesso e proprio per ciò, regolato dai concetti puri. Non deve stupire eccessivamente che l'argomento addotto sia il medesimo profuso a sostegno dello schematismo trascendentale; così infatti si chiudeva il capitolo ad esso dedicato: «Le categorie senza schemi sono dunque funzioni dell'intelletto riguardo a concetti, ma non rappresentano alcun oggetto. Esse acquistano quest'ultimo significato per opera della sensibilità, la quale *realizza* l'intelletto, *restringendolo* al tempo stesso» (KrV A 147 B 187, cors. nostro). Ciò in cui piuttosto il giudizio sintetico avanza è nella costituzione di una relazione di predicati connessi, così da istituirsi come il solo ed unico orizzonte - concettuale e sensibile insieme - capace di possibile ricezione e conoscenza del fenomeno.

Portiamo l'esempio di un determinato giudizio sintetico. Si tratta della legge del movimento (*lex inertiae*) che Newton mise a capo dei *Principia*: "corpus omne perseverare in statu suo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter indirectum, nisi quatenus a viribus impressis cogitum statum illis mutare" (NEWTON, 1965)¹⁴. In questo giudizio entrano in relazione due concetti puri appartenenti alla categoria di relazione: sussistenza e causalità; essi entrano in rapporto appoggiandosi entrambi al *sostrato* contenente tutte le rappresentazioni; mediante la sensibilizzazione dei concetti nei loro schemi - la sostanza permanente e la successione regolata secondo causalità - «ogni corpo persiste (*behart*)» se non costretto da una causa esterna («*eine äußere Ursache*»). L'oggetto - si dice in questo giudizio sintetico *particolare* - in quanto *Naturding*, corpo fisico, non è solo un mobile sussistente nello spazio, ma occupa uno spazio propagandosi ed opponendo resistenza; esso esiste in quanto forza.

Non può passare inosservato che nella sezione considerata della *Critica*, scopo della quale è l'unità del giudizio della logica trascendentale, vengano distintamente indicati i tre elementi che contengono le fonti di rappresentazioni a priori, secondo una panoramica già seguita da Kant in apertura e chiusura della *Von den Gründen* del 1781. L'osservazione è centrale: a partire dalle fonti soggettive della conoscenza - sensibilità, immaginazione e appercezione - sono possibili giudizi sintetici *puri*, giudizi cioè non contenenti nulla di empirico; non soltanto: muovendo da tali fondamenti, infatti, i giudizi sintetici puri sono detti "necessari" in vista di una conoscenza di oggetti. Affinché una conoscenza *pura* contenga un riferimento all'oggetto, questo - il fenomeno percepito - deve poter farsi incontro, la conoscenza esser ricettiva; soltanto nella sintesi tra l'«oggetto» - l' *etwas ganz anderes* - ed il concetto puro, il fenomeno è *oggettivo*. Ne consegue che la sintesi nella cui istituzione è possibile la ricezione - l'esperienza - dell'oggetto è fondata nelle *proposizioni fondamentali* che sono giudizi sintetici *puri*. A che titolo Kant può dirle necessarie? A partire dall'unità di concetti puri e tempo ed in vista del "costituirsi di una conoscenza di oggetti". Quell'unità, infatti, - l'unità delle fonti soggettive della conoscenza - costituisce la possibilità dell'esperienza ed *al tempo stesso* ciò che i giudizi sintetici puri devono istituire. La possibilità di

proposizioni a priori coincide con la circolarità in cui esse sono coinvolte; L'intera ragione pura – scrive Kant nella *Dottrina trascendentale del metodo*:

non è infatti in grado di dar luogo, per mezzo di idee, a un qualsiasi giudizio sintetico fornito di validità oggettiva. Attraverso i concetti dell'intelletto, essa istituisce senza dubbio principi sicuri, desumendoli però da concetti non direttamente ma per via indiretta, mediante il riferimento di tali concetti a qualcosa di contingente, cioè all'esperienza possibile. (KrV, A 737 B 765).

Questo riferimento all'esperienza possibile ed all'intuizione pura consente di gettare luce sullo statuto delle definizioni reali degli oggetti dell'esperienza che le proposizioni *a priori* rendono possibili. La loro possibilità - coincidente con la possibilità della schematizzazione delle categorie (Cfr. la nota del 1781 nell'*Analitica dei principi*, Cap. III: KrV A 245-6) – dunque, seppur concessa, si accompagna inevitabilmente con il divieto di poter *definire* i concetti che la consentono. Ne è concessa piuttosto una esposizione, dal momento che il concetto trascendentale (di realtà, sostanza, forza) non designa una intuizione pura, ma soltanto la *sintesi* di intuizioni empiriche. Risiede qui la condizione per cui lo statuto delle proposizioni *metafisiche* sintetiche a priori derivanti da concetti non può essere determinante – consentendo cioè il passaggio a priori della sintesi nell'intuizione – bensì quello di una *proposizione fondamentale della sintesi* di intuizioni empiriche possibili. La *Critica* nel momento in cui raggiunge il fondamento per l'estensione della massima possibilità della conoscenza rileva parimenti i limiti interni della ragione che tale facoltà ha costruito. Estensione e limiti dell'intelletto puro si esercitano entrambi e parimenti su quel medesimo campo che è la facoltà giudicativa e predicativa della conoscenza umana.

RIASSUNTO: Nel saggio del 1790 *Su una scoperta secondo la quale ogni nuova critica della ragione pura sarebbe resa superflua da una più antica* Kant risponde agli attacchi mossigli da Eberhard torna sul problema decisivo della Critica della ragion pura intorno alla possibilità di giudizi sintetici a priori, per rivelarne il carattere preliminare rispetto alla possibilità di proposizioni a priori metafisiche. In questo articolo mi propongo di seguire la controversia misurando in particolare la compatibilità di quelle che sono state dette – da Gram e, seppur non senza riserve, da Allison – due teorie della predicazione, operanti nella Critica. Oltre ai testi dell'articolo del 1790 prendo in considerazione la formulazione del supremo principio di tutti i giudizi sintetici offerta nell'*Analitica dei principi*.

PAROLE CHIAVE: Kant, Eberhard, logica trascendentale, giudizi sintetici a priori, proposizioni fondamentali.

ABSTRACT: In *On a Discovery* Kant returns to the claim of the *Critique* that the indispensable starting point for any scientific metaphysics is an investigation of the possibility of synthetic judgements *a priori* and only after that is it possible to conclude that the fundamental features of truth – “universality” and “necessity” – must also be able to be displayed and thereby made known in the form of the transcendental judgement. In this paper I examine in detail the debate between Eberhard and Kant concerning synthetic judgements a priori in order to consider the double formulation of the judgement's logical form, as observed by M. Gram and H. E. Allison. By examining and comparing texts from *On a Discovery* and the *Analytic of Principles*, I aim to demonstrate that two theories of predication are not only compatible but also needful to each other.

KEYWORDS: Kant, Eberhard, Transcendental Logic, synthetic judgements a priori, pure Principles of understanding.

BIBLIOGRAFIA

- ALLISON, H. A. *An Historical-Critical Introduction*, in KANT, I. *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, ed. by ID., J. Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- DUQUE, F. *Estudio Preliminar*, in KANT, I. *Los progresos de la Metafísica desde Leibniz y Wolff*, trad. de ID., Tecnos, Madrid 1987.
- EBERHARD, J. A. *Über die Unterscheidung der Urtheile in analytische und synthetische*, in *Philosophische Magazin*, I (1789), p. 307-332.
- ID., *Über die analytischen und d synthetischen Urtheile, zur Beantwortung des zweiten Abschnitte von H. Prof. Kants Streitschrift*, in *Ph. M.* III (1790), pp. 280-303.
- ID., *Über den Unterschied des logischen und Realwesens*, in *Ph. M.* III (1790), pp. 83-88.
- GRAM, M. S. *Kant, Ontology and the A priori*, Evanston, 1968.
- ID., *The Crisis of Synthetcity: The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*, in *KANT-STUDIEN* 71, 2 (1980), p. 155-180.
- HEGEL, G.W.F. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, hrsg. G. Lasson, F. Meiner, Hamburg 1975; tr.it. A. Moni (riv. C. Cesa), *Scienza della Logica*, 2 v., Laterza, Bari 1981.
- KANT, I. *Gesammelte Schriften*, Hrsg.: Bd. 1-22 Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. 23 Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaftne zu Berlin, ab Bd. 24 Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Berlin, 1900 et seqq.
- ID., *Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll*, AA 08: 185-251; tr. it. di C. La Rocca, *Su una scoperta secondo la quale ogni nuova critica della ragione pura sarebbe resa superflua da una più antica in Contro Eberhard. La polemica sulla Critica della ragion pura*, Giardini editori, Pisa 1994.
- ID., *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten k'nnen*, AA 04:253-383, 1980 (1783); tr. it. di P. Carabellese, *Prolegomeni ad ogni metafisica futura che potrà presentarsi come scienza*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1996.
- ID., *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, AA 04: 465-565, 1990 (1776); tr. it. di P. Pecere, *Principi metafisici della scienza della natura*, Bompiani, Milano 2003.
- ID., *Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen*, AA 09: 1-150, 2011 (1800); tr. it. di L. Amoroso, *Logica*, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1984.
- ID., *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A: 1. Auflage 1781, AA 04: 1-252; B: 2. Auflage, 1787, AA 03: 1-552, 2013 (1781/1787); tr. it. di P. Chiodi, *Critica della ragion pura*, UTET, Torino 1967.
- JAUERNING, A. *Kants Critique of the Leibnizian Philosophy: Contra the Leibnizians, but Pro Leibniz*, in *Kant and the Early Moderns*, ed. by D. Garber and B. Longuenesse, Princeton University Press, 2008.
- LEIBNIZ, G.W. *Scritti filosofi* a c. M. Mugnai ed E. Pasini, UTET, Torino 2000.
- LONGUENESSE, B. *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*, Princeton University Press, 1998.
- MARCUCCI, S. *Studi kantiani*, Fazzi editore, 1988.
- NEWTON, I. *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*. London: Innys, 1726; tr. it.: *Principi matematici della filosofia naturale*, tr. it. A. Pala, UTET, Torino 1965.
- PECERE, P. *La filosofia della natura in Kant*, Edizioni di pagina, 2009.

PRAUSS, G. *Erscheinung bei Kant. Ein Problem der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"*, de Gruyter, Berlin 1971.

SAAME, O. *Der Satz vom Grund bei Leibniz*, Krach, Mainz 1961.

SCARAVELLI, L. *Kant e la fisica moderna*, in *Scritti kantiani*, vol. II delle *Opere* a cura di M. Corsi, La Nuova Italia, Firenze 1968.

NOTES

1 Giulio Goria è dottorando in filosofia presso l'Istituto di scienze umane, presso la Scuola Normale Superiore. I suoi interessi principali per quanto concerne il periodo tra il XVII ed il XIX sec. convergono intorno al tema del giudizio e della predicazione. È autore del libro *Il fenomeno e il rimando. Sul fondamento kantiano della finitezza della ragione umana*, ETS, Pisa 2014.

2 È quanto fa peraltro F. Duque nel suo *Estudio Preliminar*, 1987, pp. XCII e ss.

3 In merito alla comprensione kantiana della filosofia leibniziana si veda A. JAUERNING, 2008, pp. 50 e ss..

4 I riferimenti critici per gli argomenti kantiani presenti nei primi tre fascicoli del volume I (1788-89) del *Philosophisches Magazin*, pubblicato da Eberhard e scritto prevalentemente da lui, sono: *Ph. M.*, I, 160-63; *Ph. M.*, I, 169-74; *Ph. M.*, I, 243-306; *Ph. M.*, I, 307-332. La nostra attenzione si concentrerà in larga prevalenza su quest'ultimo scritto di Eberhard *Über die Unterscheidung der Urtheile in analytische und synthetische*.

5 G.W. LEIBNIZ, 2000, p. 254. Per un approfondimento di questo problema che ha come nucleo principale la relazione tra principio di ragione sufficiente e di non contraddizione si veda lo studio di O. SAAME, 1961, pp. 20 e ss..

6 Cfr. EBERHARD, *Ph. M.*, III, 1790, p. 295.

7 Per un approfondimento di questa discussione tra Schwab, Albicht ed i membri dell'Accademia, si veda F. Duque, 1987, p. CXVI e ss.

8 Conseguente, dunque, la subordinazione del concetto rispetto al giudizio, peraltro rintracciabile già in scritti giovanili, cfr. I. Kant, *La falsa sottigliezza delle quattro figure sillogistiche*, § 6; in quell'occasione veniva già notata non la coincidenza di giudizio e concetto, ma che soltanto nel giudizio il concetto si realizza come «rappresentazione distinta»; occorre un giudizio affinché un concetto si chiarifichi esponendo le proprie note, sicché dell'unità di molte rappresentazioni – il concetto – non può darsi altro uso se non – come dirà la *Critica* – quale predicato di possibile giudizio per «le rappresentazioni di un oggetto ancora indeterminato».

9 Il riferimento principale è naturalmente al § 19 della KrV ed alla definizione del giudizio lì contenuta. In merito si veda l'analisi di B. LONGUENESSE, 1998, p. 181 e ss.

10 Cfr. AA 08: 93; p. 109.

11 KrV A 7 B 11.

12 GRAM, M., 1968, p. 50.

13 Per questo tentativo di stemperare la presunta inconciliabilità tra le due teorie della predicazione, in esplicito richiamo alla tesi di Gram, si veda il saggio di Allison ad introduzione dell'edizione in lingua inglese della *Entdeckung*: H. E. ALLISON, 1973, p. 72. In risposta al quale si veda ancora M. GRAM, 1980, p. 168 e ss..

14 Kant ebbe profonda consapevolezza della legge, tanto che essa figura citata nella formulazione della Seconda legge della Meccanica contenuta nei *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe*. In merito alla connessione tra Analogie dell'esperienza e leggi della dinamica cfr. S. Marucci, *Studi kantiani*, Fazzi editore, 1988, vol. I, pp. 15-41; per una ampia trattazione dell'argomento cfr. P. Pecere, *La filosofia della natura in Kant*, Edizioni di pagina, 2009, pp. 609-43.

Recebido / Received: 11/10/14

Aprovado / Approved: 16/11/14

THE IMAGINATION IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY AND SOME RELATED QUESTIONS¹

Olavo CALÁBRIA²

In this paper we seek to deal with some problems frequently identified in transcendental idealism, first using the conception we have recently elaborated on the faculty of imagination according to Kant. This will be done by determining the place it occupies in the set of mental capacities, identifying the tasks and functions that it can achieve, registering the types of operations it performs and the products it offers in different fields of his philosophy. This subject results from a second research, started almost two decades ago which focused on a problem we suspected to have discovered, or at least demonstrated its relevance and importance, namely, The distinction made by Kant between two types of objects for us, appearances [*Erscheinungen*] and phenomena [*Phaenomena*].

The path that connects these two questions is simple. To stay on track, it was enough to follow Kant's footsteps, beginning with this statement from the Critique of Pure Reason's first edition: "*Erscheinungen, sofern sie, als Gegenstände, nach der Einheit der Kategorien gedacht werden, heissen Phenomena*" (*KrV*: A248-9). With this in mind, we are simply informed that what distinguishes these two types of objects is the relationship, which only phenomena have, with the rules of conceptual unity. If we consider, however, that the schemes are responsible for enabling the application of the concepts of understanding to objects of sensible intuition, we can hope to discover the reasons and consequences of this distinction with the aid of the doctrine of schematism. From the beginning we consider Kant's first reference to the notion of *phaenomenon* occurred precisely in the chapter on schematism (cf. *KrV*: A146/B186) very symptomatic. Hence, we have investigated this issue for a long time without finding any satisfactory result. Today we know that what lacked is the advance in understanding the nature and functions that Kant assigns to the imagination, because it is precisely this that performs schematism and produces the schemes that enable the application of the concepts of understanding to the objects of intuition. At the end of this third step, we realized that one of the most relevant aspects for solving these joint problems is the discovery of the double conducts of imagination, as we will show below³. Through this process, we arrived at the question of imagination in Kant's philosophy, and "Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view" (1789)⁴ gave us the most decisive aid to progress and has enabled to build a characterization of this faculty that proved capable of solving, not only the issues raised, but some other important aspects that we initially didn't suspect, having been the key point of this whole journey, we will focus on its explanation.

THE KANTIAN CONCEPTION OF THE IMAGINATION DEFINED IN *ANTHROPOLOGY* (1798)

Through several sections of *Anthropology* Kant provides a detailed and ordered description of the imagination [*Einbildungskraft*], whose explanation, full of examples, is built around five types of characteristics that together explain the place it occupies on the set of the mind capacities, the types of operations that it performs, the relationships it establishes with other capacities of the mind and the tasks incumbent on it to perform in multiple fields of his philosophy. In general, these characteristics can be summarized as follows: (i) the status, that determines whether or not the imagination is conceived as a capacity with its own identity and, if so, whether it belongs to the trunk of sensitivity or understanding; (ii) the aptitudes, or skills, which marks the sources from which that arise the representations with which it deals (discursive or intuitive, a priori or a posteriori) and also the configurations that grant its products; (iii) the character, establishing whether it is a receptive capacity (passive), as well as the senses [*Sinnen*], or spontaneous (active), as occurs with the understanding [*Verstand*], for example; (iv) the conducts, which identify the types of behaviors it manifests in its operations, that is, if its activities are exercised freely (autonomy) or if driven by foreign rules (heteronomy); (v) the impulses, which distinguish the types of stimuli that impel it to start implementing its tasks, that is, if it has voluntary or involuntary behaviors.

We don't claim these terms as the most appropriate. Of course, some may be exchanged without loss of understanding and there will be alternatives with equivalent results. Our aim in choosing them was only to distinguish their meanings and highlight the specificities of each one.

1. THE STATUS OF THE IMAGINATION: A SENSIBLE CAPACITY WITH ITS OWN IDENTITY

The first mention made by Kant in the *Anthropology* about the status of the imagination occurs in the section 15, which is in fact dedicated to the treatment of the five senses (cf. *Anth*: 07, 152). There we find the categorical assertion not only that the sense, but also the imagination, belongs to the trunk of sensibility [*Sinnlichkeit*], because it is up to both to deal with solely intuitive representations. Immediately, Kant points out what distinguishes them:

Die Sinnlichkeit im Erkenntnißvermögen (das Vermögen der Vorstellungen in der Anschauung) enthält zwei Stücke: den *Sinn* und die *Einbildungskraft*. - Das erstere ist das Vermögen der Anschauung in der *Gegenwart* des Gegenstandes, das zweite auch *ohne* die Gegenwart desselben (*Anth*: 07, 153).

To locate the imagination in the trunk of sensibility is perhaps still an amazing and unpalatable aspect for many interpreters, for it seems that in general it is customary to conceive the exercise of the imagination as a kind of *thinking*, and there are few interpreters who support the sensible and intuitive status for the capacity of imagination. Heidegger is a rare example of awareness of [this aspect that it has the first] sensible status of the imagination (cf. "*Kant Buch*",

1929). However, we believe Heidegger has exaggerated by granting primacy and importance far superior to those that Kant would have dedicated to that capacity.

Curiously in the *Critique of Pure Reason* the same conception had already been sustained on passage of the second version of the *Deduction* of the categories:

Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch *ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung* vorzustellen. Da nun alle unsere Anschauung sinnlich ist, so gehört die *Einbildungskraft* der subjectiven Bedingung wegen, unter der sie allein den Verstandesbegriffen eine correspondirende Anschauung geben kann, zur *Sinnlichkeit* (...) (*KrV*: B 151).

This statement made in the context of the *Deduction* is not preceded or succeeded by any satisfactory explanation or justification, merely mentioning that the faculty of imagination also represents the objects without its presence in intuition. This laconic explanation may be one of the main reasons for the obscurity in which the sensible identity of the imagination remains, as well as the lack of distinction in which it is conceived in relation to understanding, whose status or identity is eminently intellectual. To make cases worse, following this excerpt we find some declarations that seem to contradict this characterization of the sensible status of imagination, giving the impression that it could be subordinated to or even identified as understanding:

(...) die *Einbildungskraft* so fern ein Vermögen, die *Sinnlichkeit a priori* zu bestimmen, und ihre Synthesis der Anschauungen, *den Kategorien gemäß*, muß die transcendentale Synthesis der *Einbildungskraft* sein, welches eine Wirkung des Verstandes auf die *Sinnlichkeit* und die erste Anwendung desselben (zugleich der Grund aller übrigen) auf Gegenstände der uns möglichen Anschauung ist (*KrV*: B151-2).

The emphasis made in this statement, that the transcendental synthesis of the imagination must be made in accordance with the categories, is opportune not only because it is a very important aspect, but also because it is a dangerous one, for even a careful reading of this fragment can induce the idea that the imagination does not belong, in fact, to the sensibility, leading to the misunderstanding of such syntheses as being performed by understanding. Hence, to confuse the identity of the imagination as understanding one step is enough, due to the sensible multiplicity having to be synthesized by the exercise of an *activity*, this is precisely the character that Kant often gives to the understanding, some people conclude that imagination only performs syntheses if conducted by discursive rules responsible for the determining of sensibility. On terms with this same mistake, there are those who come to annihilate the identity of the imagination, arguing that “imagination” is just a name that understanding gets when it addresses for the sensible context⁵.

On some *Lectures* Kant also ratifies the sensible status of imagination, saying that in its details the general capacity of sensible knowledge consists of (i) the *capacity of the senses themselves* and (ii) the *knowledge imitated of the senses*, which confirms the division made in *Anthropology* between sense and faculty of imagination, respectively:

Es entspringt die sinnliche Erkenntniss entweder gänzlich durch den Eindruck des Gegestandes, und dann ist diese sinnlicher Erkenntniss eine Vorstellung der Sinne selbst; oder es entspringt die

sinnliche Erkenntniss aus dem Gemüthe, aber unter der Bedingung, unter welcher das Gemüth von den Gegenständen afficirt wird, und dann ist die sinnliche Erkenntniss eine nachgeahmte Vorstellung der Sinne (*Vorl.* 28, 230).

So, the imagination can synthesize representations and produce the sensible knowledge that “originates from the mind” only on the condition that multiplicity of impressions are received and made available by the senses in the pure forms of space and time. This is the reason, initially, this multiplicity remains only in a disconnected state, and therefore the imagination needs to gather and unify it in an elaborated intuition⁶. Thus, the sensitive knowledge produced by the imagination is an “imitated representation”, for it was developed with ‘material’ acquired and copied from the senses. On the other hand, it “originates from the mind” due to spontaneity in which the imagination must synthesize it into a unified whole. How this entire procedure is confined only to the scope of intuitive representations, we understand why is pertinent that not only the sense but also the imagination has the status of sensible capacity.

It’s relatively easy to understand how the imagination presents intuitions without the presence of the object. In fact, by dealing with impressions received by the sense and available to the mind, it no longer needs the presence of the objects to get them. All of us can indicate several common experiences of this type, such as the figure of a blue turquoise circle figured mentally, or the melody of a beautiful song that we remember and the details of a work that one day we plan to perform, everyone imagined without the effective presence of their corresponding objects in front of us. Also in the *Lectures* there are some examples that confirm and clarify these aspects:

Z. E. die Vorstellung dessen, was ich sehe; ferner die Vorstellung für Sauren, Süßen usw. sind Vorstellungen der Sinne selbst. Aber vergegenwärtige ich mir ein Haus, was ich ehemals gesehen, so entspringt die Vorstellung jetzt aus dem Gemüth; aber unter der Bedingung, dass der Sinn vorher von diesem Gegenstande afficirt war. Solche sinnliche Erkenntniss, die aus der Spontaneität des Gemüth entspringen, heissen: *Erkenntniss der bildenden Kraft*; und die Erkenntnisse, die durch den Eindruck des Gegenstandes entspringen, heissen: *Vorstellung der Sinne selbst* (*Vorl.* 28, 230).

As an example of representations of the sense itself, or even disconnected received impressions, we have representations of sour, sweet, etc., which are also characterized as the sensations received by the mind due to the affection of the body by external objects. Now, for the re-presentation of a house previously seen and whose corresponding object is no longer in our presence, we now need these representations to come just from the mind. In this case, Kant says that we have an example of representation of the “formative faculty” [*bildenden Kraft*], the same name used in *Anthropology* to designate one of the species of the faculty of imagination (cf. *Anth.* 07, 174-5).

Kant reaffirms in *Anthropology* that imagination is able to present intuitions “also without the presence” of the objects. The term highlighted in the two passages is “without”, which infers that the imagination is not mere receptivity. Nevertheless, related to the characterization of these two sensible capacities, the most fertile aspect concerns the word “also”, which is

obscured by Kant's emphasis. The "also" in this context shows that to build the intuitions of objects the imagination needs to *perform some role even in his presence*. That is not so easy to understand. What is this role played by the imagination *in the presence* of the object?

It will be useful now to resort to another characteristic that we will deal with only later and that is related to what we call the operational aptitudes of imagination. Even so, it is possible to move forward enough for our present purpose, simply resorting to a criticism addressed by Kant to psychologists in a note of the *Deduction* of the categories in the first edition of the *KrV*:

Daß die Einbildungskraft ein nothwendiges Ingrediens der Wahrnehmung selbst sei, daran hat wohl noch kein Psychologe gedacht. Das kommt daher, weil man dieses Vermögen theils nur auf Reproduktionen einschränkte, theils weil man glaubte, die Sinne lieferten uns nicht allein Eindrücke, sondern setzten solche auch sogar zusammen und brächten Bilder der Gegenstände zuwege, wozu ohne Zweifel außer der Empfänglichkeit der Eindrücke noch etwas mehr, nämlich eine Function der Synthesis derselben, erfordert wird (*KrV*: A120, n.).

The message is blunt: for us to have a perception of something, the role played by the senses alone is not enough, just because they are merely a receptive (passive) capacity, but for any object to be presented to us in one intuition, it is also necessary that an activity be performed, and this therefore requires the role performed by another capacity, an active one. Because of its receptiveness, the senses provide us only disconnected intuitive representations (impressions), precisely due to the lack of power to synthesize them. This gathering is made only under the condition of an activity (spontaneity) of the mind that brings together such impressions on an empirical intuition. This is precisely the role that belongs to the imagination⁷ to exercise.

2. THE IMAGINATION'S PRODUCTIVE (AUTHORSHIP) AND REPRODUCTIVE (IMITATIVE) APTITUDES

In the sections 28 to 39 of the *Anthropology*, Kant focuses on the specific treatment of the imagination. These steps begin precisely with exposing the *duplicity of aptitudes* it is able to take on. These aptitudes of the imagination relate to the determination of origins (or sources) of the intuitions that the imagination presents. This is what Kant means when he classifies imagination as *productive* or *reproductive*. Imagination is considered productive when displaying representations of original mode and reproductive when displays in a derivative one:

Die Einbildungskraft (*facultas imaginandi*), als ein Vermögen der Anschauungen auch ohne Gegenwart des Gegenstandes, ist entweder *productiv*, d. i. ein Vermögen der ursprünglichen Darstellung, des letzteren (*exhibitio originaria*), welche also vor der Erfahrung vorhergeht; oder *reproductiv*, der abgeleiteten (*exhibitio derivativa*), welche eine vorher gehabte empirische Anschauung ins Gemüth zurückbringt (*Anth*: 07, 167).

The distinction between the *beginning* and the *origin* of our knowledge, addressed in the *Preface* and *Introduction* of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, can help to clarify this point. There, Kant argues that, *according to the time*, all our knowledge *begins* with

experience, but not necessarily all of it *comes* from the experience (cf. *KrV*: B1). In the first case, the point concerns with the *moment* in which knowledge begins, while in the second focuses on the *sources* from which it comes. This warning above mentioned, that is introduced in the second edition of the first *Critique*, is the basis of the distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* knowledge. It is wrong to associate the “a posteriori” to the knowledge that is post-experience and the “a priori” for one previous. Kant clarifies that *both* are knowledge acquired only after the experience. The difference here concerns their different origins: even arising after the experience, the *a priori* knowledge comes from the constitution of our own capacities of representation, while the *a posteriori*, from the experience and by means of the affection of sensibility by the objects.

However, we can also say that the difference between the productive (original) and reproductive (derivative) imagination is based on the origin of representations with which it deals with, being productive when operating over the manifold of pure intuition (*a priori*) and reproductive when operating over the manifold of empirical intuition (*a posteriori*). Hence why the “pure intuitions of space and time belong to the first [kind of] presentation”, while “all other presuppose an empirical intuition, that when connecting to the concept of the object, perform the empirical knowledge that we call experience” (*Anth*: 07, 167). As merely pure forms of the sensible intuition, space and time have an *a priori* origin, while the subject of this empirical intuition, the impressions, have an *a posteriori* origin. In accordance, Kant explains the difference between *formal intuitions* and *forms of intuition* in the following passage of the first *Critique*:

Aber Raum und Zeit sind nicht bloß als *Formen* der sinnlichen Anschauung, sondern als *Anschauungen* selbst (die ein Mannigfaltiges enthalten), also mit der Bestimmung der *Einheit* dieses Mannigfaltigen in ihnen *a priori* vorgestellt (siehe transsc. Ästhet.) (*KrV*: B160).

The *forms of intuition* are the formal and elementary condition of all multiplicity to which all objects of our (sensible) human intuition are subordinate. Referring to the receptive part of the sensibility that corresponds to it, Kant says that “the inner sense (...) contains the mere form of intuition, but without the connection of manifold therein included, therefore containing no particular intuition” (*KrV*: B154). This is ratified in the following way:

Jede Anschauung enthält ein Mannigfaltiges in sich, welches doch nicht als ein solches vorgestellt werden würde, wenn das Gemüth nicht die Zeit in der Folge der Eindrücke auf einander unterschiede: *denn als in einem Augenblick enthalten* kann jede Vorstellung niemals etwas anderes als absolute Einheit sein. Damit nun aus diesem Mannigfaltigen Einheit der Anschauung werde (wie etwa in der Vorstellung des Raumes), so ist erstlich das Durchlaufen der Mannigfaltigkeit und dann die Zusammennehmung desselben nothwendig (*KrV*: A99).

In other words, the *space* is understood in two meanings, as well as the *time*, and Kant uses different expressions to distinguish its two connotations. On the one hand, we have the formal conditions of sensibility that correspond to the “germs and dispositions” [*Keimen und Anlagen*] (*KrV*: A66/B91) of our capacities of representation and, secondly, we have the outcome of the constructions in pure intuition of space (geometric) and time (physical) as *objects*:

Der Raum, als *Gegenstand* vorgestellt (wie man es wirklich in der Geometrie bedarf), enthält mehr als bloße Form der Anschauung, nämlich *Zusammenfassung* des Mannigfaltigen nach der Form der Sinnlichkeit Gegebenen in eine *anschauliche* Vorstellung, so daß *die Form der Anschauung* bloß Mannigfaltiges, die *formale Anschauung* aber Einheit der Vorstellung giebt (*KrV*: B160, n.).

In formal geometric intuition of space the imagination is productive in comprehending (synthesizing) the corresponding manifold *a priori* given by the external sense and presenting it originally unified, that is, gathered in an ordered whole, in which we have represented *together with* a given infinite homogeneous multiplicity, typical of an extensive magnitude (cf. *KrV*: A162/B202-3). Kant insists that the productivity of the imagination should not be confused with a power to *generate* (create), by itself, the content of our representations:

Die Einbildungskraft ist (mit andern Worten) entweder dichtend (productiv), oder bloß zurückrufend (reproductiv). Die productive aber ist dennoch darum eben nicht schöpferisch, nämlich nicht vermögend, eine Sinnenvorstellung, die vorher unserem Sinnesvermögen *nie* gegeben war, hervorzubringen, sondern man kann den Stoff zu derselben immer nachweisen (*Anth*: 07, 167-8).

By linking the productive and reproductive aptitudes of imagination respectively to the authorship (inventive activity) and the recall (imitative activity) of its intuitive presentations, an aspect arises that had not been considered and that goes beyond the mere reference to *a priori* or *a posteriori* sources of sensitive multiplicity that it deals with. The authorship [*dichtend*] and recall [*zurückrufend*] denote here what we mean when we talk about a work of own invention (original) as opposed to a single copy (plagiarize). In this case, the authorship is a production of something that had not been previously experienced in a determined and specific way, while the imitation only reproduces or evokes (recall) something of the same way that has been experienced. For example, the consideration that it is not the sun that revolves around the Earth, as shown by our sensibility, but actually we, on the Earth, rotate and move around the sun, was originally imagined and proposed by Aristarchus of Samos, and so we can say that this view is his own authorship. If Copernicus had news of this discovery, it would have been simply copied and reproduced by the polish renaissance astronomer. Here it is a kind of authorship and recall that no longer concerns the simple subject (matter) of knowledge, since, from the point of view of the impressions by which we perceive the sun, the earth and ourselves, with our particular empirical characteristics, are all imitated. Now, this additional aspect of the aptitudes regards a formal arrangement, that is, to the *configuration* of the knowledge. Here, the productive or reproductive aptitudes of imagination indicate the way in which the sensible manifold was put together, which could either be done by imitating the way in which it had been subjectively and circumstantially given in the experience (geocentric conception), as inventing an original configuration (heliocentric conception).

In the section called “The authorial sensible capacity of forming” (*Anth*: 07, 174), Kant describes the productive activity of an artist as, even before making his work, “he should have it running in the faculty of imagination, and that figure is even an authorship [*Dichtung*]” (*Anth*: 07, 174-5). Here, the criterion for characterizing the productive aspect of the artist is not the

pure source of synthesized multiplicity, but the authorial provenance of the way in which the empirical multiplicity is gathered. As examples he gives the figures compiled by Palagonia's Prince at Sicily (cf. *ibid*), showing what is original in his invention is restricted to the *authorial reunion* of parties that compose in an invented formal configuration, since his statues naturally present content (matter) of only the impressions of empirical origin. The following excerpt of *Metaphysics Dohna* provides textual confirmation of this claim:

Einbildungskraft, das Vermögen der Anschauungen, bei der Abwesenheit der Gegenstände ist der vicarius der Sinne. Sie kann in Ansehung der Gegenstände bloß reproductiv (bloß Gedächtniss) sein; productiv (facultas fingendi) in Ansehung der Form, (...). Das Gesetz des Dichtungsvermögens ist, dass wir nicht die Materie, sondern die Form erdichten (*Vorl.* 28, 673-4).

Before discussing the next type of property, it is appropriate to give some examples present in the sections of *Anthropology* devoted to the description of three species of imagination authorship procedures. For this, we developed a chart obtained from the analysis of Kant's declarations at the last sections specifically devoted to imagination (cf. *Anth.* 07, 174-196), which allows to observe in a single glance not only the complex diversity of original operations that imagination is able to perform, but also to identify the products that result from each species. As a corollary, and using additional information found in the *Lectures* (*Vorl.* 28) and *Reflections* (*HN.* 15), we have elaborated a framework in which all these authorship operations are neatly presented.

THE THREE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF AUTHORSHIP CAPACITIES⁸

(I) Forming [*bildende*] (*imaginatio plastica*) (Formation [*Bildung*]): as the execution of figures in space. (Still, it is not creative [*schöpferisch*]).

involuntarily executed: fantasy [*Phantasie*]. Ex.: the dream (when sleeping), or the dizziness (when awake);

voluntarily executed⁹: composition [*Komposition*], or invention/ingenuity [*Erfindung*].

(II) Associative [*beigesellende*]: having present [*Vergegenwärtigen*] representations gathered in forms of time. His law is: 'empirical representations that have frequently followed one another producing a habit in the mind such that when one representation is produced, the other also comes into being'.

involuntarily associated: illusion, homesickness, sympathy, fantasy;

voluntarily associated:

(A) Capacity of having the past and the future (purposely) present:

* Memory [*Gedächtnis*]: [a] to grasp methodically (quickly) may be: (i) mechanical; (ii) ingenious; (iii) judicious; [b] to recall (easily); [c] to retain (for a long time);

* Foresight (*Praevision*): [a] Preview (forward / associative remembrance); [b] Premonition [*Vorempfindung*] (*premonition* [*Ahndung*] (*praesensio*) as something 'predestined'); [c] Prescience [*Vorwartung*] (*praesagatio*) (understanding: causal law);

* Gift of divination [*Wahrsagegabe*] (*Facultas divinatoria*): [a] Predicting; [b] Fortune-telling; [c] Prophesying (only properly called the capacity of divination);

(B) Capacity of designating (using signs) [*Bezeichnungsvermögen*] (*Facultas signatrix*):

* Direct: designation [*Bezeichnung*], which is symbolic or figurative (*speciosa*);

* Indirect: by characters [*Charaktere*] or signs [*Zeichen*]: [a] Arbitrary (*Kunst =*); [b] Natural; [c] Miraculous.

(III) Affinity [*Verwandtschaft*] (*Affinitas*): the union of the manifold in virtue of his derivation from a common ground [productive synthesis] (cf. § 31)].

THE THREE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF SENSIBLE AUTHORSHIP CAPACITIES (S. A. C.) [<i>sinnlichen Dichtungsvermögens</i>]			
(A) S. A. C. of formation [<i>Bildung</i>] (<i>imaginatio plastica</i>)	Execution (spatial) voluntary		Composition [<i>Komposition</i>] or invention/ ingenuity [<i>Erfindung</i>]
	Execution (spatial) involuntary		Phantasy, dream, dizziness
	Association (temporal) involuntary		Illusion, homesickness, sympathy, fantasy.
	Reproduction [<i>Nachbildung</i>] (post-formation)		Remembrance or memory
(B) S. A. C. of association [<i>Beigesellung</i>] (<i>imaginatio associans</i>)	Association (temporal) voluntary	Capacity of having present the past and the future	Capacity of foresight (<i>Prævisio</i>)
	Forecsat [<i>Vorbildung</i>] (preforming)		Gift of divination (<i>Facultas divinatoria</i>)
	Designation [<i>Bezeichnung</i>]	Capacity of designating (<i>Facultas signatrix</i>)	Symbolic or figurative (<i>speciosa</i>) designation
			Designation by characters or signs
(C) S. A. C. of Affinity [<i>Verwandtschaft</i>] (<i>imaginatio affinitas</i>)	Reunion from a same ground		Knowledge implemented by the union of sensibility and understanding

Regarding the first two species of sensible authorship capacity, the plastic or forming [*bildenden*] imagination refers to the original *execution* of figures in space, either from pure multiplicity in the production of geometric space and its figures, or the multiplicity also empirical in production of appearances and their images; and the *associative* imagination refers to the *original connection* of intuitions in time, or taking certain sensible representations in relation to past times, like the appearances and their corresponding intuitions that we consider coming from the memory, or with respect to what we project for future times, as the example of sensible representations of objects that we plan to build or the configuration of the state of affairs that we anticipate. Thus, according to the required sensible status imagination, all of these above operations remain attached to the trunk of sensibility, and it is sufficient that the senses provide the multiplicity of impressions for the imagination connecting them.

The *affinity* is the third kind of sensible authorship capacity. The criterion distinguishing this from the two initial species is the relationship that the faculty of imagination establishes with the intellectual faculties, just because these capacities “fraternize themselves” [*verschwistern sich*] to execute our knowledge (cf. *Anth*: 07, 177). Despite their distinct sensible and intelligible status, this operational *affinity* found between imagination and understanding is the foundation of *heteronomous conduct* of the imagination, a characteristic that we will discuss below and then demonstrate why the imagination, even operating only within sensible representations, can be directed by the understanding in a *way* of joining and unifying their intuitions, whose emblematic context constitutes the doctrine of schematism.

3. THE CHARACTERS OF THE IMAGINATION: SPONTANEITY AND RECEPTIVITY

Despite belonging to the domain of sensibility and dealing with intuitive representations, for Kant the imagination is a *spontaneous* sensible capacity and not a receptive one, as occurs with the senses. We call this imaginal property “character”, it concerns the capacity of presenting intuitions through an *active* operational procedure.

In the context of Kantian philosophy, the allocation of the spontaneity for a sensible capacity seems surprising, since it is common to see Kant generally assigning the receptive character to sensibility, and destining the spontaneity for the intellectual capacities, called in a broad sense “understanding”. It is comprehensible, therefore, to marvel at the possibility of the imagination being considered *concomitantly* as a sensible and spontaneous capacity. Nevertheless, this idea is confirmed by various statements presented below and have proved to be very fruitful in the hermeneutics of relevant aspects of the transcendental idealism. We begin with the following passage which presents some basic indications:

In Ansehung des Zustandes der Vorstellungen ist mein Gemüth entweder handelnd und zeigt Vermögen (*facultas*), oder es ist *leidend* und besteht in *Empfänglichkeit* (*receptivitas*). Ein *Erkenntniß* enthält beides verbunden in sich, und die Möglichkeit eine solche zu haben führt den Namen des *Erkenntnißvermögens* von dem vornehmsten Theil derselben, nämlich der Thätigkeit des Gemüths Vorstellungen zu verbinden, oder von einander zu sondern (*Anth*: 07, 140).

The two opposing types of character that can be assumed by the capacities of the mind are presented above without any reference to a specific faculty. However, in an excerpt from the first version of the *Deduction* of categories related to the first stage of the triple synthesis (concerned with the apprehension in intuition) we find declarations that help us advance this point:

Diese Synthesis der Apprehension muß nun auch a priori, d. i. in Ansehung der Vorstellungen, die nicht empirisch sind, ausgeübt werden. Denn ohne sie würden wir weder die Vorstellungen des Raumes, noch der Zeit *a priori* haben können: da diese nur durch die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen, welches die Sinnlichkeit in ihrer ursprünglichen Receptivität darbietet (...) (*KrV*: A99).

The expression “original receptivity” [*ursprünglichen rezeptivität*] is intriguing, coined by Kant in this fragment, and lives up to his meticulous genius. This is why, when referring to the multiplicity *a priori* that must be synthesized and which is derived from the forms of intuition of space and time (as “germs” and “dispositions”), Kant brings together in this expression the *receptive character*, related to the passivity of sense, and the *original aptitude*, that it possesses to provide the pure multiplicity that will be linked together and whose very sources are the capacities of the mind, and not the experience. This justifies the claim that, only after passing through the synthesis of apprehension, this multiplicity *a priori*, given by the affection of the senses under the pure *forms of intuition*, results in space and time as a *formal intuition*. However, on an excerpt from *Anthropology* located immediately following the fragment quoted above, the statements that seem to contradict what we claim about the spontaneity of the imagination emerge:

Vorstellungen, in Ansehung deren sich das Gemüth leidend verhält, durch welche also das Subject *afficirt* wird (dieses mag sich nun selbst *afficiren* oder von einem Object *afficirt* werden), gehören zum *sinnlichen*; diejenigen aber, welche ein bloßes *Thun* (das Denken) enthalten, zum *intellectuellen* Erkenntnißvermögen. Jenes wird auch das *untere*, dieses aber das *obere* Erkenntnißvermögen genannt.*) Jenes hat den Charakter der *Passivität* des inneren Sinnes der Empfindungen, dieses der *Spontaneität* der Apperception, d. i. des reinen Bewußtseins der Handlung, welche das Denken ausmacht und zur Logik (einem System der Regeln des Verstandes), so wie jener zur *Psychologie* (einem Inbegriff aller innern Wahrnehmungen unter Naturgesetzen) gehört und innere Erfahrung begründet (*Anth*: 07, 140-1).

In this passage there are eminently generic statements attributing the passive character to the “capacity of sensible knowledge” concerning affection, while the acting is also generally attributed to the “intellectual knowledge” concerned with thinking, corresponding respectively to capacities of lower and higher knowledge. In its final part, we have some references to some specific capacities of the mind, that is, the receptivity of the *inner sense* (mere passivity of affection) and the spontaneity of *apperception* (the mere act of thinking). It is remarkable that there is no explicit reference to be made about the imagination, since Kant often insists that the constitution of our knowledge is tripartite, requiring, for its execution, that appearances [*Erscheinungen*] are empirically represented (i) in perception by the senses, (ii) in association by imagination and (iii) in recognition by apperception (cf. *KrV*: A 115), what is exemplarily described as follows

Es sind aber drei ursprüngliche Quellen (Fähigkeiten oder Vermögen der Seele), die die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Erfahrung enthalten und selbst aus keinem andern Vermögen des Gemüths abgeleitet werden können, nämlich Sinn, Einbildungskraft und Apperception. Darauf gründet sich 1) die Synopsis des Mannigfaltigen *a priori* durch den Sinn; 2) die Synthesis dieses Mannigfaltigen durch die Einbildungskraft; endlich 3) die Einheit dieser Synthesis durch ursprüngliche Apperception (*KrV*: A 94-5).

In this section we find the three distinct roles that must be performed to make our experience, or empirical knowledge, possible: it is necessary that (i) sensible manifold be *given* by the senses, and (ii) this manifold be *synthesized* by the imagination in a subjective unity and (iii) this manifold synthesized still be *assembled* under the original and objective unity of apperception¹⁰.

In the fragment of *Lectures* quoted above, dealing with the division of sensible capacities of knowledge [*sinnliche Erkenntnisvermögen*] in particular, we found a categorical assignment of spontaneity to the faculty of imagination:

Z. E. die Vorstellung dessen, was ich sehe; ferner die Vorstellung vom Sauren, Süßen usw. sind Vorstellungen der Sinne selbst. Aber vergegenwärtige ich mir ein Haus, was ich ehemals gesehen, so entspringt die Vorstellung jetzt aus dem Gemüth; aber doch unter der Bedingung, dass der Sinn vorher von diesem Gegenstande afficirt war. Solche sinnliche Erkenntnisse, die aus der Spontaneität des Gemüths entspringen, heissen: *Erkenntnisse der bildenden Kraft*; und die Erkenntnisse, die durch den Eindruck des Gegenstandes entspringen, heissen: *Vorstellungen der Sinne selbst* (*Vorl*: 28, 230).

It is difficult to doubt that Kant is attributing the character of spontaneity to a capacity that deals with intuition, since it is clear that this context concerns only the trunk of sensibility. It should be noted that the prerogative of providing knowledge that originates from this *spontaneity* of the mind itself belongs to the “faculty to form” [*bildenden Kraft*], the same term used in *Anthropology* to denote the first of the three subdivisions of the imagination (cf. *Vorl*: 28, I, 230-8 and *Anth*: 07, 174 e ff., for example), beyond what is said about the knowledge that arises in this capacity takes place under the condition of senses have already been affected beforehand, exactly what we have shown about the dependence that imagination has in relation to the availability of impressions by the senses.

4. THE AUTONOMOUS AND HETERONOMOUS CONDUCTS OF THE IMAGINATION

Perhaps it is possible to find, in the duplicity of conducts of the imagination, the most original difference that exists between the interpretation that have been claimed here and the set of interpretations that have been issued in the secondary literature about the Kantian conception of imagination. Unlike defending most interpreters of Kant by giving the imagination the ability to operate either only with a behavior governed by intellectual capacities, or only through a free behavior, our proposal is based on the fertile idea of granting the imagination the ability to perform its synthetic operations with both behaviors, that is, as much regardless of rules derived from other mental capacities, as being directed by these rules

of foreign origin, depending only on the context in which it is participating. We call the first case *independent* (or “autonomous”) conduct and, the second, *directed* (or “heteronomous”).

We will take some steps from the *Deduction* of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) dedicated to the treatment of “triple synthesis”, to show that the synthesis of apprehension and reproduction are carried out autonomously, while the synthesis of recognition is performed under a heteronomous conduct. This will ratify the distinction we claim to exist between two types of objects for us, since in the first case, it results with the production of “appearances” [*Erscheinungen*], while undetermined objects of empirical intuition (cf. *KrV*: A20/B34), and in the second case, with the production of “phenomena” [*Phaenomena*], that we can similarly call the conceptually determined objects of intuition. The following excerpt refers to the *synthesis of apprehension*:

Weil aber jede Erscheinung ein Mannigfaltiges enthält, mithin verschiedene Wahrnehmungen im Gemüthe an sich zerstreuet und einzeln angetroffen werden, so ist eine Verbindung derselben nöthig, welche sie in dem Sinne selbst nicht haben können. Es ist also in uns ein thätiges Vermögen der Synthesis dieses Mannigfaltigen, welches wir Einbildungskraft nennen, und deren unmittelbar an den Wahrnehmungen ausgeübte Handlung ich Apprehension nenne). Die Einbildungskraft soll nämlich das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung in ein Bild bringen; vorher muß sie also die Eindrücke in ihre Thätigkeit aufnehmen, d. i. apprehendiren (*KrV*: A120).

As mentioned above and due to its receptive character, the senses can only provide us with a manifold of “diverse, dispersed and isolated perceptions” (*idem*), lacking the ability, alone or assisted, to provide the *connection* required for the construction of something like a simple spatial image. Thus, stating that the appearance [*Erscheinung*] contains a manifold implies that it is the result of a synthetic operation and, therefore, it must to have already had some kind of unity. Kant calls this type of synthetic unity (reunion) of the impressions the “synthesis of apprehension”. Following, there are further confirmations of this claim:

Es ist aber klar, dass selbst diese Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen allein noch kein Bild und keinen Zusammenhang der Eindrücke hervorbringen würde, wenn nicht ein subjectiver Grund da wäre, eine Wahrnehmung, von welcher das Gemüth zu einer andern übergegangen, zu den nachfolgenden herüber zu rufen und so ganze Reihen derselben darzustellen, d. i. ein reproductives Vermögen der Einbildungskraft, welches denn auch nur empirisch ist (*KrV*: A 121).

Both the “synthesis of apprehension *in intuition*” and the “synthesis of reproduction *in imagination*” [*Einbildung*] are made by the imagination [*Einbildungskraft*] and with this, Kant describes the production of appearances [*Erscheinungen*], considering only our sensible capacities, and therefore without any reference to intellectual faculties.

Thus, in this case the multiplicity of impressions given by the senses is linked together by the imagination under the character of autonomy in the *formation* of corresponding images, and in their *association* in time. Then, due to the fact that they do not have the direction of intellectual rules of unity (concepts of the understanding) this operational linking results in a purely circumstantial and subjective whole. The same conception is present in the second version of the *Deduction* of the categories, which states that by the term “synthesis of apprehension”

we must understand “the reunion of a manifold in an empirical intuition by which is made possible the perception, that is, the empirical consciousness of this intuition (as appearance)” (*KrV*: B 160).

Kant calls the reunion that is related with this association in time of the multiplicity of intuitive representations “reproductive faculty of imagination”. It is performed only by imitation of the way in which they were empirically received in the affection of the senses, as previously stated when addressing the aptitudes. What we are adding now is the fact that this reproduction is performed by means of the character of autonomy. This is also confirmed in the sections analyzed on the sensible authorship capacity of the association, in which Kant says: “the law of association [*Assoziation*] is: empirical representations, which often follow each other, producing a habit in the mind such as when a representation is produced [*erzeugt*], the other is allowed to generate [*entstehen*]” (*Anth*: 07, 176).

Although the intuitions have been successively presented and perceived, as well as remembered by the reproductive imagination in an imitated way, there is also a certain original aspect present. This is why initially we have only the perception of solitary successive representations, but without a connected reception in a temporal relationship. What the imagination provides now in an authorial way is precisely this associative relationship that is imagined (based on the law of habitual association). This is described by Kant as follows:

Weil aber, wenn Vorstellungen so, wie sie zusammen gerathen, einander ohne Unterschied reproducirten, wiederum kein bestimmter Zusammenhang derselben, sondern blos regellose Haufen derselben, mithin gar kein Erkenntniß entspringen würde: so muß die Reproduction derselben eine Regel haben, nach welcher eine Vorstellung vielmehr mit dieser, als einer andern in der Einbildungskraft in Verbindung tritt. Diesen subjectiven und empirischen Grund der Reproduction nach Regeln nennt man die Association der Vorstellungen (*KrV*: A 121).

Thus, the autonomous conduct of imagination and the role played by the senses are enough to perform the synthesis under the subjective law of empirical association. But, although these syntheses can go far beyond the mere association without *any* rules, it is still far from an *objective* relation. Of course, Kant wants to move beyond this threshold that is characteristic of the empiricist position. Then the knowledge in the proper sense of the term can only be obtained in the synthesis of intuitions performed by the imagination under the direction of rules of intellectual unity:

Würde nun aber diese Einheit der Association nicht auch einen objectiven Grund haben, so daß es unmöglich wäre, daß Erscheinungen von der Einbildungskraft anders apprehendirt würden, als unter der Bedingung einer möglichen synthetischen Einheit dieser Apprehension, so würde es auch etwas ganz Zufälliges sein, daß sich Erscheinungen in einen Zusammenhang der menschlichen Erkenntnisse schickten (*KrV*: A121).

We came finally to the third step of the triple synthesis, in which the “objective grounding” above mentioned allows the imagination to make their synthesis under a heteronomous conduct:

Es muss also ein objectiver, d. i. vor allen empirischen Gesetzen der Einbildungskraft *a priori* einzusehender, Grund sein, worauf die Möglichkeit, ja sogar die Nothwendigkeit eines durch alle Erscheinungen sich erstreckenden Gesetzes beruht, sie nämlich durchgängig als solche Data der Sinne anzusehen, welche an sich associabel und allgemeinen Regeln einer durchgängigen Verknüpfung in der Reproduction unterworfen sind. Diesen objectiven Grund aller Association der Erscheinungen nenne ich die Affinität derselben (*KrV*: A122).

Once again, Kant argues that, contrary to the first two syntheses where imagination brings together perceptions under subjective and free conducts, by travelling [*durchlaufen*] the multiplicity that is crossed [*durchgegangen*] and jointly caught [*aufgenommen*] (*KrV*: A99 and A77/B102), in this new step, the *synthesis of recognition in concept*, the synthetic operations of imagination result in an objective unity, being precisely this heteronomous conduct that “provides for the first time the knowledge in the proper meaning of the word” (*KrV*: A78/B103).

So, if we take together the descriptions of the three species of sensible authorship capacity, coming from the *Anthropology* (1798), and the descriptions of the triple synthesis, coming from the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), we find that there is a direct correlation between the formation of figures in space (*imaginatio plástica*) and the synthesis of apprehension in intuition; between the association of representations in time (*imaginatio associans*) and the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, both elaborated in a free mode. The third kind of sensible authorship capacity (*imaginatio affinitas*) corresponds to the synthesis of recognition in concept, in which the imagination, through the procedures proper of schematism, that presents intuitions which the concepts of understanding can be applied to.

Thereby, we found, as a nontrivial result, the possibility of conciliating exposures made by Kant in works of very different times, like the two editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Anthropology*, beyond several allegations present in *Reflections of Anthropology* (*HN*: 15) and *Lectures on Metaphysics and Rational Theology* (*Vorl*: 28), which make us suspect that in its main groundings the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination remained unchanged during all of his philosophical production.

5. THE VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY IMPULSES OF THE IMAGINATION

What we call “impulses” refers to the stimuli, *voluntary* or *involuntary*, that impel the imagination to perform tasks and elaborate the intuitions it presents. Kant provides an example of involuntary impulse that often makes the imagination exercise certain kinds of activity in the following comments on the imagination's original aptitude:

Begriffe von Gegenständen veranlassen oft, ihnen ein selbstgeschaffenes Bild (durch productive Einbildungskraft) unwillkürlich unterzulegen. (...) Daher muss man auch die Erwartung von Etwas nicht hoch spannen, weil die Einbildungskraft natürlicherweise bis zum Äußersten zu steigern geneigt ist; denn die Wirklichkeit ist immer beschränkter als die Idee, die ihrer Ausführung zum Muster dient (*Anth*: 07, 173).

The corresponding example is a person whose life and actions are reported as a “great man recognized for his talent, merit or position”. This description makes our imagination to assign involuntarily a considerable stature format and, conversely, when the person is described as having a slim and smooth character, usually we give him a small and docile figure. These involuntary impulses induce us to draw pictures of people with whom we have never had contact (experience), just because a subjective and circumstantial analogy. In this case, we are led to *imagine* that there is a certain relationship between his life and personality on one side, and height and body image from another (a mere assumption). In the following excerpt, already previously mentioned, there are examples that include the voluntary impulse of imagination:

Ehe der Künstler eine körperliche Gestalt (gleichsam handgreiflich) darstellen kann, muß er sie in der Einbildungskraft verfertigt haben, und diese Gestalt ist alsdann eine Dichtung, welche, wenn sie unwillkürlich ist (wie etwa im Traume), *Phantasie* heißt und nicht dem Künstler angehört; wenn sie aber durch Willkür regiert wird, Composition, Erfindung genannt wird (*Anth*: 07, 174-5).

Kant provides several other examples of these types of impulses in “Anthropology”, which are reasonably understood. Regarding involuntary executions, there are three types of fantasy, namely dreams, which occur in healthy conditions, illusions and dizziness that occur in diseased conditions in vigil, in which images and other types of sensitive representations are presented to the mind without the presence of their corresponding objects and without the determination of our will¹¹. Regarding to the voluntary executions, there is the composition and ingenuity, fundamentally linked to spatial intuition, while the memory, forecasts and designations are linked primarily to the temporal intuition. In the first case we indicate the productions of the plastic arts and, in the second, the memory of events that we experience or the name of well-known people, when voluntarily presented on intuition.

SOME PROBLEMS WHICH WE CLAIM THIS CONCEPTION OF THE IMAGINATION CAN SOLVE

The identification of these five types of characteristic properties that underlie the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination, with their corresponding operations, products and relationships established with other capacities of the mind, it follows directly from the extension of primary sources in addition to those customarily used in its characterization, in which the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* plays a decisive role for its acquisition. As a result, we claim that Kant conceived the faculty of imagination as a *spontaneous* part of our *sensibility*, being apt to perform functions through *duplicity of conducts* (free or directed), *aptitudes* (original or derivative) and *impulses* (voluntary or involuntary).

Besides providing an extensive inventory with detailed explanation and complexity of parts that constitute the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination, we consider that the main innovations that this interpretation has, for the exemplary types of concepts proposed by the interpreters of Kant, are the assignment of its ability to operate through a *duplicity of conducts*, the determination of its *sensitive status* and its *spontaneous character*, which jointly

identify what is most essential in their own identity. This is why the two complementary features, related to the *duplicity of aptitudes and impulses*, proved to be more modest corollaries regarding the exegesis and hermeneutics of relevant aspects of Kant's philosophy.

Therefore, we have suggested in recent publications and lectures some alternative interpretations related to topics such as the two versions of the *Deduction* of the categories, the distinction between the two types of objects for us (appearances and phenomena), various aspects of the doctrine of schematism, the relationship between the triple synthesis and three sensible authorship capacities, the roles played by the imagination in the aesthetic domain, the constitution of the objects of nature and experience, the distinction between the "knowing" of the animals and human knowledge and its relations with the corresponding types of view, the meaning of "blind intuitions" (cf. *KrV*: A51/B75) and the blindness of imagination without understanding¹².

In general terms, what we claim is that Kant wrote the second version of the *Deduction* of the categories because, in the first version, he deviated from the main focus when widely dealing with triple synthesis, for in it are contained many aspects which are not related to the legitimacy of the application of the concepts of understanding (discursive representations) to objects of intuition (sensible representations). This is because, as stated above, the syntheses of apprehension in intuition and of the reproduction in imagination [*Einbildung*] are made by the faculty of imagination under a free conduct (autonomy) and merely produce *conceptually indeterminate* objects (appearances), while only the third synthesis, the recognition in concepts, is performed under a conduct of the imagination which is driven by unifying conceptual rules (categories), whose mediation is provided by the schematism (cf. CALABRIA, 2012). So, what really matters is that in the second version of the *Deduction*, Kant merely restricted their arguments to the third type of synthesis, the only one that really matters to that theme.

Apart from collaborating for the understanding of the workings of schematism, these solutions allow to show that (a) the synthesis of apprehension, (b) the synthesis of reproduction and (c) the synthesis of recognition, described in the first edition of *KrV*, correspond very closely to the operations of the three sensible authorship capacities described in *Anthropology*, namely, the *circumstantial* (subjective) construction of the objects for us by means of the sensible authorship capacities of (i) the *formation* and (ii) the *association*, and the *objective* reunion of sensible manifold under an object of experience performed by (iii) the sensible authorship capacities of *affinity* (cf. CALABRIA, 2012).

We also show that, in the first case, the knowing (*kennen*) of animals (non-rational animals) is provided through autonomous forming and association of the appearances, while knowledge (*Erkenntnis*), performed by finite rational beings, can only be achieved through the building of phenomena under heteronomous conduct of the imagination (cf. CALABRIA, 2013). With this, we can also understand that the so-called "blind intuitions" are precisely these appearances, just by having the unions of sensible manifold made merely in a subjective way (free). That is why the appearances are described as objects (conceptually) undetermined from empirical intuition (cf. *KrV*: A20/B34), though obviously they have spatio-temporal determinations.

Currently, we have worked to use these solutions in an attempt to interpret similarly the operations that imagination runs in the aesthetic field of Kantian philosophy and the tasks it effectively performs in collaboration with the intellectual faculties (understanding, power to judgment and reason). Thus, guided not only by the duplicity of conducts, but also by other characteristics that we have described above, we suspect that the operations that imagination performs on aesthetic domain, as discussed mainly in the third *Critique*, should resemble what happens in autonomous production of appearances, and hence quite different to what occurs in heteronomous schematic operations for producing phenomena.

ABSTRACT: By means of an interpretation we have recently elaborated about the Kantian conception of the faculty of imagination, was obtained with the decisive aid of the *Anthropology in a pragmatic point of view* (1798), which determines the place it occupies in the set of mental capacities, identifies the tasks and functions that it can achieve and registers the types of operations it performs, as well as the products it offers in different fields of his philosophy, and we show how this idea can support cogent solutions to problems frequently identified in transcendental idealism, as the reason for Kant have wrote two versions of the *Deduction* of the categories, the motivation and consequences of the distinction between two types of objects for us (the appearances [*Erscheinungen*] and the phenomena [*Phaenomena*]), the relationship between the triple synthesis (*KrV-A*) and three sensible authorship capacities (*Anthropology*), the meaning of “blind intuitions” (*KrV: A51/B75*) and its relationship with some kinds of view, the distinction between the “knowing” [*kennen*] of the animals and human knowledge [*Erkenntnis*], some basic aspects of the doctrine of schematism involved in the constitution of objects of experience (nature), and the roles played by the imagination in the theoretic and aesthetic domains.

KEYWORDS: Imagination, mental operations, appearance and phenomenon, mind capacities, Kantian philosophy.

RESUMO: Mediante uma interpretação que recentemente elaboramos sobre a concepção kantiana da faculdade da imaginação, que foi obtida com o auxílio decisivo da *Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático* (1798), em que determinamos o lugar que ela ocupa no conjunto de capacidades mentais, identifica as tarefas e funções que pode alcançar e registra os tipos de operações que executa, bem como os produtos que oferece em diferentes áreas de sua filosofia, e mostramos como isto permite sustentar cogentes soluções para problemas frequentemente identificados no idealismo transcendental, como as razões para Kant ter escrito duas versões da *Dedução* das categorias, os motivos e consequências da distinção entre dois tipos de objetos para nós (os aparecimentos [*Erscheinungen*] e os fenômenos [*Phaenomena*]), a relação entre a tripla síntese (*KrV-A*) e três capacidades autoras sensíveis (*Anthropologia*), o significado de “intuições cegas” (cf. *KrV: A51/B75*) e sua relação com alguns tipos de visão, a distinção entre o “saber” [*kennen*] dos animais e conhecimento [*Erkenntnis*] humano, alguns aspectos básicos da doutrina do esquematismo envolvidos na constituição dos objetos da experiência (natureza), e os papéis desempenhados pela imaginação nos domínios teóricos e estéticos.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Imaginação, operações mentais, aparecimento e fenômeno, capacidades do ânimo, filosofia kantiana.

REFERENCES

- CAIMI, M. [2008] Comments on the Conception of Imagination in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In: Internationalen Kant-Kongresses: Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants, 10., 2005, São Paulo. **Akten** ... Org. por V. Rohden, R. R. Terra, G. A. de Almeida, M. Ruffing, Berlin: De Gruyter, v. 1, p. 39-50.
- CALÁBRIA, Olavo P. [2013] Da relação entre os graus de conhecimento e as capacidades de representação em Kant. **Educação e Filosofia**. Uberlândia: v. 27, n. especial, 281-302.
- _____. [2012] **A imaginação de Kant e os dois objetos para nós: e ainda, a propósito da doutrina do Esquematismo e das duas Deduções das categorias**. Tese (Doutorado em Filosofia). Belo Horizonte/MG. Departamento de Filosofia da FAFICH - UFMG.

_____. [2006] A distinção kantiana entre aparecimento e fenômeno. **Kant E-prints**. Campinas: Série 2, v. 1, n.1, p. 119-26.

_____. [2003] **Elementos fundamentais da Analítica transcendental de Kant**. Dissertação (Mestrado em Filosofia). Campinas/SP: Departamento de Filosofia do IFCH - UNICAMP.

HEIDEGGER, M. [1929] (1991) Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. **Gesamtausgabe**. Bd.03. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

KANT, I. (1900 – ss) AA (01 - 29): **Kants gesammelte Schriften**. Hrsg. von der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Berlin: G. Reimer (Walter de Gruyter).

_____. [1781] (1968) AA 03 - **Werke**: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (A).

_____. (1968) AA 04 - **Werke**: Kritik der reinen Vernunft (B) [1787]; Prolegomena; Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten [1783]; Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft [1786].

_____. [1787] (1987) **Crítica da razão pura**. Trad. por Valerio Rohden e Udo Baldur Moosburger. São Paulo: Abril Cultural.

_____. [1781 e 1787] (1997) **Crítica da razão pura**. Trad. por Manuela P. dos Santos e Alexandre F. Morujão. Lisboa: Calouste Gulbenkian.

_____. [1798b] (1968) AA 07 - **Werke**: Der Streit der Facultäten [1798a]; Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht .

_____. (2006) **Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View**. (Ed. by R. B. Louden with an Introduction by M. Kuehn). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

_____. (2007) "Anthropology, History, and Education". **The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant**. Günter Zöllner & Robert B. Louden (eds.), Cambridge/UK: Cambridge University Press, p. 227-429.

_____. (2009) **Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático**. Trad. por Clélia Aparecida Martins. São Paulo: Iluminuras.

_____. (1968). AA 15 - **Handschriftlicher Nachlass**: Anthropologie.

_____. (1968). AA 28 - **Vorlesungen**: Vorlesungen über Metaphysik und Rationaltheologie.

LONGUENESSE, B. [1993] **Kant et le pouvoir de juger: sensibilité et discursivité dans l'analytique transcendente de la Critique de la raison pure**. Paris: Presses Univ. de France.

MAKKREEL, R. A. [1990] (1994) **Imagination and interpretation in Kant: the hermeneutical import of the Critique of Judgment**. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

NOTES

1 This paper is the somewhat modified English version of an essay initially published at Nefiponline/UFSC in a companion organized by Prof. Dr. Maria de Lourdes Borges, whom I would like to thank for her kind permission. It consists of a broad reformulation of the third part of my PhD Thesis (UFMG, 2012). I thank the fundamental support for this preparation provided from CAPES Postdoctoral Fellowship for the stage at Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz (2013-2014) with the supervision of Prof. Dr. Heiner Klemme. In part it also results from the activities performed during the post-doctoral residencies at Federal University of Minas Gerais (2013), with the supervision of Prof. Dr. Virginia A. Figueiredo, and at Federal University of Santa Catarina (2014), with the supervision of Prof. Dr. Alessandro Pinzani.

2 Olavo Calabria is MS-3 Professor of Philosophy at Federal University of Uberlândia (Brazil) and member of Brazilian Kant Society. Calabria's writings focus on theoretic and aesthetic issues of Kantian philosophy, concerned with the specific functions/

tasks that each mental capacity performs (especially the faculty of imagination), their specific operations and respective products. His publications include: “A distinção kantiana entre aparecimento e fenômeno” (**Kant E-Prints** – UNICAMP/2006), “Pela tradução mais literal que liberal e invariabilidade dos termos técnicos em Kant” (in: *Crítica da razão tradutora*, **Nefonline** – UFSC/2009), “A imaginação de Kant e os dois objetos para nós” (Doctoral Thesis – UFMG/2012), “Da relação entre os graus de conhecimento e as capacidades de representação em Kant” (**Revista Educação e Filosofia** – UFU/2013). (Download this and other publications at: www.ifilo.ufu.br/node/127).

3 When dealing with the duplicity of conducts of the imagination, we will show that the appearances [*Erscheinungen*] are the objects resultant from autonomous synthesis of apprehension and reproduction that are not mediated by the schemes, while the phenomena [*Phaenomena*] are the objects that result from heteronomous synthesis of recognition performed by means of the schematism.

4 In what follows, we denote this work simply as “*Anthropology*”.

5 The two interpretations here mentioned were defended by B. Longuenesse (1993) and by M. Caimi (2008), respectively.

6 Kant gives examples of representations of imagination that originate in the mind: illusions [*Täuschungen*], fictions [*Einbildungen*] and inspirations [*Eingebunden*] (cf. *Anth*: 07, 154-61). See detailed examination of these operations in Calábria (2012).

7 This characteristic related to the operating *activities* of imagination concerns what we call its “character” and will be discussed later.

8 Cf. *Anth*: 07, 174-96.

9 Literally, this formation is “governed by the will” [*durch Willkür regiert*] (*Anth*: 07, 174).

10 Here, on an excerpt of the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we find all elements of the emblematic concept of “binding” [*Verbindung*] that opens the chapter of the second version of *Deduction* of the categories, namely, the *synthetic unity of the manifold*, one of the reasons why we argue that the two versions of the *Deduction* are largely reconciled (cf. CALÁBRIA 2012, 195-8).

11 It should be noted that this may also be present in dreams, discursive representations and operations, which, far from contradicting what is being alleged, only shows that they go beyond the domain of the roles played by the sensibility.

12 Several these papers can be downloaded by means the links hosted at: www.ifilo.ufu.br/node/127.

Recebido / Received: 05/09/14

Aprovado / Approved: 11/10/14

FORTSCHRITT ZUM BESSEREN ODER ZUKUNFT EINER ILLUSION? FREUD UND KANT ALS AUFKLÄRER.

Margit RUFFING¹

Freuds Psychoanalyse und Kants Transzendentalphilosophie miteinander in Beziehung zu setzen, ist eine spannende, aber komplizierte Angelegenheit: Eine kaum noch zu überblickende Forschungsliteratur beschäftigt sich damit, zahlreiche Aspekte lassen sich benennen, die als Anknüpfungspunkte oder Ausgang zu einem Vergleich dienen können. Doch im Grunde scheint der kantische Anspruch auf rationale Begründung der menschlichen Moralität Freuds erklärtem Ziel der Aufhebung des pathologischen Symptoms „Moralität“ unversöhnlich entgegen zu stehen. Die apriorische, auf das Denkmögliche bezogene Methode der Vernunftkritik und eine empirisch verfahrenende psychoanalytische Erklärung des menschlichen Bewusstseins und seiner Funktionen widersprechen einander. Auf Freuds eigene Äußerungen zum Kernstück der kantischen Moralphilosophie, dem Kategorischen Imperativ, soll an dieser Stelle nicht näher eingegangen werden, das wäre eine Untersuchung wert. Es ist aber festzuhalten, dass die isolierte Verwendung des kantischen Terminus als populäres Konzept zur Beschreibung des „zwangsartigen Charakters“ der Herrschaft des Gewissens über das Es² als fundamentale psychoanalytische Kritik der kritischen Moralphilosophie die Tendenz der meisten Interpretationen prägt: Freud gegen Kant! Dass diese Tendenz auch gewendet werden kann, zeigt eine Arbeit, die 2010 unter dem passenden Titel „Freud gegen Kant?“³ – mit Fragezeichen also – erschienen ist. Ihr Autor, Morris Vollmann, versucht, Freud wie Kant als Moralkritiker aufzufassen und zu zeigen, worauf der „berechtigte Geltungsanspruch“ psychoanalytischer Moralkritik beruht, wenn sie sich nicht lediglich als Destruktion von Moral verstehen will, und wie sie „eine kritische Moralphilosophie in der Aktualisierung [ihres] kritischen Potentials stärken oder gar zur Radikalisierung bereits eingenommener Positionen bewegen“ kann.⁴ Die philosophische Fragestellung der Studie bezieht sich auf die Klärung des Verhältnisses Moral und Glück, die für jede Ethik konstitutiv ist; der Autor sieht seine Untersuchung der Gemeinsamkeiten der beiden moralkritischen Ansätze als „systematischen Beitrag zum aufklärerischen Projekt methodischer Selbst- und Weltkenntnis“⁵, und stellt überzeugende Argumente dafür vor, dass ein solcher Beitrag im Rückgriff auf Freud und Kant in umfassender Weise geleistet werden kann.

Denn bei allen Differenzen und Diversitäten ihrer Ansätze besteht kein Zweifel daran, dass beide Denker ausdrückliche Aufklärungsintentionen haben; es stellt sich die Frage, auf welche Weise diese zusammengebracht und philosophisch reflektiert werden können. Im vorliegenden Beitrag wird davon ausgegangen, dass Kant und Freud bereits die Forderung nach einem bewussten Selbst- und Weltverständnis gemeinsam ist, und dass es Vorurteile sind – nämlich Kant auf den Theoretiker des Vernunftzwanges und Freud auf den Befreier der Sinnlichkeit zu reduzieren –, die der Auffassung dieser Gemeinsamkeit entgegenstehen: Beide kritischen Denker haben das Anliegen, ein aufgeklärtes Selbstverständnis des Menschen

zu fördern; und sie tragen beide, metaphorisch gesprochen, Teile zu einem Mosaik bei, das uns ein Bild des menschlichen Bewusstseins kennzeichnend für das menschliche Wesen selbst vermittelt – und das zusammensetzen Aufgabe einer philosophischen Anthropologie ist, die zu entwickeln von Kant zweifelsohne angestrebt, aber von ihm nicht in einer eigenen Schrift vorgestellt worden ist. Er ist davon ausgegangen, dass eine „praktische“, d.h. empirische Anthropologie, auf der Grundlage einer „vernünftig“ begründeten Ethik durchgeführt werden sollte, und dass eine philosophische Anthropologie diese Gesamtheit in den Blick nehmen muss – weder die philosophisch-theoretische Begründung der menschlichen Moralität noch die empirische Wissenschaft vom (moralischen) Wesen des Menschen können als Teil für das Ganze stehen, sie ergänzen einander. In diesem Sinne sollen hier einige Reflexionen präsentiert werden, die Argumente für das kontinuierliche Erfordernis von Aufklärung darstellen, aus der Gemeinsamkeit von zunächst unvereinbar erscheinenden Positionen Kants und Freuds heraus. Dabei sind das jeweilige Verständnis von Aufklärung, die Auffassungen von Kultur und Fortschritt und die Begriffe „Illusion“ und „Hoffnung“ von Bedeutung, wie auch der religionsphilosophische Aspekt – bei Kant wie bei Freud untrennbar von kritischer Moralphilosophie und Religionskritik und Gegenstand ihrer letzten bzw. späten Arbeiten.

Zunächst zu Kants Auffassung vom Menschen, dem – ganz allgemein gesprochen – das Vermögen zugesprochen wird, sich durch Selbstdenken selbst aufzuklären.

Berühmt ist das kantische Motto der Aufklärung: „Sapere aude! Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen!“ Es ist also kein naturhaftes Geschehen, dieses Sich-Aufklären, sondern es erfordert eine bestimmte Einstellung und eigene Initiative des Menschen als denkendes Wesen. Es ist unbezweifelbar, dass Kants aufklärerische Absichten sich nicht auf eine individuelle Empfehlung beschränken lassen, sondern letztlich auf einen Kosmopolitismus zielen, der vom Erfinder der ‘Selbst-Kritik’ als Theorie des vernünftigen und friedlichen Zusammenlebens der Menschheit verstanden wird; die vielfältigen Aspekte dieser Theorie werden in unterschiedlichen Schriften akzentuiert und durchdacht. Die letzte von Kant autorisierte Veröffentlichung ist die 1798 als Konzentrat seiner jahrzehntelangen Vorlesungstätigkeit erschienene *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*. In der Vorrede heißt es:

Eine Lehre von der Kenntnis des Menschen, systematisch abgefaßt (Anthropologie), kann es entweder in physiologischer oder in pragmatischer Hinsicht sein. – Die *physiologische* Menschenkenntnis geht auf die Erforschung dessen, was die *Natur* aus dem Menschen macht, die *pragmatische* auf das, was er als frei handelndes Wesen aus sich selber macht, oder machen kann und soll.⁶

Kant negiert also nicht die Notwendigkeit der Erforschung der natürlichen, wir würden heute sagen: biologischen Beschaffenheit des Menschen, aber er weist ihr als „physiologischer“ Lehre einen Platz außerhalb der Philosophie, nämlich in den Naturwissenschaften, zu. Die philosophisch dargelegte Lehre vom Menschen dagegen, die sich Kant zur Aufgabe macht, ist „pragmatisch“, und sie verbindet die empirische Beobachtung des menschlichen Verhaltens – „was er aus sich selber macht“ – mit seinem Vermögen der Selbstkenntnis und Selbstbestimmung – „oder machen kann und soll“. Der moralisch-normative Charakter dieses philosophischen Kommentars ist abhängig vom Entwicklungsstand der Menschenkenntnis,

d.h. vom mehr oder weniger aufgeklärten Selbstverständnis des Menschen. In dieser Hinsicht argumentiert Kant „pragmatisch“; denn er geht von der Tatsache aus, dass der Mensch ein Wesen ist, das sich Zwecke setzt und zum Erreichen des gesetzten Zweckes in bestimmter Weise tätig wird: Persönliche Grundsätze, die das eigene Handeln zielführend (also auf die selbst gesetzten Zwecke bezogen erfolgversprechend) regeln, sind nichts anderes als subjektive Maximen, der Form nach hypothetische Imperative: „Um x zu erreichen, muss ich y tun.“ Diese empfindet man üblicherweise nicht als „Zwang“, denn die Grundlage von Maximen ist die Auswertung von Erlebtem und deren Umsetzung in die Praxis des Handelns. Die Motivation und die Inhalte der Zwecke sind mannigfaltig und natürlicherweise von Wünschen, Vorlieben, Neigungen, Gefühlen, Trieben (mit-)bestimmt. Kants aufklärerische Intention besteht nun nicht ausschließlich darin, den Intellekt in jeder Hinsicht gegenüber den nicht-rationalen Bereichen des Bewusstseins zu stärken (was der „Klugheit“ im pragmatisch-technischen Sinn zuzuordnen wäre), sondern ist viel umfassender: Unabhängig davon, ob der Mensch sich moralische Zwecke setzt oder nicht, sollte er die Motivation und die Absichten seines Handelns kennen und „vernünftig“, d.h. reflektiert und so bewusst wie möglich, damit umgehen – was für Kant gleichbedeutend mit der Bildung eines Charakters ist, d.h. der Realisierung des Vermögens, nach Grundsätzen zu handeln. Daraus, dass der Mensch „sich selbst sein eigener letzter Zweck ist“ (Anth, AA 07: 119), ergibt sich seine moralische Verfassung und die Aufgabe der praktischen Vernunft, den durch alle möglichen Motive bestimmten Willen zu einem guten zu machen, der genau diese Eigenschaft des menschlichen Wesens berücksichtigt – sein eigener letzter Zweck und nicht bloß Mittel zu Zwecken zu sein.

Die kantische „Lehre von der Kenntnis des Menschen“ ist immer auch auf die Gemeinschaft zu beziehen; das zeigen der Aufbau und das Programm der anthropologischen Schrift, die aus zwei großen Teilen besteht: der „Didaktik“, die bestimmt wird als die „Art, das Innere sowohl als das Äußere des Menschen zu erkennen“ und der „Charakteristik“ als der „Art, das Innere des Menschen aus dem Äußeren zu erkennen“. Für Kant heißt Aufklärung immer: Erweiterung oder Vertiefung von Erkenntnis durch freien Vernunftgebrauch, was mit der kontinuierlichen Ausbildung und angemessenen Anwendung des Urteilsvermögens einhergeht. Nur wer es wagt, „sich seines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen“, kann das natürliche Innere – die Tätigkeit der Bewusstseinsvermögen Sinnlichkeit, Verstand und Vernunft – von nachträglich „verinnerlichten“ Inhalten unterscheiden, die erst durch die Prüfung des Selbstdenkens zum eigenen Urteil werden oder als Vorurteil, fremdes, also „unfertiges“ Urteil *vor* dem Selbstdenken entlarvt werden. Dieser aufklärerische Impetus bezieht sich auf das eigene Bewusstsein ebenso wie auf die Dinge der Welt, auf die von der Vernunft hervorgebrachten Ideen in gleicher Weise wie auf die von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand aufgefassten Gegenstände der Erfahrung. Hier liegt der Ursprung der Kritik der Erkenntnisvermögen und ihres Gebrauchs, und diese Kritik wird als eine Art Aufmerksamkeit oder Wachsamkeit eigenem und fremdem Urteilen gegenüber in einer aufklärerischen, irgendwann vielleicht aufgeklärten Geisteshaltung beibehalten.

Auch Freuds psychoanalytische Theorie wäre undenkbar ohne kritisch urteilende Instanz; in Freuds Stufenmodell nimmt das „Ich“ diese Funktion ein, indem es – in Freuds eigenen Worten – „Vernunft und Besonnenheit“ repräsentiert;⁷ grundsätzlich wird dem Ich also die Möglichkeit von autonomer Reflexion – bei Kant: „Selbstdenken“ – nicht abgesprochen.

Allerdings fokussiert Freud auf die das Ich beeinflussenden und bestimmenden Motive, die im Es wurzeln, und zunächst unbekannt, unbewusst, dunkel sind. Das Es wird definiert wie folgt als „der dunkle, unzugängliche Teil unserer Persönlichkeit“:

[...] das wenige, was wir von ihm wissen, haben wir durch das Studium der Traumarbeit und der neurotischen Symptombildung erfahren und *das meiste davon hat negativen Charakter*, lässt sich nur als Gegensatz zum Ich beschreiben. *Wir nähern uns dem Es mit Vergleichen*, nennen es ein Chaos, einen Kessel voll brodelnder Erregungen.⁸

Das Ich ist demzufolge der zugängliche, bewusste Teil unserer Persönlichkeit, das Positive, durch das in Form von Vergleichen Beschreibungen des Unbewussten möglich sind, das in seiner Unmittelbarkeit als Chaos von Erregungen dem Begreifen nicht zugänglich ist. Selbst wenn die Erhellung oder „Aufklärung“ unserer im Es wurzelnden Motive beschränkt und die Kenntnis unserer selbst dadurch begrenzt ist, bleibt die Forderung nach fortschreitender Erkenntnis des Unbewussten bestehen: an uns selbst als Voraussetzung für das Verständnis und die Auflösung pathologischer Konflikte, an die wissenschaftliche Forschung zum Zweck der Behandlung und Heilung psychischer Defekte.

Es mag an dieser Stelle eine interessante Ergänzung sein, dass auch Kant unter Verwendung eines Vergleiches (aus der Geographie) vom Unbewussten spricht, oder einer Art Vorstufe desselben, wenn er sich nämlich über „dunkle Vorstellungen“ äußert, deren weitere Untersuchung aber nicht zur pragmatischen, sondern physiologischen Anthropologie gehört:⁹

Daß das Feld unserer Sinnenanschauungen und Empfindungen, deren wir uns nicht bewußt sind, ob wir gleich unbezweifelt schließen können, daß wir sie haben, d.i. dunkler Vorstellungen im Menschen (und so auch in Thieren), unermesslich sei, die klaren dagegen nur unendlich wenige Punkte derselben enthalten, die dem Bewußtsein offen liegen; daß gleichsam auf der großen Karte unseres Gemüths nur wenig Stellen illuminirt sind: kann uns Bewunderung über unser eigenes Wesen einflößen; denn eine höhere Macht dürfte nur rufen: es werde Licht! so würde auch ohne Zuthun des Mindesten [...] gleichsam eine halbe Welt ihm vor Augen liegen.¹⁰

Bei Kant klingt die Beschreibung des dunklen Teils unseres Gemüths weniger bedrohlich als bei Freud, auch wenn für ihn „das Feld dunkler Vorstellungen das größte im Menschen“ (Anth, AA 07: 136) ist; Kant scheint hierin eher einen unerschöpflichen und „bewunderungswürdigen“ Reichtum zu vermuten, gleichsam „eine halbe Welt“, die sich auftäte, würde es gelingen, Licht in dieses Dunkel zu bringen. Da er keine „physiologische Anthropologie“ betreibt, spricht er hier allerdings quasi als unbeteiligter Beobachter – nicht vom Standpunkt des Naturwissenschaftlers, und schon gar nicht von dem des Arztes aus.

Freuds Auseinandersetzung mit psychischem Leid und Krankheit ist dagegen nicht auf die naturwissenschaftlich-psychologische beschränkt, sondern auch eine philosophische; denn sein Vortrag über „Die Zukunft einer Illusion“ ebenso wie die Schrift *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur* leisten eine kulturphilosophische Einschätzung der Menschheitsentwicklung aus psychoanalytischer Perspektive.

Sehen wir uns den Vortrag über die „Zukunft einer Illusion“ näher auf Aspekte an, die eine gewisse Nähe in der Haltung Kants und Freuds in Bezug auf ihr je eigenes aufklärerisches Anliegen zeigen, so können wir folgende 3 Feststellungen machen:

1) Freud grenzt den Begriff „Illusion“ von dem des Irrtums ab: Im Gegensatz zum Irrtum kann die Illusion bewahrheitet werden, insofern sie real ist. Es heißt in Abschnitt VI des genannten Vortragstextes von 1927:

Für die Illusion bleibt charakteristisch die Ableitung aus menschlichen Wünschen, sie nähert sich in dieser Hinsicht der psychiatrischen Wahndee, aber sie scheidet sich [...] auch von dieser. An der Wahndee heben wir als wesentlich den Widerspruch gegen die Wirklichkeit hervor, die Illusion muß nicht notwendig falsch, d.h. unrealisierbar oder im Widerspruch mit der Realität sein.¹¹

Die „Ableitung aus menschlichen Wünschen“, auch als Projektion bekannt (man denke an Feuerbach), d.h. ihr Entstehungsmodus, ist für die Illusion wesentlich, nicht ihr Verhältnis zur Wirklichkeit. Illusionen kommen also historisch-faktisch vor, oder genauer gesagt: Es ist aus Sicht der Psychoanalyse legitim, historische Fakten – im Fall der Religion die gesamte Menschheitsgeschichte betreffende – auf Grund der psychologischen Erklärung ihrer Genese als Illusion zu bezeichnen:

Wir sagen uns, es wäre ja sehr schön, wenn es einen Gott gäbe als Weltenschöpfer und gütige Vorsehung, eine sittliche Weltordnung und ein jenseitiges Leben, aber es ist doch sehr auffällig, daß dies alles so ist wie wir es uns wünschen müssen. Und es wäre noch sonderbarer, daß unseren armen, unwissenden, unfreien Vorvätern die Lösung all dieser schwierigen Welträtsel geglückt sein sollte.¹²

Nicht die religiösen Inhalte als solche sind also neurotisch, im Gegenteil: sie sind wünschenswert!, sondern die Tatsache, dass wir sie uns wünschen müssen – dass wir sie zwanghaft für real halten. Das scheint nun aber nicht alle Menschen gleichermaßen zu betreffen, denn religiöse Lehren basieren auf Glaubensinhalten, von denen Freud selbst sagt, dass sie weder beweisbar noch widerlegbar sind. Niemand kann und niemand darf gezwungen werden, die „Illusionen“ religiöser Lehren für wahr zu halten, an sie zu glauben. Dennoch sieht Freud es als erstrebenswert an, „ihnen kritisch näher zu rücken“, was erst durch den Fortschritt der Wissenschaft möglich werden wird, als „einzige[r] Weg, der zur Kenntnis der Realität außer uns führen kann“.¹³ Freuds Prognose: Aufklärung durch wissenschaftliche Arbeit führt zur Lösung der Welträtsel und trägt dadurch zur Überwindung der religiösen Illusion bei, diese Lösung bereits geleistet zu haben.

2) Freud vergleicht die Jahrtausende der Menschheitsgeschichte, in denen sich nahezu überall auf der Welt Religionen oder religionsartige Systeme ausgebildet haben, mit einer „neurotischen Phase“ der Menschheit, in Analogie zu den Forschungsergebnissen der Individualpsychologie über Kindheitsneurosen, die im Verlauf der individuellen Persönlichkeitsentwicklung überwunden werden.¹⁴

3) Durch wissenschaftliche Arbeit und die Psychoanalyse – den „Primat des Intellekts“¹⁵ – gibt es eine Weiterentwicklung der Menschheit, die Freud so beschreibt, dass sie nicht anders als moralisch genannt werden kann, denn die gesetzten Ziele, auf deren Verwirklichung

begründete Hoffnung besteht, sind „die Menschenliebe und die Einschränkung des Leidens“¹⁶. Ironisch wird angemerkt:

Unser Gott Logos wird von diesen Wünschen verwirklichen, was die Natur außer uns gestattet, aber sehr allmählich, erst in unabsehbarer Zukunft und für neue Menschenkinder. [...] auf Dauer kann der Vernunft und der Erfahrung nichts widerstehen, und der Widerspruch der Religion gegen beide ist allzu greifbar.¹⁷

Die Wünsche eine sittliche Weltordnung betreffend (Menschenliebe und Einschränkung des Leidens) bleiben also bestehen, sie lassen sich offensichtlich nicht durch Aufklärung aufheben, aber sie müssen nicht notwendig zu einer Illusion führen, wenn – ja was? Wenn andere Glaubensinhalte, die die klassischen metaphysischen Fragen nach dem Ursprung der Welt und der Unsterblichkeit der Seele beantworten, durch naturwissenschaftliche Antworten obsolet geworden sind.

Bei näherer Betrachtung lassen sich also bei Freud durchaus optimistische Beurteilungen der Zukunft der Menschheit ausmachen, das „Unbehagen in der Kultur“ wird durch die Perspektive einer zugegebenermaßen „unabsehbaren Zukunft“ zu einer Etappe auf dem Weg dorthin relativiert, bleibt nicht alternativlos als kulturphilosophischer Aspekt der bewährtesten psychoanalytischen Forschung stehen. Religiosität ist keine anthropologische Bewusstseinskonstante, sondern Ergebnis von sich aufdrängenden Wünschen nach der Beantwortung bedeutungsvoller Fragen, die die wissenschaftliche Forschung (noch) nicht klären kann. Glaubensinhalte sind eben kein Wissen, und können daher nicht bewiesen, aber auch nicht widerlegt werden.

Genau diese Feststellung ist aber auch zentral für Kants religionsphilosophische Reflexionen, auf der Grundlage von erkenntnistheoretischen Überlegungen zum „Meinen, Glauben und Wissen“ in der Methodenlehre der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Hypothesen, Sätze oder Begriffe, die dem „speculativen Gebrauch der Vernunft“ geschuldet sind, können weder bewiesen noch belegt werden (vgl. z.B. KrV B 669, B 809), und dazu gehören der Begriff Gottes und Aussagen über die Existenz eines solchen höchsten Wesens. Anders als Freud kennt Kant aber keinen „Gott Logos“, sondern hält es für vernünftig, ein höchstes Wesen für wahr zu halten – zu glauben –, über das man nichts wissen kann und es auch nie können wird, weil es der Erfahrung und naturwissenschaftlichen Forschung nicht zugänglich ist. Kants Vernunftbegriff umfasst auch einen „Vernunftglauben“, der nicht mit religiösen Lehren gleichgesetzt werden darf, im Gegenteil: Kant differenziert zwischen dem historischen oder Kirchenglauben und dem Vernunftglauben, der nichts als die Überzeugung zum Inhalt hat, dass es ein Moralgesetz gibt, das höher ist als menschliche Vernunft, und einen aus diesem Grunde göttlich genannten Gesetzgeber. Kant würde Freuds Religionskritik teilen, wenn man sie beschränkt auf das, was bei ihm die historische Religion heißt, wo er selbst nicht mit vernichtenden Analysen spart, die Freuds Theorie vom potentiell neurotischen Charakter der religiösen Illusion stützen; er findet scharfe Worte zur Beschreibung des historischen Kirchenglaubens als einem „knechtischem Gottes-(oder Götzen)Dienste“, der „dem hilflosen Menschen durch die natürliche auf dem Bewußtsein seines Unvermögens gegründete Furcht“

„die Verehrung mächtiger unsichtbarer Wesen“ abnötige, vom „Pfaffentum“ als „Verfassung einer Kirche, sofern in ihr ein Fetischdienst regiert“, in der es nur um als heteronom verurteilte „statutarische Gebote, Glaubensegeln und Observanzen“¹⁸ geht. Kant kritisiert mit scharfen Worten den Glauben an Wunder, Geheimnisse und Gnadenmittel als „Wahnglauben“, bezeichnet das Beten als einen „abergläubischen Wahn (ein Fetischmachen); denn es ist ein bloß erklärtes *Wünschen*“.¹⁹ Der von Kant derart charakterisierte historische Kirchenglaube entspricht der von Freud diagnostizierten Kindheitsneurose der Menschheit: Er wächst sich aus. Freud wiederum relativiert seine Religionskritik in der *Nachschrift* von 1935 zu seiner *Selbstdarstellung*: „In der *Zukunft einer Illusion* hatte ich die Religion hauptsächlich negativ gewürdigt; ich fand später die Formel, die ihr bessere Gerechtigkeit erweist: ihre Macht beruhe allerdings auf ihrem Wahrheitsgehalt, aber diese Wahrheit sei keine materielle, sondern eine historische.“²⁰

Doch nicht die Naturwissenschaft ist es nach Kant, die den historischen Religionsglauben überflüssig macht oder ersetzt, sondern der Vernunftglaube, nicht der „Gott Logos“ des Intellekts, sondern die praktische Vernunft sorgt für einen Fortschritt der Menschheit, auf den Kant zufolge berechnete Hoffnung besteht.

Eine kleine Passage aus der *Anthropologie* ist m.E. sehr aussagekräftig in Bezug auf die Vereinbarkeit des Denkens Kants und Freuds, das auf den Erfolg der Aufklärung hofft, das massive Religionskritik übt, und bei allen Unterschieden der Auffassung vergleichbar pragmatisch und realistisch bleibt:²¹

Die stärksten Antriebe der Natur, welche die Stelle der unsichtbar das menschliche Geschlecht durch eine höhere, das physische Weltbeste allgemein besorgende Vernunft (des Weltregierers) vertreten, ohne daß menschliche Vernunft dazu hinwirken darf, sind Liebe zum Leben und Liebe zum Geschlecht; die erstere um das Individuum, die zweite um die Species zu erhalten, da dann durch Vermischung der Geschlechter im Ganzen das Leben unserer mit Vernunft begabten Gattung fortschreitend erhalten wird, unerachtet diese absichtlich an ihrer eigenen Zerstörung (durch Kriege) arbeitet; welche doch die immer an Cultur wachsenden vernünftigen Geschöpfe selbst mitten in Kriegen nicht hindert, dem Menschengeschlecht in kommenden Jahrhunderten einen Glückseligkeitszustand, der nicht mehr rückgängig sein wird, im Prospect unzweideutig vorzustellen.²²

Freuds Feststellung, dass „[...] auf Dauer [...] der Vernunft und der Erfahrung nichts widerstehen [kann]“, und dass „der Widerspruch der Religion gegen beide [...] allzu greifbar [ist]“, setzt ein Zusammenwirken von beidem voraus, die Möglichkeit einer vernünftigen Verarbeitung von Erfahrungen durch das menschliche Bewusstseinsvermögen – die Möglichkeitsbedingungen der Erfahrungserkenntnis überhaupt (philosophisch) zu erklären, ist dabei nicht die Aufgabe des Psychoanalytikers. Darüber aufzuklären, dass der Entwicklung eines bewussten Selbst- und Weltverständnisses ein ‚falscher‘, politisch instrumentalisierter und instrumentalisierbarer Glaube (wie er sich in sichtbaren, von Menschen gemachten Kirchen institutionalisiert), Vorurteile, Wahnideen im Wege stehen, ist dagegen auch eines der zentralen Anliegen des Kritizismus Kants. Bei allem Unbehagen in und an der Kultur – der Mensch als vernünftiges Geschöpf wächst letztlich an ihr und lässt sich nicht davon abbringen, sich eine

bessere, wenn auch unabsehbare Zukunft für ein Geschlecht von „neuen Menschenkindern“ vorzustellen.

Dass zwei große Denker der europäischen Geistes- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte mit völlig unterschiedlichem kulturellem und individuellem Hintergrund so etwas wie eine vorsichtig optimistische Zukunftsperspektive bewahrt haben, sollte uns ermutigen, (Selbst-) Aufklärung, als Arbeit an der und für die Bewusstwerdung fortzuführen; Kant wie Freud verorten hier den Ausgangspunkt für einen Fortschritt mit Konsequenzen für das politische Gemeinwesen, das sich an der Idee eines ethischen messen lassen muss.

LITERATUR

Vollmann, Morris. *Freud gegen Kant? Moralkritik der Psychoanalyse und praktische Vernunft*. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010. [Leicht veränderte Fassung der Phil. Diss.: Dresden 2009]

Freud, Sigmund. *Zwangshandlungen und Religionsübungen* (1907). In: Studienausgabe Bd. 7: Paranoia und Perversion. Hrsg. von A. Mitscherlich u.a. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer 1980.

_____. *Das Ich und das Es* (1923). In: *Gesammelte Werke*. Hrsg. von Anna Freud. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1999. Bd. XIII, 237–289.

_____. *Das ökonomische Problem des Masochismus* (1924). In: *Gesammelte Werke* XIII, 369–391.

_____. *Die Zukunft einer Illusion* (1927). Hrsg. von Haimo L. Handl. Drösing: Driesch Verlag, 2014, 3–32.

_____. *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* (1933). In: *Gesammelte Werke* XV, 3–197.

Kant, Immanuel. *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798) [Anth], AA 07.

_____. *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft* (1793) [RGV] AA 06.

Piller, Gereon. *Von der Kritik der Vernunft zur Kritik der Religion. Kant, Feuerbach, Freud: Etappen auf dem Weg der Moderne als 'Projekt ohne Abschluss'*. Regensburg: Roderer Verlag, 2002.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Auch wenn Kants Forderung nach einer Anthropologie der apriorischen Vernunft und Freuds empirisch verfahrenende psychoanalytische Erklärung des menschlichen Bewusstseins einander zu widersprechen scheinen, lässt sich in den Moralauffassungen des Begründers der Psychoanalyse und des kritischen Transzendentalphilosophen eine bedeutende Gemeinsamkeit feststellen: Freuds erklärtes Ziel der Aufhebung des pathologischen Symptoms „Moralität“ ähnelt Kants aufklärerischer Kritik am Kultus historischer Religionen, beide kritischen Denker haben das Anliegen, ein aufgeklärtes Selbstverständnis des Menschen zu fördern. Im Folgenden sollen einige Reflexionen präsentiert werden, die Argumente für das kontinuierliche Erfordernis von Aufklärung darstellen, wobei die trennenden Perspektiven auf die jeweiligen Auffassungen von Kultur und Fortschritt zu berücksichtigen sind.

STICHWORTER: Illusion, Hoffnung, Bewusstsein/Gemüt, Selbstverständnis

NOTES

1 Margit Ruffing, Dr., M.A., 1977–1985 Studium an der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität in Mainz (Philosophie, Allgemeine und vergleichende Literaturwissenschaft, Italianistik und Buchwissenschaft). Seit 1994 Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin im Arbeitsbereich Philosophie der Neuzeit und an der Kant-Forschungsstelle am Philosophischen Seminar der Universität Mainz. Promotion mit einer Arbeit über „Wille zur Erkenntnis“ – Die Selbsterkenntnis des Willens und die Idee des Menschen in der

ästhetischen Theorie Arthur Schopenhauers, ab 1999 Redakteurin der Kant-Studien, Okt. 2014 kommissarische Leiterin der Kant-Forschungsstelle. Internationale Veröffentlichungen zu den Forschungsschwerpunkten Schopenhauer und Kant: <http://www.blogs.uni-mainz.de/fb05philosophie/arbeitsbereiche/neuzeit/mitarbeiter/mruffing/publikationen/>

2 Vgl. z. B. Sigmund Freud: Das Ich und das Es. In: Gesammelte Werke [GW]. Hrsg. von Anna Freud. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 1999. Bd. XIII, 237–289; 263; Das ökonomische Problem des Masochismus. In: GW XIII, 369–391; 380.

3 Morris Vollmann: Freud gegen Kant? Moralkritik der Psychoanalyse und praktische Vernunft. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2010. [Leicht veränderte Fassung der Phil. Diss.: Dresden 2009.]

4 Vollmann: Freud gegen Kant?, S. 13.

5 Ibid., S. 9.

6 I. Kant: *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1798) [Anth], AA 07: 119.

7 Vgl. S. Freud: *Das Ich und das Es* (1923). In: GW XIII, 237–289; 253f.

8 Id.: *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* (1933). In: GW XV, 3–197; 80.

9 Vgl. I. Kant: Anth, AA 07: 136.

10 I. Kant: Anth, AA 07: 135.

11 S. Freud: *Die Zukunft einer Illusion* (1927). Hrsg. von Haimo L. Handl. Drösing: Driesch Verlag, 2014, 3–32; 18.

12 S. Freud: *Die Zukunft einer Illusion*, 19.

13 Vgl. Ibid., 18.

14 Gereon Piller, ein Mainzer Theologe, hat zu Freuds angeblichem Nachweis des neurotischen Charakters der Illusion im Ausgang von dessen naturwissenschaftlich-psychologischer Forschung angemerkt, dass es ihm, Freud, beinahe gelungen sei, einen neuen Gottesbeweis zu liefern: Die Neurosetheorie besage, dass „es immer in der Realität vorhandene Faktoren, Ursachen sind, die zu einer Erkrankung führen, und in deren Gefolge dann anschließend erst Phantasiegebilde, Rationalisierungen usw. erzeugt werden. Wenn man das weiterdenkt, hieße das: Entweder es existiert (ein) Gott, oder es gibt keine Neurose – jedenfalls nicht in dieser universal-kulturhistorischen Form...“ Gereon Piller: *Von der Kritik der Vernunft zur Kritik der Religion. Kant, Feuerbach, Freud: Etappen auf dem Weg der Moderne als 'Projekt ohne Abschluss'*. Regensburg: Roderer Verlag, 2002, 22.

15 S. Freud: *Zukunft einer Illusion*, 30.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 31.

18 I. Kant: RGV, AA 06: 175ff.

19 Vgl. I. Kant: RGV, AA 06: 194. Es ist übrigens anzunehmen, dass Freud die Religionsschrift Kants nicht gründlich gelesen hat – bedauerlicherweise.

20 S. Freud, *Studienausgabe*, Bd. 9. Frankfurt/M: Fischer 1974, S.137 f.: Editorische Vorbemerkungen zu *Zukunft einer Illusion*.

21 Im Manuskript der *Anthropologie* findet sich übrigens neben der gleich zum Abschluss zitierten Passage eine Randbemerkung Kants, in der er sich fragt: „Ist die Menschheit im immerwährenden Fortschritt zur Vollkommenheit begriffen. Wird das menschliche Geschlecht immer besser oder schlechter oder bleibt es von demselben moralischen Gehalt?“ (OP, 1796/97)

22 I. Kant: Anth, AA 07: 276f.

Recebido / Received: 14/11/14

Aprovado / Approved: 26/12/14

A FACULDADE DE FILOSOFIA E A PRÁTICA DO USO PÚBLICO DA RAZÃO¹

Vera Cristina de Andrade BUENO²

No artigo “A institucionalização da razão”, Frederick Rauscher chama a atenção para o importante papel que a faculdade de filosofia desempenha, segundo Kant, no interior de uma universidade, devido “ao seu papel primordial de agir como a voz da razão nos debates políticos”³. Segundo o texto, cabe aos filósofos se ocupar dessa tarefa não só no interior da faculdade de filosofia, mas também fora dela, por levarem em conta a verdade na avaliação pública das leis e das políticas propostas pelos governos. Para justificar a origem da atribuição feita à faculdade de filosofia, Rauscher faz uso do trabalho tardio de Kant, *O conflito das faculdades*⁴.

Rauscher começa o artigo fazendo uma crítica ao fato de Habermas, em *Mudança estrutural na esfera pública*, considerar a exortação kantiana para que os indivíduos se empenhem em usar livremente a própria razão baseando-se apenas no texto “Resposta à pergunta: que é ‘Esclarecimento’” (de 1784). Em seu artigo, Rauscher afirma que, para Habermas, “Kant já estava comprometido com a ampla participação dos indivíduos no debate público”⁵.

Se nos voltarmos para o texto do Esclarecimento, percebemos que, nele, Kant exorta os indivíduos, na medida em que participam de uma vida em sociedade, a procurarem se desvencilhar das amarras que os impedem de usar a própria razão publicamente, o que faz com que permaneçam intelectualmente menores e na dependência de tutores (WA, AA 08:35)⁶. O texto dá a entender que os indivíduos poderiam se libertar dessas amarras em função da exortação feita, sem que nenhuma outra coisa seja necessária para isso. Assim, para tornar mais claro o que pretende, estabelece Kant uma distinção entre o que chama de uso privado e uso público da razão. Por uso privado da razão, Kant entende aquele no qual um indivíduo se manifesta na função de um cargo ou de uma posição que ocupa em alguma instituição, não podendo, por isso, ir contra os princípios dessa instituição (WA, AA 08:37)⁷. Por sua vez, o uso público é aquele em que um indivíduo expressa suas ideias como cidadão do mundo e usa livremente a sua razão, sem estar limitado aos princípios e ensinamentos de qualquer instituição (WA, AA 08:37)⁸. Ao fazer esse esclarecimento, Kant deixa transparecer que os indivíduos devem estar em condições de manifestar publicamente as suas ideias. No entanto, ainda que faça essa distinção e convoque os indivíduos a usar publicamente a sua razão, Kant não deixa claro como os indivíduos podem fazer isso com sucesso.

Nesse sentido, avalia Rauscher, mesmo que seja uma exortação necessária ao uso da razão livre de impedimentos, o texto kantiano, por si só, não é suficiente para que essa exortação possa surtir o efeito desejado. É preciso, além desse estímulo, que a razão seja exercitada e

treinada para que possa manifestar-se de forma autônoma e livre dos impedimentos que acabam por desvirtuar os seus dons naturais (WA, AA 08:36)⁹. É preciso, também, que ela possa conviver com situações em que bons exemplos sejam dados, como as práticas de um uso refletido da razão. Sem o convívio com situações e práticas em que a razão seja bem exercitada, é muito difícil que os indivíduos saibam como participar de um debate público. Para que possa participar desse debate com sucesso e também levando em consideração a verdade e a correção do que é dito, o indivíduo precisa de algum treinamento, e a faculdade de filosofia é o lugar privilegiado no qual esses objetivos podem ser alcançados. É devido ao lugar privilegiado que Kant atribui à faculdade de filosofia, como sendo aquele em que a razão pode exercitar sua autonomia, que Rauscher se volta para *O conflito das faculdades*.

O USO PÚBLICO DA RAZÃO E O TEXTO DO *CONFLITO*

Num certo sentido, e, talvez, sem muito exagero, poderíamos dizer que a filosofia kantiana em seu todo ocupa-se não só com a investigação da razão e seu modo de operar, mas também com uma educação que propicie o desenvolvimento dessa mesma razão e a prepare para que possa manifestar-se livremente. No entanto, é no *Conflito das faculdades* que Kant atribui à faculdade de filosofia o lugar, por excelência, em que a razão pode se manifestar livremente e exercer sua autonomia. Nela, os professores e alunos treinam de tal modo que, por meio das habilidades adquiridas, podem se empenhar para que a razão não sirva só de meio para que se alcance outros objetivos que não são primordialmente os seus, como acontece com as outras faculdades, mas que desenvolva a si mesma como fim. Em função dessa atribuição, Rauscher se refere à faculdade de filosofia como sendo o lugar da institucionalização da razão.

O texto do *Conflito* começa tratando da maneira como a universidade alemã estava organizada na época de Kant. Havia nela duas categorias de faculdades: as superiores, em número de três: teologia, direito e medicina, e as faculdades inferiores. Nessa categoria estava a de filosofia. Essa divisão em categorias é feita em função dos interesses do governo, e não da competência dos integrantes dessas faculdades. Uma faculdade é considerada superior se seus ensinamentos - tanto no que concerne ao conteúdo, quanto no que concerne à maneira pela qual ele é apresentado ao público - interessam ao governo. Ela é considerada inferior se sua função é cuidar do interesse da ciência e da verdade (SF, AA 07:18)¹⁰. Nesse sentido, o que guia a faculdade de filosofia em seus pronunciamentos sobre a atividade científica são as exigências da própria razão (SF, AA 07:19)¹¹. No *Conflito*, Kant conceitua “razão” como “o poder de julgar autonomamente - isto é, livremente (de acordo com os princípios do pensamento em geral)” (SF, AA 07:27)¹². Essa conceituação é semelhante àquela dada ao uso público da razão no texto do *Esclarecimento*. No entanto, os professores das faculdades superiores não têm liberdade em relação ao uso da razão. Isso acontece não só porque os compromissos primordiais das faculdades não estão voltados para a procura da verdade, mas também porque elas dependem do governo, que quer ter uma influência forte e duradoura sobre o povo. Além disso, os temas próprios dessas faculdades, religião, justiça e saúde ajudam-no a fazer isso. Nesse sentido, o governo não propõe nenhum conteúdo próprio a ser ensinado, “ele exige apenas que as faculdades respectivas, *ao expor um assunto publicamente*, adotem certos modos de ensinar e

excluem seus contrários” (SF, AA 07:19)¹³. Esse modo de proceder é semelhante ao que, no texto do *Esclarecimento*, Kant chama de uso privado da razão. Assim, o teólogo-professor da faculdade de teologia ocupa-se, especialmente, com os ensinamentos da Bíblia; o professor da faculdade de Direito, com as leis do direito positivo; e os professores da faculdade de medicina com os protocolos médicos adotados com o público, e não com a ciência da natureza (SF, AA 07:23)¹⁴. Em suas práticas, essas faculdades têm seus ensinamentos fundados não apenas nas teorias concernentes à teologia, ao direito e à medicina, mas também na sanção dada a elas pelo governo em relação a esses ensinamentos.

Por sua vez, o compromisso da faculdade de filosofia é com a verdade e com os princípios da razão, compromisso pelo qual ela se orienta e sobre os quais ela pode se manifestar publicamente. Fazendo do seu um uso público, a razão se posiciona de forma independente em relação às pressões externas que atuam sobre as outras faculdades. Ao adotar um princípio próprio, a faculdade de filosofia dá aos seus membros o exemplo de um uso autônomo da razão, o qual revela sua posição não submissa às exigências externas. Nesse sentido, o ensino da faculdade de filosofia é sancionado apenas pelo compromisso que os professores de filosofia têm para com os princípios da razão. *O conflito das faculdades* complementa, assim, de uma forma institucionalizada, o que Kant propõe no texto do *Esclarecimento*. Para Kant,

é absolutamente essencial que a comunidade erudita na universidade também tenha uma faculdade independente do comando do governo em relação aos seus ensinamentos; uma que, não tendo comandos para dar, está livre para avaliar tudo, e se preocupa com os interesses das ciências, a saber, com a verdade: uma em que a razão está autorizada a se pronunciar publicamente (SF, AA 07:19-20)¹⁵.

E continua Kant, indo mais adiante, atribuindo à faculdade de filosofia um importante papel no que concerne aos governos,

pode acontecer que a última um dia seja a primeira (a faculdade inferior seria a mais elevada) - na verdade, não no que diz respeito à autoridade, mas no que diz respeito ao conselho dado à autoridade (o governo). Pois o governo pode achar a liberdade dos professores da faculdade de filosofia e o discernimento obtido em função dessa liberdade, um meio mais adequado para atingir os seus fins do que a sua própria autoridade absoluta” (SF, AA 07:35)¹⁶.

É nesse sentido que, em “A institucionalização da razão”, Rauscher sugere, talvez radicalizando o papel a ela atribuído, que a faculdade de filosofia poderia desempenhar um papel semelhante àquele da “Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos em sua prática de exame judicial”¹⁷.

O QUE É FUNDAMENTAL PARA O USO PÚBLICO DA RAZÃO

Em função da importância do papel atribuído à faculdade de filosofia, seus professores têm de ter clareza sobre a natureza e a origem dos princípios da razão, de tal modo que possam se manifestar tendo toda confiança em seus pronunciamentos. É por isso que Rauscher alerta para a necessidade de outras práticas, além daquela da exortação kantiana, no texto

do Esclarecimento, para que os indivíduos usem publicamente a razão. Sem saber como se exercitar nessa prática, a razão não pode desempenhar com sucesso todo o potencial de que é capaz. É preciso não só que ela seja exercitada, mas também que saiba de si, daquilo de que é capaz e do que tem de fazer para se desenvolver. A faculdade de filosofia é aquela instituição que pode dar conta dessa tarefa. Mas para isso ela tem de ter clareza sobre as concepções atribuídas à razão e pelas quais ela sabe das suas prerrogativas.

No texto da *Lógica*¹⁸ estão expostas duas conceituações de filosofia: uma que Kant chama de escolástica, e outra de cósmica ou mundana. Pelo nome mesmo, pode-se perceber o sentido dessas duas conceituações. A filosofia entendida no sentido escolástico visa a aquisição de uma certa habilidade no trato com a razão. Desse ponto de vista, ela é uma doutrina da habilidade (Log, AA 09:24)¹⁹ e trata das técnicas para o uso da razão. Fariam parte desse modo de se entender a filosofia todos os procedimentos próprios de um uso lógico da razão. No sentido cósmico ou mundano a filosofia procura pelos fins últimos da razão. A razão nesse sentido não é vista apenas como alvo de um treinamento técnico, mas pertence a ela a determinação da extensão de seu uso e dos limites do conhecimento (Log, AA 09:25).²⁰ Ela também se preocupa com a elaboração de um método, pois, como diz Kant, “se quisermos nos exercitar na atividade de pensar por si mesmo ou filosofar, teremos que olhar mais para o *método* de nosso uso da razão do que para as proposições mesmas a que chegamos por intermédio dele” (Log, AA 09:26)²¹. No sentido cósmico de filosofia, a razão não é considerada como um meio, mas como um fim em função do qual ela se orienta. Nas palavras de Kant, no sentido cósmico a filosofia é “*uma ciência da máxima suprema do uso da nossa razão*, na medida em que se entende por máxima o princípio interno da escolha entre diversos fins” (Log, AA 09:24)²².

Uma vez feitas essas considerações sobre os dois conceitos de filosofia, pode-se concluir que, para a faculdade de filosofia, o conceito primordial é aquele de filosofia no sentido cósmico. Não que a filosofia no sentido escolástico não seja por ela levada em conta, mas no de que, nele, a filosofia não se preocupa com o estabelecimento dos fins e, assim sendo, nenhum fim lhe interessa especialmente. Ela se preocupa em adquirir habilidades, deixando de lado os fins aos quais elas se destinam. Como o fim principal e último da razão é a sua autonomia e liberdade, e como se preocupar com os fins é a tarefa primordial do conceito cósmico de filosofia, para a faculdade de filosofia o conceito cósmico de filosofia é o mais fundamental. Isso no que concerne ao *Conflito*. No texto da *Lógica*, no entanto, ambos os conceitos são considerados como igualmente importantes.

O conceito cósmico de filosofia nos faz ver que, para que a razão possa realizar o seu fim e consiga a sua autonomia, é preciso que os indivíduos se manifestem publicamente, pois a razão não se desenvolve por si só. Ela precisa do exercício do pensamento e da possibilidade de comunicar livremente esse pensamento. É por isso que, no texto sobre o Esclarecimento, Kant responde à pergunta sobre se a sua época é uma época esclarecida, dizendo que ela é uma época que está no processo do esclarecimento (WA, AA 08:40)²³.

A IDEIA DE LIBERDADE E O USO PÚBLICO DA RAZÃO

Se há um progresso da humanidade, se ela pode ir se tornando mais esclarecida, esse progresso depende do que há de razão e de liberdade na humanidade. O opúsculo *Ideia universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita*, de 1784, (IaG, AA 08:19)²⁴, nos dá uma chave de interpretação da história humana como um relato possível do progresso para a cultura e para a moralidade. Nesse sentido, é bom lembrar que, para Kant, o progresso ao qual ele se refere, e mesmo o de que a humanidade é capaz, não se identifica com a busca de uma felicidade crescente, nem tampouco acha ele que o progresso seja algo a que estejamos fadados de um modo constante. Pelo contrário, o progresso depende dos atos que os seres humanos efetivamente realizem em relação ao desenvolvimento da razão em busca de autonomia. O progresso tampouco resulta de atos humanos realizados aleatoriamente, mas de atos que têm *a priori* uma ideia que exerça a função de um fio condutor. A ideia de liberdade tem o *status* de um ideal regulativo, que vale para a orientação dos seres humanos, e não pode ser considerada como algo constitutivo da história humana. “Pois estamos”, como diz Kant em *O conflito das faculdades*, “lidando com seres que agem livremente, para os quais, é verdade, o que *devem* fazer pode ser dito de antemão, mas dos quais não se pode prever que *farão* [o que foi dito que *devem* fazer]” (SF, AA 07:83)²⁵.

Assim, a faculdade de filosofia, devido ao cuidado que tem com o uso correto da razão e com o interesse que tem pelo desenvolvimento da razão no sentido de uma autonomia crescente não só em relação ao que se passa na universidade, mas também fora dela, precisa, mais do que qualquer outra faculdade, ter uma atitude reflexiva e crítica em relação a si própria. Nas palavras de Kant:

Em todos os seus empreendimentos deve a razão submeter-se à crítica e não pode fazer qualquer ataque à liberdade desta, sem se prejudicar a si mesma e atrair sobre si uma suspeita desfavorável. Nada há de tão importante, com respeito à utilidade, nem nada de tão sagrado que possa furtar-se a esta investigação aprofundada que não faz exceção para ninguém. É mesmo sobre esta liberdade que repousa a existência da razão; esta não tem autoridade ditatorial alguma, mas a sua decisão outra coisa não é do que o acordo de cidadãos livres, cada um dos quais deve poder exprimir as suas reservas e mesmo exercer seu *veto* sem impedimentos (KrV A738/B766)²⁶.

O USO PÚBLICO DA RAZÃO E O DESENVOLVIMENTO DO PENSAMENTO

A respeito do uso público da razão, Onora O’Neill lembra, no texto “*Kant’s Conception of Public Reason*”²⁷, que Kant adverte que, para pensarmos não basta que tenhamos liberdade de pensamento, é preciso, também, que tenhamos liberdade para nos comunicar e expressar nossos pensamentos. No final do texto “O que significa orientar-se no pensamento” (1786), Kant critica os que acreditam que basta a liberdade de pensamento para que pensemos. Kant nega, veementemente, que isso seja possível. Para que pensemos, a comunicação entre homens é necessária. Nele, Kant adverte:

Amigos do gênero humano e do que para ele é mais sagrado! Aceitai o que, após um exame cuidadoso e honesto vos parecer mais digno de fé, quer sejam factos, quer [sejam] princípios da razão: somente não impugneis à razão o que faz dela o supremo bem na terra, isto é, o privilégio de ser a derradeira pedra de toque da verdade. Caso contrário, indignos de tal liberdade, também certamente a

perdereis, e essa infelicidade arrasta ainda igualmente outra parte [...] que, de outro modo, estaria disposta a servir-se legalmente de sua liberdade e a contribuir assim de forma conveniente para a melhoria do mundo (WDO, AA 08:146)²⁸.

CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS

É de suma importância, segundo Kant, o papel que a faculdade de filosofia pode e deve desempenhar em relação ao exercício do uso público da razão e ao desenvolvimento e aperfeiçoamento do pensamento. A faculdade de filosofia é um lugar especial em que se pode comunicar e discutir ideias, e ser criticado em função delas. Ela é um excelente canal de escoamento daquilo que a razão humana pode produzir, talvez de melhor, para o desenvolvimento da razão. Ao valorizar a faculdade de filosofia, no entanto, Kant não está considerando, apenas, os conceitos e ideias que são nela formulados e desenvolvidos, mas, principalmente, o lugar em que se pode praticar a reflexão e a crítica de forma eficaz e proveitosa. É nela que se pode começar a exercitar a independência da razão de todas as forças que impedem o seu desenvolvimento e sua autonomia. É ela que, mais do que qualquer outra faculdade, pode chamar a atenção para que não se deixe de levar em conta os fins últimos da razão. E Kant sabe disso muito bem. Ele foi durante anos professor na Universidade de Königsberg²⁹ e pôde vivenciar o papel que ele próprio atribuiu à faculdade de filosofia: aquele que, além de exercitar, incentiva o desenvolvimento e autonomia da razão. Na época de Kant poucos filósofos foram professores em universidades, Kant, ao que tudo indica, foi um dos primeiros. Talvez, como nenhum outro, ele tenha visto a importância de pertencer a essa instituição que, para Rauscher, é a própria institucionalização da razão.

RESUMO: Tendo como pano de fundo “A institucionalização da razão”, de Frederick Rauscher, o artigo chama a atenção para o importante papel que, segundo Kant, a faculdade de filosofia desempenha na universidade para a prática do que Kant chama de “uso público da razão”. O artigo enfatiza que é no esforço de bem expor publicamente as suas próprias ideias que a razão pode se desenvolver no sentido de sua autonomia crescente.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Kant; faculdade de filosofia; uso público da razão; Esclarecimento; liberdade.

ABSTRACT: Having as background Fred Rauscher’s “The Institutionalization of Reason”, the paper draws attention to the important role that, in accordance to Kant, the faculty of philosophy plays concerning the practice of what Kant calls the “public use of reason”. The paper stresses that, it is in the effort of well exposing in public its own ideas, that reason can develop itself concerning its growing autonomy.

KEYWORDS: Kant; faculty of philosophy; public use of reason, Enlightenment; freedom.

REFERÊNCIAS:

KANT, IMMANUEL. “Resposta à questão: que é iluminismo?” (1784). In: *A paz perpétua e outros opúsculos*. Tradução de Artur Morão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1988.

_____. "O que significa orientar-se no pensamento?" (1786). In: *A paz perpétua e outros opúsculos*. Tradução de Artur Morão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1988.

_____. *Crítica da razão pura*. Tradução de Manuela Pinto dos Santos e Alexandre Fradique Mourujão. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1994.

_____. *Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita* (1784). Tradução de Ricardo Terra e Rodrigo Naves. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003.

_____. *Lógica* (1800). Tradução de Guido de Almeida. Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 2003.

_____. *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798). Translated by Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

LOUDEN, ROBERT. "General Introduction" In: *Anthropology, History and Education*. New York: The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, 2011.

O'NEIL, ONORA. "Kant's Conception of Public Reason". In: *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationaler Kant-Kongresses*, Band I. Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Hortsman, und Ralph Schumacher (Ed). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001.

RAUSCHER, FREDERICK. "A institucionalização da razão". Tradução de Alexandre Medeiros de Araújo. In: *O que nos faz Pensar* 32 (2012):167-177.

NOTES

1 Esse artigo é uma versão modificada da palestra feita na XIV SAF - Semana dos Alunos de Pós-graduação em Filosofia - da PUC-Rio, em maio de 2013. O objetivo da palestra foi o de lembrar o importante papel que a faculdade de filosofia desempenha no âmbito da universidade. A motivação para o tema surgiu do artigo de Frederick Raucher, "A institucionalização da razão", publicado no número 32 da revista do departamento de filosofia da PUC-Rio, *O que nos faz Pensar*.

2 Professora aposentada da PUC-Rio, editora do n. 32 de *O que nos faz Pensar*, revista do Departamento de Filosofia da PUC-Rio. Escreve artigos sobre a filosofia prática kantiana. Faz parte do conselho editorial de vários periódicos brasileiros. Doutorou-se em filosofia pela Université de Paris X e foi *visiting scholar* na University of Pennsylvania.

3 *O que nos faz Pensar*, n. 32, p. 167.

4 *Der Streit der Fakultäten* (SF). O livro, publicado em 1798, reúne três ensaios escritos em diferentes ocasiões, sendo o primeiro, que trata das relações entre a faculdade de teologia e a de filosofia, foi escrito entre junho e outubro de 1794. Devido à ordem, emitida nesse mesmo ano, para que Kant não publicasse nem lecionasse nada em matéria de religião, o livro só foi publicado quatro anos mais tarde, acrescido das relações da faculdade de filosofia com a de Direito e a de Medicina.

5 *O que nos faz Pensar*, p. 168.

6 "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?"(WA). "Resposta à questão: que é iluminismo?" In: *A paz perpétua e outros opúsculos*. Tradução para a língua portuguesa de Artur Morão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1988, p. 11. Ainda que no corpo do texto a expressão usada seja "Esclarecimento", a expressão "Iluminismo" é a que aparece no título da referência dada.

7 Idem, p 13.

8 Idem, p.13.

9 Idem, p. 12.

10 *Der Streit der Fakultäten* (SF). *The Conflict of the Faculties*, translated by Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor, in *Religion and Rational Theology*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 248.

11 Idem, p. 248.

12 "The power to judge autonomously - that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general)". Idem, p. 255.

13 "It requires only that the respective faculties, *in expounding a subject* publicly, adopt certain teachings and exclude their contraries". Idem, p. 248.

14 Idem, p. 251.

15 “It is absolutely essential that the learned community at the university also contain a faculty that is independent of the government’s command with regard to its teachings, one that having no commands to give, is free to evaluate everything, and concerns itself with the interests of the sciences, that is, with truth: one in which reason is authorized to speak out publicly.” Idem, p. 249.

16 “It could well happen that the last would some day be first (the lower faculty would be the higher) - not, indeed, in authority, but in counseling the authority (the government). For the government may find the freedom of the philosophy faculty, and the increased insight gained from this freedom, a better means for achieving its ends than its own absolute authority.” Idem, p. 261.

17 “A institucionalização da razão”, p. 176-177.

18 A *Lógica* foi editada e publicada, por Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, tendo por base o manuscrito elaborado pelo próprio Kant para seus cursos dessa disciplina. Esse manuscrito foi entregue pelo próprio Kant a Jäsche para que este o preparasse para o prelo. A *Lógica* foi publicada em 1800.

19 *Logik* (Log). *Lógica*, tradução de Guido de Almeida, Rio de Janeiro: Tempo Brasileiro, 2003, p. 41.

20 Idem, p. 42.

21 Idem, p. 43.

22 Idem, p. 42.

23 “Resposta à questão: que é iluminismo?”, p. 17.

24 *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlich Absicht* (IaG). *Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita*. Tradução de Ricardo Terra e Rodrigo Naves. São Paulo: Martins fontes, 2003. Ver especialmente a Segunda proposição, p. 5.

25 “For we are dealing with beings that act freely, to whom, it is true, what they *ought* to do may be *dictated* in advance, but to whom it may not be predicted that they *will* do.” Apud Robert Louden, “General Introduction” to *Anthropology, History and Education*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.11.

26 *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (KrV). *Crítica da razão pura*, tradução: Manuela Pinto dos Santos e Alexandre Fradique Morujão. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1994, A738/B766.

27 Apud Frederick Rauscher, “A institucionalização da razão”, p. 172, nota 11.

28 “Was heisst sich in Denken orientiren?” (WDO). “O que significa orientar-se no pensamento”, em: *A paz perpétua e outros opúsculos*. Tradução de Artur Morão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1988, p. 54-55; 8:146.

29 Durante cerca de 41 anos, desde 1755 até 1796, Kant deu aulas na Universidade de Königsberg. Mas só em 1770 ele passou a ser contratado pela própria Universidade. Entre 1755 e 1770, como *Privatdozent*, o pagamento de suas aulas era feito diretamente pelos alunos.

Recebido / Received: 06/10/14

Aprovado / Approved: 28/10/14

A FORMA E O SENTIMENTO DO MUNDO, *JOGO, HUMOR E ARTE DE VIVER NA FILOSOFIA DO SÉCULO XVIII*, DE MÁRCIO SUZUKI. EDITORA 34, 2014.

Márcio Benchimol BARROS

Diversas são as razões que contribuem para a originalidade de *A Forma e o Sentimento do Mundo*, alentada obra de Márcio Suzuki recentemente publicada pela editora 34, bem como para o interesse que o volume já começa a despertar na comunidade filosófica do país. Dentre elas, porém, gostaria de destacar primeiramente o caráter não usual, pelo menos em âmbito nacional, tanto dos temas tratados quanto do percurso eleito pelo autor para tratá-los.

Começemos pelo tema, indicado com mais precisão pelo subtítulo da obra: *Jogo, humor e arte de viver na filosofia do século XVIII*. O texto de Suzuki focaliza a tematização feita pela filosofia no *Século das Luzes* de todo um conjunto de atividades lúdicas então apreciadas e cultivadas socialmente como o jogo, em suas várias modalidades, as diversões galantes, a caça, a conversação e evidentemente também as artes que – como poderiam esperar aqueles que acompanham a produção do autor – recebem atenção especial. Mas neste campo o interesse de Suzuki vai além de apenas apresentar o pensamento estético de diversos autores relevantes da época (o que aliás faz com grande habilidade): procura também dar conta do problema da relação entre a arte e as demais atividades pertencentes ao campo do entretenimento. O mesmo caminho seguirá o autor também no tocante à própria filosofia. De fato, já em nota preliminar delimita ele como tema geral dos estudos reunidos na obra a pergunta sobre como a filosofia no século XVIII “... pôde ser pensada por analogia com ocupações consideradas menos ‘sérias’ como a conversa de salão e as diversões em geral...”. Um dos méritos do texto de Suzuki é precisamente o levar a sério essas ocupações *menos sérias*, notadamente em suas relações com a arte e com a filosofia, e isso, bem entendido, não a partir de uma visão retrospectiva contemporânea, mas sim segundo as próprias doutrinas filosóficas da época. Trata-se então de se perceber como, na época que viu o alvorecer da *estética* como disciplina filosófica, pelo menos uma tradição importante do pensamento considerou a arte segundo critérios e pontos de vista que hoje em dia tenderíamos talvez a considerar como não estéticos. E também se trata de perceber como a própria auto-consciência da filosofia reflete suas supostas relações com o mesmo conjunto de práticas e atividades em que se enraizavam aqueles critérios e pontos de vista. Trata-se, pois, de matéria polêmica e certamente bastante rara no panorama editorial nacional sobre filosofia.

Já quanto ao itinerário percorrido por Suzuki para abordar tais temas, seu texto reserva ao leitor uma surpresa quicá ainda maior. Pois a presença dos termos *forma* e *jogo*, respectivamente no título e subtítulo da obra, mormente pela sua associação explícita com o século XVIII,

pode, de fato, suscitar expectativas errôneas neste particular. Foi o que ocorreu aliás com este resenhista, que, levado por seus próprios interesses, julgou, ao inteirar-se do aparecimento da obra, que esta teria em Kant e Schiller importantes pontos de apoio – quiçá os principais –, e se movimentaria sobretudo segundo o caminho que vai de um ao outro, passando talvez por Goethe e o classicismo alemão. Deste prognóstico, apenas aquilo que diz respeito a Kant se vê confirmado, embora também de maneira inesperada. O filósofo é realmente abordado de forma extensa e em detalhe, mas, para nosso deleite, o intérprete sabiamente se exime de nos oferecer a protocolar análise da idéia de *jogo* na Terceira Crítica. De fato, a ocupação com o texto e temas específicos da *Crítica do Juízo* concentra-se sobretudo no último capítulo da terceira parte do livro, intitulado *O sublime às avessas*, como também no último da segunda parte, *O sentimento e a descoberta do juízo reflexionante*, em que Suzuki de forma convincente nos chama a atenção para as raízes britânicas da estética de Kant. Mas o que poderia parecer uma lacuna no trabalho de Suzuki só lhe vem, na verdade, em benefício, pois dá suficiente espaço ao autor para debruçar-se extensamente sobre os textos relacionados à *Antropologia*, com o que nos revela aspectos do pensamento estético de Kant que costumeiramente não recebem significativa atenção da crítica. O texto pré-crítico sobre o sentimento do belo e do sublime é também visitado, no capítulo *O sublime às avessas* da parte III, sendo ainda digna de nota, por seu cunho polêmico, a referência que o autor faz à *Estética Transcendental* e aos *Prolegômenos* no capítulo “*Não há relógio na floresta*”: *Kames e a percepção natural do tempo*. O objetivo do autor no capítulo como um todo é o opor-se à interpretação de Bergson a respeito da temporalidade em Kant, segundo a qual este haveria concebido o tempo como meio homogêneo por analogia como o espaço: ao invés da mera justaposição linear de instantes ou *fatos psicológicos*, que segundo o francês caracterizaria a concepção kantiana do tempo, propõe ele, como se sabe, a noção de *duração*, como tempo vivido, indiviso e unitário, constituído pela composição e interpenetração dos momentos subjetivamente experienciados. Contrapondo-se a Bergson, Suzuki contrastará a interpretação mais tradicional da temporalidade em Kant – haurida de seus textos recém-mencionados e assumida por Bergson – com outras imagens do tempo que ele reconstrói a partir principalmente dos textos da *Antropologia* e que se aproximam da própria ideia bergsoniana de duração. Como preparação para essa reconstrução, porém, Suzuki passa em revista doutrinas sobre o tempo em Locke, Hutcheson e Kames, nos quais enxerga a possível origem desta forma alternativa de compreensão do tempo em Kant.

Já Schiller recebe apenas curta menção, e, ao contrário do que se poderia talvez esperar, não relacionada ao conceito de *jogo* elaborado nas *Cartas Estéticas*, mas sim à sua conceituação do *ingênuo* presente em seu texto sobre poesia ingênua e sentimental, menção essa que aparece no interior do contexto de uma discussão sobre o riso em Kant. Outras personagens ligadas ao período pós-kantiano alemão, como Jean-Paul, Moritz, Lessing, Mendelssohn e Herder fazem breves aparições, sem que Suzuki se detenha demasiado nelas. Pois Kant é aqui muito mais ponto de chegada do que de partida. O interesse do autor é muito mais o de reconstruir o panorama da reflexão setecentista pré-kantiana britânica a respeito dos temas mencionados acima, tarefa que realiza com rigor e competência notáveis. O pensamento de autores pouquíssimo estudados entre nós, como Shafetsbury, Cumberland e Hutcheson é extensamente explorado, com o que o texto de Suzuki contribui definitivamente para preencher uma antiga lacuna na bibliografia

de comentário filosófico nacional. Autores mais comumente abordados, como Adam Smith, Hobbes e a célebre tríade do empirismo inglês, Berkley, Locke e Hume, também recebem tratamento aprofundado, porém não nos campos em que tradicionalmente são estudados, mas sim no da estética, o que reforça ainda mais o valor da contribuição de Suzuki.

É sobretudo a partir destes autores que Suzuki procura abordar o tema das relações entre divertimento, arte e filosofia. O pressuposto comum destas atividades aparentemente díspares é a experiência do tempo ocioso, o tempo subtraído a toda necessidade pragmática e toda orientação utilitária. Como se pode imaginar, a emergência deste excesso de tempo e de vida não deixou de trazer consigo problemas práticos de fundo ético, pois, como sabemos, o *otium* não é apenas origem de toda cultura superior, mas também pai de todos os vícios. Surge então naturalmente a necessidade de criar-se meios de eludir o tédio sem prejuízo do decoro, da invenção e cultivo de prazeres inofensivos que, se não pudessem contribuir diretamente para a edificação do caráter, pelo menos não o ameaçassem seriamente. Assim, desde sua origem, esses divertimentos estão comprometidos com as regras da sociabilidade, com os ditames do bom convívio e da cortesia, constituindo-se, portanto, como ocasiões de aprimoramento ético. Por isso, não é de estranhar a presença, no texto de Suzuki – especificamente no segundo capítulo da segunda parte do livro, intitulado *O cálculo das virtudes* – de uma longa discussão comparativa sobre as doutrinas morais de Cumberland, Hume, Hutcheson e Kant, especialmente no que toca ao problema da virtude, discussão essa que é precedida por uma contraposição entre as concepções de direito natural em Hobbes e Cumberland.

Dessa interpenetração entre o lúdico e o ético advém, nas palavras do autor, “... o reconhecimento e a valorização das atividades não produtivas...”, bem como a importância que então se atribui “...ao tempo livre, aos *divertissements* da conversa de salão, dos jogos, do *hobby*, o enaltecimento do ócio nas *fêtes galantes* e a representação do convívio informal nas *conversation pieces*...”¹. Claro que tanto o ócio quanto os delicados prazeres a que dá ensejo têm como pressuposto as condições econômicas e sociais então vigentes na Grã-Bretanha: tudo isso, diz Suzuki, “... pode ser visto como tentativa de distanciamento e diferenciação de uma elite ascendente ou decadente em relação ao trabalho, com o elogio da inatividade restabelecendo a oposição entre artes liberais e artes mecânicas...”². Mas o certo é que o volume e a densidade das reflexões magistralmente reunidas pelo autor a respeito de tais atividades nos dão indireto testemunho da importância e do peso adquiridos então, para escárnio de nossa era freneticamente utilitária, por esta forma particular de experiência do tempo.

Porém, é preciso notar que não se trata apenas de diversão e refinamento ético do convívio, mas também do desenvolvimento de certas qualidades e disposições do espírito que tornam possível e dão subsídio a ambos, como o humor, a sagacidade, o engenho, a vivacidade da imaginação, a acuidade do intelecto e dos sentidos *etc.* E é então natural que as artes venham ocupar um lugar de destaque neste contexto. Pois que atividade geradora de prazer poderia ser mais benéfica ao indivíduo e à sociedade do que aquela que demanda e estimula ao mesmo tempo a máxima agilidade do intelecto e a maior perfeição dos sentidos, além de nos mostrar, com a eloquência que lhe é peculiar, a virtude e o vício em suas cores mais verdadeiras? Mas esse lugar destacado não nos deve enganar: um dos principais ensinamentos do texto de Suzuki é,

como já indicado, a percepção de que a primazia desfrutada pela arte entre as atividades lúdicas não a retira totalmente, aos olhos dos filósofos ingleses, da comunidade e do contexto geral por elas delimitado, e muito menos impede que ela possa ser apreciada segundo critérios pelo menos semelhantes àqueles pelos quais se pode avaliar também suas irmãs menos refinadas. Assim é que paralelamente à continuidade existente entre a arte e os outros domínios da *arte de viver*, estabelece-se também uma continuidade, muito claramente atestada por Suzuki, entre os domínios da ética e da reflexão estética. Em Hume (apenas para citar um caso paradigmático), afirma Suzuki, "... o senso estético é..., por um lado, o órgão para as percepções mais sutis, que se dão somente em filigrana, sendo responsável pela fineza no trato comum e no trato da linguagem, como poder filosófico de fazer distinções; por outro lado, o senso estético é um bem superior a quase todos os outros, na medida em que é livre de todo interesse Por tudo isso, o senso estético já é inseparável da moral"³.

É nesta ideia do *desinteresse* da apreciação estética, que, passando por Kant, Schiller e Schopenhauer, iria tão profundamente marcar os caminhos da estética futura, é aí, dizia eu, que Suzuki nos ensina a ver o ponto em que o ético e o estético tendem a se intersectar para os filósofos britânicos. A arte serve à moralidade exatamente porque nela o interesse pessoal é necessariamente excluído, de modo que, se ela não ensina diretamente o respeito ao bem comum, pelo menos ensina a mitigar o egoísmo individual que destrói aquele respeito. Mas, lembra o autor, não seria correto dizer que na estética setecentista de língua inglesa haja uma confusão entre os âmbitos da ética e da estética, já que, como sugere ele, é em grande medida apenas a partir das formulações do pensamento britânico do século XVIII, e em particular do de Hutcheson, que passa a ser historicamente possível uma separação clara entre esses dois planos⁴. É neste pensador que o intérprete aponta a existência de um conflito entre uma tendência inercial à manutenção da antiga indiferenciação entre os dois planos e outra dirigida ao estabelecimento de uma autonomia do estético frente ao ético. Chega ele mesmo a dizer que em Hutcheson coexistem duas estéticas, uma "...em vínculo estreito com a moral...", com caráter, diríamos hoje, mais conteudístico, e relacionada à literatura e ao teatro, e outra mais voltada às discussões formais, "...que desembocará na autonomia da estética, com Adam Smith e Kant..."⁵. É dentro desta última perspectiva que o filósofo considera o objeto belo como capaz de instituir "...uma adesão imediata, inevitável e incontornável, que está assentada *num elo misterioso mas necessário entre a forma e o prazer que ela desperta...*"⁶

Já quanto às relações entre filosofia e o campo das diversões, dois momentos do texto de Suzuki merecem, a meu ver, especial destaque. O primeiro já recebeu alusão: trata-se da interpretação que dá o autor para a gênese da noção do juízo reflexionante em Kant, cuja "invenção", segundo suas palavras, "...ocorre em paralelo com a valorização radical de ocupações 'gratuitas', não utilitárias, como a diversão, o jogo, o *hobby* e até mesmo a atividade científica ..."⁷. Em tais ocupações, a filosofia britânica, especialmente na pessoa de Hutcheson, identifica uma espécie de satisfação que nada tem a ver com a posse de objetos ou com qualquer tipo de resultado ou vantagem delas advindos, repousando somente no prazer proveniente da própria atividade em si, como puro externar-se e exercitar-se das forças do espírito. Estaria aí a matriz da ideia de uma contemplação desinteressada na qual a existência material do objeto contemplado

é posta de lado para dar lugar a um contentamento do *ânimo* com a mera vivificação mútua de suas faculdades.

O outro momento é aquele em que se discute a influência da experiência da diversão na forma como Hume vê a filosofia, assunto tratado sobretudo no capítulo *A aposta de David Hume* (o segundo da primeira parte). Para o escocês, argumenta Suzuki, o filosofar deve ser considerado como "...uma atividade entre outras...", que se conta entre os "...poucos prazeres seguros e inofensivos conferidos à raça humana"⁸, nas palavras do próprio filósofo. A filosofia é, pois, como um jogo, no qual o que importa, antes de tudo, é o próprio jogar. Ora, o jogo, como em geral as diversões, exige a variação, a diversificação das atividades, o não prender-se em demasiado a um único objeto ou representação. A não observância deste princípio básico no campo da filosofia gera uma espécie de "obsessão monomaniaca" pela qual os filósofos se aferram a seus sistemas de eleição, com consequências sumamente danosas à sua própria saúde espiritual como ao próprio espírito da filosofia. Aqui se recomenda a variação, a experiência de outros modos ou outros objetos do pensar, ou mesmo o recurso a outras ocupações mais leves: "...o filósofo janta, joga uma partida de gamão, conversa e se alegra com os amigos..."⁹, após o que pode retornar à filosofia, que é seu pendor, porém refeito e livre tanto de qualquer dogmatismo quanto da obsessão anti-dogmática extrema do cético pirrônico, contra o qual Hume defende seu ceticismo *bem-humorado*, no qual somente se pode encontrar a paz de espírito a que visa a boa filosofia.

Muitos outros aspectos de *A forma e o sentimento do mundo* mereceriam destaque, mas, seguindo o preceito humeano, prefiro não maçar demasiado o leitor e encaminhá-lo diretamente ao texto de Suzuki, que é bem mais vivaz e variegado do que qualquer resenha sua o pode ser.

NOTES

1 Suzuki, M., *A forma e o sentimento do mundo*. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2014; p. 128.

2 Idem, *ibidem*.

3 Idem, p. 177-178.

4 Cf. idem, p. 171.

5 Idem, p. 172.

6 Idem, p. 220.

7 Idem, p. 130.

8 Idem, p. 75.

9 Idem, p. 72.

NORMAS EDITORIAIS

A revista *Estudos Kantianos* publica artigos, traduções e resenhas, sempre atinentes ao pensamento kantiano e ao kantismo.

Todo material submetido à revista será avaliado por dois pareceristas. Para tanto, ele deve ser encaminhado diretamente à editoria do periódico [cpek@marilia.unesp.br] por meio de arquivo [em formato “word” ou em formato “rtf”] anexado a mensagem eletrônica.

Serão aceitos trabalhos redigidos em alemão, espanhol, francês, inglês, italiano e português, os quais deverão ser digitados com fonte “Times New Roman” em tamanho “12”, com espaçamento “1.5” e extensão aproximada de 30 páginas. Notas constantes do texto deverão apresentar-se ao final do mesmo, após as “Referências”, em tamanho “10” e com espaçamento simples. Citações superiores a três linhas serão digitadas em tamanho “11”, com espaçamento simples e recuo à esquerda de 4 cm.

Após o título do texto, seguir-se-á a identificação nominal de seu autor, acompanhada, em nota, de um breve relato biobibliográfico. No caso de artigos, resumo e palavras-chave figurarão ao final do texto, após a conclusão do mesmo. Quando o artigo apresente-se em espanhol, italiano ou português, nota biobibliográfica, resumo e palavras-chave na língua original do mesmo serão acompanhados de tais itens também em inglês.

Citações e referências obedecerão em todos os casos às normas específicas da “Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas” [ABNT]; respectivamente: “ABNT/NBR 10520/2002” e “ABNT/NBR 6023/2002”.

EDITORIAL GUIDELINES

The Journal *Estudos Kantianos* publishes articles, translations and reviews, always related with Kant’s thinking and Kantianism.

All submitted papers will undergo a double peer review and will be addressed attached to an e-mail to journal’s editors [cpek@marilia.unesp.br] in *word* or *rtf*.

Papers in German, Spanish, French, English and Portuguese are accepted, edited in TNR size 12, with spacing 1,5 and with an approximated length of 30 pages. Footnotes of the texts should appear at the end of the text, after the bibliography, in TNR size 10 and with simple spacing. Quotations longer than three lines will be edited in TNR size 11, with simple spacing and 4 cm. left indentation.

Author’s name and a brief biographical note in footnote should appear below the title. In the case of articles, abstract and keywords will be set at the end of the text, after the conclusion. When the paper is written in Spanish, Italian or Portuguese, the biographical note, abstract and keywords will appear in the original language of the paper, followed by a translation into English.

Quotations and bibliography will follow the guidelines of the “Associação Brasileira de Normas Técnicas” [ABNT]: “ABNT/NBR 10520/2002” and “ABNT/NBR 6023/2002”.

